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BUDDHIST AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY
NATHAN KATZ



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BUDDHIST AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHY: A CRITICAL COMPARATIVE STUDY is a collection of essays by nineteen noted scholars from the United States, India, Japan, Sri Lanka and England. Each essay takes up a particular topic, school or philosopher from within the Buddhist and western traditions of philosophy, and analyzes them comparatively. The anthology contains a Foreword by His Holiness the Dalai Lama and an Introduction by John Blofeld.

Presupposed in undertaking comparative philosophical studies such as this, is the contention that philosophizing is a product of the human condition: a condition which is not altered radically by the vicissitudes of time and place. The editor, Nathan Katz, argues that based on this premise, it is coherent to compare thinkers separated by millennia and continents.

Some of the western traditions and thinkers included in these comparisons are: logical positivism, Heidegger, Marx, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Aristotle, Buber, Jaspers, Frege, formal logic and Christian theology. These are analyzed in connection with: the Pāli nikāyas, Nāgārjuna, Ratnakīrti, Zen, Dignāga, Candrakīrti, pramāṇavāda and the philosophy of emptiness. This very wide range of topics and traditions serves to indicate the fecundity of Buddhist philosophy, the comparative aspects of which have only begun to be explored by modern scholarship.

This anthology presents a very good balance and wide range of scholarship, offering perspectives and raising issues from both the western and Buddhist worlds. It should arouse worldwide attention from students of Buddhism, Philosophy, Comparative Religions and Asian studies.

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Foreword

It is becoming evident that Buddhism is not merely a philosophy, but an entire way of life as well. Its teaching is both profound and varied; and irrespective of whether one can attain enlightenment or not, the path of Buddhism leads man to become a more compassionate body of humanity.

As more and more people give voice to the growing awareness of the correlationship between Buddhism, man and his environment, Buddhism as a dynamic and living experience will be realized. Mr. Nathan Katz is to be commended for his efforts in coordinating a selection and balance of subjects indicating man's increasing perception of Buddhism and Existence.



His Holiness, the Dalai Lama

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Masao Abe, "Zen and Nietzsche", first appeared in the *Eastern Buddhist*, New Series, Vol. VI, No. 2, October, 1973.

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D. Seyfort Ruegg, "On the Divine and the Supramundane in Buddhism", first appeared in *The Tibet Journal*, Vol. I, No. 3.

Ninian Smart, "Problems of the Application of Western Terminology to Theravāda Buddhism", first appeared in *Religion: Journal of Religion and Religions.*

Alex Wayman, "Who Understands the Four Alternatives of the Buddhist Texts ?", first appeared in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XXVII, No.1, January, 1977.

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Contents

FOREWORD BY
HIS HOLINESS THE DALAI LAMA v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS vi

PREFACE ix

INTRODUCTION BY
JOHN BLOFELD xix

1. *Zen and Nietzsche*
MASAO ABE 1

2. *Nirvāṇa as a Negative Image of God*
THOMAS J.J. ALTIZER 18

3. *Tautology as Philosophy in Nicolaus Cusanus and Nāgārjuna*
GUSTAVO BENAVIDES 30

4. *Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic and Their Comparisons*
DOUGLAS DUNSMORE DAYE 54

5. *The Zen Understanding of the Initial Nature of Man*
RICHARD J. DEMARTINO 80

6. *The Conflict Between Analytic Philosophy and Existentialism in Buddhist Perspective*
M.W. PADMASIRI DE SILVA 121

7. *Buddhism and Marxism in the Socio-Cultural Context of Sri Lanka*
GUNAPALA DHARMASIRI 134

8. *Martin Buber and Oriental Religions*
MAURICE FRIEDMAN 149

9. *Heidegger and Zen on Being and Nothingness: A Critical Essay in Transmetaphysical Dialectics*
CHARLES WEI-HSUN FU 172

10. *Nāgārjuna, Aristotle and Frege on the Nature of Thought*
ASHOK K. GANGADEAN 202

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11. *Dionysus against the Buddha: Nietzsche's 'Yes' and the Buddhist 'No'*
STEVEN HEINE 244

12. *Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self*
KENNETH K. INADA 267

13. *On the Notion of Verification in Buddhism and in Logical Positivism: A brief philosophical study*
A.D.P. KALANSURIYA 287

14. *Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein on Error*
NATHAN KATZ 306

15. *Buddhism and Modern Philosophies of Existence*
BHIKKHU ÑĀṆAJIVAKO 328

16. *Nihilism and Śūnyatā*
KEIJI NISHITANI 379

17. *On the Supramundane and the Divine in Buddhism*
D. SEYFORT RUEGG 421

18. *Temporality and Consciousness in Ābhidharmika Buddhism: A Phenomenological Approach*
BRAJ M. SINHA 425

19. *Problems of the Application of Western Terminology to Theravāda Buddhism, with Special Reference to the Relationship between the Buddha and the Gods*
NINIAN SMART 444

20. *Who Understands the Four Alternatives of the Buddhist texts?*
ALEX WAYMAN 450

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS 473

INDEX 481

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Preface

I

A good beginning to an anthology of essays on comparative Buddhist and western philosophy would be to present arguments against the possibility or desirability of such studies. Indeed, much has been said as to why just such an undertaking as this volume should *not* be attempted, and those of us who do such work have gained quite a lot from these criticisms. In a sense, one learns more about a project from how it should not be done than from how it should.

Basically, we have found four types of objections to doing comparative east-west philosophy :

(1) The criticism of the western philosopher that there is nothing in the Indian tradition that merits being called "philosophy" in the first place, and thus western critical methods are misapplied and wasted;

(2) The criticism of the Buddhist who feels that western philosophy is so materialistic, reified and academic that it misses the point of philosophy, which should be *mokṣa*, the spiritual transformation of the person;

(3) The critique of the Orientalist which in essence holds that it is truly a lifetime's work to master the traditions, languages, histories and so forth of any one tradition, and therefore any attempts at serious comparative studies must necessarily be superficial; and

(4) The claim of the Buddhist that all attempts at east-west comparisons have been instances of the westerner "reading into" Buddhism all sorts of inappropriate prejudices and bliks.

Actually points (3) and (4) are correlative, if not identical, but we prefer to treat them separately due to the different historical perspectives brought to bear on each of them.

While we do not, in the final analysis, accept any of these positions as valid, we do feel that each of them is significant and quite worthy of the attention of a scholar of east-west thought. No claim is born out of a vacuum, and there are causes and conditions which led to each of these statements, causes and conditions which must be regarded seriously if comparative philosophy is to remain on the forefront of modern scholarship.

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The first point, we feel, is based on too narrow a use of the word "philosophy." Those who make this sort of claim are generally of the Anglo-American philosophical school, and much of the work they do is within the fields of logic and linguistic analysis. Their work reveals structures of arguments and is both critical and analytic. Much of Buddhist philosophy is not. Much of it is speculative, and much is perhaps more amenable to comparative analyses with French and German philosophy than with the Anglo-American variety. However, those who make this type of claim are requested to have another (or perhaps a first ?) look at the field within Buddhism that is called *nyāya* or *pramāṇa-vāda*. This has been a very vital area within Buddhism traditionally; in Tibet, for example, it was one of the required subjects for the *dge. shes.* examinations. We would appeal that this area of Buddhist thought would meet the most rigorous and technical uses of the word "philosophy."

But "philosophy" has a wider range of valid usages than logic and epistemology, rough equivalents of *nyāya* and *pramāṇa-vāda*. To those who would dogmatically compartmentalize philosophy into "philosophy proper" and a softer, less rigorous category called something like "religious thought," we would offer that they should look again at the way the word "philosophy" is used in our language.

As for the second point, which we hear most often from Buddhists, to the effect that western philosophy is too materialistic and divorced from the aim of *mokṣa*, we would offer the following:

In the first place, the Buddha himself was never so dogmatic. According to him, the *summum bonum* of his *sāsana* ('teaching', 'philosophy', 'religion'?) could be found wherever the noble eightfold path was found, and that he claimed no exclusivity of truth. He allowed for the possibility of the dissolution of the multi-lemma of *saṁsāra* outside of his own teachings by the concept of the *paccekabuddha* (*pratyekabuddha*, *rang. gi. sangs. rgyas.*), indicating the *sui generis*-ness of truth. Therefore a Buddhist is committed to an open-minded study of diverse teachings.

In the second place, we feel that it is of great value, in the Buddhist sense, that one understands the way the world and our language about the world work. It seems that these were the aims behind two of the most important trends in the history of Buddhist philosophy—the *abhidhamma* (*abhidharma*, *mngon. chos.*) and the *mādhyamaka* (*dbu. ma.*). If *nibbāna.* (*nirvāṇa*, *rnams. grol.*) is understood as the solution (or dis-solution) to the world, then a clear understanding of the world is in order. For this one may certainly look to any quarter for new, revealing and suggestive approaches, methods and visions. Thus even a so-called materialistic philosophy may be accommodated in a Buddhist's searching.

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We feel that this criticism helps us to unearth a basic presupposition behind the type of ventures found in this volume. While it may be true, as has been said, that western philosophy follows a mathematical, whereas Buddhist (and Indian) philosophy follows a medical model, one may become aware of this type of cultural presupposition and go on to do meaningful comparisons. (Of course, doing comparisons does not limit one to finding similarities; finding meaningful differences is just as significant a result.) Behind this lies the conviction that insights of humankind are basically products of the human condition, and that this condition is not altered radically by the vicissitudes of time and place. What is being suggested here as a rationale for comparative philosophical studies is this: that, as humans, we share more than we exclude, and that beneath cultural differences lies a fundamental humanness. Thus what is thought and intuited by various humans in various circumstances has relevance for other humans. And we would attempt to maintain this position without falling into the academic dead-end of reductionism.

There is much to be said for the third point above. In a sense, this criticism follows directly from our position just stated. One can certainly jump too quickly into unwarranted comparisons due to the lack of a very firm grounding in the traditions, histories and languages of the east or west. But we feel that times have changed, so to speak. One may fly from America to Sri Lanka to find seminars there on Kant, Ayer and Wittgenstein. Or one may fly in the other direction to find serious seminars in Dharmakīrti or Buddhaghoṣa. We don't mean to trivialize this discussion with references to a media—and travel-inspired "global village." However, it cannot be denied that information flows much more freely today, and that one can find serious work on any aspect of philosophy in almost any part of the world. A quarter of a century ago it might have been necessary to spend years in Varanasi for one to learn good Sanskrit. Today this can be done in London, New York or Berkeley nearly as well. And the *paṇḍita* need go only as far as the nearest university to learn what Hume or Heidegger has to say, rather than risk his caste by taking a steamship to London. We simply have better learning tools available to us today than we did before, and it is possible for one to gain an in-depth familiarity with more than one tradition of thought.

This is not to say that the Orientalist's criticism does not have meaning and should not be taken highly seriously by anyone pursuing comparative studies. Undoubtedly, much comparative work, even today, is superficial due to a lack of understanding of one (or both!) sides of the comparison. But three things can overcome this very real and potent danger: one, there is methodological and terminological sophistication available today to the

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scholar that was impossible in the past; two, there is much more information available to the scholar today; and, three, most east-west scholars do in fact have the opportunity for extended studies on both sides of the globe. The Orientalist's objection, for us then, does not rule out comparative studies, but should serve us today as a very sage caution.

The fourth objection, which has been raised by Buddhists, is really an extension of the objection of the Orientalist. The Buddhist feels that comparative philosophical studies have been instances of the scholar "reading into" Buddhism his own cultural and historical presuppositions; that the questions he raises and the methods he follows are alien to Buddhism; and that such comparative studies should be discouraged. This response is quite current: when I read an earlier version of my paper included in this anthology at the International Seminar on Buddhism's Contribution to World Civilization and Culture at New Delhi in March 1977, much of the response generated was explicitly along these lines.

One can certainly empathize with this position. Stcherbatsky, while held in universal awe by scholars of Buddhism, has been criticized for his interpretation of *abhidharma* texts as materialistic, reflecting philosophical trends current in Europe at the time of his writing. The dean of scholars of Buddhism in India, T.R.V. Murti, has been roundly criticized for his reading of Kant into the Mādhyamaka. Mrs Rhys-Davids, despite her heroic efforts in resuscitating Pāli Buddhism in Sri Lanka, is constantly under fire for finding a "soul" in *anattā*, which has been seen as her inability to divorce herself from her Christian background. This is not meant as a comment on the justice of these criticisms, but merely to indicate that these criticisms have been raised, and that many Buddhists are sceptical as to the value of comparative studies because of them.

The only safeguard against any "reading into" Buddhism is simply a thorough acquaintance with the Buddhist tradition and its own contexts. Stcherbatsky, Murti and Rhys-Davids are pioneers. They were working at a time when much of Buddhist literature was unavailable. One was unable to gain a thorough overview of the contextual perspectives in which classical Buddhist thinkers wrote. For example, it would be extremely difficult to make sense out of Nāgārjuna unless one were quite familiar with those influences which shaped his vision, in this case especially the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāśika school, the Naiyayikas and the emerging Prajñāparamitā literature. Likewise, if one were to see only the *abhidharma*, without the context of the other two *piṭakas* as well as a good background in both heterodox and Brahmanical Indian thought at the time, one might draw the queerest conclusions from it (as some believe Stcherbatsky did).

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Many of the late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century scholars were writing at a time of humanistic optimism, at a time when the likes of Olcott, Blavatsky (whatever else one might think of her), Vivekānanda, Dharmapala and others were loudly proclaiming the universality of human thought. Their laudable efforts arose partly in response to a Christian missionary view of Asia, a view which saw anything but Christianity as heathen, demonic, or at best, worthless. Small wonder, then, that when these more liberal-minded westerners saw what they felt to be a kindred spirit among classical Buddhist and Hindu writings, that they did not hesitate in the least to proclaim it as such. They were responding to a rigid adherence to the view of the universality of Christianity, to the pejorative view of Asian thought, and they served a very excellent purpose in proclaiming that Indian thought was the equal of (if not superior to) European philosophy. Unfortunately, tied up with this enthusiastic proclaiming were some unwarranted parallels, some muddled thinking, and some overly-hasty conclusions. But the Buddhist today could not object seriously to their efforts if they were seen in this context, which is how we feel they should be seen. The world today is, hopefully, a more tolerant place wherein even fundamental differences of world-view may be tolerated. Thus today's scholar is not under historical pressure to jump the academic gun in finding parallels in east-west thought. In short, Buddhism is no longer on the defensive. It has matured in its dealings with the west to the extent that it need not feel itslf to be saying the same thing as the west in order to avoid being overwhelmed by it. Today's scholar of Buddhism, be he eastern or western, must be aware of the newly-found pride in his own tradition. He may adopt a more critical, less compromising attitude in his comparisons. As this confidence continues to mature, the fear felt by some Buddhists about comparative philosophical studies may diminish.

In writing the above, the objections raised have not been dismissed; one hopes that we may have entered into a dialogue with those who would object to this type of volume. The reasons for engaging in this dialogue are two : (1) the objections raised above are significant ones which deserve serious attention from those who would go about doing comparative philosophical studies; and (2) the above is a defense of the value of this type of anthology to those who would deny it. The issues raised are important and sensitive, and it is hoped that in raising them they have been put to an open forum.

II

Having set aside these objections as guidelines to successful ventures

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into comparative philosophy, we may now introduce the reader to the anthology itself.

The general rubric used in selecting scholars and topics for inclusion has been to indicate the range of the field of comparative Buddhist and western philosophy. No one of these essays is the "final word" about Buddhist philosophy. This is because of the underlying pedagogical and heuristic structure of Buddhist thought in the context of the goal of Buddhism : *mokṣa*. One theme that seems to run throughout Buddhist literature, be it from the Pali canon or from any of the diverse Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese or Japanese traditions, is the provisional nature of the teachings : that the philosophic quest ends in silence, and that whatever conduces to this silence is of philosophic value.

Upon receiving an early listing of the contents of this anthology, one of the contributors remarked in a letter to me that he was astonished at the range of western philosophic disciplines employed in comparisons with various Buddhist systems. This latitude of thought might also bewilder the reader at first glance, as it has been a major editorial consideration to include as many approaches as feasible. This range, we feel, only serves to indicate the fecundity of Buddhist philosophy, the comparative aspects of which have only begun to be exploited in modern scholarship. Certainly not all avenues for such research have been represented in this anthology; for example, the important areas of comparative aesthetics and philosophy of mind have not found their way into this volume. However, like Buddhism itself, this book is provisional. It seeks to introduce, rather than define, a field of study.

This collection is prefaced by Tenzin Gyatsho, His Holiness the XIVth Dalai Lama, and introduced by Mr. John Blofeld. Their place in this study is to indicate that the world of the academic study of Buddhist philosophy and that very vital world of Buddhism as a living religion are not so widely disparate as might be thought. Open-minded philosophic enquiry has always been one of Buddhism's greatest strengths, as it reached its maturity in India in dialogue with the Vedānta, Nyāya, Sāṁkhya and other Hindu and heterodox systems. It does not seem unreasonable to expect that it will continue to flourish in a new dialogue with western philosophy, psychology and religions.

The first essay by Masao Abe explores the transition from Nietzsche's *Ubermensch* to Zen's True Man. This piece could well be read alongside Steven Heine's analysis of world affirmation and denial in Nietzsche and early Buddhism. While comparative studies of Nietzsche and Buddhism are not new, these two essays, which deal with later and early Buddhism

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in dialogue with Nietzsche, elucidate many of the salient points for comparisons and analyses.

The second essay by Thomas J.J. Altizer, one of Christianity's leading theologians, treats *nirvāṇa* as a negative image of God, which should arouse a good deal of controversy among scholars of Buddhism. It is strongly felt by the editor that such comparative studies as this anthology must be dialogical, and it is hoped that Dr. Altizer's essay will pose as many serious questions for the Buddhist as the other essays pose for western philosophy. This study, along with the one by Maurice Friedman, are included to raise substantive issues, from thoroughly western perspectives, which the Buddhist must consider if he is to remain in dialogue with the west.

The paper by Gustavo Benavides studies the role of self-definition in two key concepts of Christian Neo-Platonism and Madhyamaka Buddhism: non-aliud and *śūnyatā*. Through an examination of these self-defining terms, the author stresses the importance of tautology in certain types of mysticism, and examines whether there is a logical necessity in the sequence : everyday language—paradox—tautology.

Douglas Dunsmore Daye's topic is a metalogical study of the traditions of logic in the contemporary western and classical Buddhist worlds. In a sense, this study of the fundamental logical structures of the occident and the orient could serve as a principle for dialogue and a very rich ground for unearthing basic presuppositions of world-views.

A very penetrating analysis of the nature of problematic man is found in Richard J. DeMartino's study. He argues that there is a very basic dualism involved with being human, and he traces this concern in western thought, but demonstrates that this very dualism is the central focus of Zen.

Padmasiri de Silva uses Buddhism's open-minded and eclectic attitude to attempt to bridge the recent bifurcation of western philosophy into the existential and analytic trends. He contends that Buddhism's treatment of the human identity crisis can accommodate help from both quarters in its therapeutic philosophizing.

Gunapala Dharmasiri gives us a study *engagé* of Marxism and Buddhism as they offer contrasting but not contradictory solutions to the social realities of Sri Laṇka. His essay is proscriptive, as he offers that only degenerate forms of these contending ideologies are truly irreconcilable.

In Maurice Friedman's essay we are presented with a study of Martin Buber's treatments of Asian religions, especially Buddhism, as well as a Buberian analysis of these religions. As with Dr. Altizer's essay, this

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piece should raise issues which need to be considered by Buddhists in dialogue with the west, which is the very application of Buberian methodology onto a new and rich ground.

A transmetaphysical study of Heidegger and Zen, dealing with the notions of being (the preoccupation of the west) and nothingness (the focus of the east) is given by Charles Wei-hsun Fu. His study presents an analysis of the levels of nothingness in the Zen as a method of comparison of Heidegger and Zen on this topic.

A study of the dialectics of logical form, focusing on the primary concept of logical theory—predicative form, is the topic analyzed by Ashok K. Gangadean. Focusing on Nāgārjuna, Aristotle and Frege, he demonstrates that Aristotle's maintaining such principles as the excluded middle and non-contradictions are examples of an unnecessary concession to an inherent dualistic mentality. He employs Nāgārjuna as a corrective for this uncritical assumption.

Kenneth K. Inada returns us to the puzzling doctrine of *anātman*. By indicating the unsatisfactoriness of its treatment by such major scholars as Rhys-Davids and Poussin, he offers us a new, process-oriented approach to this cardinal notion, with wide comparative implications.

Verification is the topic of A.D.P. Kalansuriya's essay. He shows the inapplicability of the logical positivist meaning of this term to early Buddhism, and offers criticisms of modern interpretations of Buddhism along empiricist lines.

My own contribution is a study of the notion of error as found in the later writings of Wittgenstein and in both Pali and Mādhyamaka Buddhist texts. In this essay, the approach to Buddhism is that of a language analyst; however, it is found that Buddhism's soteriological goal of *mokṣa* relocates this language analysis to a very different level of discourse than in Wittgenstein's writings.

Ven. Ñāṇajīvako's lengthy essay deals with some trends in recent European existentialist thought in comparison with Pali Buddhism. His essay ranges over such western thinkers as Eckhart, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Jaspers and Nishida, but holds together by revolving around the themes of *diṭṭhi* (views), *dukkham* (suffering) and *suññatā* (nothingness).

Keiji Nishitani's study of nihilism and *śūnyatā* revolves around the ideas of emptiness and substance and the emptiness of the personal subject. He argues that one is left in a bind by reason when it approaches the actual being of a thing through the medium of its essential being, all of which leaves reason incapable of "penetrating the precise point where something *is*."

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A structural approach to the supramundane and the divine in Buddhism is presented by D. Seyfort Ruegg. He points out that while the categories of "divine" and "supramundane" are more or less identical in western theological talks, they must be clearly distinguished to provide any useful application to Buddhism. Ninian Smart's essay follows similar lines. As Dr. Ruegg treats the notion of a god (*lha*) in the Tibetan tradition, so Dr. Smart treats a similar notion (*devā*) in the Pali tradition. His appraisal of western theological labels to Buddhism leads him to conclude that it is a "trans-polytheistic, non-theistic religion of contemplation."

The paper by Braj Mohan Sinha articulates the Ābhidharmika conception of temporality in phenomenological idiom. Pursuing the insights of Edmund Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, he tries to bring out the uniqueness of the Ābhidharmika understanding of the problem of temporality and its relationship to the question of subjectivity.

The tetralemma of logical predication (*catuṣkoṭi*) has been a central issue in Buddhism from the Pali texts through the Mādhyamaka, and Alex Wayman, employing some apparatus from modern western logical theory, offers a re-appraisal of this topic. In his study he distinguishes the four alternatives as a disjunctive system, as they are applied to causation, and as they are applied to existence (*svabhāva*).

III

I wish to express my appreciation to the following :

His Holiness the Dalai Lama and Mr. John Blofeld for very kindly providing the Foreword and Introduction to this anthology;

Messrs O.P. and S.K. Ghai of Sterling Publishers for their very strong interest in the publication of this volume, from the inception of the idea in New Delhi in March 1977, right through all stages of publication;

Professor Bibhuti S. Yadav for some very useful discussions in Madras at a crucial stage in collecting these essays. His keen observations helped to add a coherence to this collection;

The contributors, who put up with an endless barrage of editorial "hurry-up" letters;

And to the editors and publishers listed elsewhere for permission to reprint some of the essays included.

NATHAN KATZ

Dharmasala
March, 1978.

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Introduction

JOHN BLOFELD

DURING the last century when Buddhism was much less widely known to the world at large than it is today, it was sometimes spoken of as being 'more of a philosophy than a religion'. This view of the Buddha Dharma is, of course, untenable since the ultimate goal of all Buddhists is Enlighenment, a profound intuitive experience whereby liberation from bondage to *saṁsāra* is attained and the birth-and-death-transcending state of *nirvāṇa* won. Undoubtedly Buddhism is first and foremost a religion, for all that belief in the existence of a Supreme Creator plays no part in it; indeed, the Buddha discouraged philosophical and metaphysical speculation as an unprofitable expenditure of time better spent on making immediate progress towards liberation by a combination of spiritual, psychological and ethical practices having little in common with pure philosophy. However, with the passing of the centuries, there came into being two versions of a vast canon of orthodox Buddhist teaching—the Pali Canon now followed by the Theravādins of South-East Asia and the Sanskrit version followed by the Mahāyāna adherents in the more northerly Buddhist countries—of which the latter corpus of doctrine and exposition, especially, contains a very considerable body of philosophical and metaphysical works of striking interest, even though their role is supportive rather than central to the whole.

In making comparisons between the works of Buddhist and Western philosophers, it should be noted that, among the religions of the world, Buddhism has special characteristics which make it more amenable than most others to such comparisons, but also possesses one other very important characteristic that limits full comparability. Among those which favour comparisons is the complete absence of dogma. Whereas a Christian philosopher cannot (unless at the cost of ceasing to be accepted as Christian) argue from premises that do not accord with the notion of a creator God as the First Cause, and must reject—as he will do very likely with horror—conclusions that tend to impugn the validity of that notion, a Buddhist thinker is tied by no such restrictions, since the Buddha himself encouraged his followers to test his teachings in the light of their own experience

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and not to accept them on account of unwavering faith in the Teacher they venerated so highly. There are in practice a great many Buddhists who do repose implicit faith in the teaching of the Buddha and in expositions of it by those held to be much wiser than themselves; but the point is that they are by no means bound to do so and that thorough questioning and testing is deemed entirely laudable. That this wide freedom still exists became clear to me from my very first contact with larger numbers of Buddhists. During my visits to Chinese Buddhist monasteries beginning in the 1930s, I was at first quite astonished to come upon monks belonging to different sects who not only dwelt amicably beneath one roof but even went so far as to concede the perfect validity of one another's widely differing doctrines. They explained to me that apparent conflict of doctrine within the Mahāyāna Canon, such as the seeming conflict between Pure Land and Ch'an (Zen) Buddhism, result merely from different conceptualizations of the same fundamental truths, not at all from conflicts between truth and error.

As to such metaphysical matters as the origin of the universe, the nature of *nirvāṇa* and whether final extinction or eternal life is the lot of sentient beings—concerning which no firm conclusions can be drawn on the basis of experience—the Buddha, in all the fifty years of teaching which followed upon his Enlightenment at the age of thirty, made very few affirmations, preferring to negate the formulations put to him ('Not this, not this!') as a means of driving questioners towards ever more subtle refinements of perception. In regard to some other matters, such as the existence of supernatural and invisible orders of beings, he seems to have accepted many of the notions of his Hindu contemporaries (though never to the extent of believing in God as the Ultimate Cause), but in such a way as to make those matters appear trivial if they have no direct bearing on the self-effort required for the attainment of Enlightenment. To him, the great deities venerated by most of his countrymen were of little account; he taught that humans must depend not on divine aid but solely upon their own exertions to achieve the goal.

This absence from the very outset of dogmatic assumptions or 'revelations from on high' greatly assisted the development of all kinds of philosophical and metaphysical notions, among which there are however, two categories with which the present work is not much concerned, namely: (1) certain ancient cosmological beliefs (perhaps of pre-Buddhist origin), such as the notion that the universe consists of an incalculably tall mountain, surrounded by four continents the southernmost of which contains our own world system—a belief which has more in common with the speculations of the authors of Genesis than with those of philosophers whose

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works command respect in this scientific age; and (2) some devotional doctrines subscribed to by certain Buddhist sects, such as the short-cut to liberation attainable by desiring to be reborn in Amitābha Buddha's Pure Land wherein conditions are ideal for making progress towards Enlightenment without having to undergo a further long sequence of birth and death within *saṁsāra's* round. There is, however, one doctrine that may seem to the Western reader too fanciful for serious discussion, but which can certainly not be left out of account in any work concerning Buddhism, since it is almost universally subscribed to by Buddhists of every kind and has exercised tremendous influence on the development of almost every branch of Buddhist thought—namely, the doctrine of rebirth.

Not only Buddhists but also a great many Asians subscribing to other faiths have always taken it as a matter of course that sentient beings undergo birth and death not once but innumerable times and that this process continues aeon upon aeon until Enlightenment (or its equivalent for the followers of other faiths) brings final liberation. On the face of it, rebirth in this sense is at least as logical as any other doctrine of survival, and perhaps more logical; but for some reason it seems very difficult for most Western people to entertain such a notion. I am inclined to think that this difficulty is a legacy of Christianity to the Western world; if so, had the Church not rejected Origen's belief and pronounced it to be heretical, but accepted it like so much else from Greek philosophers and theologians, then the heirs of Christianity (whether Christian or otherwise) would not have failed, as they have done, to give the doctrine of rebirth the attention it deserves. After all, if one is inclined to believe at all in survival beyond the grave, it is easier to accept some form of gradual evolution than to suppose that an evil man who has made his peace with God at the moment of death could be instantly translated from the reeking stews of evil to the pure surroundings of paradise or heaven rather than being gradually weaned from drunkenness, lechery, cruelty and corruption (by less abhorrent means than purgatory). Furthermore, as to the probability of there being some mode of survival as opposed to total extinction, though it is hard to find proof of the one or the other, some fairly strong arguments can be urged to the effect that any reasonable non-mechanistic way of accounting for the universe suggests, at least as a strong supposition, the survival of sentient beings. Favouring the rebirth variant of belief in survival are some shreds of evidenee that would be convincing but for their relative paucity; from time to time one comes across well-documented accounts of people (usually young children) who support their claims to have vivid memories of a life immediately preceding this one by giving verifiable

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descriptions, often in astonishing detail, of people and places concerning which they can certainly have acquired no knowledge in this life.

The Buddhist doctrine of rebirth does not, however, by any means imply the existence of a soul (which would be quite contrary to the general teaching of the Buddha Dharma); yet, if there is rebirth, there must of course be something to be reborn. Belief in anything in the nature of a permanent entity equivalent to what Christians mean in speaking of the soul is rejected; for it is a cardinal Buddhist teaching that there are no entities in the universe (whether beings or objects) that are not essentially void in the sense that none can exist independently of all others, that none ceases to change for the space of a single moment, and that none possesses anything remotely identifiable as self or own-being. What passes from life to life, then, is not an entity but a wave, a continuum of karmic force conditioned by what has gone before and conditioning what follows.

Having noted that freedom from dogma makes Buddhist philosophy more nearly comparable, than that of many other religions, to secular philosophic systems, we shall now examine the special characteristic of the Buddha Dharma that somewhat limits that comparability, namely its *mystical* genesis. All religions and some philosophical systems, no doubt, contain elements of mysticism, that is to say of thought based not on intellectual or logical process, but on direct intuitive experience. Nevertheless, the churches or corporate bodies built around religions have, in most cases, eyed those laying claim to mystical experience askance; and, where these men and women have not been actually persecuted, they have usually been removed from easy contact with the outside world. This may have been partly because mystics are apt to welcome seclusion, but largely because of their propensity to query the need for established hierarchies, to smile at the pomp and circumstance with which high prelates are surrounded, and even to question the dogmas which provide the very reason for a church's existence and continuance! Though mystics are generally mild, inoffensive people, they have often been regarded as dangerously subversive of the established order. Buddhism, on the other hand, openly proclaims mystical intuition attained during meditation as the surest guide to true understanding and as being greatly superior to mere ratiocination. Enlightenment —meaning the highest possible form of mystical intuition—is more than the goal of Buddhists, for the Buddha's own Enlightenment constitutes the very fount of doctrine. Therefore, the premises from which the majority of Buddhist sages proceed are rooted not in intellect, still less in faith, but in intuition experienced by the sages themselves or by their predecessors, in particular the Buddha. Intellect, ratiocination, logic are drawn upon to develop truths arrived at intuitively; yet, however lofty and intricate the

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resulting philosophical or metaphysical edifice, its foundations are unquestionably mystical.

Unfortunately, the nature of intuitive experience is such that it cannot be directly communicated to others, hence Bodhidharma's use of the term (perhaps first coined by Lao-tzū), 'A teaching without words'. On the other hand, that experience (usually attained during meditation) is utterly convincing to the individual concerned and nothing can thereafter shake his conviction of its validity. Though proof of the ordinary kind required by scholars cannot be furnished either by words or demonstration, the experience does not have to be locked up in one person's mind forever; others can be shown how to attain the same experience, though, in most cases, this requires such long and arduous preparation as to be positively daunting. (In Tibet, for example, the training used to involve, among many other hardships, living in strict seclusion for a period of more than three or even more than seven years!) It is difficult to find people motivated solely by scientific interest who are willing to face the difficulties; and, even if they are to be found, the most they can be offered is high probability of success—there can be no guarantee that a high level of intuition will be attained.

Even so, it is clear that what can be termed 'convincing proof' is not of one kind, but two. There is the kind of proof that consists of demonstrating a truth in such a way that all who are capable of following the logic of the argument are compelled to accept it; and the kind of proof that involves, for each individual, intuitive recognition that is rarely attainable without many years of training, yet absolutely convincing when attained. Who shall say that proof depending upon logic and intellection is of a higher order than the proof resulting from direct (albeit hard won) experience? A burnt finger is more convincing proof than any reasoned account of what would happen were one to hold one's finger in the flame!

Whereas, to a secular philosopher, all this talk of mystical intuition may seem spurious or a kind of self-delusion; to a Buddhist, philosophers dependent wholly on intellection appear sadly restricted by the limitations of man-made logic and by those inherent in conceptual thought; indeed, any intelligent man must be aware of the extent to which words are but imperfect vehicles of what is experienced. Here is an example of such limitations. According to the Mahāyāna Canon, there are two levels of truth—*saṃvṛti-satya* (relative truth) and *paramārtha-satya* (absolute truth); at the former level, one perceives differentiated objects each with its individual form and each appearing as a separately existing entity; at the

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latter level (perception of which requires a heightened state of consciousness only sometimes attainable except by advanced adepts), one actually perceives them as being identical in nature and forming a seemless unity, *but without ceasing to recognize them also as separate entities*. In short, one experiences the amazing truth that unity and diversity persist *simultaneously*! Logically, diversity can proceed from and return to unity, but what is diverse cannot simultaneously be a seemless unity; form can proceed from void and return to void; but form and void cannot be simultaneously identical: IS cannot be simultaneously IS NOT. Intuition, however, transcends logic; hence in those heightened states of consciousness comes direct experience of unity and plurality as simultaneously existing attributes of being—an experience no less vivid than those produced by the touch of fire or ice. The truth of their simultaneity then seems so obvious that recollection of the conceptual difficulties formerly posed by this doctrine becomes a matter for hearty laughter. Yet verbal difficulties remain; for, on emerging from the experience, one has no means of describing it in logically acceptable terms, still less of conveying in such terms the precise nature of the truth experienced. What is carried back into a more usual state of consciousness is unwavering conviction that a logically untenable truth has been proved to the hilt (albeit only to oneself). It may be that a time will come when such proof is no longer deemed scientifically worthless; for, if one day it is accepted that (as suggested by Sir James Jeans) 'the stuff of the universe is mind', there will have to be changes in the scholarly view of what constitutes scientific proof.

In evaluating intuitive perceptions of this kind, a sceptic is entirely free to suppose that they arise as the fruit of pondering a particular doctrine so long that mental exhaustion brings about wholly illusory experience of coming face to face with truth; however, to a Buddhist, it is not by any means mental exhaustion but exhaustion of the intellect that lies behind such experiences—a *liberating* exhaustion that leads away from delusion, not into it!

Similarly, a sceptic may be of the opinion that the validity of the Buddha's Enlightenment is no more proven or provable than the divine inspiration claimed for Jesus, Mohammed and the Jewish prophets by their followers. All alike may be regarded as delusions, or even as artifices used to justify faith. Well, a Buddhist would agree that it is impossible, prior to one's own Enlightenment, to plumb the full extent of *Samyak Saṁbodhi* (Supreme Unexcelled Enlightenment), but be likely to point out that intuitive insight of the same order, though less all-embracing, *is* attainable by most people willing to make the effort (and

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occasionally without any effort at all), so that the nature of such intuitive experiences is in fact verifiable. He would perhaps add that the quality of Supreme Enlightenment can also be gauged from its having given rise to a body of teaching that has won the admiration of millions—teaching which stands up very well to intellectual evaluation, even by those scholars who remain sceptical of the validity of mystical intuition.

In any case, the two Buddhist Canons contain many works that can properly be called philosophical or metaphysical of which the scholarly standard is high. There are also some intricate works on logic. Many of these were penned by pandits whose approach may have been more intellectual than intuitive. Through the centuries, their works have enabled Buddhists to do more than hold their own in debates and discussions with men of intellect and learning outside the Buddhist fold. Indians have a natural aptitude for metaphysical speculation, which is probably the reason why the Buddha's austere attitude in this matter did not deter many of his later followers. It may be true to say that such works as the Avataṁsaka Sūtra (which like all sūtras is attributed to the Buddha himself) are among the most sublime metaphysical works ever written. Even in China, where metaphysics have traditionally been less highly regarded than in India, this particular work has been very greatly reverenced. On the other hand, Buddhist metaphysics gradually became so intricate as to bring about a sharp reaction among a section of Chinese (and, later, Japanese) Buddhists. The Ch'an (Zen) School went so far as to castigate scholarship as a positive hindrance to progress towards Enlightenment, likening it to fastening one's gaze upon a finger pointing to the moon, instead of gazing at the moon itself (that is attaining direct intuitive perception).

Despite the Ch'an (Zen) reaction, many other Buddhist sects in China and elsewhere continued to hold that study and intellectual understanding must go hand in hand with the pursuit, through meditation, of intuitive insight. For example, among Tibetans, with whom the mystical tradition has remained especially strong, much emphasis is also placed upon sound learning and the study of logic. It is with the scholarly aspect of Buddhism that the present work is most concerned (though it seems to me essential that the mystical basis of the Dharma be constantly borne in mind if Buddhist scholarship is to be properly understood). If in touching upon some of the essential doctrines in the paragraphs that follow, I have made my choice largely from the Mahāyāna Canon, this is because, although that great Pali scholar, Miss I.B. Horner, is of the opinion that the Pali Canon of the Theravādins contains the *seeds* of all Mahāyāna doctrines,

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it is in the Chinese and Tibetan translations of the Sanskrit works comprising the Mahāyāna Canon (of which but few of the original texts survive) that the doctrines are to be found in their most developed form.

Nevertheless, it would not do to omit some reference to the Abhidharma (Higher Doctrines) section of the Pali Canon, wherein what Professor Conze calls 'the oldest recorded psychology' is set forth. The point of view adopted there is less idealistic than the Mahāyāna philosophy; a considerable number of factors are identified as 'ultimates' and, with the help of this and other exhaustive analyses of the components of being, strenuous introspection is undertaken by Theravādins to root out the delusion of selfhood. Though the Abhidharma does not put forward a very satisfactory metaphysical explanation of the universe, it offers a wealth of psychological methods for breaking through faulty constructs based on everyday sensory perception. One may arrive through strenuous meditation combined with careful study of the Abhidharma's contents at an impersonal view of the universe in which there is no place for an ego lying beyond 'the five components of being', namely form (matter), feeling (pleasant, unpleasant or otherwise), perception (through the sense organs and mind), impulses (greed, hate, wisdom and so forth) and consciousness. A particular advantage of Abhidharma-style analysis and meditation is that they fortify one against many of life's disappointments and frustrations, besides reducing egocentricity to a point at which impartial compassion takes over from the fierce loves and hates engendered by preoccupation with personal satisfactions.

The Pali Canon, then, inculcates a psychological approach to life's problems, and we must turn to the Mahāyāna Canon to encounter a great soaring of metaphysical thought. It presents us, for example, with the mind-boggling concept of a universe in which our own world system is comparable to a single grain of sand among all the sands to be found in *an infinite number of* Ganges rivers, so vast is the total number of world systems! Perhaps unexpectedly, this conception of vastness augments rather than diminishes the significance of man (not regarded, of course, as a unique phenomenon pertaining solely to our infinitesimal planet); for it is held that the unfoldment of events throughout the entire universe results from the collective *karma* of sentient beings, among whom man holds a pre-eminence that places him even higher than the gods in that the human state is regarded as the only one in which Enlightenment is possible. Furthermore, it is held that the Bhūtatathatā or True Suchness (embracing both *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa*) has neither beginning nor end: yet life (though measurable in 'aeons of aeons') is full of meaning during every moment of its unfoldment in that, as Professor Garma Chang points out

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in his work on the Avatamsaka Sūtra, it offers 'a challenge and an opportunity for every man to gain the highest good through an approach to the state of Buddhahood'. What use one makes of this opportunity will depend partly on his own personal *karma* and partly on the collective *karma* to which he himself minutely contribues. There is no deity to punish or pardon transgressions, *karma* being a natural force, arising from the collective action of sentient beings, that proceeds unconsciously in accordance with immutable laws. Certainly this notion presents great difficulties, but it is easier to square with the circumstances of life, involving as they do incredible sufferings for all kinds of sentient beings, than the notion that these circumstances result from the arbitrary whim of a benevolent, all-wise, all-powerful creator.

The notion that the unfoldment of events throughout so vast a universe results from the collective *karma* of sentient beings may, at first sight, seem as unacceptably disproportionate as an assertion that mighty Everest or Kanchanjunga was thrown up by colonies of ants! Nevertheless, it becomes easier to understand in the light of another intuitively derived doctrine, that of Mind Only, which is common to most surviving Mahāyāna schools of thought, notably the Yogācāra, Avataṁsaka, Dhyāna (Ch'an or Zen), Pure Consciousness (Wei Shih) Schools, etc., etc. According to this doctrine, mind is equated with the total psyche of individuals and simultaneously with the Suchness of phenomena as a whole, no ultimate difference being recognized between them. Thus all things are regarded as manifestations or projections of the one mind; one's own mind and the Suchness being in no way apart (for all that perception of their unity is obstructed by delusion), it follows that reality—the entire universe—exists only in mind. This concept goes much beyond Bishop Berkeley's philosophy of idealism in that it asserts that the physical universe can actually be transformed by sentient beings, since their thoughts, words and actions result in transformations of the *ālaya* (*karma*-supporting) consciousness which is also the supporter of all other types of consciousness and thus the reservoir of *karmic* forces. Where this view is held, there is no great difficulty in conceiving of sentient beings as collectively responsible for the unfoldment of events.

Closely related to the Mind Only doctrine, but more difficult to expound satisfactorily, is the concept of Śūnyatā—Void. By void is meant not nothingness but 'no-*thing*-ness', differentiated phenomena being in fact not *things* in any ordinary sense of that term, since every seeming 'thing', besides being transient to the extent of not remaining exactly the same for the space of a single moment, exists only in dependence upon all other things

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without exception; and, even so, cannot really be said to exist at all in that it is merely the fleeting sum of ever-changing qualities, there being nothing in its composition that could possibly be identified as self or own-being. Thus, it is only for the sake of convenience that one regards them as being things in their own right. Voidness is not to be understood as underlying or containing or in any way standing apart from, behind or over and above the realm of phenomena, but as the very nature of phenomena. Forms are manifestations of void; void is the nature of form; the one IS the other! This doctrine bears only a very superficial resemblance to the Vedānta concept of *māyā* (illusion), for there is no eternally existing Being to undergo that illusion, nor any reality underlying appearances. Appearances ARE reality; seen one way, there are innumerable and diverse; seen another way, they form a seemless unity devoid of any attributes whatever. An analogy that may serve, if not pushed too far, is that of the waves of the sea. However much they may seem to differ from one another in size, colour, position and so on, they are indivisible from the sea and their nature is identical with it in all respects. It is scarcely possible to find words that will do justice to this subtle and all-important Mahāyāna doctrine, although an enormous number of words have from time to time been used in efforts to expound it. Like the identity of unity and plurality, it is something graspable by direct intuitive experience, but only to be hinted at in the conceptual terms to which language binds us.

The typical Buddhist way of dealing with all such problems is well exemplified by the advice: 'If asked about existence, answer with non-existence; if asked about non-existence, answer with existence; asked about common, answer with holy; asked about holy, answer with common. These polarities being mutually dependent, between them will arise the principle of the Middle Way.'

In lightly touching upon some of the major philosophical components of the Buddha Dharma, I have been very conscious of my failure to present them in a manner worthy of their profundity. A reasonably satisfactory exposition of any one of them would require much more space than has been accorded to all of them together here; what is more, not just my explanations but even my understanding of them may be seriously at fault. Yet I hope I have been successful in providing a rough indication of the perspective in which Buddhist philosophy needs to be viewed, and in making it clear that a very great part of all Buddhist writings are firmly rooted in intuitive perception to which intellectual formulation, however useful for comparative purposes, is regarded as being entirely secondary.

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1

Zen and Nietzsche

MASAO ABE

I

NIETZSCHE says : "God is a sacred lie (*eine heilige Lüge*)."[1] Nietzsche was not merely saying that "God is a lie" as many atheists and anti-religionists do. Rather, he affirms that God is "the sacred." In that limitation, there is a point in which Nietzsche is in agreement with the view of religionists who believe in God. However, Nietzsche does not stop with that. He seems to say : "God is sacred. However, God is a lie precisely in being sacred." It seems to me that the above phrase should be understood in this fashion.

In what sense has Nietzsche affirmed God to be "the sacred"? At the beginning of *The Will to Power*, concerning the advantage which the Christian moral hypothesis brought, he speaks of the following purport. Christian morality granted an absolute value to man who is small and accidental within the flux of becoming and passing away; it conceded the character of freedom and perfection to the world filled with suffering and evil, and posited that man has the possibility of knowing this absolute value and perfection. In this way, it prevented man from rebelling against life and despairing of cognition. "In sum : [Christian] morality was the great *antidote* against practical and theoretical *nihilism*" (*Der Wille zur Macht*, Kröner edition, section 4.) It may be thought that Nietzsche has recognised God, "the sacred," as that fundamental source of value which confers transcendent, absolute value, in the midst of man's valuelessness and the world's meaninglessness, and as the foundation ground which saves man from his own self-negation and destruction. But *now* this God is dead. For such a "God" was a "lie" which man, who could not bear the *nihilum* of the valuelessness of himself and the meaninglessness of the world, has fabricated in the depths of his awareness of that *nihilum*. "Man does not

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speak of *nihilum* : man speaks instead of the 'other-shore'; or 'God'; or the 'true life'; or nirvana, deliverance, pure bliss." And Nietzsche regards this as "a tendency which is antagonistic to life" (*Der Antichrist*, section 7).

The paradoxical words of Nietzsche who says "God is a sacred lie" were deeply rooted in an awareness of what he himself calls a "fundamental falsity." This fact also indicates that Nietzsche's position was based on an acute historical insight, on the one hand, and that he was attempting to recover life and nature from its deepest source, on the other.

The artificial construction of a "God" in the depths of the awareness of *nihilum* is not some arbitrary and casual matter which man could refrain from doing. Nietzsche rather sees it as an inevitable enterprise rising out of the instinct for self-preservation deeply rooted in man's life. Further, he recognises that it is a disguised and inverted function—indispensable for man's life itself—of a cosmological "will to power" which transcends man. But even though it is *fundamental* enterprise for human life, it itself is an artificial construct, a self-deception.

To speak in historical terms, the empty construct of "God" was thus fundamental to human life, and therefore, down to the present day, it has functioned efficaciously as "the sacred" in the life of man, and especially in the lives of the weak and downtrodden. By believing in the existence of a "true world" behind this world, men could endure the *nihilum* of this world. But when Nietzsche proclaims that "now God is dead," he personally discerned, prior to all others, that this era has come to an end, and that no matter how fundamental it is, the era which ought to be aware of this deception as a deception, has arrived. This is the reason he preaches the arrival of nihilism.

On the other hand, Nietzche bitterly censures the instinct of theologians, which fabricates the kingdom of God on the other-shore of *nihilum*, claiming that such an instinct brings about a spoliation of life and an attitude of anti-naturalness. "The instinct of theologians is the most widely spread and truly *subterranean* form of falsity on the earth...Whenever the influence of the theologians extends, *value-judgements* are overturned, and the concepts of 'true' and 'false' are necessarily inverted; what is most prejudicial to life is here called 'true,' while what most elevates, extols, affirms, justifies and makes life triumphant is called 'false' " (*ibid.*, section 9). According to Nietzsche, the essence of life is the instinct for the development and preservation of life, the instinct toward the accumulation of energy, the instinct to power. However, antagonism against life, nature, and the will to live has been proclaimed in the name of God "Since the concept of 'nature' has been fabricated as the anti-concept to 'God,' the

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'natural' could not help becoming the word for 'worthy of being rejected'—and the total world of that fiction has its root in *hatred* of the natural (—of actuality!)" (*ibid.*, section 15). It was Nietzsche's intention to cause the value-judgements of "true" and "false" which had been inverted in the name of God to be again reversed, and thus to recover life and naturalness which had been robbed in the name of God.

To sweep away every empty construct and return to the *will to power* itself—that is a return to life itself; it is a returning to the innocence of becoming (*Unschuld des Werdens.*) That was, for Nietzsche, the attainment of *reality*, and at the same time the full realisation of *sincerity*. Nietzsche's ideas of the "Over-man" (*Übermensch*) who can endure the *nihilum* without God, the will to the eternal return which says "If that be life, so let it be, once again!" and the Dionysian philosophy which is a "religious affirmation of life," all are grounded herein. Every attempt at a revaluation of all values which tries to expose the hidden source of the concept of "God" and to restore life and naturalness from their deepest root which had been robbed by God fails to succeed if it lacks the awareness of deception expressed in the phrase "God is a sacred lie."

Precisely the awareness of deception expressed in "God is a sacred lie," the awareness of what Nietzsche himself calls "fundamental falsity," is the decisive element for the establishment of Nietzsche's nihilism and constitutes its core. In that sense Nietzsche's nihilism may be called a *nihilism based on an awareness of falsity*. As has been already made clear, falsity spoken of here is a fundamental self-deception—called "God" and "faith" —functioning in the depths of the fundamental *nihilum* of present existence; it is the self-deception perpetrated by the very disguised and inverted will itself to power.

II

In Zen, too, it is said that "the triple world[2] is a deception." This is of course an insight shared by all Buddhists and it constitutes the background of Zen. For example, in the *Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana*, it is written that "the triple world is a deception and merely the creation of the mind. Apart from the mind, the realm of the six grains of dust ceases to be." What is here called 'mind" means conceptual mind in modern terms. The concepted mind is the discriminating mind which distinguishes between subject and object, between being and non-being, between right and wrong, good and evil. and so forth. We set up the world of objectivity over against the subjectivity of the self, and taking it as the objective world, make various distinctions concerning it; but these are all false and

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unreal worlds produced by the discriminating mind, and not the world of true reality. Once one departs from that kind of discriminating mind, the discriminated world also ceases to be and the real world manifests itself in its "suchness." The *Awakening of Faith*, continuing the above quotation, adds "...since all things are without exception developed from the mind, and produced under the condition of delusions." Indeed, it goes on to say "Every discrimination discriminates the mind of the self; [but] since the mind does not see the mind itself, there is no form to be obtained." In these citations we have the true meaning of "the triple world is a deception" and at the same time find a clue to the standpoint of Zen.

The discriminating mind, which distinguishes the objective world in various ways and which thereby produces a discriminated world, distinguishes its own mind as well. This is an unavoidable activity from the original nature of what is termed the discriminating mind. And yet the mind cannot discriminate itself. The mind cannot see the mind itself—just as an eye cannot see the eye itself. For the true Mind is that which is entirely indiscriminable, that which can never be seen—or rather, is the very substance of activity which *discriminates*, the very substance of activity which *sees*. Even if called mind, it is Mind which has "no form to be obtained." Zen endeavours to *self-awaken* to this kind of Mind immediately and directly. In this self-awakening there is no need of the mediation of theory and doctrine. This is the reason that Zen advocates "directly pointing to man's Mind." However, what is the meaning of "directly pointing"? What is the true meaning of "the triple world is a deception"? And what relation do they have to Nietzsche's nihilism?

As we have seen above, the discrimination of the self-mind is an inescapable activity arising from the original nature of mind (the discriminating mind); and yet, the mind cannot discriminate the mind itself. Therein lies the essential dilemma which the mind possesses. The delusion rooted in this essential dilemma is generally called *avidyā* (Ignorance) in Buddhism, and is called "non-awakening" in the *Awakening of Faith*. That "the triple world is a deception" is also not something different from this Ignorance or non-awakening. Accordingly the realisation that "the triple world is a deception" is not something said merely of the objective world; at the root of this awareness there is contained the realisation of the delusory and deceptive nature possessed by the discriminating mind itself, which sets up that kind of objective world and distinguishes between subject and object. Just as the above dilemma is something essential to the discriminating mind, the realisation that "the triple world is a deception," as well is, with "Ignorance" and "non-awakening," a matter intrinsic to

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the mind. On this point we find something congruous with Nietzsche's "fundamental falsity."

Again, Buddhism's "the triple world is a deception" calls to mind the following words of Nietzsche : "that the *value of the world* lies in our interpretation...; that previous interpretations have been perspectival valuations by virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the will to power, for the growth of power....This idea permeates my writings. The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not a fact." (*W.z.M.*, section 616). The idea of Nietzsche that the value of the world lies in our *interpretations*, and that there is no world apart from our *value-interpretations*, is not essentially different from Buddhism and the Zen standpoint which hold that everything arises from the *discriminating* mind. For when there is discrimination, value-interpretation is involved. But in Nietzsche's case those value-interpretations concerning the world, all of which are empty constructs and deceptive, had the positive significance of preserving life through a disguised will to power. The world fabricated in terms of value, even though an empty construct, was something to be affirmed. For it was also one perspective of the will to power. In Buddhism and in Zen, on the contrary, the world perceived by the discriminating mind does not possess positive meaning as such. It is the world of Ignorance, of deception, which must be absolutely negated. The meaning that it is advantageous for the preservation of life is not found therein.

Why is this so? In Zen, the delusory nature of the world is not grasped from the angle of the will to power, as in Nietzsche's case; instead it is grasped as the issue of *illusion* or as the issue of *non-awakening* from the angle of the discriminating mind. It is grasped as the problem of how existentially to rid oneself of the very dilemma posed by the discriminating mind, "Even to set upon the quest for awakening is to go contrarywise." However, just as the mind cannot be objectively grasped, similarly neither illusion nor non-awakening, nor "the deception of the triple world" can be objectively realised as such, for in that very instance of attempting to treat them objectively as issues and conquer them objectively, there is illusion, non-awakening, and "the deception of the triple world" in the true sense. Precisely at that time when that fact is realised directly in us, do we rid ourselves of illusion and transcend non-awakening. But this hardly means to transcend towards an other-shore beyond illusion and non-awakening. As expressed in the words "outside of mind there is no Dharma, and this mind is precisely Dharma" and "this very mind is the Mind of no-mind" (*Transmission of Mind*), apart from the mind of discrimination and delusion there is no true Mind. Apart from the awakening of non-awakening, there is no true Awakening. Here is the reason why it is said that

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"when seeing, hearing, perception, and consciousness are simply abandoned, the paths of the mind are cut off and there is no place to enter Enlightenment; the original Mind is found only in the places of seeing, hearing, perceiving, and consciousness" (*ibid*). For this reason the Zen saying advocates : "Directly pointing to man's Mind." The immediacy of mind is no-mind, is original Mind.

Consequently, even though Nietzsche similarly makes problematic the delusory nature of the world and fundamental deception in some sense, in his case the will to power is affirmatively posited in their background. In Zen, on the contrary, there is nothing at all that can be affirmatively established in their background. That there is nothing at all that can be so posited means that *outside of this mind* there is no Dharma, that this mind is *originally* the true *Mind*, the *Mind of no-mind.*

However, it is not that Nietzsche's phrase "fundamental falsity" referred merely to the delusory nature of the *world*; rather it referred to the fabrication of *God* in the depths of the realisation of the delusory nature of the world—the inevitable functioning of the self-preservation instinct of life. Therein lay the reason that Nietzsche proclaims that "God is a sacred lie." Yet it is certain that at the root of that proclamation the will to power was affirmatively established. But it must not be overlooked that the core of Nietzsche's nihilism does not consist in the awareness of the delusory nature of the world; it lies in the awareness of the delusory nature of "God" in the sense spoken of above. Such Nietzschean themes as antagonism to life, robbing man of naturalness, the fabrication of a world beyond, the active nihilist or Over-man who can endure *nihilum*, were all themes attendant upon his conviction about the delusory nature of God. Since our focus of inquiry is Zen and Nietzsche's nihilism, we must further enter into that point.

III

According to Heidegger, the "God" of which Nietzsche speaks is not merely the Christian God, but refers also to metaphysical principles from the tradition of Platonic philosophy on. In other words "God is used as a name for the supra-sensory world in general" (Heidegger : *Holzwege*, p. 199). Nietzsche's attempt at inversion of values was aimed at the overthrow of "God" as supra-sensible value common to Christianity and Platonism. This is the reason Nietzsche so bitterly censured Christianity and Platonism. And in the many instances where he made these censures, I would like to argue that his immediate and direct enemies were Paul and Kant.

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For Nietzsche, the confrontation with Christianity was indeed a theme running throughout his career. But the objects of Nietzsche's severe attacks were institutional Christianity and Christian morals, not Jesus Christ himself. They were Christian *faith*, but not Christian *practice*. Nietzsche writes: "Christianity as an historical reality must not be confused with that one root that is called to mind by this name. The other roots from which historical Christianity has grown up have been far more powerful. It is an unexampled misuse of words when such manifestations of decay and abortions as the 'Christian Church,' 'Christian faith' and Christian life' label themselves with that holy name. What did Christ deny? Everything that is today called Christian." (*W. z. M.*, section 158). Or again: "The word 'Christianity' is already misunderstanding—in essence there was only one Christian, and he died on the cross. "The 'good tidings' (Gospel, *Evangelium*) died on the cross. What has been called the 'good tidings' from that moment was already something contrary to what he lived through : an "ill-tidings,' a *Dysangelium*. It is false to the point of nonsense to find the mark of the Christian in a 'faith,' for example in the faith in redemption through Christ. Only Christian *practice*, only a life similar to what he *lived* who died on the cross is Christian..." (*Antichrist*, section 39).

There could be no sharper dichotomy between Christus and Christendom than this. For Nietzsche then, who was Jesus Christ, and in what sense did Christendom change the *Evangelium* into a *Dysangelium* ? "He (Jesus) demonstrates how one must live in order to feel 'deified'....and how one will not achieve it through repentance and contrition for one's sins: 'Sin is of no account' is his central judgement" (*W. z. M.*, section 160). Jesus did not have such concepts as rebellion, revenge, sin, retribution, and judgement. "He *lived* this unity of God and man as his 'glad tidings" (*Antichrist*, section 41). That gospel was pure bliss; it was the freedom, the realisation of the kingdom of God.

In contrast to this, says Nietzsche, it was Paul who grasped the death of Jesus as "God hung on the cross" and as "the sacrifice to redeem man's sins" and who fabricated, not a new practice, but a new faith. "A God who died for our sins, salvation through faith, resurrection after death—all these are counterfeits of true Christianity for which that disastrous wrong-headed fellow (Paul) must be held responsible." (*W. z. M.*, section 169). It was precisely Paul, according to Nietzsche, who brought back the Judaic legalistic spirit and ressentiment over which Jesus had conquered, who set up the concepts of repayment and retribution in the centre of the explanation of life, and who established faith in the world beyond and immortality of the individual in order to make this world value-less. In place of natural causality, he set up a "moral world-order" in which the

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will of God rules over the behaviour of man, and thus in place of human sanctification he robbed man of this naturalness. "Paul was the greatest among all the apostles of revenge" (*Antichrist*, section 45).

Nietzsche's severe censure of Paul was aimed at Paul's *faith* that believed in the redemption of sin by Jesus and his resurrection. Moreover it was aimed at the point that faith, based on a rabbinical sentiment, produced *Christian morality* which attempts to rob man of his naturalness, transform aristocratic values into a lower-class ones, and elevate the inferior and vulgar life. It is a well known fact that Nietzsche severely criticised Christian morality as a priestly morality and a slave morality in contrast to an aristocratic morality. In *Ecce Homo* he even writes: "What defines me, what sets me apart from the whole rest of humanity is that I *exposed* Christian morality" (*Ecce Homo*, Kröner edition, p. 406).

Within Jesus' *practice* Nietzsche rather saw true life. In contrast to this, within Paul's *faith* and Christendom after him he found a hostility to life rooted in a legalistic spirit, a decadence of life which extols self-abnegation. These were the issues concerning Christian morality. "Up to now one has always attacked Christianity not only in a modest way but in an erroneous way. As long as one has not felt Christian morality as the capital crime against life, its defenders have had it all their own way. The question of the mere 'truth' of Christianity is a matter of secondary importance as long as the value-question of Christian morality is not touched upon." (*W. z. M.*, section 251). Nietzsche's criticism of Christianity becomes essentially a criticism of Christian *morality*. The questions of the truth of Christianity, of knowledge of God, and of faith are also reduced to and treated as the issue of Christian *morality*. This fact was essentially linked with his position of seeing a fundamental *falsity* in the concept of God, and of setting up the will to power in the depths of this fundamental falsity.

IV

We have seen above that, for Nietzsche, confrontation with Christianity was the greatest task, and that the focal point of his criticism was not Jesus but Paul. However, apart from his confrontation with Kant, the rational philosopher of the modern world, would not Nietzsche's nihilism lose its sharpness ? Is not Nietzsche's *nihilism* in a sense a negative inversion of Kant's *moral teleology* ? At any rate, it may be thought to be so in one respect.

In the very beginning of *Thus Spake Zarathustra* there is the well-known passage describing the three metamorphoses of the spirit into a

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camel, a lion, and then a child. The camel which hastens over the desert sands as the pious spirit bearing a heavy burden becomes a lion as it endeavours to create freedom as its own. As the lion itself attempts to become lord of the desert, it clashes with a great dragon as his last ruler. "What is the great dragon which the spirit no longer calls Lord and God ?' Thou shalt' is the name of the great dragon. But the spirit of the lion says 'I will' " (*Zarathustra*, Kröner edition, p. 26). The great dragon on whose each and every scale 'thou shalt' glitters can perhaps be regarded as a symbol of the Judaic-Christian legalism which is represented by the Ten Commandments. However, is it not even more appropriate to see it as a symbol of Kant's transcendental ethics, which clarified the ground of possibility of every moral principle since ancient times and taught the categorical imperative of the unconditional 'Thou shalt,' and as a symbol of Kant's moral and historical teleology, which taught not only the postulate of God as the accordance of happiness and virtue but also the realisation of a moral community as the people of God which pure rational faith should set up on earth by transcending the faith of the Churches? For Kant's philosophy was not only a modern reconstruction of Platonism but also a product of Protestantism.

That this interpretation of mine is not necessarily inappropriate should be clear if considered in conjunction with the fact that even in *The Antichrist*, written as a criticism of Christianity, Nietzsche often speaks of Kant, as for example, "How could one fail to feel Kant's categorical imperative as *dangerous to life*....the instinct of theologians alone protected it"; and "Kant's success is merely a theologian's success"; and "The instinct which errs without fail, *anti-nature* as instinct, German decadence as philosophy—*that is Kant*" (*Antichrist*, section 10, 11). In fact, Nietzsche saw Kant as "in the last analysis, a cunning Christian (*ein hinterlistiger Christ*)" (*Götzendämmerung*, Kröner edition, p. 99). That words of criticism of Kant appear everywhere in Nietzsche, as for example in the following citations, illustrates the intenseness of Nietzsche's confrontation with Kant. "Kant: or cant would be a more intelligible characterisation" (*ibid.*, p. 130). "Kant, in his 'morality' falsifies his interior psychological propensity" (*W. z. M.*, section 424). "Kant as a fanatic of the formal concept 'Thou shalt' " (*ibid.*, section 888).

Nietzsche's active nihilism arises as a means of destroying Kant's stifling system of moral teleology, which is permeated by that "Thou shalt." The Over-man overturns even Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which had been substituted for the "Kingdom of God." In Kant, who never ceased teaching the primacy of practical reason, both the problem of knowledge and the questions of religion and history were ultimately reduced to

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the problem of *morality*. They were reduced to the "Thou shalt." Nietzsche stood diametrically opposed to Kant in this matter. And hence it was a natural conclusion for Nietzsche, who in reference to Paul censured the Christian morality which he thought to be rooted in Paul's faith, that the greatest "enemy against life" to be confronted in the modern world was Kant. With his confrontation with Kant Nietzsche's nihilism became even more scathing. The common element in Paul and Kant was the legalist spirit which stifles man's natural life. In order to come to the purity of the child who utters the sacred word "Yes" the lion had to bravely challenge the great dragon whose name was "Thou shalt."

V

When Nietzsche said that "God is a sacred lie," he was astutely countering the deceptive nature of supra-sensory value which appears in Platonism, Paul (Christianity), and Kant, the most modern representative of these two. He countered with the claim that such supra-sensory value was a fundamental falsity fabricated by life which could not endure *nihilum*, and hence exposed the fact that life and naturalness were robbed by the empty construct of God (supra-sensory value). However, when Nietzsche in this way regarded God as a deception and said that life is robbed by God, he violently attacked the *legalist spirit*. Accordingly he reduced all problems, that is the problem of cognition, religion, history, and so forth, to the issue of *morality*. And this reduction, in Nietzsche's case, is inseparable from the fact that the *will* to power is always placed at the root of the issue. This has been our interpretation of Nietzsche, as articulated above. The issues of priestly morality (slave morality) versus aristocratic morality; the one who died on the cross versus Dionysius; and his philosophy of the "Over-man" over against the "last man" are all developed by taking *morality, the mode of being of the will*, as the pivot.

Now, what meaning does this standpoint of Nietzsche have when we attempt to consider the question of Zen and nihilism? Nietzsche has censured as a fabrication the search for God and the posting of God in the depths of the awareness of *nihilum*. Zen also severely admonishes against seeking for Buddha and setting up Buddha. "Do not seek for Buddha outside" is a point which Zen always emphasises, but "outside" hardly means the spatial outside alone. Even if one seeks Buddha in the interior of the self, in the depths of an inner *nihilum*, the 'seeking' itself already contains the meaning of *outside in respect to the self itself*. Consequently, "do not seek Buddha outside" means do not seek Buddha at all, whether inside or outside, for as long as one seeks Buddha, the true Buddha cannot self-awaken.

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This is the reason that Lin-chi says : "If you seek a Buddha, you will be seized by a Buddha-devil; if you seek a patriarch, you will be bound by a patriarch-devil; if you seek at all, all is suffering; it is better that there be no-matter..."[3] It is the reason he says: "When the seeking mind ceases, there is no matter" (*Lin-chi lu.*)

"The seeking mind ceases" does not mean something negative. It means the transcendence of self (*ecstasis*). In true transcendence of self, there is the finding of the true Self within an unending expansion of self-awakening: there is a realisation of true suchness of the world and the self. The ecstatic self-awakening in which "the seeking mind ceases," the endless expansion of ecstatic self-awakening which finds the "Self" in its midst—that is the *self-possessed* world (the world naturally in its own-being) wherein there is no seeking either God or Buddha; it is the world of *Reality* of the phrase: "The blue mountains are of themselves blue mountains, the white clouds are of themselves white clouds." The fact of "no-matter" is also spoken of here. What is spoken of in Zen as "your Original Face prior to the birth of your father and mother" is nothing other than the infinitely expanding esctatic Self-awakening in which our ordinary discriminating awareness itself—the seeking mind—is realised. There is the reason it is also said : "The harder you strive after it the further it is away from you. When you no more strive after it lo, it is right in front of you. Its super-sensuous voice fills your ear" (*Lin chi lu*). The relations between the self and others, between the self and the world, and even the relation between the self and God arise therein. The ecstatic Self-awakening which clearly and endlessly expands in the ten directions—without that there is no true Self, no true World.

When Nietzsche rejected God saying that "God is a sacred lie," God was grasped as a supra-sensory value inimical to natural life. Moreover that supra-sensory value was not merely something of an ontological character; it was something of a legal, moralistic character which attempts to regard what extols life as sin and what suppresses life as noble. We have already touched upon the point that Nietzsche set up the will to power in the depths of the concepts of God fabricated as the entity which performs these functions. In this case, God is a "*sacred* lie" which makes the self-preservation of life possible by causing *nihilum* to attain fullness, on the one hand, and at the same time God is a "sacred *lie*" produced by the instinct of theologians which brings about an inversion of the concepts of "true" and "false". That it is considered as a "fundamental falsity" is also because God himself was one perspective—historically, at any rate, efficacious—of the will to power. The perspective which was elaborated by the disguised and inverted will to power was God; it was the other-shore after

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life; it was Christian morality based on them. Nietzsche's active nihilism tears off this disguise of the name "God," and by overturning from its foundation the mode of being of the inverting will which regards the extollation of life as a sin, returns to the will to power itself which lies at the deepest root of life. To return to the will to power itself, to always stand therein—for Nietzsche, therein was Reality, and the innocence of the becoming.

Therefore for Nietzsche life, *nihilum*, God, the innocence of becoming were all perspectives of the will to power. The reason for his considering *God* to be "a sacred lie" and for his censure of Paul's *faith* as giving a ground to a priestly morality is that despite the fact that they were perspectives—seemingly efficacious for life—of the will to power, Nietzsche saw them as ultimately self-deceptive enterprises of the will to power functioning hostilely against life. That cognition, religion, and history were grasped in essence as questions of morality was also based on their all being grasped as perspectives of the will to power.

VI

Now, from the perspective of religion, and especially of Zen, at last the following two questions must be asked of this standpoint of Nietzsche.

Firstly, when Nietzsche speaks of God and faith, how is the *problem of death* grasped therein? Nietzsche writes in the following way in the chapter entitled "On Free Death" in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* : "Die at the right time : so teacheth Zarathustra." For Nietzsche, the ideal death is precisely death not too late, not too early, "the free death which cometh unto me because I want it." In the same chapter he also writes: "The consummating death I show unto you, which becometh a stimulus and promise to the living." How, then, did Nietzsche view the death of Jesus? "Verily, that Hebrew [Jesus] died too early whom the preachers of slow death[4] honor: and to many hath it proved a calamity that he died too early" (*Zarathustra*, p. 78). We have seen above that Nietzsche found what is truly Christian not in the faith of Paul but within the practice of Jesus. That practice was one of compassion (*Mitleiden*) and love which, not being hostile even to those who do one violence, prays together with them, suffers with them, loves them. "This 'bringer of glad tidings' died as he had lived, as he had *taught—not* to 'redeem men' but to show how one must live. Precisely this *practice* is his legacy to mankind" (*Antichrist*, section 35).

If I may say so, for Nietzsche, death was the consummation of life.

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Jesus exhibited the evangelical practice of compassion and love, but since he died too early he ended without knowing how to love the great earth and life. Nietzsche interprets this fact as causing Paul and the apostles of the early church to raise the question "who killed him, who is his real enemy?" to bring about the faith in his sacrificial death for the sake of the redemption of sin and in his resurrection, and to produce the decadence of life, a morality of ressentiment. Here we see the forms of Nietzsche, the philosopher of life who views *death* from the side of *life* alone, and of Nietzsche, the anti-moralist (who grasps morality as the greatest problem), who grasps even *faith* exclusively as a *morality* which causes a degeneration of life.

However, is death in fact something exhausted in the consummation of life? Can the true nature of death be grasped by seeing death from the side of life alone? Do not Paul's words "I die day by day" (I Corinthians 15—31) on the contrary express the true nature of death, and accordingly the true meaning of life? Zen, which self-awakens to the birth-and-death of the moment and grasps birth-and-death itself as the Great Death, on this point differs from Nietzsche and rather is in agreement with Paul. An existential self-realisation of death is essential to a great affirmation of life. From this standpoint the fact that Nietzsche focused his attention only upon the legalistic spirit within the Pauline faith and censured faith exclusively from the angle of morality as something which produces a priestly morality that causes a suppression and degeneration of life, must be said to miss the true meaning of faith, and in turn, of religion. This fact causes us to recall that Kant's understanding of religion which while taking radical evil as its theme, ultimately did not touch the core of religion and was based on his attempt to grasp religion from the standpoint of practical reason, morality. To Paul, faith did not suppress life; it was the living of a new life which is supported by the realisation of death. As he said, "—always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our bodies" (2 Corinthians 4-10) and "I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me; and the life I now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God" (Galatians 2-20). Paul died and rose again with Christ. In that case, needless to say, Christ's death and resurrection was for Paul a spiritual fact which made his own resurrection through death possible. It was not something merely fabricated in the depths of *nihilum*, rather a living Reality in which spiritual life became real and present in him. Paul's is a standpoint of the self-realisation of ontological life which ultimately cannot be reduced to the issue of morality. On this point, Zen, which realises birth-and-death itself as the Great Death and gains a new Life of rebirth

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through the realisation of the Great Death, does not differ from the standpoins of Paul in essence.

Having taken up the theme of awareness of death in Nietzsche and having stated that the core of religion cannot be touched as long as religion is grasped by reducing it to the problem of morality, as in Nietzsche, we must inquire secondly whether Nietzsche's standpoint of the *will to power* truly expresses the *innocence of becoming*.

As repeatedly said above, when Nietzsche regarded God as a sacred lie, Nietzsche himself recognised the fact that in one aspect it was an enterprise inescapable from the instinct of self-preservation of life which cannot endure *nihilum*. In other words, for Nietzsche God too was one perspective of the will to power. But God was rejected as an empty construct because it was a self-deceptive function of a disguised and inverted will to power. Nietzsche proclaimed the arrival of nihilism and emphasised that one had to live as an active nihilist, i.e., Over-man who can endure *nihilum* without a God. This was because however much it was for the sake of preservation of life, he rejected that kind of self-deception and lived with utter sincerity by returning to, and taking his stand in, the fundamental will to power itself. For Nietzsche it was precisely therein that the innocence of becoming became present and true naturalness shone forth. Nevertheless, was Nietzsche's standpoint of the will to power one in which the innocence of becoming and true naturalness really present themselves? Rephrased from the perspective of Zen, the question would seem to be best put as follows : Is Nietzsche's standpoint of the will to power in fact "the place where the seeking mind ceases"? Is it truly "no-matter" in the sense above mentioned (p.11)? This rephrasing is necessary because in Zen the innocence of becoming and true naturalness is realised only in "the place where the seeking mind ceases" and in "no-matter".

Nietzsche's will to power may perhaps be said to express the innocence of becoming as a cosmological will which regards even God as a perspective of itself and which also restores the naturalness which has been robbed in the name of God. And yet, when seen from a Zen perspective, even if it is cosmological and not at all of the character of a personal God, is not the will to power still the "seeking mind"? However deeply the will to power is realised as such it is "something" affirmatively posited in the background of God as "a sacred lie", but not "Nothingness". It is a "matter", not "no-matter". As has been stated above (p. 3ff.) Zen, like Nietzsche, emphasises the delusory nature of the world and severly admonishes against seeking for Buddha and setting up Buddha. Unlike Nietzsche, however, Zen does not affirmatively establish anything in the background of either the world or Buddha—Zen establishes 'nothing' in their

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background. Hence Zen's realisation that outside of this mind there is no-Dharma: this mind is originally the true Mind. In this Zen realisation the "seeking mind" completely ceases and "no-matter" is fully realised. The innocence of becoming is also truly realised herein. And directness in pointing to man's Mind and Self-awakening to the true Mind is possible only through the realisation of "nothingness" *behind* God and the world, i.e., the realisation of complete non-objectification. On the contrary Nietzsche posits the will to power as the basic principle behind God and the world. However basic it may be, the will to power is not "Nothingness" but "something" affirmatively established and thereby not free from objectification. This is the reason I said the will to power is still the "seeking mind." Indeed, is it not the most fundamental form of the "seeking mind" itself? In that limitation, it cannot be called the standpoint of "having no-matter; that is the noble man." (*Lin-chi lu*)

The Zen standpoint of "the place where the seeking mind ceases is precisely no-matter," as touched on above, is the standpoint of a thoroughgoing ecstatic Self-awakening. In self-transcendence (*ecstasis*), a "naturalness" or "being so of itself" (*jinen* in Japanese), in which everything personal including a personal God, is transcended, presents itself. It is "the originally pure," and "no-matter." And yet as ecstatic *Self-awakening* it is existential through and through. What Lin-chi calls the "True Man of no rank" also points to "the Man of no-matter," "the originally pure Man", as the manifestation of a "naturalness which thus transcends everything of a personal character.

In that limitation, this kind of standpoint of Zen has something in common with the standpoint of Nietzsche rather than of Paul. For Paul's standpoint, though congruous with Zen as stated above in the sense of the presence of a new life through the mediation of the awareness of death, is to the end personal and not transpersonal *in its basic structure.* The standpoint of Zen, on the contrary, together with that of Nietzsche, is cosmological, yet at the same time existential. Therein lay the reason that Nietzsche's standpoint of the will to power restores the naturalness "robbed" by the personal God and causes the innocence of becoming to appear. However that naturalness, that innocence of becoming was not something mediated by a thoroughgoing awareness of death. This means nothing other than that Nietzsche's innocence of becoming was based on the standpoint of the will to power.

Nietzsche negated and rejected God as a "sacred lie" and was permeated by an awareness of profound deception and *nihilum.* But his standpoint which grasps everything in the perspective of the will to power, and consequently which, without the mediation of a thorough awareness of death,

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considers the problematic of religion from the angle of morality, can still not, when seen from Zen, be squared with "the place where the seeking mind ceases is precisely no-matter." The standpoint of the Over-man must still be said to be far from the standpoint of "the True Man of no rank." For the "innocence of becoming" to truly present itself, the *Over-man* must become the *True Man*.

Postscript

There still remain some important questions here. For example, how can one progress from the standpoint of the Over-man to the standpoint of the True Man? And what of the existential, practical questions contained therein? Precisely these were the most important existential questions of overcoming Nietzschean nihilism. If I may be permitted to add one word in postscript concerning these important topics, which should be discussed but have been left out, I would suggest the following.

As stated above, Nietzsche's standpoint of the will to power does not transcend the "seeking mind" itself even though it is the source of the "seeking mind." This signifies that Nietzsche's "innocence of becoming" was still not "unblemished" and "pure". Accordingly, Nietzsche's own "will to power," which he considered had transcended every empty construct and deception, was itself, on a deeper level, an *empty construct* and a *deception*. These facts must be clearly realised. This awareness, that the "will to power" itself is an empty construct and a deception is not therefore, a Nietzschean nihilism at all. That is, it is not a nihilism which I referred to above as "*nihilism based on an awareness of falsity*." As a nihilism which negates even the will to power itself as a deception, it may perhaps be called *a nihilism as an awareness of the devil*.

The nihilism which Dostoievski made problematic is rather of the latter type. The devil is the embodiment of the Nietzschean awareness of falsity. (cf. my paper "Falsity and the Devil," *Risō* no. 355) Lin-chi emphasised that to reach an authentic and genuine understanding of Buddhism, there must be a discerning eye of the Dharma for *discriminating Buddhas from devils* and taught that "both the Buddhas and the devils must be struck down." As long as Zen and Nietzsche is our theme, the disclosure of a way from the Over-man to the True Man is a necessary topic, and again, for that, the clarification of nihilism as an awareness of the devil and the elucidation of a way to overcome it is an inescapable theme. However, in this small essay, I could not go into that question.[5]

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Notes

1. In Nietzsche's writings there is no literal formulation for this sentence. But it seems justifiable to interpolate it from his writings, particularly *Der Antichrist*, sections 18, 36, 55, and *Der Wille zur Macht*, section 141, etc.
2. The triple world is the Buddhist conception of the world of transmigration which consists of the three realms of sensuous desire, form, and formless pure spirit.
3. "No-matter" stands for *buji* in Japanese, *wu-shih* in Chinese which has no equivalent idea in the West. For Zen, Reality is here and how in Chinese, so it is illusory to search for Reality beyond here and now. Hence, "no-matter". However, "No-matter" is existentially realised not by withdrawing from but by overcoming "searching." It is the dynamic basis out of which one freely works for both oneself and others. Cf. Abe Masao, "Zen and Western Thought," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. 4, p. 534.
4. Christian clergymen who teach the necessity of enduring suffering.
5. This paper was originally published in Japanese in *Riso*, No. 442, April 1970. The author is deeply grateful to Professor David Dilworth, who translated the paper, and to Professor Morris Augustine, who read it and gave valuable suggestions. This translation first appeared in *Eastern Buddhist*, vol. VI, no. 2, October 1973, pp. 14-32.

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2

Nirvana as a Negative Image of God

THOMAS J.J. ALTIZER

CAN the word 'God' be spoken today? While it would be idle to pretend that this word is literally unspoken in our time and world, it would likewise be audacious to presume that it is any longer spoken with a human voice or in a language that can actually speak. And 'God' has become most unsayable to those who are most bound to what was once sayable as 'God'. Significantly enough, among critical theologians, it is only liberal theologians who continue to speak spontaneously of God, and one suspects that their very power of speech is inseparable from their being innocent of what was once manifest as God. But can there be any innocents left in our world? Yes, of course, there are innocents among us, and not only about but also within us, and perhaps at no point is innocence more manifest than in those moments in which we utter the word 'God'. What can the word 'God' mean in our world and time? What is said when this word is spoken? Is anything said at all? Can it be possible that when we say the word 'God' we are saying nothing at all? Now this is not an idle question, for only the purest language says nothing, as witness music and mathematics. So what can it mean to suggest that we say nothing when we say the word 'God'. It might mean that we cannot thereby pronounce the Divine Name of revelation, and this is obviously true. But it is only a partial truth, and all partial truths are dangerous, which is to say that they are also untruths or lies, and they are lies when they lie unattended. In this case, a seeming loyalty to the Divine Name is in fact a betrayal of it, for it presumes the impossibility of blasphemy. We are incapable of blasphemy if we can say the word 'God' and say nothing at all. Perhaps this is possible for saints, but they lie beyond us, or at least beyond our understanding.

Are we even capable of blasphemy today? This is to ask if we can actually pronounce the name of God. We should not foolishly think that

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simply to say the word 'God' is to pronounce the Divine Name. Or is this apparent foolishness at bottom a truth? Do we in fact pronounce the Divine Name when we idly and thoughtlessly say the word 'God'? This is a difficult question, too difficult even to pose at this point. So let us return to the question of whether we say nothing when we say the word 'God'. In one sense, this is to ask whether we can speak innocently when we speak of God. Or is our talk of God simply idle chatter, of no consequence either to us or to anyone else? No, this cannot be, for we know, and know as much as we know anything, that contemporary speech about God is often either demonic or pathological. Many think that it is never anything else, unless simple foolishness, but this begs too many questions. In the context of our question, we must not neglect the possibility that we are capable of innocent speech. What is innocent speech? The speech of children? Perhaps, but psychoanalysis has denied us the possibility of believing it. The language of poetry then? Perhaps, but we should have to add that if so it is a language which we cannot yet understand. Is our religious language, or its purer or genuine expressions, capable of innocent speech? Must authentic religious language be either immediate or spontaneous? And therefore innocent?

Innocence is lost when we reflect upon it, and perhaps the advent of thinking testifies to a loss of innocence. In Christian language, innocence is the Garden of Eden, and we are long since exiles fom it. Do we return to that garden when we speak the word 'God'? Christians have often thought so, at least when the word 'God' is spoken in faith. But there are grave objections to this position. First, it is questionable whether it is truly possible for Christians to believe in the possibility of returning to the Garden of Eden, and most particularly so in the context of the apocalyptic or eschatological goal or end of Christianity. It is also questionable because it seems to assume that sin is annulled rather than forgiven, thus making possible a return to a sinless state. For the forgiveness of sin is not the simple abolition of sin, and it presumes the presence of faith, a faith that was absent from the Garden of Eden, and absent because it was then both impossible and unnecessary. Many doubtless long for innocence, and it may well be our deepest desire, but this says nothing of either the possibility or the desirability of its realisation. Yet it may indeed say something of what we intend when we say the word 'God'. Nevertheless, our word 'God' is inseparable from our history and experience, an experience which has long since banished innocence from its horizon, and a history which it is impossible even to associate, except negatively, with innocence. Have we not lost the ability to associate innocence with anything which

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we can know, experience, or speak? If so, must we not move away from our language and experience if we are to reflect upon innocence?

Certainly one way by which we are moving away from our given and actual language and experience is by our voyages to the East. Whatever the East might be to and in itself, it is a realm of innocence to us, or, at least it is so insofar as we apprehend it as a religious world or worlds. Innocence is a world apart from our experience, or apart from what we know as experience, which is to say that it is far distant from our language and consciousness. Above all it is in the perspective cast by our word 'God' that the East must appear infinitely distant to us. Who can imagine our word 'God' being spoken in an Eastern language? In the horizon of our Biblical traditions, and more particularly so in the context of the Christian Biblical theologies of the twentieth century, Eastern religions are quite simply and literally atheistic. Not atheistic in the sense that they revolve about a rejection or negation of God, but rather atheistic in the sense that they are wholly innocent of God. One suspects that this is a primary reason why the East is exercising such an overwhelming religious attraction upon the West today. But this is another way of suggesting that our attraction to the East is in part at least a consequence of our longing for total innocence.

Atheism as innocence? Who could imagine it? Our greatest atheists have been the least innocent among us, so much so that one could formulate a rule that the depth of atheism will vary in accordance with the negation of innocence. Can we truly associate atheism with the East? Surely it would be grotesque to do so within an Eastern context. But from a Western context? Is Buddhsim atheistic in this sense? Yes, of course. Or have we said this too glibly? Perhaps Buddhism truly knows God but we are so far removed from God that we cannot detect His presence here or anywhere. This is a disquieting thought, and one which we should not abandon altogether. Let us rephrase our question and ask whether Buddhism seems to us to know what we have known, or sensed, or named as God. Then the answer must quite clearly be no. Nevertheless, the possibility remains open that in some sense, and in a fundamental sense, Buddhism, has known God and has transcended or dissolved the presence of God in a way uniquely its own. This possibility raises the question of whether or not Buddhism can truly be understood by us as a negation and transcendence of everything which we can name as God. Is what presents itself to us as Buddhism a total dissolution of all which is and has been manifest to us as God?

Just as God is the most primal word of our religious traditions, so Nibbana or Nirvana is the most primal word of Buddhism. In ancient

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India, Nirvana was apparently used as an everyday word for being well or healthy (i.e., not in a state of fever). But to be healthy in Buddhism is to have realised final release, liberation, or salvation. Final release in Buddhism lies wholly beyond all possible experience, and thus Nirvana is unthinkable or inconceivable, and finally cannot be spoken at all. Traditionally, Nirvana is approached through the three doors to deliverance: (1) the Signless Emptiness; (2) the Signless; and (3) the Wishless. When approached through the three doors, Nirvana appears as follows: (1) as empty it has no relation to one's self, and cannot be had or attained; (2) as signless Nirvana has nothing or is nothing by which it can be recognised or known; and (3) as wishless it is that which cannot in any way be desired, and with and in its presence all desire comes to an end. Thus Nirvana is unborn, unbecoming, unmade, and uncompounded, and thereby is absolutely unconditioned. Consequently, Nirvana is the opposite of the conditioned, and in this respect it is: (1) deathless, or free from death or any kndi of impermanence; (2) at peace, or free from any disturbance of its peaceful calm, and from any kind of suffering; and (3) secure, or free from any threat to security from without or any kind of self-estrangement within. As the Deathless, Nirvana is permanent, unchanging, non-production (because it causes nothing), unborn, and uncreated. As Peace, Nirvana is the opposite of all fever or pain, and, is non-affliction, or the pacification and extinction of all pain and suffering. As security, Nirvana appears by way of images of the secure, the refuge, shelter, asylum, and island. Nevertheless, all such images are only temporary pointers, and are discarded with a full realisation of the way.

Now we must take with full seriousness the Buddhist negation of all words and images. It may well provide us with the purest meaning of innocence, and quite naturally this is a negative meaning, a meaning negating and transcending all experience. What we know as experience here appears as the conditioned, and as such it is humanly or interiorly identified as craving and delusion. Is innocence then the true or real opposite of experience? And perhaps the opposite above all of religious experience? Or can we say that innocence will be meaningful or real to us only in so far as it is manifest as the opposite of whatever we have known or named as religious experience? More specifically, can we say that Nirvana will be meaningful to us only in so far as it appears or is speakable as the opposite of whatever we can know or name as God? Is it possible that in our Godless time and world God can only be meaningful and real to us as the opposite of Nirvana? Or as the opposite of whatever we can sense or apprehend as a full and total innocence?

In order to explore these questions, let us employ a philologically and

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historically irresponsible thought-experiment. Suppose that the three Buddhist doors to deliverance were opened in a reverse or backward manner. What meaning might this bring to 'God' ? Then (1) Emptiness (2) the Signless, and (3) the Wishless might become (1) Fullness, (2) the Signed, and (3) Will. Let us begin with the opposite of Wishless, Will, or absolute and total Will. Buddhism teaches that as wishless Nirvana cannot be desired. Could we say, and speak genuinely, that the word 'God' evokes that which we must deeply and totally desire ? Now surely this is precisely what we moderns can no longer in fact say about God, at least to judge by our actual speech. Indeed, we cannot even say this about our unconscious, unless we assume that the unconscious is the opposite of all speech. Nonetheless, can we say that the word 'God' inevitably evokes for us an image of an absolute and total desire ? That is to say, a desire, passion, or a will so total that it not only embraces everything whatsoever but also that it subordinates or subsumes everything to itself. 'Here, subordinate' and 'subsume' are too weak. We should rather speak of a passion so total that it consumes everything in itself. Is this a meaningful way for us to speak of God ? Whether or not this is true, it does supply a possible clue as to why we are so reluctant to speak of God.

Let us take up the image of will from a Buddhist perspective. Buddhism names desire or will as the deepest source of pain and illusion. Since Buddhism identifies the ego or the centre of will as illusory, here will is simple or pure will, a will without real purpose or direction. It is simply craving, a craving that cannot be satisfied with anything, and cannot be assuaged so long as it is present. We have difficulty in imagining a will without direction intention or purpose. But how else can we imagine an absolutely total will ? Significantly enough, our theological language about God has ever increasingly ceased to associate God with a concrete or humanly meaningful will or purpose. The classical theological doctrine of providence is an apt example of this. Only the most naive or the most perverse theologian now dares to speak openly or straightforwardly of providence, or to speak of it in a way which has any concrete or historical meaning. Is it possible that Buddhism can restore to the Christian theologian his speech about providence ? Can we now speak of an absolute Will that wills nothing outside itself ? Or speak of God as that Will which wills and totally wills only itself ? Nietzsche's Will to Power as an image of God for us ? Or an image of the only God about whom we can actually speak ?

If the wishless is that which cannot be desired, and its 'possessor' is content with what he just 'is', can we say that the opposite of wishless, total or absolute will, can only be content with that which it 'is not' ? At first this seems an odd way of speaking, but at once we recognize it as a

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portrait of ourselves, and of ourselves as Western or Faustian man. There is no moment in which we can tarry or abide, no life which we can recognise as simply our own, and no goal which we can achieve which would still our passion. Our will for the infinite, for the boundless, would seem to be the innermost identity of ourselves. Finally, is not a will for the infinite an infinite will? Of course, our wills are not infinite, or not infinite in their actuality, in their conscious manifestation and identity. And our unconscious will ? What is it that Freud named as the *id* ? And what is it which motivates the Western goal of a future and total utopia ? Or the Western ideal of an absolute and total science ? What is it that motivates the certitude of the Cartesian cogito, a cogito that in the twentieth century becomes absolute in Husserl ? Is it not something like an infinite will, a will without boundaries or limits ? Can this be one meaning of God for us ? If so, can we say that it is a will which is content only with that which it is 'not' ? And is this 'is not' the opposite or intrinsic "other" of its own 'is' ?

An infinite will, as an actual will, can only be a dichotomous will, a will that is wholly other than itself. A dichotomous will ? A ceaselessly striving will, a will that must ever be other than itself ? A will that wills to be just what it is not ? Can this be an image of God for us ? We might note that no such image of deity can be found within an Eastern horizon, and perhaps none in the non-Christian world. And the Christian world, particularly the pre-modern Christian world ? Who is the God who is *only* Himself, the God who is the *sole* cause of Himself ? Is this God the Creator, the eternal Creator, the God whose very being is act itself ? God the Creator as the true opposite of a wholly impassive God, an unmoved Mover, is a God who is eternally inactive and unchanging. And the God who acts, the God who creates, is the opposite of all impassive and unchanging identity. The God who *is*, who actively and actually *is*, is wholly other than the God who is simply and only Himself. How could the Creator *be*, or how could God 'act' and 'move', if His 'isness' does not derive from His being ask about the "other" than Himself ? Is this the question that St Augustine forbade us to identity of God before the creation ? For is not God the Creator the God who wills as God to be other than Himself ? Such questions inevitably follow from the Christian identity of God, from Christian faith in God, and they unveil an interior dichotomy lying at the source and centre of our language about God.

Certainly an image of an absolutely dichotomous will lies at an infinite distance from Buddhism. The distance appears to be so impassable that surely in this context it is not even possible to speak of 'God' as the opposite of Nirvana. Or could it be that it is only in some such context

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that it is possible to speak of God and Nirvana at once ? Does not the image of total peace or calm give us a decisive way into the meaning of a ceaselessly striving will ? A ceaseless or infinitely striving will cannot simply be a turbulent will or a deluded or blind will. It is far rather a will that in its innermost identity refuses to be itself, or refuses to be simply and only itself. An infinitely striving will is a will that cannot and will not rest. No calm whatseover can be either actually or potentially present in such a will because there is no point or moment at which it can rest in itself. True calm is alien, and utterly alien, to its innermost identity, and is so above all because it will not and cannot simply be itself. Here, the total absence of calm is a decisive sign pointing to a will which *is* other than itself. The very identity of such a will, indeed, its deepest identity, embodies a dichotomous 'isness', an 'isness' which both is and is not itself.

Hegel was not unwise in his *Science of Logic* in speaking of the "soulless word 'is'." For the very word 'is' is soulless to us. That is to say, it is that word which is most threatening to us, most "other" than what our souls most yearn to be. Leibnitz's famous question, repeated so forcefully in our own time by Heidegger—'Why is there any being at all, why not far rather nothing ?'—can here be seen to be our "soul's" response to the identity for us of 'isness.' Can Buddhism ask this question ? Or can Buddhism ask anything which we can recognise as a question or recognise as speech itself ? If Nirvana is the Signless, can any speech be here at hand ? Perhaps nothing is more odd in Christianity from a Buddhist perspective that what the Christian calls the Word of revelation. Word speaks in Christianity, and it does not simply reveal itself, it actually speaks. Indeed, the Christian Word 'is' only in so far as it embodies itself and speaks. Is the actuality of its speech a primary ground of why the word 'is' is soulless to us ?

Let us glance a moment at what the Christian might mean when he says that word speaks. When Heidegger affirms that language is the "house" of Being we might suspect that he is thereby attempting to demythologise what the Christian knows as the Word of revelation. For the Word which the Christian knows is not a Word which simply happens to speak, nor is speech here simply the infinite Creator's accommodation to the finitude of the creature. Word actually speaks in revelation, and that speech is not accidental or extrinsic to the Word which speaks, it is rather the self-expression or self-manifestation of Word itself. Speech is Word manifest, it is the unveiling of Word, and not only the unveiling of Word but also the self-embodiment of Word. True, such speech is silent or unmanifest apart from faith. But the Christian knows faith as the voice of Word. In

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faith, the Christian knows that the Kingdom or the Word is dawning or immediately at hand. Hence the Christian speaks of Word's becoming flesh. Yet this is but another way to saying that Word speaks. Not only does Word speak, but it actually speaks, and it speaks here and now. Therefore Word does not speak in a beyond or in Eternity. Or, rather, what is here manifest and hearable as Word is the Beyond in the near at hand or Eternity in time itself.

Now let us return to our thought-experiment. If a signless Nirvana has nothing by which it can be recognised, is the Word which speaks recognisable as Word in speech itself ? God manifest ? And manifest as God or Word to us ? Surely this is impossible. Far rather let us ask if a God who is wholly other than Himself is manifest in our world or speaks in our speech. Yes, of course, or so it would appear. But can we say this ? Can we say anything at all about God ? Or is this a way of saying nothing about God ? Inspired by the Buddhist, who now appears to the Christian as a desperately needed ally, can the Christian say that God *is* signless and there is nothing by which He can be recognised ? How many Christians there are in the modern world who have said, or who have attempted to say, just this ! But can the Christian say it ? Can the Christian say that Word no longer speaks ? If not, did Word ever speak ? Yes, but just once ! Just once and never again ? Can that be speech ? What can it mean to hear or listen to a Word that has spoken just once and never again ? Would it not be far wiser to say that God is unmanifest ? Then the Christian God is a God who does not speak, His is a wordless Word, and we hear that Word by listening to nothing at all. One might well imagine that a Christia n theology inspired by Buddhism might well succeed in evolving a doctrine of God which means nothing whatsoever. Or, at least to attempt to do so. However, is not something like this just what has happened to Christian theology in the twentieth century ? Barth, Bultmann Tillich, Rahner, and Lonergan as Buddhist Christian theologians ? It would be difficult to imagine another key which more effectively unlocks the secret identity of modern Christian theology.

It was not for nothing that German theologians, ever in the *avant-garde*, banished the discipline of the history of religions from the university. What better means of disguising themselves ? Alas, American theologians were not so wise, or perhaps not so powerful. And what a terrible harvest has risen for the Christian in America ! For now there would appear to be no reason why anyone should desire to be a Christian. What need of the incredible complexities of theologies which have finally learned to speak fully and say nothing of God when in Buddhism one finds an even older tradition than Christianity which has never spoken of God ? A signless

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Nirvana one can take seriously. But a wordless Word ? Or a Creator God who is finally the Unconditioned and the Unmanifest ? Why choose such a devious route to Nirvana? Or is the Christian as Christian now learning to speak in faith without speaking of God? Is this what the new theological hermeneutic about ? A wordless language as the language of revelation ? But is not a wordless language a signless language, and hence something like a Buddhist language ? What is this desperate Christian need to transcend all speaking of God ? Is it because the Christian can no longer say 'God'? Or is it because the only God whose name we can pronounce is the God who is wholly other than God ?

In Mahayana Buddhism, however, Nirvana is not finally and only the Unconditioned and the Unmanifest. Here, simply to speak of Nirvana as Nirvana, or of an Unconditioned which is other than the conditioned is to speak in the language of distinctions, and hence of illusion. The transcendental emptiness (Sunyata) of Mahayana Buddhism is so empty and so transcendental that at bottom it is neither empty nor transcendental at all. For an emptiness that is wholly empty is without boundaries, and this means that nothing distinguishes it from anything else. Thereby Nirvana can in no sense be spoken or evoked, or not spoken as Nirvana, for to speak of an other of Nirvana is to speak, although indirectly, of Nirvana itself. All otherness disappears in Mahayana Buddhism, and disappears because otherness is a consequence of discriminating mind or self. Then the manifest and the conditioned disappear as manifest and conditioned, and with and in that disappearance the otherness of Nirvana disappears, and Nirvana is neither Unconditioned nor Unmanifest.

Can the Buddhist say that Nirvana 'is' ? Certainly not if 'isness' bears a Western connotation, which is to say if it is an 'is' which is irrevocably distinguished from an 'is not'. When the Mahayana Buddhist says that Nirvana is Samsara and Samsara is Nirvana we may rest assured that what he says as 'is' is not what we say as 'is'. But can we rest in the presence of a Buddhist statement ? In so far as we hear a statement, we sense a discrimination, but Mahayana statements transcend discrimination, thus when they fall upon our ears they register a sense of shock. Such a shock is presumably impossible for the Buddhist. Or might he be shocked in hearing a Christian say "God is"? Assuming for the moment that a Buddhist might be capable of hearing such a statement, what would he hear ? Would he hear the word 'God' ? Could he hear that word ? Perhaps, but if so, what might it mean ? Would he hear the 'isness' of God as being identical with His 'is-not-ness' ? This is a tantalising possibility, particularly for the Christian today. But can the Christian imagine such a possibility ? Can the Christian say the word 'God' and simultaneously say

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'is' and 'is not' ? Is this not precisely what is impossible when the Christian speaks about God ? Is it impossible because the Christian cannot say 'is' and 'is not' at once ?

If this is impossible for the Christian, can the Christian speak of God as the opposite of totally transcendental emptiness ? And what might this mean ? First when we speak of opposite we speak of otherness. Can, then, the Christian say that God is the "other" of transcendental emptiness? Yes. Is this not finally something which even we can say about God ? Mustn't we say this Yes if we are able to speak of God at all ? And not only to speak about God, but to speak at all ? Must not all language and speech disappear if there is no "other" of transcendental emptiness ? And is not 'God' the one word which we can truly and immediately say in speaking of otherness? Must we not say the word 'God' if we are to say the word 'other' and mean what we say ? God as the ground of otherness" ? Yes. And this gives the word 'other' a meaning which it cannot have in Buddhism. The Buddhist can say Yes is No and No is Yes in such a way that neither is the "other" of the other. But this identity is impossible for the Christian if only because he cannot know an 'is' which is identical with an 'is not'. This pure identity of opposites the Christian cannot know because he has said, "God is". Has said ? Yes. For to say "God is" is to say 'is' finally, to say an 'is' which can never be simply cancelled and annulled.

Perhaps Buddhism can teach us that what is most odd about our speech about God is not the word 'God', but rather the word 'is'. Our 'is' evokes an otherness which a Buddhist language cannot speak, an otherness which exists, which stands out from something apart from it, a something which in Buddhism is emptiness. Our 'isness' is the opposite of a Buddhist emptiness, and, significantly enough, it is the opposite of a Buddhist emptiness in a way in which a Buddhist emptiness cannot be the opposite of 'isness'. In Buddhism, emptiness and fullness are not "other", and finally nothing distinguishes them. Hence a Buddhist emptiness cannot be an actual or real opposite of 'isness'. But the 'isness' of "God is" is the real and actual opposite of 'is not'. Here, 'is' is an "other", an "other" of 'is not'. Thus in this context we are speaking of a real and actual opposite, and once this opposite has been spoken or embodied, it cannot be annulled by a turn of speech. If not by a turn of speech, perhaps by an absence of speech ? Alas, this cannot help us. For unlike the Buddhist, silence is impossible for us, and it is impossible because we have known and spoken an 'is not' which is the real opposite of 'is'. Once this 'is not' is established for us, and it is established when we speak it, then silence lies beyond us. And it lies beyond us because it can never be simply and

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only silence, it must rather be the "other" of speech, and so long as it is the "other" of speech, it is not silence. Be silent? Oh, that we could! This is the grace that is impossible for us.

If we must speak of the name God as the "other" of a transcendental emptiness, can that "other" be the "other" of itself? This is perhaps the ultimate theological question which Buddhism can ask of Christianity. Note that the question closely parallels many Mahayana Buddhist formulations. The Buddhist says that Nirvana is the other of Nirvana when he identifies Nirvana and Samsara. What does 'other' mean here? It cannot mean an actual other, that is an intrinsically other, if only because Buddhism finally transcends all otherness, and does so precisely when it identifies Samsara and Nirvana. Here, Nirvana is the other of itself only when Nirvana itself is apprehended as an "other". But the otherness of Nirvana is illusion and not real, it disappears in total calm. Yet the otherness of the Christian God is not an illusion. Or, at least, it is not an illusion to those who can say 'God'. To say God is to say "other", and here otherness is just as real as speech. As real as speech? We might far rather say that here otherness *is* speech, and if only for this reason we are exiled from silence.

Is the Christian God as God the real "other" of Himself? What can this question mean? First, it does not speak of God as an illusory "other" of Himself, an "other" which disappears in full faith or mystical union. On the contrary, it speaks of God Himself as "other", and thus affirms that God *is* otherness. Buddhism cannot make affirmations of this sort, and cannot make them because it cannot say an 'is' which actually *is*, an 'is' which is other than 'is not'. Christianity, on the other hand, in saying "God is", thereby say God *is*: God is not 'is not'. This double negation is at bottom a real negation and thus it differs from the double negations of Mahayana Buddhism. These negations, in negating the Nirvana which is other than Samsara and the Samsara which is other than Nirvana, bring an end to all discriminating judgment and apprehension. Therefore they embody the dissolution of negation itself, the end of the illusion of otherness. But to say that God "is", is to say that God *is* "other". God *is* other, and therefore otherness *is*. Yet God is "other" as God! Here, there can be no illusion of otherness, hence no innocence, no Garden of Eden. It is not the illusion of otherness but rather the illusion of innocence which ends when the Christian says, "God is." Thereafter 'is' and 'is not' fall apart, for to say "God is" is to make an ultimate affirmation of "is", and therefore an ultimate negation of "is not". If Mahayana Buddhism knows the identity of Yes and No, the pure identity of all opposites, Christianity knows their intrinsic otherness, an otherness which is spoken

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and embodied whenever the Christian speaks of God.

God as the "other" of Himself? Why of Himself? Can it be because God's "isness" is inseparable from His "otherness" and therefore God can only be the otherness of Himself? God cannot be the otherness of anything other than Himself, else God would not be God. But as the other of Himself, and the real "other", God can act and speak as God. God "acts" and "speaks" because He negates, because God *is* God. Indeed, real negation, ultimate and actual negation, is what one means in speaking of the "act" and "speech" of God. Finally, God negates Himself when He "acts" and "speaks," when He acts and speaks as God. God *is* only in so far as God negates Himself, and negates Himself as the "other" of Himself. At this point we have apparently moved as far from Buddhism as it is possible to move, and yet this is a movement which is possible only from within the horizon of Buddhism, an horizon of total peace and calm. Buddhism knows Nirvana by way of such images as the Deathless, Peace, and the Secure. But these images pass into their opposite when the Christian speaks of God. Small wonder that the Christian now hesitates to speak of God. Is it innocence that stills our speech? Oh, that it were! Is it not far rather because we yet remain capable of speech? Do we refuse to say 'God' because we cannot speak innocently of God? Cannot speak innocently at all? Yet that is precisely the moment when we can speak the "other", when we can say: God!

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3

Tautology as Philosophy in Nicolaus Cusanus and Nāgārjuna

GUSTAVO BENAVIDES

Christian speculation on the *docta ignorantia*, *coincidentia oppositorum* and *non-aliud* occupies more than fifteen centuries. Gregory of Nyssa[1] starts a trend which will last at least until the seventeenth century, when it finds its poetical summation in the stanzas of Angelus Silesius, *Cherubinischer Wandersmann*.

Between Gregory and Angelus Silesius (Johannes Scheffler), we find the great names of the Greek, Latin and German traditions: Pseudo Dionysius the Areopagita, Johannes Scottus Eriugena, Meister Eckhart, Nicolaus Cusanus, Valentin Weigel, Jakob Böhme.[2] Their fates and their position in the Christian world could not have been more different. 'Dionysius the Areopagita' is the name of the supposed disciple of the apostle Paul, the identity of the person behind that illustrious name having been the object of an endless scholarly discussion.[3] Johannes Scottus Eriugena was, as his name shows, an Irish monk who, in the court of Charles the Bald, translated the works of Dionysius, Gregor and Maximus, and wrote, among other works, the *De divisione naturae*.[4] The works and fate of Meister Eckhart, prior of the province of Saxony, author of the 28 propositions condemned in Avignon by John XXII (*In agro dominico*, 1329) are better known, and translations into English (as well as comparative studies with Indian and Chinese authors)[5] are available. Nicolaus Cusanus (Nicholas of Cusa) is quite a different figure; a man of scientific, theological, philosophical, mystical, political and administrative interests, he was a Roman cardinal, friend and confidant of popes and humanists alike.[6] Nicolaus was never condemned (although he was fiercely attacked by Johannes Wenck von Herrenberg, a Heidelberg professor), and his body reposes in his church San Pietro in Vincoli, not far from Michelangelo's Moses, while his heart is buried in Kues, his place of birth.

Valentin Weigel, postor of Zschoppau, kept secret his mystical works,

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leading the tranquil life of a Lutheran minister.[7] Jakob Böhme was neither a monk, nor a cardinal, nor a minister—Böhme was a shoemaker, basically an autodidact, who very early had difficulties with the established Lutheran church.[8]

Being thus a comparative study, we will deal with only some of the doctrines of these authors. Our main concern will be to show the place which concepts such as 'knowledge of God', *docta ignorantia*, *coincidentia oppositorum*, *Nichts*, *non-aliud* have in the history of western mysticism—or, at least, in one of its branches. On the other hand, we will study the similarities between these concepts and its Buddhist counterparts. To that effect we will focus our attention on the Madhyamaka school of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti.

I

A constant use of paradoxical statements can be found in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, the Greek Father who has been called the founder of Christian mysticism. Trying to liberate the human mind from the bondages imposed by space and time, he postulates a kind of knowledge that can be called not-knowledge, *docta ignorantia*. This concept, later made famous by the writing of Cusanus, can also be found in Augustine,[9] as well as in Basilius and Gregory of Nazianz. The *docta ignorantia* is expressed by means of paradoxes: thus Gregory speaks of a bright, shining darkness, a divine darkness. Dark and unnameable is his Godhead, and beyond language and thought. Gregory says that a man who claims to be able to explain the mystery of God is a liar, God being beyond language and thought, unthinkable and unspeakable (we shall find a similar reasoning in Cusanus' *De deo abscondito*); the names given to 'Him' might express his creation but not his essence. 'He' is not even 'good', but beyond 'goodness'; 'He' is not 'God' but beyond 'God'.[10] In the polarity thinking/not-thinking or knowledge/not-knowledge, ecstasy is clearly on the side of the not-thinking. To 'know' 'God' is to 'know' that 'God' cannot be 'known'. A thinking that functions according to *yes* and *no* is incapable of 'apprehending' 'God'. To 'apprehend' 'God' is to retreat into the inner part of the soul, leaving aside the world.[11] Thought, world and will have to be abandoned in order to 'find' the impossible 'God'.

Dionysius continues the line started by Gregory[12] (although we should have always present the influence of Proclus). His *Mystical Theology* is certainly one of the most influential mystical works in the history of Christianity.[13] The 'God' of Dionysius is also unknowable, unthinkable,[14] unspeakable. Consequently, the language of Dionysius[15] adopts the most

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torturing forms in order to be able to express the inexpressible. He, as Gregory, affirms by negation: the first line of the *Mystical Theology*, with the use of the particle *hyper*[16]—situates every word, every characteristic beyond the normal reach of the intellect.[17] The Trinity is beyond essence (*hyperoúsie*), beyond the divinity, beyond goodness; the highest reality is above knowledge, super-luminous. As in Gregory, darkness is resplendent with light.[18]

Timotheus, the disciple to whom the *Mystical Theology* is addressed, is advised to devote himself to the mystical contemplation (*mystiká theámata*), leaving behind sensations and intellectual operations, sensible and intelligible objects, *being* and *non-being*.[19] The theme of the *docta ignorantia* (1001A) returns: 'He' can be known beyond intelligence (*hyper noūn*), by not knowing. In the second chapter (1025A. ff.), the author expresses his desire to enter the luminous darkness by means of the *docta ignorantia*: by not-seeing and not knowing.[20] Inside the darkness the intellectual discourse will vanish and all words will be absent: it will be voiceless and will merge with the ineffable. The 'cause' of all has neither imagination (*phantasían*) nor opinion (*dóxan*), nor definition (*lógon*), nor intellect (*nóēsin*). It is neither word (*lógos*), nor intellection (*noséis*), it cannot be said (*légetai*) or thought (*noeītai*). Like the absolute of the Upaniṣads it is neither greatness, nor smallness (*smikrótēs*). Negations follow negations: it is neither similarity (*isótēs*) nor dissimilarity (*anisótēs*). Not even wisdom (*sophía*) can be predicated of it. One (*hēn*), Oneness (*henótés*), Divinity (*theótēs*), Goodness (*agathótēs*) are no more appropriate. The limits of our thinking, non-being (*ouk óntōn*) and being (*óntōn*) are no more helpful, neither darkness nor light, neither error (*plánē*) nor truth (*alétheia*).

Repeating the favourite thoughts of Gregory, he says (Epistle I, 1065A) that if somebody, having seen God, claims to understand what he has seen, it is because he has not seen God. As Gregory before, and Nicolaus after, he writes that God is known beyond the intellect by not being known.

Dionysius inaugurates a type of language that we will later recognize in Eckhart, Cusanus and Scheffler. His endless chains of negations require a particular type of vocabulary, a vocabulary where a word means not what it means, but more and less. Thus we find that his use of prefixes is most helpful for his purpose.[21] Particles such as *hyper-*,*pán-*, *arch-*, *hólo-*, *prōto-*, *auto-*[22], are used in order to rarefy the meaning of the word. *Hyper-*, the most important of all these prefixes, is used, as Scazzoso says, to 'elevate', to 'spiritualize' the words. This rarefication ('*hyper*-ication') of language is one aspect of what Vanneste[23] has called the abstractive negation (*aphairesis*): the systematic (almost Nāgārjunian) negation, rarefication of the thinkable world. The *aphairesis* leads to the

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docta ignorantia, but leads also to a (again Nāgārjunian) *hyper-aphairesis*: the negation of the aphaïresis itself: a perfect example of a self-referential paradox. After a merciless use of the abstractive negation, the abstractive negation itself is negated: as when Āryadeva, having taught the way to *nirvāṇa*, says that there is neither *nirvāṇa* nor *saṁsāra*, nor, certainly, any doctrine about them (the *tathāgata* does-not have any theory). The dialectics of apophatism includes itself: it is not enough to negate the positive attributes, one has also to negate that negation: what remains is an endless, Beckettian, circular movement.

II

Johannes Scottus Eriugena, translator of the Areopagita and Maximus, continues the Dionysian speculation. All the themes are present: the apophatic and cataphatic theology,[25] the speculation on being and non-being, the *docta ignorantia*[26]. *De divisione naturae* (*Periphyseon*),[27] written in the 9th century in France, clearly states the difference between "the two branches of theology, the affirmative, which by the Greeks is called *kataphatiké* (*quae a grecis KATAPHATIKE dicitur*), and the negative, which is named *apophatiké* (*quae APOPHATIKE vocatur*). The one, that is *apophatiké*) denies that the Divine Essence or Substance *is* any of the things that are, that is, of the things which can be discussed or understood" (458A-B, pp. 72 ff.).[28] Referring to God he repeates the Dionysian theme "Thus (God) is called Essence, but strictly speaking He is not essence: for to being is opposed non-being (*Essentia igitur dicitur* [*deus*] *sed propria essentia non est. Esse enim opponitur non esse*). Therefore he is *hyperoúsios*, that is, superessential (*hyperoúsios igitur est, id est superessentialis*)" (459D-460A, pp. 76 ff.). This *superessentialis* is both affirmation and negation[29] (*superessentialis est, affirmatio simul et abdicatio...*; 462C, p. 84). Being both affirmation and negation, the divine is incomprehensible to all reason and all intellect (*Incomprehensible enim omne rationi et intellectui divinum est*); it is more-than-being and absolute being, beyond language and understanding (*est enim super ipsum esse aliquo modo superessent universaliter super* [*quod*] *dicitur et intelligitur*; 482A-B, p. 126).

We have already encountered similar statements in our short examination of Gregory and Dionysious; their is however in Eriugena, as well as in Cusanus, a kind of 'fourfold negation' which is surprisingly similar to the *catuṣkoṭi* of the *mādhyamikas*. Eriugena says about the "formlessness of the things that cannot be formed": "(it) is Form; it is not Form: it is Formlessness; it is not Formlessness. For whatever is predicated of it

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can both be affirmed and denied, because it is above every thing that can be said and can be understood and that cannot be understood" (*Forma est, forma non est*; *informitas est, informitas non est. Quicquid enim de ipsa praedicatur et firmari et negari potest quia super omne quod dicitur et intelligitur et non intelligitur est*; 500B, pp. 166 ff.)

Eriugena's God is, as the Areopagita's, unthinkable[30]: *nullam categoria in Deum cadere* (518B, p. 72); *nulla igitur categoria proprie Deum significare potest* (463C, p. 15). God is nothing, but not 'nothing' as opposed to 'something', since that presupposes an opposition, and thus falls back into the realm of thinking. Both nothing and something are thinkable, or rather they are thinkable because one refers to the other, and 'exists' through the absence of the other.

Eriugena is, as Nicolaus and the *mādhyamikas*, aware of the problem. If his God is an absolute contradiction (*principium sine principio*), he is also unknowable both to the creatures and to himself. God is "*divinae superessentialis excellentia*" (III, 5, 634B[31]), but the '*super-*'[32] that defines our ignorance of God defines also the knowledge that God has of himself. It is with this concept that Eriugena sets himself apart from most of the Christian mystics: a God ignorant of 'what' he is, because he is not a 'what'[33]. The text reads: "If, then, God knows (of Himself) what He is, does He not define Himself—for everything which is understood by itself or by another as to what it is can be defined (by itself [or by another]) and therefore is not altogether infinite." (*Itaque si deus cognoscit* [*se ipsum*] *quid sit nonne se ipsum diffinit—omne siquidem quod intelligitur quid sit a se ipso vel ab alio diffiniri* [*a se ipso* (*vel ab alio*)] *potest—ac per hoc non universaliter infinitus est...*) (II, 587B, p. 198). The consequences are inevitable: "So God does not know of himself what he is because he is not a 'what', being in everything incomprehensible both to himself and to every intellect" (*Deus itaque nescit se quid est quia non est quid, incomprehensibilis quippe in aliquo et sibi ipsi et omni intellectui...*; II, 589B, p. 142).[31]

Different from the Areopagita's *docta ignorantia*, Eringena's not-knowing encompasses man and God. It could be said that the *ignorantia ineffabilis* (593C) of God is the model for the *docta ignorantia* of man (not(unlike the 'fall' of Böhme's God, which can be considered the model for the fall of the primordial man): man and God are not very different in this sense. When Eriugena says that by "not knowing Himself (god knows more of Himself" (*atque ideo nesciendo seipsum a seipso melius scitur*; II, 598A, p. 29), he places God and the creature on the same level: *docta ignorantia.*[35]

The last theme which will occupy our attention is the problem of

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identity—a theme that as the *non-aliud* will find its full development with Nicolaus Cusanus.[36] This God who does not fall into any category of thought creates "not only things similar to Himself but also dissimilar, since He Himself is the Like and the Unlike, and the cause of contraries" (*Non enim similia sibi solumodo considit sed etiam dissimilia quoniam ipse similis est et dissimilis, contrariorum quoque causa est*; 510D., p. 192). As the non-other, He is the absolute identity of things with themselves. Actually, the non-other goes even further : it is the identity of identity with itself : it is the identity of non-identity with itself : "for He is the Likeness of like things and the Unlikeness of unlike things, the Oppositeness of opposites, the Contrariness of contraries" (*Est enim ipse similium similitudo et dissimilitudo dissimilium, oppositorum oppositio, contrariorum contrarietas*); (517C, p. 206).[37]

The first appearance of the *non-aliud* in the Christian world is perhaps the greatest contribution of Johannes Scottus. If in his treatment of the *docta ignorantia* he develops the doctrines of Gregory and Dionysius, if he is able to present a way of reasoning very similar to the Buddhist *catuṣkoṭi*, it is with the notion of identity that the sheer simplicity of the tautology 'explains' what 'is' and what 'is-not'.

III

We will not attempt an exposition of the doctrines of Meister Eckhart. Of all the authors so far studied, Eckhart is probably the best known, and some of his works are available in translation. Here we will only try to show how Eckhart's approach to language (as a means to apprehend the ineffability of the world) is per force very similar to that of Dionysius and Eriugena. Thus, while Dionysius used the *hyper-*, and the other negative prefixes, and Eriugena translated *hyper-* with *super-*, Eckhart used the German *über* to make possible the 'rarefication' of language necessary for his mystical purposes. As a matter of fact, Eckhart developed an entire vocabulary, being for that reason one of the creators of the modern German language[38]. Eckhart's handling of his *Mittelhochdeutsch* is the inevitable consequence of his mystical attitude: the given 'reality', which is in a way a given language (Gustav Landauer has written : "*Eure Welt ist die Grammatik eurer Sprache*", "*Weltanschauung ! Sie ist nichts als unser Sprachsatz*")[39] had to be transformed, and that violent transformation had to be accomplished through the violent transformation of the given language.[40] The paradoxes used by Eckhart (*Got ist ein wort, daz sich selber sprichet. Swâ got ist, dâ sprichet er diz wort; swâ er niht enist, dâ sprichet er niht. Got ist gesprochen und ist ungesprochen...gotes ûzgang*

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îst sîn ingang...)[41] are only part of his particular use of the given language.

What is perhaps more interesting is his role as creator of a new vocabulary—a vocabulary which has survived, and to a great extent has determined the fate of Germany's philosophy and history. A word such as *grunt* (*Grund*, eng. ground)[42] is taken and transformed into a mystical term : the *Seelengrund*[43] is the place common to man and God (*Hie ist gotes grunt mîn grunt unde mîn grunt gotes grunt*; Pfeiffer 66, 2)[44]. Prefixes have also an important role in Eckhart's language; prefixes, being part of the word itself, can transform the word into its own negation. Words are thus living paradoxes : *unbegrîfelich*, *unbedenklich*, *unbekantlich*, *unendlich*, *ungenatûret*, *ungeworden*, *unwesenlich*.[45] The violence exercised on language does not stop there; as Scheffler will do a few centuries later, Eckhart combines words with the *un*-prefix in a tireless *aphairesis* : *ungenante un genantheit*, *unbegrîffene unbegrîfelickeit*.

Other particles that fulfil this role are *abe-*, *ent-* : *abescheiden*, *absprechen*, *entbilden*, *entwerden*, *entgeisten*, *entsinken*, *entvremden*,[46] all, as we can see, verbs of an extreme negative character.

There is another type of construction that deserves to be mentioned; it is the deconcretization, 'rarefication' as we have called it. Eckhart accomplishes this by means of the endings - *heit*, - *keit* and - *ung*. The example of *got/gotheit* (*Gott/Gottheit*)[47] is rather well known, but it should be noticed that the transformation also takes place in many other nouns, and adjectives: *menscheit*, *innicheit*, *nihtheit*, *blôzheit*, *grundelôsicheit* (notice here the use of both negation 'grunde-los' and abstraction - *heit*), *ungewordeke-it* (a good example of negation '*un-*' and abstraction '*-heit*').

Surrounded by this linguistic alchemy is Eckhart's *gotheit*: what remains after the *über-*, the *un*, the *-heit* is the nothingness of God, its 'groundlessness' (*die grundelôsigkeit gotes*, Pfeiffer 302, 20).[48] In Eckhart, as in Eriugena, we find a God who is not only unnameable and unthinkable, but also a *gotheit* that is unknown to *got* himself.[49] What remains after the silence is the nessness of things (the permutations of 'less' and 'ness' are both endless and irrelevant) : the simple tautology of what is. Eckhart's answer to the question "Why did God become man ?" is so simple that it is not an answer : "*So, wie Gott ohne Warum wirkt, so auch wirkt der Gerechte ohne Warum; und so, wie das Leben um seiner selbst willen lebt und kein Warum sucht, um desentwillen es lebe, so auch kennt der Gerechte kein Warum, um desentwillen er etwas tun wurde.*"[50] It is not just the Godhead (who, as we saw, does not know itself) who acts without a reason (*ohne Warum*), it is also 'life' (*das Leben*) that lives for its own sake, without a *Warum*. In Eriugena we found a God who, apart from being

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unknown to himself (we are aware of our use of both 'who' and 'that', 'itself' and 'himself'), was the non-other of everything that is and is not (*similitum similitudo et dissimilitudo dissimilium*), in Eckhart's *ohne Warum*, as in Scheffler's rose (*sie blühet, weil sie blühet, Cherubinscher Wandersmann*, I, 289), there are no reasons, no answers to questions : 'Why?' is answered by 'because', but by a 'because' that stops there : a 'because' that is no different at all from the 'Why?' (German *warum/darum* and Spanish *por qué/porque* are more transparent examples). *Gottheit* and non-*Gottheit* are identical in so far as they are without a reason. The reaction to this can be one of bliss or one of despair : Antoine Roquentin's "*l'existence partout, á l'infini, de trop, toujours et partout; l'existence—qui n'est amais bornée que par l'existence*" seems also a reasonable complaint.

IV

Nicolaus Cusanus (1401-1464),[51] mathematician, statesman, cardinal, philosopher, mystic, reader of the condemned Eckhart,[52] of Dionysius,[53] Eriugena, Maximus; a hero for Giordano Bruno (burned alive in Rome, not too long after Nicolaus' death, not too far from the church where Cusanus was buried)[54]—Nicolaus is remembered because of two or three fortunate formulae : *docta ignorantia, coincidentia oppositorum* and, perhaps, *non-aliud*. The first has, as we know, a long history : Gregory of Nyssa, the Areopagita, Eckhart, have all considered this plunging into darkness (a conscious plunging, however : a *docta* ignorantia) as a necessary condition for the knowledge of God. Some aspects of this *via purgativa* are certainly understandable : in its simple form it is nothing else than the retreat from the external world (*Nam hic nunc clare vidimus, quomodo Deum per remotionem participationis entium invenimus; De docta ignorantia* I, 17=I, 252). In its most extreme form, however, it implies nothing less than the negation of language and discursive thinking; thus, in the *Apologia doctae ignorantiae* he writes : "*Id enim, quod inflat et ad conflictum excitat, se ipsum prodit : eam scilet non esse scientiam, quae per vacationem in mentis visionem tendit, qualis est docta ignorantia* (*Apologia*= I, 534); a trend of thought which will reach its climax in the almost Nāgārjunian dialogue *De deo abscondito*.[55]

Not-knowing is, as in the other authors so far studied, closely related to the notion of nothingness. In fact, Nicolaus quotes Dionysius, saying that the spirit of God is nearer to nothingness than to something (*magnus Dionysius dicit intellectum Dei magis accedere ad nihil quam ad aliquid; De docta ign.*=I, 252). '*Quid*' : we are still listening to Eriugena, saying that God is not a '*quid*'. *Docta ignorantia* and nothingness are defined by

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negation; a negation which, according to Cusanus, precedes every affirmation, a negation which, however, does not merely become a *negatio negationis* in the Eckhartian sense,[56] that is, the means to arrive at a higher affirmation. Nicolaus' negations are self-negating, self-perpetuating, not unlike the dialectics of Proclus.[57] Endless negation and self-negation seem to be regulated by a fourfold negation that already was present in Eriugena. Answering a question about the existence of God, he says that "He neither is, nor is not, nor is and is not"; this statement, that in this case is only threefold, appears more than once in the writings of Cusanus; in *De deo abscondito* he says of God: "*quod necque nominatur, necque non nominatur, necque nominatur et non nominatur*" (=I, 306). In *De docta ignorantia* I, 6 we find finally the four terms : "*Maxime igitur verum et ipsum maximum simpliciter esse vel non esse, vel esse et non esse, vel nec esse nec non esse*" (=I, 212); see also *De coniecturis* I, 7 : "*Non poterit enim infinitius responderi an Deus sit, quam quod ipse nec est nec non est, atque quod ipse nec est nec non est*" (=II, 22).[58]

Given this unknowable reality, what remains is again a conscious not-knowing, a situation in which positive or negative statements convey the same meaning. In the already mentioned *De deo abscondito*, the not-knowing is shown mercilessly : He who believes to know, knows less than the one who knows to know nothing (*Quia minus scit hoc, quod se scire putat quam id, quod se scit ignorare*; I, 300). Even more, what is said in the first line is contradicted in the last (a procedure that only the *mādhyamikas* and Samuel Beckett can afford) : after having said that God is the source and origin of the fundaments of being and not-being (*...sed est (Deus) fons et origo omnium principiorum essendi et non essendi*), Nicolaus goes on to say that God is *not* that source : "*G : Est Deus fons principiorum essendi et non-essendi? C : Non*". And, when confronted with the helplessness of his interlocutor ("But you have just said that"; *Iam statim hoc dixisti*) he answers, as Āryadeva would have done: "I have said the truth when I affirmed it, and I said again the truth when I negated it" (*Verum dixi, quando dixi et nunc verum digo, quando nego*; I, 306).

The merging of affirmations and negations constitute the *coincidentia oppositorum*.[59] God is *De docta ignorantia*, the coincidence of the opposites, of the contradictories[60] (*Et quoniam ex prioribus manifestum est Deum esse omnium complicationem, etiam contradictorium*; *De docta ign.* I, 22=I, 270). God is, however, also above or beyond the coincidence[61] : the opposites form a wall, the wall that protects the Paradise (*De visione dei*, X=III, 134).[62]

But, as happened with the *negatio negationis*, the very concept of *coincidentia oppositorum* has to be overcome (as Dionysius overcome his

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aphairesis). *Coincidentia oppositorum* becomes *coincidentia coincidentiarum*, until the logic of paradox is replaced by the logic of tautology. At this stage, what matters is that God is the oppositeness of opposites (*oppositio oppositorum*); the likeness of likeness and the unlikeness of unlikeness. What follows is the elaboration of a logic of identity; in his *Dialogus de genesi* (1447)[63] Nicolaus compares the notions of the 'One' (*unum*) and 'Self' (*idem*), and decides that too much attention has been paid to the One in detriment of the Self (*...adhuc ipse Idem Unum praetelerunt, quasi identitas sit minus uno. Omne enim idem unum est et non converso*; Reding, 30=II, 329). In the absolute Self (*in Idem absoluto*) being and not-being are necessarily the same. This absolute Self, "which is also named God" (*Nam Idem absolutum, quod et Deum dicimus*),[64] is the basis for the conception of the *non-aliud* from 1462. Between 1447 and 1462, the *unum* seems to regain importance in *De principio* (1459), where the influence of Proclus is particularly clear. In that same year, however, *De aequalitate* returns to the problem presented by the *idem*. In this work we assist to the search for the definition that defines itself and everything (the central problem of the *non-aliud*): a definition which has to be basically tautological: the ground of what is, but also the ground of the ground. Nicolaus' solution is an anticipation of the propositions of 1462: *aequalitas* generates *aequalitas*, *aequalitas* is identical with *aequalitas*: *Ideo omnia intantum sint, inquantum aequalitatis rationem participant* (=III, 398). The logic of tautology will also account for the existence of difference: *Non potes videre plura inaequalia sine aequalitate. In hoc enim concordant, quod inaequalia* (=III, 402).

Gerhard Schneider has observed that the philosophy, or rather metaphysics, of Cusanus moves from the *coincidentia oppositorum* to the *non-aliud*.[65] We might add that it could not have been otherwise. Given the rigour with which the doctrine of the *docta ignorantia* is pursued, given the dialectics of the *coincidentia oppositorum, contradictorium* and *coincidentiarium*; given also the relations between the *idem* and the *idem absolutum*, it was necessary for Nicolaus to arrive to a point where paradox becomes tautology. If opposites have to be reconciled, anything left outside the *coincidentia* becomes an opposite to it and has necessarily to coincide. Not even the distinction between the *idem* and the *idem absolutum* can be maintained. Cusanus has said that plurality and otherness[66] are confusing and unnecessary (*Pluralitas quasi alteritas est turbativa non necessaria*; *De principio*=II, 214), thus, if the reasoning is to be followed to its last consequences, *idem* and *idem absolutum* have to be merged into each other. As, when seen from *saṁsāra, nirvāṇa* is 'other', but when seen from *nirvāṇa saṁsāra* is non-other—so, from the perspective of the absolute *idem*, the *idem* is non-other.

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The ideas presented in *De aequalitate* (1459) find their full development three years later in the *Directio speculantis seu de non aliud*, [67] a work which, as Cusanus scholars have noticed, is both highly speculative and deceptively simple.

In *De non aliud*, Nicolaus looks for a definition that can satisfy any reasonable mind. This definition is, in his words, that "which defines itself and everything" (*Definitio, quae se et omnia definit, ea est, quae per omnem mentem quaeritur*; *De non aliud*=II, 556). A definition is, however, non other than a definition, and consequently, the 'non-other' is the definition of the definition (*Quisquis videt verissimum esse, quod definitio est non aliud quam definitio, is etiam videt ipsum non-aliud definitionis esse definitionem*; *Prop* II). Being the *non-aliud* the definition of itself and everything, being actually the definition of the other (as in *De aequalitate*, identity will define difference) : the other is non-other than the other—the incomparable secret will have been revealed. Proposition VI of *De non aliud* is as absolutistic as the *madhyamaka* : nothing is 'postulated', the world might be empty, but even that emptiness is tautological *Śūnyatā*, as the *non-aliud*, defines itself and everything : *Qui videt, quomodo ex eo, quod non-aliud se ipsum definit, ipsum non-aliud est non aliud ipsius non aliud, et quomodo ex eotiam, omnia definit et singula, est in omnibus omnia et in singulis singula, ille quidem videt ipsum non-aliud esse aliud ipsius aliud et videt non-aliud ipse aliud non opponi, quod est secretum, cuius non est simile.*

V

On the one hand Buddha preached two 'realities' (in the widest sense of objects of discourse) : (a) the impermanence of things, the persistence of suffering, and (b) a way of deliverance, a goal : *nirvāna*.[68]. On the other hand, the *Majjhima-Nikāya* informs us of a dialogue that took place between Buddha and the ascetic Vaccha :

"But has Gotama any theory of his own ?"
"The *Tathāgata*, O Vaccha, is free from all theories."[69]

The word translated by Warren as 'theory' is *diṭṭhi*, but even if this 'theory' is replaced by another word such as 'view', 'belief', 'speculative opinion' or 'insight',[70] the problem remains : "The *Tathāgata* is free from all views, from all opinions." This affirmation, a perfect example of a self-referential paradox, is by no means an exception in the Pāli Canon. Thus, Gotama speaks of 'ignoble' and 'noble' craving. The first being

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"the case of one who, himself subject to birth, craves what is subject to birth...Wife and child...slaves, male and female...goats and sheep...fowls and pigs..."; while the second, the 'noble' craving, is "the case of one who, himself subject to birth, perceives the wretchedness of what is subject to birth, and craves the incomparable security of *nirvāṇa* free from birth... corruption."[71]

The paradox of "not having any *diṭṭhi*" returns in the case of *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is both craving, and the product of not-craving. *Nirvāṇa* is again the extreme case of a self-referential paradox : the case of a theory that negates itself.[72]

We shall not review the different conceptions of the Buddhist *nirvāṇa*;[73] be it enough to say that different schools approached and 'solved' the problem in different, and many times opposite ways. The *sautrāntikas* considered *nirvāṇa* as pure non-being (*abhāva*), as the interruption of a series of causes and effects,[74] as the destruction of this great mass of suffering, as simple negation, cessation.[75] The *vaibhāṣikas*, on the contrary, considered *nirvāṇa* as a thing in itself (La Vallée Poussin translates, "*une chose en soi*"), a reality, an entity. *Vaibhāṣikas* and *sautrāntikas* seem to approach the problem from the two sides of the paradox : the *vaibhāṣikas* see it from the "noble craving" angle : a '*summum bonum*', a place of bliss, the exact opposite of the horrors of *saṁsāra*. The *sautrāntikas* see it from the other side, from the "non-craving" angle; thus *nirvāṇa* is desirelessness, interruption, annihilation—but also 'other' than the painful *saṁsāra*. Later, the *mādhyamikas* will approach the problem from both sides, and will arrive at the only possible conclusion : *nirvāṇa* is a fiction, it exists only in the realm of *saṃvṛti*, it is not different from the other fiction, *saṁsāra*. To solve the contradiction between craving and not-craving, clinging and not-clinging, the famous silence of the Buddha will be extended to comprehend not only the reserved points, but the entire teachings. Buddha's silence will become arn all-encompassing metaphor, where *saṃsāra*, *nirvāṇa*, the four noble touths, etc. will dissolve; in the silence of the Buddha all this soteriological cncepts will have a provisional existence : they will have become empty.

Śūnyatā is, to be sure, the least approachable 'concept' in Buddhism.[76] That it is not *nihil* has been repeated by Nāgārjuna and his disciples; that it is not 'something' has also been said by those same masters. In the *Prasannapadā*, Candrakīrti says : "Victim of your own discursive thinking, you superimpose to (the term) 'emptiness' the false interpretation of 'non-being'...in other words, you worry yourself with all kind of hypostasis devoided of reality."[77] In this text we find an interesting expression, "hypostasis or emptiness"—with this term Candrakīrti tries to fight the misuse of a concept which by its very nature tends to become proteic and thus useless.[78]

21/7/2017
डा. डिल्ली रमण रेमी
कल्याणी रेमी स्मारक
पुस्तकालय

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Candrakīrti differentiates between the use of *śūnyatā* as (a) 'hypostasis' (*parikalpanā*), a view that turns *śūnyatā* into the extreme of non-being, and (b) as a means of eliminating (*upacam*) all differentiation (←*prapañca*) in the world. With (a) we consider non-being as the contrary of being, and therefore, as one of the members of a polarity (we have encountered the same problem with Nicolaus Cusanus); with (b) we use emptiness in the opposite way : as the oppositeness of opposites (*oppositio oppositorum*), and thus *oppositio sine oppositione*.

Being free from hypostatic constructions, *śūnyatā* can be defined properly : "The 'originating dependently' we call 'emptiness'."[79] Candrakīrti quotes the passage thus : "The production by causes and conditions is called emptiness. Emptiness is a metaphoric designation."[80] In the *Cun-lun*, Kumārajīva takes a more extreme position : emptiness is a "fictitious name", a "fictitious denomination" (Walleser translates, *fiktive Bezeichnung*);[81] emptiness is empty ("*Leer*" *auch ferner ist leer*),[82] it is only used in order to lead the living beings (*sattva*).

Not being absolute, emptiness is no more (non-other than) a synonym of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). As metaphor or as an interchangeable term, *śūnyatā* is emptied of any intrinsical meaning. To say that "whatever is relational origination is emptiness", is to say. that the relationship between these two terms is of a tautological type- If *pratītyasamutpāda* defines *śūnyatā*, this definition takes place in a cir' cular, non-temporal form. *Pratītyasamutpāda* and *śūnyatā* define, 'create- each other. This mutual originating, however, presupposes a *pratītyasa mutpāda* of a second order ($=psp_2$), a meta-dependent-origination. The following scheme (A) represents this relation :



where we have at the same time : (a) $psp_1 = s_1 < psp_2 = s_2$, but also, (b) $psp_1 = s_1 = psp_2 = s_2$.

In the Scheme (A), psp_1 and s_1, which are synonymous, are defined by psp_2, which is also s_2 ; now, the relation between psp_2 and s_2 is regulated by a third level *pratītyasamutpāda*, ($=psp_3-$), which is also empty ($=s_3$). Thus, (b) can be followed by a (c) of the following type : (c) $psp_1 = s_1 = psp_2 = s_2 < psp_3 = s_3$, but also by a (d) : $psp_1 = s_1 = psp_2 = s_2 = psp_3 = s_3$... *ad infinitum*. The relation between (a), (b), (c), (d) ..., will always fluctuate between absolute identity and dependence. The same

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problem was faced by the Buddha when he claimed to be free from all *diṭṭhi*, or by Nāgārjuna who, in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* said: "If I had any proposition (*pratijñā*), this defect (*doṣa*) would be mine. I have, however, no proposition (*nāsti ca mama pratijnā*). Therefore, there is no defect that is mine (*tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ*)." The proposition is, at the same time, 'within' the 'world' (and, therefore, empty), and 'outside' the 'world', and therefore capable of saying something about it.

The metalinguistic character is however only provisional; to consider it real would lead us into an infinite regress, and would contradict affirmations such as: "I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated."[84] The metalinguistic and metalogical will have to collapse sooner or later into the *docta ignorantia* of the paradox.

The introduction of the notion of two truths[85] has to be considered in the same way. The tension between identity and dependence is also visible in the relation between *saṁvṛti* and *paramārtha*. From the point of view of *saṁvṛti*, *saṁvṛti* and *paramārtha* are different (are 'other'); moreover, the discrete entities that constitute the world are seen as different ('other') from each other. Seen from *paramārtha*, however, even the relation between this supreme truth (the realm of the non-other) and the mundane truth (the realm of the other), is seen as one of identity. The relation between the two truths is that of the *idem* and the *idem absolutum* of Cusanus' *Dialogus de Genesi*. The *idem* is different from the *idem absolutum*, but the *idem absolutum* is *not* different from the *idem* (see the series (b) and (c).....). This paradoxical relation, where identity becomes the cause for difference, where the 'otherness' of *saṁvṛti* with respect of *paramārtha* is caused by *paramārtha's* absolute non-otherness—different from the relative non-otherness of *saṁvṛti*—is expressed by Eckhart's *Gottheit* who/that is distinct because of his/its absolute indistinction.[86]

As *pratītyasamutpāda* was not conceivable without its counterpart *śūnyatā*, so *saṁvṛti* is not conceivable without *paramārtha*. Nāgārjuna writes in the *Kārikās* (XXIV, 10): "Without relying on everyday practices, the absolute truth cannot be expressed. Without approaching the absolute truth, *nirvāṇa* cannot be attained." The *Cun-lun* also says: "if not dependent on the usual way of expression (*vyavahāra*) *paramārtha* cannot be taught" (Walleser translates "...*wenn nicht abhängig von der gewöhnlichen Ausdrucksweise* (vyavahāra), *ist eben der höchste Sinn* (paramārtha) *nicht zu lehren*).[87]

Being *paramārtha* and *saṁvṛti* governed by *pratītyasamutpāda*, we have not only two but four terms in our scheme (A), and we have two possible ways of arranging them (i) as a progressive series going from

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saṁvṛti→paramārtha→nirvāṇa, or (ii) in a circular non-causal way, that comprises the scheme (A) as well as the two new elements ; in this case, we may assume that the diagram (A) belongs to the relam of *paramārtha* (since it supposedly describes correctly the relations of emptiness and dependent origination), and that this is opposed to the realm of *saṁvṛti* :



This opposition, however, is governed by another instance of *pratītyasamutpāda* (psp_3), and so on, *ad infinitum*. But, as we saw before, the relations are not only of dependence, but also of identity: one term defines the others, but it also defines itself. Dependent origination depends upon dependent origination, *śūnyatā* depends on *śūnyatā*; *śūnyatā* defines everything and itself.

Self-definition is, it has been shown, at the core of the *non-aliud* of Cusanus. The perfect definition is that "which defines itself and everything", and being a definition "non-other than a definition", the 'non-other' becomes the definition of itself and of everything. The way by which Nāgārjuna and Nicolaus arrived at this conclusion (explicit in Cusanus, implicit in Nāgārjuna) is remarkably similar. Both started by rejecting a basic opposition ; in the case of Nāgārjuna it was the refusal to consider *nirvāṇa* different from *saṁsāra* ; for Nicolaus, it was the attempt to recognise the dialectic coexistence of oneness (*unitas*) and otherness (*alteritas*) in what he called God, *unum, idem, non-aliud, possest*.[88] Both attempts went against the mainstream of the tradition within which they were working.[89] Both attempts resulted in a tense paradox. For the *mādhyamikas* it conduced to the rejection of the four noble truths—thus, Āryadeva said that there is liberation only according to *saṁvṛti*.[90] It conduced also to the rejection of any difference between *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa* : "There is no *nirvāṇa* at all (*es gibt überhaupt kein* nirvāṇa), and since there is no *nirvāṇa* there is no *saṁsāra* either.[91] "There is nothing whatsoever which differentiates *saṁsāra* from *nirvāṇa*.../the extreme limit

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(*koṭi*) of *nirvāṇa* is also the extreme limit of *saṁsāra*" (MMK XXV, 19-20). This way of thinking forced them to consider *nirvāṇa* as different from being and non-being,[92] using expressions not unlike those used by the neoplatonic philosophers, Dionysius, Eriugena, Nicolaus.

The *mādhyamikas*' treatment of the *nirvāṇa* problem is particularly relevant for our study. For the *mādhyamikas*, the *nirvāṇa* problem is seen in the more vast context of thinking, opposites, affirmation and negation. Refusing to talk[93] about the 'bliss' of a dubious absolute, they said, as Candrakīrti in his *Prasannapadā* : "He (the wise who knows rightly the four Noble Truths) does not negate or affirm (*āvyuhati, nirvyūhati*) any *dharma*, therefore his thought depends on nothing in the three spheres of the universe."[94] Or, as Nāgārjuna in the *Yukti-saṣṭikā* : "Separated from the both extremes (lit., shores) the wise has nothing upon what to rely" (similar statements can be found in the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, so that we are entitled to speak of a "*Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon*)".[95]

For Nicolaus Cusanus, our 'thinking' about God has as condition the darkness of the *docta ignorantia*; the opposites of being and non-being are seeing as the contradictories that merge in the *coincidentia oppositorum*; what is more important, however, is that the way that goes from opposition to the self-reference of the paradox leads finally to the self-definition of tautology : *non-aliud est non aliud quam non-aliud*, emptiness is empty, *śūnyatā* is non-other than *sūnyatā*: *Was sich nicht selbst annihilirt, ist nichts werth.*[97]

Notes

1. On Gregory of Nyssa cf. Walther Völker, *Gregor von Nyssa als Mystiker*, Wiesbaden 1955 ; Endre von Ivánka, Vom Platonismus zur Theorie der Mystik (1936), reprinted in Kurt Ruh (ed.), *Altdeutsche und altniederländische Mystik*, Darmstadt 1964.

2. For this 'neoplatonic' current in Christian mysticism see Clemens Baeumker, Der Platonismus in Mittelalter (1916), reprinted in his *Studien und Charakteristiken zur Geschichte der Philosophie insbesondere des Mittelalters*, Münster i. W. 1925, pp. 139-179 ; Josef Koch, Augustinischer und Dionysischer Neuplatonismus und das Mittelalter, *Kant-Studien* 48, 1956/57, reprinted in his *Kleine Schriften*, I, Roma 1973, pp. 3-25 ; Koch, *Platonismus im Mittelalter*, Krefeld 1948 (Kölner Universitätsreden 4) ; Raymond Klibansky, *The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition during the Middle Ages*, London 1950 ; Klibansky, Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, *Mediaeval and Renaissance*

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Studies I, 1943, pp. 281-333; Werner Beierwaltes (ed.), *Platonismus in der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Darmstadt 1969. For medieval, especially German mysticism see, K. Ruh, *Altdeutsche . . .*; Josef Bernhart, *Die philosophische Mystik des Mittelalters*, München 1922, rep. Darmstadt 1974, F.-W. Wentzlaff-Eggebert, *Deutsche Mystik zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit*, Berlin 1968 (3d. edition); Dietrich Mahnke, *Unendliche Sphäre und Allmittelpunkt Beiträge zur Genealogie der mathematischen Mystik*, Halle 1937.

3. Cf. Walther Völker, *Kontemplation und Ekstase bei Pseudo Dionysius Areopagita*, Wiesbaden 1958; Koch, Augustinischer . . . , p. 6, note 6.

4. On Eriugena see, M. Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Érigène, son oeuvre, sa pensée*, Louvain 1933, rep. 1964; *De divisione naturae* is now being critically edited, *Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae, PERIPHYSEON (De Divisione Naturae)*, Edited by I.P. Sheldon–Williams, The Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968 (*Liber Primus*), 1972 (*Liber Secundus*).

5. The classical comparative study is Rudolf Otto, *West-östliche Mystik*, 1926, second ed. 1929, third 1971; D.T. Suzuki, *Mysticism, Christian and Buddhist*, New York 1957; Sh. Ueda, *Die Gottesgeburt in der Seele und der Durchbruch zur Gottheit. Die mystische Anthropologie Meister Eckharts und ihre Konfrontation mit der Mystik des Zen-Buddhismus*, Gütersloh 1965.

6. See the bibliography given in note 51.

7. On Weigel see Alexandre Koyré, *Mystiques, spirituels, alchimistes du XVIe siècle allemand*, Paris 1932, reference to Weigel in Wentzlaff-Eggebert, Nambara (cf. infra).

8. On Bohme see A. Koyré, *La philosophie de Jakob Böhme*, Paris 1929; Ernst Benz, *Der vollkommene Mensch nach Jacob Boehme*, Stuttgart 1937; Günther Graf zu Solms-Rödelheim, *Die Grundvorstellungen Jacob Böhmes und ihre Terminologie*, Diss., München 1960; Gerhard Wehr, *Jakob Böhme*, Hamburg 1971 (good bibliography).

9. Augustine, epist. 130, XV, 28 "*Est ergo in nobis quaedam, ut ita dicam, docta ignorantia, sed docta spiritu dei*", quoted by Josef Stallmach, Zusammenfall der Gegensätze und die Philosophie des Nichtwissens, in Cornelio Fabro (ed.), *Gegenwart und Tradition. Eine Festschrift für Bernhard Lakebrink*, Freiburg 1969, p. 95, note 3; cf. also Völker, *Gregor von Nyssa*, p. 200; Joachim Ritter, *Docta ignorantia. Die Theorie des Nichtwissens bei Nicolaus Cusanus*, Leipzig-Berlin 1927, p. 2.

10. Cf. von Ivánka, Vom platonismus. . . , p. 57.

11. v. Ivánka, p. 61 (P.G. 44, 809B).

12. Klibansky, *Continuity . . .*, p. 25; Koch, *Platonismus . . .*, pp. 18-20.

13. Koch, Augustinischer und Dionysischer . . . , p. 5.

14. M. Nambara, Die Idee des absoluten Nichts in der deutschen Mystik und seine Entsprechungen im Buddhismus, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* VI, 1960, p. 184.

15. On the language of Dionysius see P. Scazzoso, *Ricerche sulla struttura del linguaggio dello Pseudo-Dionigi Areopagita*, Milano 1967; L. Grondjis, La terminologie métalogique dans la theologie dionysienne, *Actes du Premier*

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Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale, Louvian-Paris 1960, pp. 335-346.

16. Scazzoso, *Ricerche . . .*, p. 41.
17. For the concept of 'apophatic theology' in the Areopagita see Scazzoso, pp. 113-114 : "l' apofatismo é un' attitudine religiosa che rifiuta sistematicamente di formulare dei concetti sulle verita divina, é una teologia mistica, cioé visuta . . . " (p. 114). Is, however, apophatism always a 'religious' attitude?
18. On the tradition of blinding light, see H.—Ch. Puech, La tenebre mystique chez Pseudo-Denys et dans la tradition patristique, *Études carmélitaines* 23e annee, vol. II, pp. 33-53.
19. Cf. Koch, Augustinischer . . . , p. 17.
20. Cf. Grondjis, La terminologie métalogique . . . , pp. 342-343.
21. Cf. Scazzoso, *Ricerche . . .*, pp. 22, 38-39, 42.
22. Scazzoso, pp. 41-42.
23. Jean Vanneste, *Le mystère de Dieu. Essai sur la structure rationelle de la doctrine mystique du Paseudo-Denys l' Aréopagita*, Bruges 1959, *passim.*
24. For a comparison with the *negatio negationis* of Proclus see Werner Beierwattes, *Proklos. Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*, Frankfurt 1965, pp. 361-366, and the Exkurs IV, pp. 395-398.
25. On the apophatic and cataphatic theology in Eriugena see Cappuyns, *Jean Scot Erigène*, pp. 324-325 ; C. Allegro, *Giovanni Scoto Eriugena*, Roma, 1974, pp. 291 ff.
26. On the *docta ignorantia* see Allegro, pp. 343-345.
27. See note 4.
28. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, Das Problem des absoluten Selbstbewusstseins bei Johannes Scotus Eriugena, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 73, 1965-1966, pp. 264-284, reprinted in *Platonismus in der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, pp. 488 ff.
29. Cf. Beierwaltes, Das Problem . . . , p. 491.
30. Cf. Cappuyns, pp. 332-333 ; Nambara, Die Idee . . . , p. 190 ;
31. Cf. Beierwaltes, Das Problem . . . , p. 495.
32. On the 'super-' see Cappuyns, p. 327.
33. On the 'what' of God see Beierwaltes, Das Problem . . . , p. 500; Nambara, p. 196 ; Cappuyns, p. 343 ; see also Ueda, *Die Gottesgeburt* . . . pp. 115, 117.
34. Cf. Cappuyns, pp. 343 ff. ; Koch Augustinischer . . ., pp. 19-20.
35. Cf. Beierwaltes, Das Problem . . . , pp. 514-515.
36. The problem of 'Identity and Difference' has been the object of the researches of W. Beierwaltes, see Andersheit. Zur neuplatonischen Struktur einer Problemgeschichte, *Le néoplatonisme*, Paris 1971, pp. 365-372; Andersheit. Grundriss einer neuplatonischen Begriffsgeschichte, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte* XVI, 1972, pp. 166-197 ; *Identität und Differenz. Zum Prinzip cusanischen Denkens*, Opladen 1977.

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37. Cf. Beierwaltes, Das Problem . . . , p. 493 ; Cappuyns, p. 348.

38. Eckhart's language is studied by Josef Quint, Mystik und Sprache. Ihr Verhältnis zueinander insbesondere in der spekulativen Mystik Meister Eckharts, *Deutsche Viertelsjahrsschrift* XXVII, 1953, pp. 48-74, reprinted in K. Ruh (ed.), *Altdeutsche* . . . , pp. 113-151 ; H. Kunisch, Die mittelalterliche Mystik und die deutsche Sprache, *Kleine Schriften*, Berlin 1968, pp. 21-77 ; the article by U. Nix, Sprache und Mystik, *Muttersprache* 72, 1962, pp. 129-135 need not be considered.

39. Gustav Landauer, *Skepsis und Mystik. Versuche im Anschluss an Mauthners Sprachkritik*, Köln 1923, second ed., (first published, Berlin 1903), p. 5. The study of the language of mysticism seen in the context of the current 'crisis' of language remains to be done ; for a study of the early twentieth century background (Hugo von Hofmannsthal's *Lord Chandos Letter*, Mauthner, etc.) see Alfred Liede, *Dichtung als Spiel. Studdien zur Unsinnpoesie an den Grenzen der Sprache*, Berlin 1963; Joachim Kühn, *Gescheitere Sprachkritik. Fritz Mauthners Leben und Werk, Berlin 1975*; *Walter Eschenbacher, Fritz Mauthner und die deutsche Literatur um 1900. Eine Untersuchung zur Sprachkrise der Jahrhundertwende*, Frankfurt-Berne 1977.

40. Cf. Kunisch pp. 28-29 on the *Sprachfeinddichkeit* ; Quint, *passim.*

41. Quoted by Quint, p. 131.

42. Cf. Quint, pp. 142 ff. ; we have not been able to use H. Kunisch, *Das Wort "Grund" in der Sprache der deutschen Mystik des 14. und 15. Jahrhunderts* Osnabrück 1929.

43. The *Seelengrund* has a long history in neoplatonic and Christian mysticism; the concept can be found in Gregory of Nyssa as the *apex mentis*, cf. v. Ivánka, Der 'Apex Mentis', *Platonismus in der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, pp. 121-146 ; for its appearance in Proclus see Beierwaltes, Der Begriff des 'unum in nobis' bei Proklos, Miscellanea Mediaevalia II, Berlin 1963, pp. 255-266; *Proklos*, pp. 376-377 ; The *Seelengrund* is the *scintilla animae*, the *Fünklein.*

44. Quint, p. 142.

45. Quint, p. 143 ; Ueda, *Die Gottesgeburt* . . . , p. 115.

46. Quint, p. 145.

47. For the relation *Gott/Gottheit* see Ueda, p. 114 ; the abstraction in Eckhart's language is discussed by Kunisch, pp. 30-33.

48. Ueda, p. 116.

49. Ueda, p. 118 ; Nambara, *Die Idee* . . . , p. 198.

50. J. Quint, Meister Eckhart, *Deutsche Predigten und Traktate*, München 1969, Predigt 46, p. 371.

51. The bibliography on Cusanus has grown considerably in the last few years; for a list of publications, see the *Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft*, Mainz ; a history of Cusanus scholarship can be found in K. Jacobi, *Die Methoden der cusanischen Philosophie*, Freiburg-München 1969, and in G. Santinello, *Idtroduzione a Nicolò Cusano*, Bari 1971, pp. 143-160.

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Cusanus' writings are being published by the *Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*; we have used the *editio minor*, Nikolaus von Kues, *Philosophisch-theologische Schriften*, Herausgegeben von Leo Gabriel, Übersetzt von Dietlind und Wilhelm Dupré, Studien-und Jubiläumsausgabe Lateinisch-Deutsch, 3 Bände Wien 1964-1967. This being a rather short paper, we have not discussed the recent publications on Nicolaus, we expect to do that in a larger study. Some of the recent books on Cusanus are *Nicolò da Cusa, Relazioni tenute al Convegno Interuniversitario di Bressanone nel 1960*, Firenze 1962 (*-Nicolò da Cusa 1962*) ; *Nicolò Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno. Atti del Congreso internazionale in ocasioni del V centenario dalla morte di Nicolò Cusano* (Bressanone 6-10 settembre 1964), Firenze 1970 (*-Nicolò Cusano 1970*) ; Marcel Reding, *Die Aktualität des Nikolaus Cusanus*, Berlin 1964 ; Mariano Alvarez-Gómez, *Die verborgene Gegenwart des Unendlichen bei Nikolaus von Kues*, München-Salzburg 1968 , S. Dangelmayr, *Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesbegriff in den philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues*, Meisenheim/Glan 1969 ; G. Schneider, *Gott—das Nichtandere*, Münster 1970 ; P. Sandor, *Nikolaus Cusanus*, Berlin-Budapest 1971 ; E. Fräntzki, *Nikolaus von Kues und das Problem der absoluten Subjektivität*, Meisenheim 1972 ; K. Flasch, *Die Metaphysik des Einen bei Nikolaus von Kues*, Leiden 1973 ; J. E. Biechler, *The Religious Language of Nicholas of Cusa*, Missoula 1975.

52. For the influence of Eckhart on Cusanus H. Wackerzapp, see *Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts auf die ersten Philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues*, Münster 1962 ; J. Koch Nikolaus von Kues und Meister Eckhart, *MFCG* 4, 1964, pp. 164-173.

53. For the influences of Dionysius on Cusanus see Ludwig Baur, Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps. Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemerkungen des Cusanus, *Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Phil.—hist. Klasse, Jahrg. 1940/41, 4. Abh. ; the connections between Cusanus and Proclus have been studied by Raymond Klibansky, Ein Proklos-Fund und seine Bedeutung, *SBH* 1928/29., 5. Abh., his views have been corrected by Rudolf Haubst, Die Thomas—und Proklos-Exzerpte des "Nicolaus Treverensis" in Codicillus Strassburg 84, *MFCG* 1, 1961, pp. 17-51.

54. Cf. H. Védrine, L' influence de Nicolaus de Cues sur Giordano Bruno, *Nicolò Cusano 1970*, pp. 211-223.

55. See note 9, Ritter, Stallmach, and the references to the *docta ignorantia* in the authors quoted in note 51.

56. For Eckhart's *negatio negationis* see Nambara, p. 227 ; the influence of Proclus was assumed by Klibansky, Ein Proklos-Fund .. ; *Continuity...*, p. 26 ; cf. Koch, *Platonismus*, pp. 29-30.

57. Beierwaltes, *Proklos*, pp. 361 ff., 395 ff.

58. Beierwaltes, Deus oppositio oppositorum, *Salzburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie* VIII, 1964, pp. 175-185.

59. For the history of the concept see Ernst Hoffmann, Die Vorgeschichte der cusanischen coincidentia oppositorum, *Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues*, Heft 2, *Über den Beryll*, Leipzig 1938, pp. 1-35. The concept is studied in P.

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Wilpert, Das Problem der coincidentia oppositorum in der Philosophie des Nikolaus von Kues, *Humanismus, Mystik und Kunst in der Welt des Mittelalters*. Leinden-Köln 1953, pp. 39-55 ; J. Stallmach, Zusammenfall der Gegensätze! Das Prinzip der Dialektik bei Nikolaus von Kues, *MFCG* 1, 1961, pp. 52-75, Stallmach, Zusammenfall der Gegensätze und die Philosophie des Nichtwissens. *Lakebrink Festschrift ;* S. Caramella, Unita ideale e coincidenza reale degli opposti nel pensiero di Nicoló da Cusa, *Nicolò da Cusa* 1962, pp. 17-28 ; G. Klaus, Das Prinzip der coincidentia oppositorum un der logische und dialektische Widerspruch, *Nikolaus von Kues*, Berlin (DDR) 1965, pp. 23-31.

60. Cf. Kurt Flasch, *Die Metaphysik des Einen, passim.*

61. Cf. Wilpert. Das Problem . . ., pp. 39 ff. ; G. Schneider, *Gott—das Nichtandere*, p. 73, note 92 ; the problem of God as the *coincidenta*, and beyond or above it, is discussed by Flasch, *Die Metaphysik . . .*, where he shows that already in *De docta ignorantia* (1440) God is considered to be above the opposites, *supra omnem oppositionem*, p. 173, note 1.

62. On this passage see Stallmach, Zusammenfall der Gegensätze. pp. 68, 71 ; Schneider *Gott . . .*, p. 85.

63. Part of the *Dialogus de genesi* has been edited, commented and translated by Marcel reding (*Die Aktualität des Nikolaus Cusanus*, Berlin 1964) ; we owe to the Seminar of Prof. Reding (Freie Universitat Berlin, SS 1972) our introduction to the thought of Nicolaus Cusanus.

64. Cf. Wackerzapp, *Der Einfluss Meister Eckharts . . .*, pp. 106-107.

65. Schneider, *Gott—das Nichtandere* : "*. . .die cusanische Philosophie, genauer gesagt die cusanische Metaphysik in ihrer "Jagd nach Weisheit" von der coincidentia oppositorum hinbewegt zum non-aliud. Das besagt andererseits aber auch, dass aus dem richtigen Verständnis des Nichtanderen als einem angestrebten Ziel die Lehre vom Zusammenfall der Gegensätze erst vollgültig einsichtig werden kann.*"

66. On 'otherness' see the articles by Beierwaltes (note 36) ; E.A. Wyller, Zum Begriff "Non aliud" bei Cusanus, *Nicolò Cusano 1970*, pp. 419-443; K. Bormann, Zur Lehre des Nikolaus von Kues von der "Andersheit" und deren Quellen, *MFCG* 10, 1973, pp. 130-137.

67. On the *non-aliud* see Wyller, Zum Begriff "Non aliud" bei Cusanus ; Beierwaltes Cusanus und Proklos. Zum neuplatonischen Ursprung des non aliud, *Nicolò Cusano 1970*, pp. 137-140 ; E. Gutwenger, Das "Nichtandere" bei Nikolaus von Kues, *Cusanus Gedächtnisschrift*, Insbruck-München 1970 ; G. v. Bredow, Gott der Nichtandere. Erwägungen zur Interepretation der cusanischen Philosophie, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 73, 1965, pp. 15-22) (see also notes 36 and 66) ; it is interesting to notice the use of both '*der' Nichtandere* and '*das' Nichtandere* : a simple article shows the basic position interpreter ; '*der*' is the 'personal' God, '*das*' is the 'principle'.

68. On the "Four Noble Truths" in general see, E. Lamotte, *Histoire du Bouddhisme indien*, I, Louvain 1958, pp. 29 ff. ; E. Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India*, London 1962, pp 34 ff. ; A Bareau, Der indische Buddhismus- *Die Religionen Indiens* III, Stuttgart 1964, pp. 32 ff.

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69. *Majjhima nikāya, sutta* 72, in H.C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*. p. 123.

70. Nyanatiloka, *Buddhist Dictionary*, Colombo 1972, pp. 51-53.

71. Warren, pp. 333.

72. For similar paradoxical statements in the Pāli canon see Luis O. Gómez, Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon, *Philosophy East and West* XXVI, 2, 1976, pp. 137-165.

73. The literature on *nirvāṇa* is vast ; for a general, and imperfect overview see G.R. Welbon, *The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters*, Chicago 1969 ; the classic works are Louis de Vallée Poussin, Nirvana, Paris 1925 (and numerous articles) ; Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, Leningrad 1927 (and reprints). The *nirvāṇa* problem has to be seen in the context of the 'Absolute' in Buddhism, on this problem see Andre Bareau, *L' absolu en philosophie bouddhique*, Paris 1951 ; H. von Glasenapp, *Buddhismus und Gottesidee*, Mainz 1954; Luis O. Gómez, Consideraciones en torno al absoluto de los budistas, *Estudios de Asia y Africa* X, 2, 1975. The 'Absolute' of the *mādhyamikas* has been the object of a heated controversy ; the main articles are, La Vallée Poussin, Réflexions sur le madhyamika, *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* II, 1933, pp. 4—59 ; Buddhica, *Harvard Journal of Oriental Studies* III, 2, 1938 ; S. Schayer, Das mahayanistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Mādhyamikas, *Orientalische Literaturzeitung* 1935, col. 401-415 ; Stcherbatsky, Die drei Richtungen in der Philosophie des Buddhismus, *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny* X, 1934, pp. 1-37 (La Vallée Poussin's Schayer's and Stcherbatsky's articles are part of a fascinating discussion in which positions have been reversed in the most surprising ways : the proteic 'absolute' has resisted all attempts of characterization ; the discussion itself deserves to be studied if only to show the ways in which an anti-concept deals with its interpreters); J. W. de Jong, Le problème de l'absolu dans l'école Madhyamaka ; *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger* CXL: 1950, pp. 323-327 ; J. May, La philosophie bouddhique de la vacuité. *Studia philosophica* xviii, 1958, pp. 123-137 (there is an English translation) ; F. Tola and C. Dragonetti, La doctrina del vacío en la escuela Madhyamaka y el Hastavalanamaprakarana, *Revista Latinoamericana de Fitosofía* III, 2, 1977, pp. 159-175.

74. La Valée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, p. 68.

75. *ibid.*, p. 70

76. On *śūnyatā*, see the articles mentioned in note 73 ; see also Linnart Mäll, Une approche possible du śūnyavāda *Tel Quel* 32 1968, pp. 55-62. General expositions of the *śúnyavāda* are T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London 1955 ; Vicente Fatone, *El Budismo "Nihilista"*, La Plata 1941 (reprinted Buenos Aires 1962 ; also in *Obras Completas* II, Buenos Aires 1972) ; F. Streng, *Emptiness*, Nashville-New York 1967 ; R. Robinson, *Early Madhyamaka in India and China*, Madison 1967 (Delhi 1976) ; K.V. Ramanan, *Nagarjuna's Philosophy*, Tokyo 1966 (Varanasi 1971).

77. J. May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛttī*, Paris 1959, pp. 222-223.

78. Cf. Luis O. Gómez, *Consideraciones* : *"No se quiere sustituir la piedra del animista, un fetiche hecho centro del universo, con el nirvana sutilísimo, no menos*

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fetiche, no menos objeto de appropiación" p. 121.

79. Nāgārjuna. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikas* XXIV, 18, Streng p. 213.

80. *Prasannapadā*, May p. 237

81. Friedrich Walleser, *Die Mittlere Lehre des Nāgārjuna. Nach der chinesischen Version übertragen*, Heidelberg 1912, p. 160.

82. *ibid.*, p. 161.

83. Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartanī* XXIX, translated by K. Bhattacharya, *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1, 1971, pp. 217-261 (p. 237)

84. *Vigrahavyāvartanī* LXIII, p. 255.

85. On the problem of 'Two Truths' see Mervyn Sprung (ed.), *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, Dordrecht 1973.

86. Cf. Maurice de Gandillac, La "dialectique" de Maitre Eckhart, *La mystique rhénane* (*Colloque de Strasbourg* 1961) Paris 1963, p. 87.

87. Walleser, *Die Mittlere Lehre* . . .. pp. 158-159.

88. On the names of God in the writings of Nicolaus Cusanus see S. Dangelmayr, *Gotteserkenntnis und Gottesbegriff in den philosophischen Schriften des Nikolaus von Kues* pp. 161 ff, ; on the name as *aenigma* see Beierwaltes. *Identität und Differenz. Zumprinzip cusanischen Denkens*, pp. 15 ff.

89. For the proto-mādhyamika see the illuminating article by Gómez; the doctrine of 'emptiness' is already present in the *prajñāpāramita* literature, where we also find a tireless use of paradoxes (cf. *prajñāpāramita in 700 lines*). Cusanus was not isolated, he could quote Dionysius to defend himself against any charge of heresy; on the other hand, he was in the non-christian tradition of Proclus, and in the heretical tradition of the condemned Eckhart and Eriugena.

90. Āryadeva, *Sataśāstra* X, translated by G. Tucci, *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Baroda 1929, p. 89 : "On account of the refutation of Nirvana, there is no liberation : how is it possible to say that man obtains liberation ? (We say that) there is liberation only according to the worldly truth" ; there is an Italian translation also by Tucci, '*Le cento* strofe, (*catacastra*), *Studi e Materiali di Storia delle religioni* I, 1925, pp. 66 ff. : ". . . siccome (è stato confutato il nirvana, non c'é liberazione ; come mai si puo dire che gli uomini ottengono liberazione? Nella verità mundana si dice che (esiste) la liberazione." (p. 189)

91. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, translated by S. Schayer, Ausgewählte *Kapitel au der Prasannapadā*, Krakowie 1931, p. 96.

92. Cf. Erich Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin 1958. p. 174 : "*Und vor allem ist es (das nirvana) weder seiend noch nicht seiend, da Sein und Nichtsein als gegensätzliche Begriffe der Welt der Abhängigkeit angehoren.*"

93. B.S. Yadav, Negation, Nirvāna and Nonsense, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* XLV/4, 1977, pp. 451-471.

94. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*, Schayer p. 107 :"*Er (der Weise der die edlen Wahrheiten richtig erkennt), postuliert und negiert āvyūhati nirvyūhati) keinen dharma,*

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und weil er nichts postuliert und nichts negiert, deshalb haftet sein Denken an nichts in den drei Sphären des Universums. Als irreal (-ungeworden, ajāta) *betrachtet er die drei Sphären des Universums. Das ist die ausführliche Darlegung.*"

95. Nāgārjuna, *Yukti-sastika*, translated by Phil. Schäffer, Heidelberg 1923, p. 8 : "*Getrennt von den zwei Extremen* (koti), *dem Sein und Nichtsein, hat der Wissende nichts, worauf er sich stützt.*" A typical paradoxical statement of the *Yukt-sastika* is "*Der Wissende sieht die Wesenheit als nicht wesenhaft an* (p. 13) ; the result of this is absolute peace : "*Der Wissende streitet* nicht" (pp. 17-18). The paralysis of the Wise One has to be studied in a context wider than that of Buddhism or what is called 'mysticism' ; we have mentioned the critique of language (Mauthner, Landauer), but we could also mention the 'mystical' language of Beckett (*The Unnamable, 13 Texts for Nothing*), or the mental vacuum of the heroes of John Barth.

96. See note 72.

97. Friedrich Schlegel, *Literary Notebooks* 1797-1801, edited by Hans Eicher, London 1957, p. 89. The romantic sesnsibility shares with the buddhist the desire for an 'absolute' that disproves itself. Only a very provincial approach to the study of 'mysticism' can speak of the "Wisdom of the East" and other similar platitudes. This provincialism is particularly obvious in certain studies of Zen, where we do not find references to the Indian roots (*Mādhyamaka, Kālacakra*) of many supposedly original features of Zen (antinomian tendencies, irrationalism, etc ; on the whole complex see H. Hoffmann, Die Polaritätslehre des späten Buddhismus, *Eranos Jahrbuch* XXXVI, 1967, Zürich 1968, pp. 361-378). Another area, only recently explored is that of the confluence of buddhism with the gnostic systems of the west, on that see E. Conze, Buddhism and Gnosis, *Le origini dello Gnosticismo* (Colloquio di Messina 1966), Leiden 1970, pp. 651-667 ; Hans-Joachim Klimkeit, Manichäische und buddhistische Beichtformeln aus Turfan. Beobachtungen zur Beziehung zwischen Gnosis und Mahāyāna, *Zeitschrift für Religions— und Geistesgeschichte* XXIX, 3, 1977, pp. 193-228.

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4

Aspects of the Indian and Western Traditions of Formal Logic and Their Comparisons

DOUGLAS DUNSMORE DAYE

I. INTRODUCTION

AS the title indicates, there are three conceptual components of the objects of this article. First, there is the Indian tradition of formal logic (nyāya, hetu-vidyā, particularly, inference, anumāna); second, there is the "Western" (Greek-European-Anglo-American) tradition of formal logic, with particular emphasis upon many 20th century developments applied to Indian logic; third, there are the extremely important methodological presuppositions embedded in comparative aspects between the first and second. I have also used the qualifier "some" because it seems obvious that the generalizations required here which range over a variety of controversial points and which lack extensive textual documentation and detailed arguments allow the author relatively little opportunity to exhaust the many philosophical points generated. In other words, as with all *surveys* of philosophical controversies, more questions will be generated than will answers be given.[1]

In Section I, I shall introduce the field briefly, sketch some logical features of its major periods and its scholarly background in the East European and global contexts. In Section II, I shall comment on methodological problems inherent in 20th century comparative inquiries; in Section III, I briefly note four methodological phases in the history of the scholarly literature since 1900. In Section IV, I offer an example of an inference schema (parārthānumāna) and two translations, one with syllogistic (Section V), and one with the predicate calculus (Section VI). Two examples of *metalogical* incompatibilities (Sections VII and VIII) are examined prior to my final comments concerning the heuristic uses of comparative logic (Section IX). Finally I briefly discuss rationality and the logic in the global context (Section X).

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In viewing the seventeen-hundred-year span of the *systematic* Indian development of inference (anumāna), the English word "logic" has been widely used as the target word for translating the Sanskrit words "nyāya (i.e. analytical methodology in the post-2nd century Sanskrit literature), hetu-vidyā ("knowledge of the justification-member [of inference schema]"), anumāna (inferences), etc." "Logic" has been used in three general senses; first it has been used to denote any generally systematic, cohesive point of view held by Indian philosophers; second, it has been used to denote the particular methodological and stylistic characteristics of those Indian scholars of the post-second century (A.D.) pramāṇa vāda tradition (the doctrines of the means and sources of legitimate knowledge); third, it has been used to denote the specific *Nyāya Darśana* (systematic school), one among the traditionally organized "six major Hindu" philosophical schools.[2] In the second sense, the word "logic" denotes the three major historical components in the Indian philosophical tradition, namely the Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina. Only the Hindu and Jaina traditions remain in India today; Buddhism, as a living and developing philosophical tradition, died out in India by about 1,000 A.D. although it was imported into Tibet, China, Korea and Japan. The Buddhist logical (pramāṇa vāda) tradition flourished in Tibet; but in China and Japan, the two logical texts translated had little impact,[3] and although they were preserved as acts of religious merit (puṇya), the logical tradition died out. On the other hand, the Hindu and Jaina traditions have been preserved to the present day; there are paṇḍitas (traditional scholars) alive today in India who still possess and are continuing to transmit the logical traditions; however there are some who suggest that the tradition is dwindling greatly as the attention of most young Indians turn to more contemporary interests such as the hard sciences.

It should also be pointed out that although the Buddhist and the Hindu traditions of logic have been relatively well surveyed by international scholars in this century, they certainly have not been fully analyzed nor even widely translated into modern languages. For example, the Jaina *logical* tradition has received *relatively* little scholarly attention.[4] Among some of the younger Indian scholars there have been a few significant attempts to combine traditional Sanskrit education (the paṇḍita tradition) with the modern international scholarly tradition, and as a consequence a few comparative studies are gradually becoming available. A liberal guess would be that perhaps very little of the *pramāṇa vāda* texts have been translated (and some with meagre evidence of a knowledge of formal logic on the part of the translators !). The obvious absence of diacronic studies of particular logical topics (and other epistemological, ontological topics concomitant

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in the pramāṇa vāda traditions) offer almost unlimited avenues of comparative research, be they of intra-Indian or of international origins.

The Indian tradition will be divided into three general periods: the Early period (200 A.D.—600 A.D.), the Mature period (600 A.D.—1200A.D.), and the New Logic (Navya-Nyāya) period (1200 A.D.—1700 A.D.). The first period is clearly marked by the development of stylized argumentation (and thus a proto-formalism) from debating (vāda) conventions such as is found in the *Nyāya Sūtra* (s).[5] The development was from the general sequences of debate to a rule-governed ten-membered (and then a five-membered) logical schema (anumāna). Because Sanskrit, as with many other languages, does not require an explicit copula (some finite form of the verb "to be"), the first two members of the five-membered anumāna (below) are usually described as ascripts; the remaining three members are assertions (an interesting definitional problem in itself). The well worn example is : (i) "the mountain (is) fire-possessing"; (ii) "because (it possesses) smoke"; (iii) "where there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen"; (iv) (this mountain) is similar (to that, i.e. it possesses fire); (v) "therefore, that (the mountain) is similar to that, i.e. it possesses fire.)" The obvious tendency to take iii-v as somehow a representation of *Modus Ponens* has been difficult for most scholars to resist.[6] However, in the Mature period the five-membered anumāna was reduced to three, consisting of i, ii and iii above. Obvious complications arise with the (implicit functor) "because" and the implicit relationship between ii and iii (see Section VIII), and in combination, their relationships to the conclusion, "the mountain is fire-possessing." It has been argued by some[7] that this is a mere argument by analogy because of the explicit requirement (see Section IV on the three forms of the justification) of the example ("kitchen") which (then) did not require the third universally quantified statement (dṛṣṭānta) of the concomitance between smoke and fire. The *sole* use of an example (without quantification) did justify that the argument was one of analogy; however, during the later part of the early period when the *universal* concomitance in iii was introduced, the example subsequently served merely to fix attention on the concomitance of the two properties found in the kitchen example and also found in the two other "members" of the anumāna, i.e. the alleged smoke and fire in iii (hetu[1]) and i (pakṣa[1]).

In the Mature period, particularly with the early Buddhist logician Dignāga (as will be illustrated in the example in Section V), two important distinctions were made. First, a distinction between raw perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna was made to resolve metaphysical and epistemological controversies;[8] second, a distinction was made between inference-for-one's-own-self (svārthānumāna) and inference-made-for-another

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(parārthānumāna). However, when one analyses a text[9] one discovers that the sufficient condition for a legitimate inference-for-others is the production of an inference-for-one's-self in the consciousness of the one who hears the inference-for-another. Thus this non-formal "psychologism" generates great logical and epistemological problems for those contemporary logicians who expect and argue very strongly that such introspective references which appeal to first-person descriptions should play no significant part in a fully formalized/formal logic. It also seems obvious that the well-known concept of formal deductive validity is not appropriate here. However, many scholars have tried to bend the word "validity" and apply it to the process of the legitimisation of the inference schema according to the implicit and explicit rules of the tradition,[10] e.g., the trirūpahetu ("Three Forms of the Justification" rule; see Section IV).

It is during this very active Mature period that we find the interchanges (sometimes very heated interchanges) between the various Hindu, Buddhist and Jaina schools. These greatly aided (1) the development of an ordinary-language metalogical theory; (2) an increasingly semi-formalized style of inference schemas; and (3) an emerging second-order set of metalogical cliches which function somewhat as variables do today (see Section V). Although it is this period in Indian logic which has received quite some attention, there still remain libraries of logical texts to be analysed and translated; there also remain many, many topics worthy of metalogical analysis which have failed to receive attention, particularly in comparison with the contemporary international traditions of logic. It has been only in the last few decades that scholars of the history of logic and of comparative logic have begun to find extremely interesting ancient theories which generate various metalogical controversies. These competing theories have been expressed, refuted and modified in the works of Hindu logicians such as Vātsyāyana, Uddyodaka and Udayana, the Buddhist logicians Dignāga,[11] Dharmakīrti,[12] Dharmottara[13] and Ratnakīrti.[14] Also an intimate part of the ongoing controversies of the Mature period were the Jaina logicians whose contributions have been relatively unrecognized and little explored; two recommenced figures easily available to contemporary scholars are those on Akalaṇka[15] and Vādi Devasūri.[16] In the latter-part of the Mature period there were introduced questions not only of epistemology, ontology, and formal logic, but also questions which are relative to more contemporary concerns such as the various *philosophies* of logic and the relationships between formal systems and natural languages.[17] These concerns, if not always recognized in the 20th century scholarly literature, are inescapable today with comparative inquiries.

The third period of Navya Nyāya (New Logic) represents an extremely

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significant shift in metalogical sophistication, formalistic complexity and precise organisation; a primary source is the thirteenth century logician Gangesopādhyāya whose work, the *Tattva-cintāmaṇi* exemplifies the later concentration upon the theory of inference and, in particular, the many definitions of logical concomitance (vyāpti). Buddhism had died out by this time and although these logicians owed much to the pre-Navya-Nyāya controversies, their energies were directed to such intra-Indian darśana traditions as Mīmāṁsa and Advaita and Dvaita Vedānta; their patterns of textual organisation, technical terminology and metalogical theories (expressed in difficult, highly compounded and specialized Sanskrit) strongly influenced the other Indian lineages, most of which have continued to the present day; this influence has been little explored.[18]

In this period we have a fully formal logic. Some of the important characteristics are the use of explicit variables, explicit rules for the evaluation of schemas, the sufficient conclusion (s) of which refer only to non-material internal structural relationships.

Also of interest are the extended uses of double negation, the concept of the locus of a property (dharma), "generic absence" (sāmānyābhāva) as a referential category which negates *any* particular of the genus of its opposite, the functional equivalent of DeMorgan's law and a type of intensional quantification accomplished by means of a hierarchy of properties and their "limitors" (avacchedaka[19]).

Thus within the 1700-year scope of these three periods the scholar may find a non-Western, independent developing system of generating inferences and their metalogical theories of evaluation which range from early proto-formal arguments by analogy to the highly sophisticated Navya-Nyāya literature.

II. THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF METHODOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS AND THE STATE OF SCHOLARSHIP

Although there was speculation before Aristotle about the theory of inference, syntax and semantics among the rhetoricians, mathematicians in such pre-Socratic philosophers as Parmenides, Zeno and the Sophists, when one compares the emergence of that tradition with the Indian, it does seem fair to say that formal logic emerged almost fully formalised with Aristotle with little formalised evidence of it before him. In India, the scholar may find the gradual, step-by-step emergence of both formal logic and various metalogical theories. This, of course, makes the tradition quite attractive as it (surprisingly) offers (many times) parallel problems and solutions from which one may compare the universal philosophical quest for rules for

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judging inferences and their concomitant metatheories. It is a historical accident that the western scholarly tradition has become aware of the Indian philosophers only during the latter half of the 19th century.[20] With a few obvious and brilliant exceptions, serious scholarship analysing Indian logic by those who possess *both* the necessary formalistic *and* philological backgrounds has (relatively speaking) just begun. Western logicians might remember that it was the great Polish logician Jan Lukasiewicz, a logician who knew both Greek *and* the philosophy of logic, who gave the Western intellectual tradition its first analysis (in 1950) of Aristotle suitable to legitimate contemporary expectations in spite of the abundance of Aristotelian scholarship.[21] In the early 20th century, philologists (understandably) and most philosophers knew very little metalogical theory (and *less* about those *peskey* modal functors Aristotle just would *not* stop discussing !); obviously, at any given time, those who are interested in the history of logic are fewer than those who practice *doing* logic. And although there have been a small number of international scholars interested in nyāya, there have been (again) even fewer scholars trained in logic who have examined the history of the Indian *formal* developments. A glance at the *history* of studies of Indian logic will provide a few exceptions, but it will also indicate that much of the work done until the post-World War II period has been done by those whose backgrounds were that of religion, philology or traditional Indology. It does seem obvious that these gaps are directly related to the sociology of scholarly knowledge. Even today, a glance at the graduate curricula of most universities and some knowledge concerning the *few* opportunities to combine Indology with studies in formal logic will indicate how hard and difficult these sociological and educational gaps have been to bridge. Hence, in the comparisons of Indian and modern "Western" logic, there is little history to this relatively new field of comparative logic; indeed, it may be a misnomer to call it a "field" at all. Although some studies have considered (in passing) the problems resulting from the expression of Indian inference schemas in modern notation, very few Indologists have analysed the (sometimes) incompatible metalogical *theories* which are even more important and attractive to the (comparative) historian of logic.

It has only been since the late post-Renaissance period, with the influence of such mathematicians as Boole, Venn, and Frege, that we find the strong mutual influences of mathematics and formal logic in the Western tradition; this modern influence of mathematics on logic was simply lacking in India. However, since the beginning of this century there has been widespread use of the non-Aristotelian "Classical" logic up to the period of the Second World War; and since 1950, mathematical logic has been

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widely used as a target language into which Indian inferences have been translated. Sometimes this has resulted in interesting and helpful studies; sometimes it has resulted in confusion and obscuration of those theories and controversies in the *philosophies* of logic which are of greater value to the comparative logician. Ideally, perhaps, each schema should be described in its own terminology; subsequently, each might then be translated by means of *explicit* transformation rules such that one knows clearly that what one has lost or gained in the process of formal translation. But these problems remain almost untouched in the scholarly journals and extremely few Indological scholars have examined these twin questions of comparative *philosophies* of logic and the legitimate conceptual traumas of translation.

Thus the problem of metalogical and methodological presuppositions must be made clear immediately or, as has been the case in most of the scholarly analyses of anumāna, the modern scholar implicitly assumes that 20th century logic is a *wholly* appropriate medium of formal description *and* that its theories of logic are compatible and nondistorting with respect to the Indian traditions. Although many of these assumptions *may* be proved correct, it is most important to note that that comparative metalogical case has *not yet been made*. I shall illustrate a few areas of possible obscuration and distortion. However, in order not to be considered critical of ideal-language methodology, I must add that obviously, the valuable clarity and precision so characteristic of contemporary logic, may be gained by the descriptive and/or heuristic uses of modern calculi as the target languages into which Indian inferences schemas may be translated.

It is also obvious that the western logical tradition has undergone great and conclusive changes since Boole, DeMorgan (both 1847) and Frege (1878); mathematics and its methodological analogues have been held to be the primary *model* into which Indian inference schemas should be translated and expressed. Although this particular modern emphasis[22] upon analytic arguments was (generally) true in the later Aristotle (but that it need not necessarily be so, one has only to contrast the two "logics" of the Aristotle of the *Topics* and the *Prior Analytics*), I think it is more accurate to say that the analogies between Indian nyāya, jurisprudence and debate (vāda) are much greater than those between Indian nyāya, and mathematics, analytic paradigms and much of contemporary logic. Epistemology, grammar, linguistics and debating rules were major influences on nyāya. For example, the meta/object language distinction was learned in the prior study of Sanskrit grammar[23] where it is clearly but implicitly distinguished; thus it was assumed in the metalogical discussions even in the earlier texts. However, since the 1880's there has been a very strong

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emphasis upon analytic arguments in the western tradition; while being highly fruitful, this has also generated highly specialised ideal-languages with relatively narrow ranges of application to inferences embedded in such *natural* languages as Greek, Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan. These relatively modern models and means of description are significantly different from what is found when one looks at the history of some ancient (and some European medieval) forms of logic in either the Indian, Chinese or the European-Anglo-American traditions.

One possible reason for this in the West may perhaps be the divergent developments in the sociology of knowledge in India and the Anglo-European-Greek lineage. As in the cases of nyāya and in the European pre-Renaissance and late medieval scholastic periods, the incorporation of mathematical, geometrical *models*, for the generation of inferences and their evaluative theories was generally excluded. By contrast, this was not so in all of ancient Greek but was the case in late and post-19th century Western logic. In India, the division between mathematics and epistemology and logic was severe; there was little mutual influence. Perhaps one may look to historical precedent concerning the rubrics of the organisation of "relevant" educational cultural models to account for the absence of the influence of mathematics on both nyāya and the development of some western logic. However, these metalogical and cross-cultural problems have remained almost untouched in the scholarly journals and extremely few scholars have even broached the difficult questions of comparative philosophies of logic and their social contexts.

These basic questions of methodological presuppositions, then, revolve about the extent to which any ideal-language analysis with its necessary and legitimate restrictions of the multiple semantic values of natural language terms does generate sufficiently and legitimately accurate expressions which describe both what is required for formal argumentation *and* what is presupposed ontologically, epistemologically (etc.) in the multiple historical uses of such terms in natural languages. The question thus revolves around the degree to which expressions in a formalised language are held to constitute a more desirable *model* for analysis, and are held to be a more accurate *method* of description than, say, "ordinary" Sanskrit (!) technical terminology.

Let me be clear, however, that I am *not* saying that one logic may *not* be more useful than another into which to translate a third logic; I *am* saying, however, that unexamined cultural and methodological assumptions which may be implicit in the use of logic with which to describe another (possibly incompatible logic) *have* occurred often in the past and should be investigated and made explicit in the present context. These important

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questions constitute a semi-independent excursion into the comparative *history* of the *history* of philosophies of logic and I shall only point out these presuppositions and give a few examples (below) so that the reader may note their importance if not their resolution.

However, within the context of contemporary international (no longer "western") philosophy, this ideal-language methodology is clearly concomitant (to oversimplify) with contemporary Anglo-American analytical trends, e.g., Frege, Russell, Carnap and Quine. Now philosophical Indology is slowly coming of age; logic, east of Suez, is no longer left exclusively to the tenderly muddled mercies of the philologists. With the Indological works of such post-War (1945) scholars as Ingalls,[24] Staal,[25] Kitagawa,[26] Barlingay,[27] McDermott,[28] and Matilal,[29] this growing formalistic approach contrasts strongly with that of such older scholars as Drs Vidyābhūṣaṇa,[30] Keith,[31] Randle,[32] Stcherbatsky[33] and Kunst[34] who assumed either a post-Renaissance syllogistic or a pseudo-Aristotelian model for their description of Nyāya.

In spite of the above criticism, I would be remiss if I did not mention those East European Indologists and formal logicians (including the famous school of Polish logicians) who have examined (or contributed to the examination of) nyāya. One immediately thinks of Professor St Schayer[35] and the interesting works of Dr Arnold Kunst.[36]

Perhaps the best known East European Indologist-cum-logician is Th. Stcherbatsky. His justly famous *Buddhist Logic*[37] stands well today, with the exception of the sections on philosophy of logic where his sources understandably betray a lack of comparative and metalogical sophistication by today's standards; however, few, if any have matched his many monumental contributions. It is my opinion that he did for Buddhist Logic what Jan Lukasiewicz[38] did for Aristotelian logic—no small contribution, indeed !

Among those contemporary Indian scholars interested in nyāya, foremost are S.S. Barlingay, B.K. Matilal, J.N. Mohanty, P.K. Sen, and Sibajiban Bhattacharya; the latter's discussion[39] of the "middle term" and Barlingay's second edition of *A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic*[40] are a few examples of high quality contemporary studies.[41]

III. A HISTORICAL SKETCH OF FOUR METHODOLOGICAL PHASES IN 20TH CENTURY STUDIES ON NYĀYA

Although the study of the Indian inference (anumāna) and its comparative relationships to the study of the global logic (and other hard-core

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philosophical topics) has understandably not been as popular with Indologists as has the study of doctrine, philology and religious aspects of India, still there is a considerable literature on Indian logic written during the 20th century. To narrow our scope for a moment, let us consider just the literature of Buddhist nyāya. This literature exhibits at least four stages in the development of methodological presuppositions concerning the analysis and translation of Nyāya inference schemas. There are (1) the Early Syllogistic phase, 1900-1929; (2) the later Syllogistic phase 1929-1934; (3) the Ideal-Language phase, 1950-1965; and (4) the Anti-Language phase, 1967-1976. It is also obvious that I have defined these stages solely with respect to the methodological and formalistic descriptive presuppositions exemplified in these studies of Buddhist Nyāya. However, in passing I wish to note that these four stages contrast with four general stages in the formalistic development and uses of formalised logic in the contemporary Anglo-American tradition. They are: (1) the "Classical Syllogistic" phase (Renaissance—1910, e.g. to *Principia Mathematica*); (2) Ideal Language philosophy, 1910-1930+(3) Ordinary Language philosophy, 1930-1965; and, (4) Anti-Ordinary Language philosophy, 1965-1976.

My first hypothesis is that there is *at least* a 15-year lead time between certain developments in Western logic and their subsequent incorporation in interpretations of Buddhist logic. For example, interest in ideal-language methodology stemming from analyses such as those of Russell and Carnap, were not "picked up" in the studies of Buddhist logic until 1950 although such machinery was available in the 1920's and 1930's; it was only incorporated by Indological studies in the 1950's and the middle 1960's. However, during the 1930's with such writers as Randle, Keith and Stcherbatsky, all were still using the (so-called) "Post-Classical" Syllogistic logic with which to describe the Indian schemas. Also there was *very little* discussion of the philosophies of logic on either side of the comparisons in such studies. Thus, within the context of these studies (even taking into consideration the scholarly setbacks of the Second World War) there was a 20-year delay before the developments in western logic were utilized in the description of Buddhist Nyāya.

My second hypothesis is that in the present state of scholarship, I believe that the end of the use of ideal language methodology with Buddhist nyāya should be rapidly coming to an end since it is now over ten years since its demise in contemporary philosophy. However, in the contemporary literature there is little (if any) mention of the methodological and philosophical criticisms (or *lessons*) that Western logicians and philosophers have learned from the analytical excesses and methodological fads of these three phases of Western philosophy. In other words, in the

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methodological phases of Buddhist nyāya scholarship, Buddhologists have not learned the methodological lessons of Western philosophers; on the contrary, they have unconsciously incorporated wholesale aspects of these controversial contemporary logical methodologies into their studies of Nyāya. In short, it seems that Indologists have not learned their formalistic and methodological lessons.

Although I cannot demonstrate these theses for the full scope of 20th century (comparative) studies in this very brief paper (I am doing this in a book), I do wish to turn to Sanskrit and to two representative examples of formalistic translation from the early Syllogistic and the Ideal Language periods.

IV. AN INDIAN INFERENCE SCHEMA (PARĀRTHĀNUMĀNA)

A Representative Example (from the Buddhist *Nyāyapraveśa*, "Introduction to Logic"):[12]

Thesis: "SOUND (IS) IMPERMANENT[13]
(pakṣa) Śabdah 'nityaṁ
Justification: BECAUSE (IT POSSESSES THE PROPERTY OF) CREATEDNESS.
(hetu) kṛtakatvāt
Exemplification: WHATEVER (IS A) CREATED (THING), THAT (IS) WELL KNOWN (AS AN) IMPERMANENT (THING)
(dṛṣṭānta) yat kṛtakaṁ tad anityaṁ dṛṣṭam.
Similar Example: ...AS (IN THE) CASE OF A POT ETC.,
(sapakṣa) yathā ghaṭa adis
Dissimilar Example: ...AS NOT (IN THE) CASE OF SPACE ETC.
(vipakṣa) na yathā ākāśam.

An early explicit metalogical method of "legitimization" (not "validation") in early Buddhist Nyāya (*circa.* 450-600 A.D.) is "The Three Forms of the (Relations of the) Justification-Member (trirūpahetu), a proto-metalogical rule. The justification (hetu[2]) property (dharma) must be: (a) concomitantly present with the thesis-property (pakṣadharmatvam) in the property-possessor (dharmin), i.e. śabda; (b) present in the similar example sapakṣe sattvaṁ), i.e., in both sound and in pot; and (c) absent in the dissimilar example (vipakṣe ca asattvaṁ), i.e. not in space.

The sixth century example given above is clearly formal*istic*, in that it is an explicit manual which offers: (1) *models* for the correct generation of inference schemas; (2) second-order descriptive and metalogical cliches

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(=MC) which have a clear topic-free meaning which clearly express the assumed second-order relationships, and by which these metalogical relationships were recognized and evaluated.[11] These MCs were associated with explicit and implicit rules, which when satisfied, provide one with explicit *criteria* which constitute (at least) necessary conditions with which to evaluate the specific structural mistakes, if any, within an inference schema; (3) *rules* for the juxtaposition and expression of well-known empirical and assumed metaphysical presuppositions of logical concomitances; (4) general *warrants* or exemplifications (dṛṣṭānta) stating universally quantified concomitances vyāpti) which may authorize (when correctly established) the legitimacy of the MC relations; (5) a list of *fallacies* (ābhāsa) which constitute procedures in a technical vocabulary, the function of which is a check-off list with which one may evaluate an almost infinite string of possible inference schemas. A quick sketch of *some* of the technical problems follows.

The example of an explicit rule, such as the three forms of the Justification-member, (later rejected and refuted by other logicians) may help to illustrate the development of such proto-formalistic characteristics as topic-free criteria. As is obvious, this rule requires the use of an empirical metaphysical example e.g. "pot" and "space"; this metalogical requirement is abhorrent to modern logicians. Quantification is not explicit as a metalogical theory, nor is explicit class membership an operative concept in the metalogical discussion. The foregoing class interpretation presupposes implicit context-restricted transformation rules for translation into either a formal or a natural language. To so interpret explicitly would presuppose an analysis of at least the three interrelated fields of formal systems theory, natural languages and the methodology of comparative logic.

Also we find the systematic use of variable-like cliches (MCs) rather than explicit variables, e.g., sādhya (inferendum). Evaluation rules and such machinery were developed concerning darśana-restricted meta-*physical* positions coupled with a gradually emerging awareness of the formal rather than the material relations of the inference schema. Inference schemas may and were deemed incompatible not solely on grounds of empirical or logical criteria, but also on grounds of the incompatibility of certain metaphysical or ontological assumptions about the world presupposed by certain darśanas. As an example, we may have a Vaiśeṣika and a Buddhist arguing about the ontological status of the self (ātman). The former would hold that it is eternal; the latter would hold that it is impermanent, subject to causation and non-eternal. Thus the acceptability of an inference schema between different disputants may appeal *not only* to empirical evidence or analytically true presuppositions but also by appeal to logically

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prior metaphysical presuppositions.

Elsewhere I have demonstrated that in the Buddhist logic of the sixth century (and in most, but not all, of pre-twelfth century Indian logic) there are special terms (MCs) which have attained the status of technical terms through the long period of Indian logical development. I refer to such terms (above) as "thesis" (pakṣa), "justification," (hetu) "inferendum," (sādhya), "exemplification" (dṛṣṭānta), "similar example" (sapakṣa), and "dissimilar example" (vipakṣa). These second-order cliches or "proto-variables" enabled the Indian logicians to evaluate and recognize the legitimacy and the illegitimacy of certain inference schemas (parārthānumāna) by pointing out internal relations. I have remarked that these MCs are somewhat (if not the functional equivalent) akin to the function of modern variables. However, I do not hold that the Indian logicians have used explicit variables as did Aristotle or the Stoics, or as modern logicians use them; although the Indian logicians did use these content-neutral second-order metalogical terms, this is *not* to say that these terms are either the *exact* functional equivalence of variables today. It is *only* to say that within this proto-metalogical terminology, there were sets of words and metalanguage rules, each of which had a clear topic-free meaning, and which clearly expressed the assumed second-order metalogical relationships among the very possible linguistic components of the inference schema. Each MC, then, without regard to its content or reference, designated metalogical relationships and implicit darśana assumptions. They functioned as instruments by which these metalogical relationships were recognized and evaluated.

In brief, there are three sources from which rules for the evaluation of inference schemas can be derived: (1) an explicit *rule* such as the three forms of the justification (trirūpahetu); (2) the *fallacies* (ābhāsas) which refer (in part) to different assumptions denoted by these content-neutral second-order terms which express licit and illicit metalogical relationships between components of the inference schema; (3) last are the differing metaphysical assumptions between the different darśanas which gave rise to *model inference schemas* which may be deemed incompatible, not wholly on grounds of empirical or logical evidence, but on grounds of the incompatibility of certain assumptions about the world. Thus, the *acceptability* of an inference schema which assumed one of two possible assumptions might be considered incompatible between different disputants. The instruments by which these incompatible relationships and assumptions are pointed out are the second-order content-neutral MCs. Thus the evaluation and acceptability of a given inference will be judged not only on formalistic grounds but on empirical or non-empirical metaphysical

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grounds as well. The *degree* to which these non-formal relations were operative grew less with the ongoing debates and metalogical developments between darśanas; thus the Early proto-formalism grew into the Mature formalistic schemas which finally evolved into the explicit Navya-Nyāya formal metalogical theories. Let us now turn to two 20th century translations and interpretations.

V. A TRANSLATION WITH SYLLOGISTIC

In Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa's book of 1909, *Indian Logic: Medieval School*,[45] one of the notable features of this monograph is that at a very early period in the history of scholarship Vidyābhūṣaṇa adopts post-Renaissance, so-called "Aristotelian" terminology. He gives no general source of his knowledge of logic; he mentioned G. Grote (p. 511) and Dr B. M. Barua (p. 500) but their discussions (p. 500-513) reveal the metalogical confusions common to the early part of this century. He then hedges in his interpretation by saying "The form of reasoning is as follows"; here (as with half the scholars after him) he offers the old chestnut concerning the hill being fiery because it has smoke, etc. which is not found in the text at all.[46] However, he is the first to discuss the metalogical relationships by consistently adopting the terminology, "middle term" (hetu[2]), "major term" (sādhya), and "example" (dṛṣṭānta). When examining the Vaiśeṣika school as exemplified in the text, he supplies none of the metaphysical presuppositions concerning the word "śabda."[47] This is necessary to understand why it *is* a fallacy when one states a thesis which is incompatible with one's own doctrinal (darśana-philosophical school) basis (svāgama). In other words, to know that, by the translation "sound" as in "sound is eternal (śabdo 'nityam)," one must know something of the background of the Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā, etc. school, in order to understand *why* it is a fallacy.[48] He supplies none of this.

Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa also makes other *implicit* metalogical and epistemological assumptions when he supplies a dummy subject for the justification[49] member (hetu[1]) and thus transforms it from an ascription to a proposition. He implicitly quantifies the thesis-(pakṣa)-property (dharma) "sound" (śábda); this becomes controversial because of the divergent metaphysical and ontological views concerning the nature of śabda; that is, whether it *is* impermanent (anityaṁ) as do hold the Buddhists, or whether it is permanent (nityaṁ) as a Mīmāṁsika might hold; existential quantification *with* existential commitment would obtain with the latter position but not with the former. He also ignores the metalogical complications (without comment) of the metalogical requirement in the Three Forms of

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the Justification (trirūpahetu). Thus he makes several implicit transformations in his use of syllogistic which obscure and distort many significant presuppositions held by different logicians of the different philosophical schools. To say that Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa has translated helpfully and thus clarified the exposition of Indian logic is to beg the important (and cross-culturally significant) questions of these two philosophies of logic; it is my opinion that the degree of distortion is simply too great and that Dr Vidyābhūṣaṇa has obscured much more than he has clarified.

To return to the text, I cannot ignore that in discussing the three characteristics (trirūpa) of the "middle term" (hetu, justification), (which *is* found first in Buddhist nyāya) he gives in a footnote,[50] a term common to the Nyāya darśana, not to the Buddhist logical tradition; by "characteristics of the middle" term he offers the Sanskrit term "liṇga" and the equivalent of the Naiyāyika phrase "liṇgasya trairūpyam" (three characteristics of the mark) which (again) is not found in the text. The usual Buddhist terminology—if given at all—is that of a "rūpa" (form) or "lakṣaṇa" (mark) of the justification (hetu). In his exposition of the metalogical relationships in the text Vidyābhūṣaṇa states: "If we suppose the minor term to be the minor subject 'E' the middle term to be 'R'."[51] He then gives the following formula: "All S is R, all R is P, no R is non-P." Vidyābhūṣaṇa uses the quantifier "all"; "sarvam" (all) is not in the text nor can universal quantification be *necessarily* presupposed. One common characteristic of Indian logic is that the subject term (pakṣa), the locus of the property-to-be proved (or inferendum, sādhya) is many times a singular entity to locus, which is denoted by the *singular* locative case. This is certainly more accurately described with the iota restricted quantifier (ix) rather than the universal quantifier "all." His conclusion is "Hence, we find that Dignāga holds only two conclusions:

All S is all P, and
All S is some P."[52]

First of all, Dignāga has never said "all"; and would certainly not admit to the quantified expression: "All S is some P." In passing we may note that never does Vidyābhūṣaṇa question the implicit assumption that "yat.....tat" ("if.....then") may be different from "All S is P" and that the ablative case may not be the *logical* equivalent of "therefore."

Although Vidyābhūṣaṇa describes the relationship between the "middle term (hetu[2]) and the major term (sādhya)", he does state that this represents a universal or inseparable connection between the two properties of these terms called "vyāpti", but which is not in the text; vyāpti.....the general concept is implicit but operative. In his discussion of the universal

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proposition (dṛṣṭānta) he said "Dignāga's discovery of the universal proposition marks a new era in the history of Indian logic and shows a great development of the principle of induction . . . . ."[53] In light of the work done prior to the publication of Vidhyābhūṣaṇa's book on Medieval Indian logic in 1909, one must conclude that the miniscule scholarly community interested in Indian logic was as understandably uncommunicative as we fortunately find among *some* present-day Indologists; they had an excuse.

VI. A TRANSLATION WITH THE PREDICATE CALCULUS

One possible formal translation follows below:

	Dṛṣṭānta-Warrant	Hetu[1]-Data	Conclusion	Implicit Assumption
(x),	(iy). . .((Sx ⊃ Ix) ●	(Sy))	$\underset{\supset}{B}$((Iy) ●	(y ∈ x)

Where:

Properties: $S \overset{df}{=}$ Kṛtakatva (createdness)

$I \overset{df}{=}$ anityam (impermanence) the proferred property (dharma) of the thesis

Variables: (x) $\overset{df}{=}$ the class of all conditioned things

(iy) $\overset{df}{=}$ restricted variable (iota) denoted by the term "śabda," the locus of property-to-be demonstrated (sādhya)

Functors: $\bullet \overset{df}{=}$ (conjunction, "and")

$\underset{\supset}{B} \overset{df}{=}$ The Sanskrit Ablative cases interpreted as interchangeable with and the reverse of "if...then" and "⊃"

∈ = Class Inclusion, as in (y ∈ x) : =y is a member of the class of x.

The similarity (but not isomorphism) of this formal translation to the Indian inference schema suggests many controversial metalogical issues for discussion. I shall confine myself here to that of the ablative case and truth-functionality and some metalogical incompatibilities between the ablative case as it is implicitly reversed in the use of material implication "⊃."

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VII. THE ABLATIVE AND TRUTH-FUNCTIONALITY

Simply stated, the relationship between the ablative case (=AC) and "$\supset$" is not truth-functional at all. In the truth-functional propositional calculus, the truth (-value) of a proposition containing a truth-functional operator (such as "and" (p, q), "if-then" ($p \supset q$) either—or (p v q), equals ($p \equiv {}^{1}q$)) is determined by the truth value of its components; these licit and illicit combinations are described in truth-tables. For example, if either *or* both of the propositions of a conjunctive proposition is/are false, the complex propositions (expressed as e.g. (p' q)) is false, and if both are true the complex proposition is true. Two counter examples unacceptable in the Buddhist context will serve to make the point.

A non-Buddhist (e.g. a proponent of the Mīmāṁsa school) would hold the metaphysical presupposition that (1) śabda ("word/sound") was a non-created thing (a-kṛtaka), and (2) that therefore the conjunction of the relationships of (Iy), ($y \in x$) and (Ix) does not obtain. Therefore, the third and fourth lines of the truth-table definition (FT, FF) of MI would not obtain in the formal translation offered above. Neither would be allowed as a legitimate inference in a nyāya schema. It can be seen that (x), (iy) $(((Sx \supset Ix) \bullet (y \in x)))$ is unacceptable where:

M: 1) I = anityam (the property impermanence), the postulated property (dharma) of the thesis member (pakṣa), as *per* a rival metaphysical axiom, is not concomitant with the property-to-be-inferred (sādhya), i.e. (Σy),

N: 2) (Iy) is false, and

N: 3) ($y \in x$) is false by definition, a false concomitance (avyāpti), based on a rival metaphysical axiom; the Mīmāṁsā school's śabda *is* permanent (nityam)

In other words, both M and N would be rejected when (1) the exemplification (dṛṣṭānta), ($Sx \supset Ix$) and justification (hetu[1]) (Sy) are false (FT), and (2) when *both* the above *and* (Iy) are false (FF). This may easily be and is the case between rival Indian schools (darśanas) holding incompatible metaphysical presuppositions.

VIII. METALOGICAL INCOMPATIBILITIES BETWEEN THE ABLATIVE CASE AND THE FUNCTOR OF MATERIAL IMPLICATIONS

With descriptive model of the first order predicate calculus in mind,

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many scholars have been inclined to assume a symmetrical relationship between "because" and "if...then."[54] The former is implicitly held to be the reverse of the latter, and the latter is regularly expressed by "$\supset$" in most post-War interpretations. For example, Staal,[55] Chi,[56] and Barlingay[57] have been quick to interpret the ablative relationship in such a manner. With the assumption of such a symmetrical relation between "$\supset$" and "because" one could conclude that the relation of material implication adequately expresses the relation between the thesis and the remaining two members, i.e., the justification and the exemplification. Does this symmetry actually obtain? Let us look again at the members which authorize the drawing of an inference—the exemplifications (dṛṣṭānta, sapakṣa, and vipakṣa) and the justification (hetu[1]).

With the advent of the universally quantified expression "whatever (is) x, (then) that (is) y," the exemplification (dṛṣṭānta) seems—in the eyes of many scholars, inclined toward a mathematical model of description—to become formal logic in one full stroke as was the case in the *Prior Analytics*. The dṛṣṭānta expression, "yat...tat (d)," may be expressed as (x) ($Sx \supset Ix$). To elucidate the metalogical role of the dṛṣṭānta I shall refer first to the discussion of such in Stephen Toulmin's book *The Uses of Argument*,[58] in particular the concept of a warrant. In Toulmin's discussion, the dṛṣṭānta would be considered a "full warrant."[59] A full warrant is a universal proposition, a metalogical prescriptive statement or rule which authorizes in this case, the drawing of the thesis (conclusion, pakṣa) by noting the concomitance of the properties "S" and "I" as described in the expression "(x) ($Sx \supset Ix$)." However, it is most important to note that the similar and dissimilar examples (sapakṣa, vipakṣa) components of the dṛṣṭānta, are essentially the backing (B) of the warrant, i.e., the evidence given to support the concomitance expressed *in the warrant*. This is independent of whether the sapakṣa presupposes existential commitment. That is, the pot "possesses" both the properties of impermanence and the property of being a created thing regardless of whether any specific pot empirically exists.

As Toulmin has noted the symmetry of "data (D) so conclusion (C)," and "(C) because of (D)" is legitimate when the information given in the second "premise" (D) appeals to a full warrant authorizing the making of the inference.[60] This symmetry does not hold when the second "premise" is not a full warrant, but rather is the *backing* of a potential warrant. The form is as follows:

Symmetry of "if...then" and "because": (D+W, "if...then" C) $\equiv$ (C *because* of D+W)

As asymmetry of "if...then" and "because": (D+B (of W), "if...then" C) $\not\equiv$

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(C *because* of D+B (of W))

Where: $D \overset{df}{=}$ Data (hetu[1])

$W \overset{df}{=}$ warrant: exemplification, dṛṣṭānta without the examples, (sapakṣa and vipakṣa)

$B \overset{df}{=}$ backing of warrant (sapakṣa and vipakṣa)

$C \overset{df}{=}$ conclusion (pakṣa)

The relation between the thesis (pakṣa), the justification (hetu) and exemplification (dṛṣṭānta) is imcompatible with the formal relationship of material implication (and, *a fortori*, strict implication too). In other words, to say that the ablative-"$\supset$" relation is symmetrical as between "because" and "if...then" is to presuppose something contrary to facts, i.e. that the dṛṣṭānta represents a *full* warrant rather than a combination of a warrant and its backing. With this mixture, the ablative relation remains asymmetrical with the "if...then" of "$\supset$".

Therefore, the assumption that the "because" (the ablative case) is symmetrical with "if...then" is false if and only if there is a nyāya metalogical rule which presupposes that the backing for the warrant is a *necessary condition* for a legitimate inference schema. Of course, this is exactly what the trirūpahetu rule requires. In order that the ablative relation by symmetrical with "if...then" the exemplification (dṛṣṭānta) would need be a full warrant, i.e., without the mixture of backing and warrant, which is extensionally equivalent to the absence of the similar and dissimilar examples (sapakṣa and vipakṣa). Since the *Nyāyapraveśa* holds that the presence of the sapakṣa and the vipakṣa are *necessary conditions* for the legitimacy of the thesis, we do not have a *full* warrant in the dṛṣṭānta; we have a mixture of the backing and a warrant. Consequently, we do not have a symmetrical relation between the thesis (pakṣa), and both the justification (hetu[1]) and exemplification (dṛṣṭānta). Therefore it is illegitimate to *assume* that the use of "$\supset$" to describe the asymmetrical "because" (ablative) relationship is an compatible distortion-free description compatible with the metalogical theories presumed by both traditions.

IX. HEURISTICS IN STUDIES OF INDIAN AND COMPARATIVE LOGIC

As we can see in the above example, formalised languages may have either a distorting or a clarifying role to play in the comparative analysis of different logical traditions, be they from within or without the same

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cultural lineage. Formalised languages have such a role to play in two ways, first as an alternative device (upāya, prajñapti) for expository translation, and second, as an heuristic device for the discovery and elucidation of inferential relationships and/or metalogical compatibilities and incompatibilities. However, the point is that in the context of a reader who is at least slightly knowledgeable about modern mathematical logic, the use of mathematical logic (and syllogistic) will be extremely helpful *if and only if* it is *coupled* with a natural language discussion which provides the reader with a series of aspectual metalogical views (naya (s), to use Jaina terminology) of comparative logic. Contrary to the implicit assumptions and naive reactions of some Indologists, a mere ideal-language translation does *not* render the reader's knowledge of the inference schema deeper or clearer : perhaps it becomes merely clever. When these metalogical discussions and formal translations are *sequentially* juxtaposed and examined, such description conveys both the clarity of accurate information about this use of mathematical logic, something of its comparative aspects and an explicit sense of the inevitable non-isomorphism in each of the translations ; *neither* is *obviously* pedagogically superior. Given the logical ambiguities and oddities of natural language expressions *and* given the necessary but narrow restrictions of ideal-language translations without explicit detailed transformational rules, I ask : What more can we require that ideal and non-ideal languages do other than that which I have described in the previous sentence ?

Thus, I would hold that the *illegitimate* use of mathematical logic and syllogistic occurs when they are used for unexamined unconscious) purposes to achieve an aura of modernity, which may obscure and distort the more valuable comparative *methodological* theories present in the text. This will not occur if one will be explicit about the obvious helpful and/or heuristic but limited role of modern logic. However, this obscuration will continue to occur if it is mistakenly assumed that modern logic is universalisable without serious distortion in *all* descriptive contexts. More so, it is only either the naive logician or the non-logician (e.g., the philologist ?) who would so assume and act upon the former methodological questionable assumptions. In most cases, it is the logician who knows both the important limitations *and* the powerful virtues of his craft ; he harbours no illusions of it being an expository or a methodological panacea.

X. RATIONALITY AND LOGIC IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT

To summarize, when a formal ideal language is used to describe an inference which presupposes two quite different theories *about* logic and

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its proper uses, procedures and evaluative rules, we may too easily translate one inference into the form of another as the procedure appears very simple. The history of the literature on nyāya exemplifies this rational assumption. However, what may now become incompatible are the two different *webs* of metalogical *theories* and implicit rules for the (context-restricted) "proper" form of the translated inference when it is compared to the form of its original expression. It is *not* to say that a degree of clarity may not be achieved by such translations, but rather that what is of proper "form" in the source inference language, given *its* metalogical theory, may be an improper form in the target expression (the translated form) because of *its* context restricted metalogical theories. Hence, unneeded obscuration may thus ocur ; in my opinion it *has* occurred quite often. In short, it is the *theories* of philosophy *of* logic which may be incompatible and/or the translation theories concerning the two inferences. Thus the universal quest for good reasons from which to generate reliable conclusions is fully and constantly instantiated in the long history of nyāya: the gradually developed formalistic sophistication as witnessed in India represents one instance in the philosophers' *universal* quest for reliable knowledge be of either "East" or "West".

Within the international perspective of this anthology, a further word may be in order. If our present university students are to receive adequate educational perspectives from which to participate in the twenty-first century, I see two general needs to which these concerns, in some small way, point. First, there is the growing need to integrate the values and methods of the humanities and into many cognitive fields. Simultaneously, there is the very real need to integrate (or recognise) Asian perspectives into both our present Western-oriented humanities and into cognitive fields outside the humanistic tradition. I assume that *rational* analysis constitutes one of the main contributions of the scholar to such needed perspectives. Logic, in *all* its worldwide exemplifications, remains *an* ideal *model* which may help to guide the development of these perspectives. Therefore, comparative comments on the logical traditions of India and of modern philosophy, with a hope for explaining, developing and predicting worldwide perspectives, may constitute a contribution to the above needs.

Unfortunately, many otherwise well educated individuals seem to be the last to know that the systematic, philosophical analysis of human experience did not stop west of Honolulu and east of Suez. In a world rapidly becoming a single interrelated and mutually supported *field* through modern communication media and rapid travel, such academic and popular provincialism are unwarranted. We live in one world.

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Notes

1. This article first appeared in *Dialectics and Humanism*, The Philosophy Journal of the Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warszawa), Nos. 3-4, 1976, 197-217; I have modified it slightly since.

2. The usual classification is into six orthodox (āstika) schools and three unorthodox (nāstika) ones, the former being Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Yoga, Sāṁkhya, Mimāṁṣā and Vedānta), and the latter being Buddhist, Jaina and the Cārvākas. *Functionally*, the Vedāntists are to be subdivided into the writings of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva; also to be noted is the theological school of the Śaiva Siddhānta. Further scholarship isomorphic within the long Indian tradition, e.g. Karl Potter's schema in his *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies*, Prentice-Hall, N.Y., 1963.

3. The two logical texts translated into Chinese are first, the Nyāyapraveśa, Taishō Shinshū Daizokyō, gen. eds., Takakusu Junjiro and Watanabe Kaigyoku (Tokyo : Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai, 1924-29), Vol. 32, no. 1630, see note to Section V; second is the *Nyāyamukha*, *ibid.* Vol. 32, no. 1628. The Sanskrit is not existent, and the only study (which is primarily a translation) is *The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga*, by G. Tucci, Heidelberg, 1930: I am preparing a new one from Chinese.

4. An excellent survey is *Jaina Ontology*, by Dr. K.K. Dixit, (L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad-9), 1971; also a masterful study is *Advanced Studies in Indian Logic and Metaphysics*, by Pt. Sukhlal Sanghvi, a reprint of *Indian Studies: Past and Present*, Calcutta, 1961.

5. An excellent modern source is *Nyāya Philosophy, A Literal Translation of Gautama's Nyāya—Sütra and Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya (with the) Elucidation by M.P. Tarkavāgīśā*, translated by D. Chattopadhyaya and M. Gangopadhyaya, *Indian Studies : Past and Present*, in five volumes (4 completed at this writing), 1967-1973, Calcutta.

6. Cf. my article "Metalogical Incompatibilities in the Formal Description of Buddhist Logic", in *The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, Vol. 18, No. 2, April 1977, 221-231.

7. e.g. Bochenski, I.M., *A History of Formal Logic*, translated and edited by Ivo Thomas, University of Notre Dame Press, 1961, p. 430 ff. For an example of the controversy see my review article on R.S.Y. Chi's *Buddhist Formal Logic* in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XXIII, no. 4, (Oct. 1973), particularly pp. 533-534.

8. Cf. *Dignāga, On Perception*, translated and annotated by M. Hattori, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 47, Cambridge, p. 24 ff.

9. For example, *Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu Ṭīkā*, edited and translated by M. Gangopadhyaya, *Indian Studies: Past and Present*, Calcutta, 1971, pages 159 ff.

10. Cf. *Buddhist Formal Logic*, by R.S.Y. Chi, London, 1967, e.g. pp. XI, 22 ff.; also see my review article of Chi's book in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 23, no. 4 (October 1973), p. 525-535; *Buddhist Logic*, by Th. Stcherbatsky, Dover Publications, N.Y., 2 vols., 1962, vol. I, pp. 308 ff.; also compare conceptions of validity and logic in "Algebraic and Geometric Logic", by T. Ellingson-Waugh,

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in *Philosophy East and West*. vol. 24. no. 1 (Jan, 1970) : 23-40, and my critical article on Ellingson-Waugh in "On Logic and 'Algebraic and Geometric Logic'", *Philosophy East and West*, vol. 25, no. 3, 1975, pp. 357-364.

11. See note 8 on Hattori.

12. See note 9 no *Vinītadeva's Nyāya Bindu Tikā*.

13. See note 10 on Stcherbatsky.

14. See an *Eleventh-Century Buddhist Logic of "Exists"*, by A.C.S. McDermott, Foundations of Language Supplementary Series, Vol. 11, Dordrecht-Holland/ New York, 1970.

15. *Akalaṅka's Criticism of Dharmakīriti's Philosophy, A Study*, by N.J. Shah, L.D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1967. See my review in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (October 1976), 480-481.

16. *Pramāṇa-Naya Tattvalokālaṁkāra*, by Vādi Devasūri, translated by Dr H.S. Bhattacharya, Bombay, 1967. See my review in *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 27, No. 1, (January 1977), 115-117.

17. *The Differentiation Theory of Meaning in Indian Logic*, by D. Sharma, The Hague/ Paris, 1969.

18. The classic study is Harvard Professor D.H.H. Ingall's *Materials For the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 40, Cambridge, 1951. His pupil, an outstanding scholar in his own right, is Toronto Professor Bimal K. Matilal, whose *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 46, Cambridge, 1968 is very highly recommended. Also see Professor Karl H. Potter's *The Padārthatattvanirūpaṇam of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi*, Harvard-Yenching Institute Studies, XVII, Cambridge, 1957, and C. Goekoop's *The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Dordrecht Holland, 1967.

19. See Ingalls, *ibid.*, particularly pp. 28-85.

20. And, of course, the Chinese tradition too. Poland is very fortunate in having Professor Janusz Chmielewski at Warszawa, author of (at least) six exceptional articles on Chinese logic entitled "Notes on Early Chinese Logic", in *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* (-RO), I., RO, XXVI-No. 1, 1962, pp. 7-21; II., RO, XXVI, No. 2, 1963, pp. 91-105; III, RO, XXVII, no. 1, pp. 103-121; IV, RO, XXVIII, No 2, 1964, pp. 87-111' V, RO, XXIX, No. 2, 1965, pp. 117-138; VI, RO, XXX, No. 1, 1966, pp. 31-52. An excellent bibliographical article is Professor C.Y. Cheng's "Inquiries into Classical Chinese Logic" in *Philosophy East and West*, XV, Nos. 3-4 (July-October), 1965, 195-216; also see the excellent *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, edited by Professor Chung-Ying Cheng and published by D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland.

21. *Aristotle's Syllogistic*, second edition, Oxford, 1957, e.g. pp. viii and 1ff. His comments on "psychologism," p. 13, are most relevant for the methodological problems in Indian and comparative logic.

22. e.g. cf. S. Toulmin's *The Uses of Argument*, Cambridge, 1969, p. 131-141 and 146ff.

23. See J.F. Staal, "The Concept of Metalanguage", in *The Journal of Indian*

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Philosophy, Vol. 3, Nos. 3/4, September-December, 1975, 315-354, particularly p. 334. However, it is well to remember that one may have a functioning meta-language and still not have made the meta/object-language distinction explicit; also the distinction maybe a legitimate function of the scholar's descriptive framework which does *not entail* that the source-language theories are violated in any way.

24. Ingalls, op. cit.
25. J.F. Staal, "Means of Formalization of Indian and Western Thought", in *Proceedings of the XIIth International Congress of Philosophy* (Venice: 1958).
26. H. Kitagawa, "A note on the Methodology in the Study of Indian Logic", *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū* 8 (1960): 380-390.
27. Barlingay, op. cit.
28. McDermott, op. cit.
29. B.K. Matilal, Epistemology, *Logic and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis*, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 111 (The Hague: Mouton, 1971).
30. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *A History of Indian Logic: Ancient, Medieval and Modern Schools* (Calcutta, 1921).
31. A.B. Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism* (Oxford : The Clarendon Press, 1921).
32. Herbert N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930).
33. Stcherbatsky, op. cit.
34. Kunst, op. cit.
35. "Z bada and logika indyjska (Studien zur indischen Logik)" in the *Bulletin International De L'academie Polonaise Des Sciences Et Des Lettres*, No. 1-6, Janvier, 1933, p. 70, and "Ueber die Methode der Nyāya-Forschung", in *Festschrift Moriz Winternitz*, p. 247 ff.
36. *Probleme Der Buddhistischen Logik in Der Darstellung Des Tattvasaṅgraha* (Zagadnienia Logiki Buddyjskiej Wedlug Tattvasangraha Siantarakszity) Nakladem Polskiej Akademii Umiejetnosci, Krakow, 1939; and "The Two-member Syllogism" in *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, vol. 15, 1939-1949, pp. 72-83; "An Overlooked Type of Inference", in *Bulletin of the School of African and Oriental Studies*, vol. 10, Part 4, 1942, pp. 976-991, and "The Concept of the Principle of Excluded Middle in Buddhism," in Rocznik Orientalistyczny, Tome XXI, 1957, 141-148.
37. Reprinted by Dover Publishing Co., two volumes, New York, 1961.
38. Aristotle's Syllogistic, *ibid.*
39. In *The Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, IX, 1968, pp. 229-232.
40. New Delhi, 1976.
41. Other sources may be found in the articles in *Modern Logic : Its Relevance to Philosophy*, 1969, and in *Current Trends in Indian Philosophy*, edited by K. Murty and K. Rao, (Waltair: Andhra University Press), 1972. A succinct philosophical

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overview may be found in "Philosophy in India, 1967-1973", in *The Review of Metaphysics*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1, Issue no. 109, (Sept. 1974), pp. 54-84.

42. Sanskrit editions of the *Nyāyapraveśa* may be found in: Dhruva, A.B., *The Nyāyapraveśa*, Part I, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1930; Ui, H. *Bukkyō Ronrigaku* (Buddhist Logic), Tokyo, 1944; Mironov, N.D., "Nyāyapraveśa, 1, Sanskrit Text, edited and reconstructed", in *T'oung Pao*, Leiden, 1931, pp. 1-24; Tachikawa, M., "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic", in *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, I (1971) p. 111-145, Toronto. A Chinese translation of this text may be found in the *Taishō Shinshū Daizokyō*, Buddhist Tripiṭaka, vol. 32, No. 1630, 11-13. The Tibetan translation has been edited by V. Bhattacharya in *The Nyāyapraveśa* Part II, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda, 1927, and in the *Tibetan Tripiṭaka*, Peking edition, Reprint, edited by D.T. Suzuki, Tokyo, 1962, No. 5706, 130 74-76. A textual example *could* have been taken from a wide variety of Sanskrit texts, but I picked this one for three reasons: (1) I have worked with this text in Chinese, Sanskrit and (to a lesser extent) Tibetan; (2) it is available in all four languages, thus being at hand for more scholars; and (3) it seems to me to be representative of many of the interesting (but messy) problems common to a formal lineage slowly emerging out of an ordinary-language tradition of debate and reliance on concrete examples.

43. Sādhya (inferendum, i.e., impermanence)

44. I have considered these MCs in detail in two articles "Metalogical Cliches (Proto-Variables) and Their Restricted Substitution in Sixth-Century Logic", vol. 20, no. 3 (July, 1979), 549-558, and in *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic*, and "Empirical Falsification and the Frequency of Darśana Relevance in the Sixth-Century Logic of Śaṅkarasvāmin", in *hogiguo et Analyse*, Nouvelle Serie, Nos. 85-86 (Mars-Juin), 1979, 223-237.

45. (Calcutta, 1909), p. 89.

46. ILMS, p. 89. Tachikawa (1972) while discussing the NP uses the same inappropriate and misleading (I hold) example. The fire-smoke example is *empirically* contingent; the śabda-antiyaṁ example is a function of one's darśana presuppositions.

47. op. cit., p. 91.

48. See my Section IV, metaphysical presuppositions. Also, it was Vidyābhūṣaṇa that I had in mind when I mentioned in a review article of R.S.Y. Chi's *Buddhist Formal Logic* that some discussion states that "nyāya" means "logic" and then changes the subject to history, philology (or Aristotle), *Philosophy East and West*, vol. XXIII, no. 4, (Oct.) 1973, 525-535.

49. If the hetu[1] is without a subject, a term logic interpretation is more plausible; however in later nyāya, the common Sanskrit convention of compounds allows for an alternative propositional interpretation too.

50. *ibid.*, p. 91, n. 1.

51. *ibid.*, p. 91.

52. *ibid.*, p. 92.

53: *ibid.*, p. 96.

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54. There is, of course, an extensive modern tradition of scholarship warning against this assumption, e.g. Quine's many criticisms come to mind.

55. Staal J.F. "Composition in Indian Logic" *Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, Proceedings of the 1960 International Congress. Edited by E. Nagel. Stanford : 1962, p. 634.

56. Chi, op. cit. (see note 9).

57. Barlingay, S.S., "The Significance of Drishtanta in Indian Logic", in *Essays in Philosophy*, Presented to Dr T.M.P. Mahadevan, Madras, 1962, p. 161ff.

58. Toulmin, op. cit., p. 94ff. I have written on this point in more detail, see note 6.

59. Toulmin, *ibid.*, pp. 103-135.

60. Toulmin, *ibid.*, p. 107.

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5

The Zen Understanding of the Initial Nature of Man[1]

RICHARD J. DEMARTINO

As is now rather widely understood, Zen Buddhism aims at the overcoming of all dualistic discrimination. What is not so widely understood, however, is that a genuine overcoming of all dualistic discrimination overcomes as well the very dualistic discrimination between duality and nonduality, between discrimination and nondiscrimination. This means that an authentic nonduality has always to be a self-negating nonduality. In this sense, it could also be said that an authentic nonduality has always to be a self-negating duality. Trying to express both of these aspects at once (or "nondualistically"), it could be said that a genuine nonduality has always to be a nondualistic-duality.[2]

While this will be treated more fully in a later paper,[3a] what is to be stressed here is that Zen Buddhism as the overcoming of all dualistic differentiation is, precisely thereby, the overcoming of all nondualistic nondifferentiation. In speaking of Zen, accordingly, it may be said that Zen Buddhism has two aspects, the nondiscriminatory and the discriminatory—always remembering that the two are never exclusively (or "dualistically") two. For those who argue that because of this Zen Buddhism is beyond being "spoken of, "or is beyond being "expressed in words," one need only offer the reminder that a silence that stands opposed to verbal speech would be restricted or limited by verbal speech. Such a silence would not alone be itself a "dualistic" silence, it would be "bound" or "unfree" silence, and so, finally, a "dumb" silence. A truly free, unbounded, "nondualistic" silence is a silence that can speak and express itself unrestrictedly through speech or silence.

In speaking of Zen Buddhism, then, and from the aspect of discrimination, it may be said that Zen Buddhism has two ultimate and interrelated aims. These are the most thoroughgoing Self-actualization and the most apprpopriate Self-expression of that nonduality (or nondualistic-duality) which is, for Zen, the true nature not merely of the human being but of all beings—indeed, of the very relation between being and nonbeing. The

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human being prior to this Self-actualization and Self-expression is regarded by Zen, in its discriminatory perspective, as *not yet* having actualized —or awakened to—its true nature, and so still in its "initial" nature. Such a human being is considered by Zen to be not simply, in this sense, "ordinary,"[3b] but also problematic. In this view, moreover, the core problem of the initial or ordinary human being is not derivative or accidental. Quite the reverse, it is inherent in the initial nature of the ordinary man. For in the Zen understanding it is the ordinary or initial nature of man as such, that constitutes his most basic or, because of being both inherent and most basic, his "religious" problem. It will be the primary intention of this paper to present this Zen understanding of the initial nature of man. It will be the intention of succeeding papers to present, respectively, the Zen understanding of: (1) why it is that the initial nature of man constitutes man's underlying problem; (2) the nature of the most thoroughgoing resolution of that problem (3) the ways most helpful to bring about that resolution; and (4) some of the most appropriate ways for that resolution to express and apply itself.

Before embarking on this enterprise, however, a further preliminary word should be said about the place or significance of cognitive, noetic, or intellectual "understanding" in Zen Buddhism. In its differentiating mode, Zen, of course, distinguishes clearly intellectual understanding from existential actualization—even when the former is based upon the latter. As a consequence, there are those who would insist that the exclusive concern of Zen Buddhism is an im-mediate or non-dualistic Self-actualization. For those taking this position, Zen is not—and should not be—interested in any form of intellectual—notably, "philosophical"—understanding. In addition to any would-be "intellectual understanding of Zen," this would also include any purported "Zen intellectual understanding." The contention, furthermore, is that this disparagement and shunning of intellectual—especial "philosophical"—understanding started with Gautama himself.

Now it is true that Siddhartha Gautama, for example, in his famous poisoned-arrow analogy,[4] is reported as seeking to make clear to a persistent disciple why certain questions that the disciple wanted answered would thwart, rather than advance, the religious quest. These questions, ten in number, were: is the world eternal, or not; is it infinite, or not; is life the same as the body, or not; is the *Tathāgata* (i.e., The Awakened One) beyond death, or not, or both, or neither. A person on a religious quest who would pursue such questions, Gautama maintained, would be like a man with a poisoned arrow piercing him who would not let himself be medically treated until he had first learned all about the one who had shot the arrow, about the composition of the bow that had been used, about the

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specific qualities of the arrow itself, etc. etc.

Gautama, however, then continued that while he refused to deal with matters not immediately germane to the religious quest, he did deal with those matters that were. So, he pointed out, he did explain that human life at its root is problematic and so characterized by a distinctive anguish or distress (i.e. *duḥkha*); that there was a fundamental cause that accounted for this condition; that this cause could be removed; and that there was a way that would lead to that removal.[5]

Gautama, thus, did not inveigh indiscriminately against intellectual understanding *per se*. To the contrary, he distinguished, as a religious teacher, between that understanding which was, in his appraisal, directly relevant and helpful, and that which was not. In fact, with respect to those issues that he deemed appropriate, a correct or "right" understanding was, for him not just helpful, it was indispensable. So much so, that a correct or "right" understanding is not simply one of the components of his noble eightfold way (or path), it is the very first component.[6]

Zen Buddhism, on the other hand, has tended to regard even a correct understanding of what is pertinent to its concerns with much more caution. For although of possible help, such an understanding is also recognized to be a possible hindrance. Because of this, it is not considered to be indispensable. That is, it is not indispensable—and can be a hindrance—for one who (like a man with a poisoned arrow piercing him) is already bestirred by his (or her) fundamental problem—and, moreover, who has gone to "Zen" to seek a solution. Such a person, Zen contends, wants not an intellectual understanding, but an actual (or "existential") resolution. Further, since, for such a person, an intellectual or cognitive understanding can sometimes get in the way of or be confused with an actul resolution, the understanding as well as the person have always to be most carefully checked and monitored. Largely for these reasons, Zen traditionally has not expended much effort to provide (to the extent that it is possible) an all-inclusive cognitive or intellectual explication of itself or of its implicit—if not explicit—"understanding."

For those, however, not in a Zen community but in society at large who may deny that there is a central problem besetting man, or, if they do acknowledge such a problem, who may not be convinced as to either its cause or its possible resolution—or both, or who may be inclined toward other explanations or interpretations of either or both, a comprehensive intellectual presentation of Zen and its religious (or religio-philosophical) "understanding" would seem to be quite necessary.

Beyond this patently "religious" concern, since one of man's chief faculties is the cognitive-noetic, and since an understanding of

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himself and his world has always been one of man's intellectual as well as religious concerns, the pertinence of Zen and its comprehension to this noetic or intellectual self-world understanding has its own general philosophical significance. For example, to show conceptually, analytically, and logically why any purely rational, analytic, logical, or, in that sense, "philosophical" approach has inherent limitations or shortcomings is itself of philosophical significance.

Finally, considered as a presentation or expression of Zen, as the cognitive-noetic is one of man's main faculties, an intellectual-conceptual presentation or expression—albeit utilizing not solely a dualistic logic of non-contradiction but also a nondualistic logic of paradox—is just as valid and justifiable as an expression in painting, poetry, sculpture, architecture, calligraphy, flower-arrangement, the tea-ceremony, swordsmanship, archery or whatever. In short, the noetic-cognitive-intellectual is equally worthy a mode of Zen expression as the kinetic-conative-volitional or the aesthetic-affective-emotional. To proceed, then, to the Zen understanding of the initial nature of man.

As used in English, the term "man" (in Greek, "*anthrōpos*"; in Latin, "*homo*") as a synonym for "human being" permits of at least two different sorts of definition. One could be called the morphological—or the bio-morphological; the other, the existential—or the onto-existential. In the former mode of definition, man is essentially an animal. Considered as no more than one physical (or "object") being among others, he is said to be a bipedal, tail-less, vertebrate, mammalian primate with stereoscopic vision who belongs in the animal kingdom to the family *Hominidae* by virtue of his bony chin, nasal bridge, philtrum, lumbar curve, and ability to stand continuously in a truly upright position. In this phylogenetic, zoological classification, it is the familial, bio-physiological determination *Hominidae*—with its single genus, *Homo*[7]—that distinguishes the human from the rest of animal life. Taken in this sense, man, *anthrōpos* or *homo* although unique is closely resembled by what has been designated, for that very reason, the anthropoid-(or sometimes, actually, "man"-) ape. Anthropoid in the meaning of man-like or human-like when applied to non-humans (as in this usage) has reference, then, to bio-physical—or "object"—characteristics.

Interestingly, however, in English, the word "anthropoid" (in contra-distinction to the word "humanoid") may also signify ape-like, denoting a deviation away from the human toward the ape—and this in non-physical as well as physical characteristics. For anthropoid meaning ape-like when applied to the human being may refer not solely to such features as excessive hairiness, a massively protruding jaw, a lumbering gait, a

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sprawling awkwardness, etc., but also to a certain dullness or deficiency in personal sensitivity or general personal awareness. The implication—or, indeed, permissibility—of such non-physical allusions to what may be called a lack or blackness in "existential subjectivity" leads directly to the second possible mode of defining the term "man" or "human being."

This alternate manner of defining the denomination man, *anthrōpos*, or *homo* is represented in English better by the word anthropomorphic than the word anthropoid. For human-like or man-like as indicated by the adjective anthropomorphic, despite its Greek etyomology, *anthrōpomorphos*, of human form or shape, refers more to that quality of being (or as shall soon become evident, being-and-consciousness) suggested by the connotations of the Latin terms *humanitas* and *persona*. In this type of definition, man or the human beings as that animate being that reflectively distinguishes, questions, judges, and attempts to characterize or to define itself is never simply an animal. Rather, he is a personally and socially responsible being harbouring some sense of individual and collective "humanity," of what it means—as well as what it ought to mean+to be "human" "humane", and "inhumane" (or "inhuman"), of what it means to be an individual "subject," "self" or "I"—whether as pertains to himself or to any "other" human being. A human being in this kind of depiction, then, is a "person"—i.e., a particular, accountable, "someone" or "subject," able to entertain consciously and to appropriate consciously or sub-consciously a reflective world not only of meanings but also of ideals, values, traditions, questions, doubts, and obligations in contrast to being merely an impersonal or unresponsible "object," "thing," or minimally subsisting "vegetable." Hence "to be human" in this meaning besides being descriptive is also be normative. For to be a human being in this sense carries with it the obligation to actually be human—and not to be inhuman.

While it is certainly to be acknowledged that without the necessary physical, "object" qualities (e.g.. a specific kind of cerebro-neurological development) what may be called those non-physical, "personal," or "existential" human qualities and capabilities would not be possible, in the Zen view the more crucial defining traits of man or the human being are the latter. For though the ultimate focus of Zen—like that of Buddhism in general—is never restrictively the human being, but all beings, it is with the emergence (as will be fully argued later) of the human reflectively conscious personal being that not only its own being but also, collaterally, the being of any other, all others, and "the world" arise together wlthin the reflectively delineated purview or matrix of being—as well as of non-being. Expressed in a slightly different

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way, it is owing to man's singular ability to be reflectively aware of himself—which means, as being a subject, self, or person—that he can be aware that he "is," that other beings "not himself" or "all beings" including himself "are," and that he can—indeed, in his reflective functioning, must—distinguish be-ing from not-being. In fact, of the various personal attributes involved in being a concrete, human being in the sense of *humanitas* or *persona*, the most critical for Zen is exactly this reflective capacity-necessity of the human self's functioning consciousness to distinguish itself from not-itself, its be-ing from its not-being. It is this reflective functional—and structural—dichotomizing modality of the human self's be-ing, be-ing conscious, and being itself that Daisetz T. Suzuki has spoken of as "the dualism residing in the very nature of the person."[8]

This radical dualism that Zen sees as epitomizing man in his initial (but not, it is again to be noted, his "true") condition as a human being in the meaning of *humanitas* or *persona*—or, in other words, the "ordinary"[9] human self or "I," and this in its being, its consciousness, its life, and its world, assumes many forms. Singularly pervasive among these, however, is just the dualistically structured functioning (or functionally related dualistic structure) of subject and object, or *noesis* and *noema*. For therie is no duality that is not a reflectively discriminated duality, and there is no reflectively discriminated duality that is without an object reflectively discriminated by a dualistically discriminating subject. Duality, in this sense, therefore, signifies an inseparable relation between two equipollent components—neither of which can obtain without the other, be reduced to the other, or be subsumed with the other under some greater, all-encompassing third component. Concerning the functional dualism of subject and object, this means that there can be no subject or object that is autonomous unto itself, totally removed or isolated from its correlative counter-component. In this view, accordingly, it is impossible for any operative dualistic subject to be an allegedly "pure subject" capable of subsisting simply in, of, or by itself without any object. Quite the contrary, with the functioning dualistic or "ordinary" subject or "I," as Shin'ichi Hisamatsu, another modern Japanese Zen teacher, has commented:

> Ordinarily, within—and for—oneself there obtain the various contents of the internal and external worlds such that it can never be said about oneself that "there is not even one single thing." If not externally seeing colours or hearing sounds, then we are internally lamenting, rejoicing, or thinking about something. It may be said that there is no time when one is not entertaining some internal or

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external object. The ordinary "I", therefore, is an "I" that is always connected with an object. This is the reason that [ordinary] consciousness is said to be of the nature of *noema-noesis*.[10]

Here Hisamatsu has emphasized that in the functioning of its consciousness, the ordinary I is continuously engaged with an object. But the converse is of equal importance. For invariably associated with an object is the human being—or "I"—as a functioning subject. As long ago recognized by the sixth century Third Patriarch of Chinese Zen, Seng-ts'an:

> The object is an object for [a functioning] subject.
> The [functioning] subject is a subject for an object.[11]

Suzuki has given this his own focus:

> In man's [ordinary] world of sense-and-intellect, we always have a subject that is aware of something and an object of which the subject is aware, for the [ordinary] world of sense-and-intellect is a dichotomous world of subject and object.[12]

Hisamatsu is in complete accord: "In ordinary, dualistic *noema-noesis* consciousness, there is no *noema* without *noesis*, and there is no *noesis* without *noema*. There cannot be a exclusive *noema*-only consciousness or a *noesis*-only consciousness."[13]

On occasion, Hisamatsu has indicated this in a different fashion: "We human beings, ordinarily, are physical and mental beings; and our ordinary self is a subject which, as it were, lies 'behind' or 'has' that mind and body."[14]

Hence, that which admits of an object—or that which entertains or "has" an object—is ever the human being or self as an actively functioning subject. In the ego's dualistic mode of reflective consciousness there can be no object except that it be an object to a functioning subject, and there can be no actively functioning subject except that it be a subject to an object. The objectivity of the object and the functioning subjectivity of the subject are mutually interrelated. Neither is prior to nor the ground of the other.[15] As the reflecting subject always functions in a correlative relation with an object, the object reflected upon always stands in a correlative relation with a reflective subject. In its dualistic subject-object functioning in which it is always a subject in relation to an object—which may, to anticipate a bit, be itself or not itself,[16] the ego always functions within a dualistic subject-object structure that it concomitantly gives rise to and finds itself in. For in so far as the ego is an object to itself—or,

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indeed, to any other ego, it is at once an active, functioning-structuring subject and a passive, functionally-and-structurally given object.[17]

The dualistic, reflective interrelationship between subject-and-object is thus inherently functional and structural—the functional always having a structural aspect; the structural always having a functional aspect. In the case of contact between two egos, the structural relation will vary according to the particular functioning (or functional perspective) involved—e.g., whether the functioning subjectivity is on the part of the one, the other, or both either alternately or concurrently. In this very last instance, each is simultaneously a subject and an object as well to itself as to the other. For in their mutual awareness of each other's awareness of each other, each is aware of itself and other as being an object of its own and the other's functioning reflective subjectivity. In this regard, it is to be stressed that the functioning of the reflective consciousness of a subject is never solely a matter of consciousness, but is always a matter of reflective consciousness-and-being. The dualistic, subject-object inter-dependence of man's reflective consciousness besides being structural and functional is ontological and existential—or, therefore, onto-existential. This will all be more fully developed as this paper progresses. At this juncture, however, additionally to be discerned from the last Hisamatsu statement is that another form of the dualism that typifies man initially is that of mind and body.

The duality of mind and body is akin to that of subject and object. For that which prehends or is aware of an object (for instance, the body) may be referred to as the mind. Thus, Yung-chia, a seventh century Chinese Zen master, wrote: "The mind is an organ of thought and objects are set against it..."[18]

Nevertheless, as anticipated in the Hisamatsu quotation, in so far as the ordinary person may say, "I have a mind," the mind becomes an object to the person as subject. When, accordingly, "mind" and "subject" are used synonymously, in the ordinary man's reflectively knowing he "has" a mind, the mind becomes an object to itself as subject. This does not mean, it should quickly be cautioned, that the mind can be said to have a detached or independent "disembodied" being. Quite the contrary, operative reflective consciousness, subjectivity, or any of its modalities—e.g., thought or thinking—even when it makes itself its own "object," is always the functioning of a concrete, bio-physical being with the necessary physiological as well as cerebo-neurological requirements. That is to say, there can be no functioning reflective consciousness, subjectivity, or thought without, for example, a functioning brain, and there can be no functioning brain without a bio-physical organism in which it

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is functioning. The ability to be aware of being aware, consequently, is never the capacity of a sheer or "disembodied" reflective consciousness, but is always the capacity of a bio-physiological being with reflective consciousness.[19]

The distinctly self-referential subject-object nature of man's initial "human"—or reflective—awareness is even more strikingly manifest in his consciousness not of his mind but of himself. In the ordinary self's awareness of itself—e.g., in the consciousness that "I am I," or in the assertion, "I am conscious of myself" (which is implied in the self-affirmation "I am I"), the ordinary self is both the subject that is conscious and the object (including its body and its mind) of which it is conscious. In its reflective awareness of itself, the ego is both the subject-I which is aware and the object-I—or "me"—of which it is aware. Regarding its consciousness of itself, the ego's duality can be delineated in terms of the subject-I and the object-me.

In fact, the dualism initially permeating man (and his world) arises precisely with his reflective consciousness of himself (and that world). As noted earlier, the determining trait that distinguishes (or actually "establishes") the human being as "human" (in the sense of *humanitas* or *persona*) is none other than its ability to be reflectively aware of itself. For in radical distinction to any other being (known so far), the human being as *persona* is not only conscious, but is able to be reflectively conscious of its being conscious—which means to be reflectively conscious of its existing or be-ing. This reflective consciousness of its be-ing—or that it "is"—is expressed by the ego in its own onto-existential predication of its be-ing or existence: "I am."

The ego's reflective awareness that it (ontologically) "is," is thus one facet of its (existential) reflective awareness of itself—or (onto-existentially) that it is itself. Inherent in its reflective consciousness of itself ("I"), or that it is itself ("I am I"), is the reflective awareness that it is ("I am"). In the ordinary human being's reflective consciousness of itself ("I"), it is reflectively aware both of its being ("I am") and of its being itself ("I am I").

This reflective consciousness that the ordinary self has of its so-called "personal-(or self-)identity" is likewise the consciousness of its so-called "personal, (or self-) uniqueness." For the reflective awareness of the ego that it is itself, "I am I," is also the reflective awareness that it is not any other—for example, "I am not this sheet of paper," or, "I am not you," or, "you are not I."

Hisamatsu has commented upon this latter aspect as follows:

> In itself self-consciousness may seem to be without circumscription,

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> but the self-consciousness of every human being stands in contrast and opposition to the self-consciousness of every other human being. The. . . .self-consciousness of one stands against the. . . .self-consciousness of the other. So it is that self-consciousness intrinsically comes to con-contain a differentiation, the differentiation between itself and the other.[20]

Again to be underscored is that this dual awareness of the ordinary person that it is itself and not any "other"—whether person or not—is of the order of subject-and-object. For as the reflective self which is aware, the ordinary self is a subject before whom that of which it is aware, albeit itself or another self, inescapably occupies—if only in part—the status of an object. As the ego's reflective awareness of itself, "I am I," institutes —because it constitutes—a duality of the subject-I and the object-me, its reflective consciousness of another self, "Thou art thou," institutes— because it constitutes—a duality of the subject-I and the object-thee. When the other of which the ego is reflectively conscious is not a self, the resultant instituted-constituted duality is that of a subject-I and an object-it.[21]

Besides its apperceptual[22] awareness of itself and perceptual awareness of some "other," the ego's reflective, dualistic subject-object functioning is to be found as well in its conceptual awareness of "all human beings including itself" in what it designates "the whole human race," and, as a would-be extension, in its conceptual awareness of "all beings human or not" in what it designates "the whole world."

That is, in distinguishing itself dualistically from another, the ordinary self comes to be conceptually—or "ideationally"—aware of the compre-hensive aggregate of "all other selves plus itself" in what it denominates "all-mankind" and of "all other beings plus itself" in what it denominates "the world." But in its awareness of such an all-encompassing "mankind" or alleged "world," in both of which it is included, the ordinary self functions as a subject that conceives of either presumed "all-inclusive totality" as an object of its consciousness.[23]

Consequently, in the ordinary self's reflective awareness of itself, any other self, all other selves including itself, or all other beings including itself, that of (or concerning) which it is aware ever remains indefeasible— at least in part—an object to the ordinary self as subject.

So it is that in this interdependent modality of the ego's dualistic subject-object-structured-functioning, as the object is always accompanied by a functioning subject, the functioning subject is always accompanied by an object. Each belongs to—or "stand with"—the other. On the

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other hand, the ego as a dualistic subject is *not* its object and, in that sense, is separated from—or "stands against"—that object. The initial affirmation of itself ("I, "I am," or "I am I") with which the ego comes into (and finds itself in) being along with the other and "the world," is coincidentally a negation that distinguishes it—and therein sets it apart—from the other and "the world" ("I am not not-I," "I am not the other," "I am not the world").[24] Hence, although in their duality subject and object necessarily go with one another, they also necessarily stand apart from—and, in fact, opposed to—one another. The same reflective functioning of ordinary human subject-consciousness that enables it to distance itself from—and so to predicate or to affirm—its object (therewith bringing it into the delineated matrix of be-ing), is, concomitantly, a negating functioning or a negating distancing that removes that consciousness as a functioning (albeit affirming) subject from its object—which it is not. This even applies to the duality of the subject-I and the object-me.[25]

To return to the ego's reflective consciousness of itself, as already noted it is due to this actualised capacity for self or ego consciousness that the ordinary human being is a person or a self. As stated by Hisamatsu, "to say self-consciousness is really the same as to say self. . . ."[26] This is because the ordinary self, in this view, is not some special "substance," but rather has its derivation exactly in that mode of (being-and-) consciousness that has come to be—and continues to be capable of being—conscious of itself. If presented inversely, that (being-and-) awareness which has once become—and, thereafter, is able to be—aware of itself is what is meant by reflective—or "self"—awareness.

To explicate this in greater detail, not all consciousness is, *ipso facto*, reflective or "self" consciousness[27]—that is, consciousness with the activated and re-activatable capacity to be conscious of itself. There is also a centred and integrated manner of sensing, feeling, and responding (e.g., of infants and animals) without this capacity that is to be described as unreflective consciousness.[28] Even with this unreflective consciousness, however, consciousness is always consciousness of something.[29] But in the case of unreflective consciousness (or awareness),[30] that of which there is the consciousness (or awareness) cannot properly be called an "object," because that which is conscious (or aware) cannot properly be called a "subject."[31]

To be a subject bespeaks the awakened and recoverable ability not simply to be conscious, but to be conscious of being conscious—which means to be reflectively conscious (e.g., of being reflectively conscious). This, in turn, means not alone to be able to be reflectively conscious of existing or being, but of being precisely a subject—that is, of not being merely an

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"object" (not to mention a "thing"), but of being a "subject-self" which, in its "subjectivity," is (or can be) reflectively aware as well of its consciousness as of its be-ing. To be a subject, self, or subject-self, then, is to be a being-with-consciousness that has once been—and continues to be able to be—conscious of its being a being-with-consciousness. And it is just this once actualised and subsequently re-actualizable capacity to be reflectively conscious (or to be self-conscious) that makes for a reflective being (or a subject, or a self). Stated conversely, a reflective being, or a subject, or a self, or an ego, or an I, or a person, or a "human" being is a being-with-consciousness that has once actualized and, thereafter, is able to re-actualize its ability to be reflectively conscious of its be-ing—which, again, means its ability to be reflectively (self-) conscious of its being reflectively (self-) conscious. The awakened reflective (self-) consciousness of reflective be-ing and the awakened reflective be-ing of reflective (self-) consciousness are inseparably interfused. With the initial or "ordinary" man or human being, it is not so much "I think, therefore I am" as it is that "I am able to be aware that I think (or that I am aware), therefore I am"[32]—and in my reflective consciousness-and-be-ing, "I am (and can function reflectively as) an 'I.' "

Hence, while not a special "substance," neither is the ordinary self, ego, or I a continually active or functioning subject. The ordinary self or ego is more correctly characterised, as has just been noted, as a being-with-consciousness that has once activated and subsequently continues to be able to activate its reflective capacity to be an actively functioning subject, which includes its capacity to be reflectively aware of being an actively functioning subject.

To explain this still further, to be a functioning subject does not necessarily mean, in that moment, to be aware of being a subject; but it does necessarily mean, in that moment, to be able to be aware of being a subject. Similarly, to be an ordinary self or ego does not necessarily mean, in every moment, to be an actively functioning subject; but it does necessarily mean, in every moment, to have an ultimately re-activatable reflective capacity to be an actively functioning subject. If, at any time, such a determination cannot be made with certainty (e.g., in the case of a very deep and prolonged coma caused by severe brain damage), then, during that time, it can not be known whether one is still dealing with a human person or self. So, to recapitulate : to be, in the sense of *persona or humanitas*, an ordinary human being, person, subject, self, ego, or I is to be a being-with-reflective (or self)-consciousness, or, therefore, to be a reflective-being; and to be a reflective-being or a being-with-reflective (or self)-consciousness is to be a being with an awakened

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and recoverable capacity to be reflectively conscious at once of its be-ing its being itself, and its being reflectively conscious.

To put this in yet another way, to be an ordinary self or subject is to have an awakened and continuing capacity to discriminate reflectively one's be-ing, being oneself, and being conscious from one's not be-ing not being one-self, and not being conscious. For in the ability to be reflectively aware of be-ing ("I am") and not not-be-ing ("I am not 'not' "), of being oneself ("I am I") and not another ("I am not 'you,' 'he,' 'she,' or 'it' "), or of being a conscious subject ("I am an 'I' ") and not a non-conscious object or thing ("I am not 'not-an-I' "), there is embedded the ability to be reflectively conscious of the negation of one's non-being. This includes the negation of what may be termed one's "ontological non-being" (i.e., not being "non-existent"—e.g., "I am not dead"), one's "phenomenological non-being" (i.e., not-being "any 'other' being"), and one's "existential non-being" (i.e., not being "not a reflectively conscious subject or self"). To be a human being, ego, or self is to be able to be reflectively aware not solely that "I am I" but also that "I am not-I" in its various implications.

Thus, although all awareness (as with consciousness) is awareness of something, not all awareness can be aware that it is aware of something. It is peculiarly human, reflective, or "self" awareness that can be aware of its being aware—and of its not being "not-aware," irrespective of the particular something or "object"—or its "negation"—of which it is aware.[33]

So it is that ordinary, human, reflective consciousness, beyond being able to be conscious of something (or the "negation" of something) can be conscious of its being conscious of something (or of that "negation")—which also means that it can be reflectively conscious of the be-ing (or not being) of the something (or "negation") of which it is conscious. In its functioning, dualistic, reflective awareness, therefore, the ordinary human self is a "subject" aware of an "object"—or, more inclusively, a subject capable of being aware of being "a subject aware of an object,"[34] which object may either "be" or "not be." As a consequence, with regard to "being," it is not simply, as with Bishop Berkeley, that "to be is to be perceived" (*esse est percipi*). Rather, to be is to be reflectively perceived[35]—or, more exactly, to be a positive modality (i.e., an affirmed object, a functioning subject, or both) in the dualistic matrix of reflective being-and-consciousness. "Non-being" or "not to be," on the other hand, is not the absence or the non-functioning of reflective consciousness-and-being; but, to the contrary, is the reflective awareness of either the actual or potential absence, de-limitation, or negation of being. "Non-being" or "not to be," accordingly, is a

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negative modality (i.e., an actual or possible negated object, negated subject, or both) in the dualistic matrix of reflective consciousness-and-being. Moreover, since the positive and the negative modalities are always mutually correlative,[36] being and nonbeing are likewise always mutually or correlatively involved in the matrix of dualistic, reflective being-and-consciousness. Any dualistically affirmed object or affirming subject is precisely thereby, whether logically, existentially, or onto-existentially, a negation of its own possible negation.

Reflective self (or ego) consciousness, then, is consciousness with the awakened, continuing ability to be conscious of its consciousness—or to be conscious of itself, which encompasses the awakened, continuing reflective ability to be conscious that it is not not-conscious—or that it is not not-itself. And it is uniquely this dualistic, reflective awareness able to be aware that it "is" its-self and "is not" not-its-self that can be reflectively aware of its being a self—or an ego, or a subject, or a person, or an I, or, in fine, a "human" being.

Furthermore, it is singularly this human self or ego consciousness able to be reflectively conscious of its-self in contrast to not-its-self—and, therein, of its being a self, that can know whether the "other" being is or is not a self. In any extended encounter with an "other," the ordinary self can ascertain not merely if the other is a "being-with-consciousness" (i.e., if it has a central capability of consciousness[37] that can be, for example, trained in a certain way—or even rendered non-functioning and the organism, therewith, "un-conscious"), but, when it is so determined to be a "conscious-being,' whether it can be conscious of its being conscious (i.e., if it has the same kind of consciousness that the ordinary self has). In its reflective awareness of the "other" and (where the other "is conscious") of the other's awareness of it, the ego can discern whether the awareness that the other has of it is the same sort of reflective, subject-object awareness that it has of the other—or of itself.

That is, when one, as a human self, is aware of another that is simultaneous aware of oneself, one can be aware of whether the other can from its side, even against one's will, drive the major focus of one's awareness back away from the other as that of which one is aware to oneself as that of which the other is aware. For when one as a reflective subject engages another subject, the subjectivity of the other can function not only as a limit to check or block one's own subject-awareness from penetrating, as it were, "right-through" the other,[38] but also as a "counter-power" to force back one's awareness away from the other to oneself—thereby making oneself psychologically (as well as onto-existentially) "self-conscious."[39]

Hence, in an ego's existential interchange with another ego, the ego

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becomes aware of its being an object of the other's consciousness—just as the other ego becomes aware of being an object of the ego's consciousness. Thus aware of itself as an object of the other ego's consciousness, the ego is aware not only of the other ego as an object, but also of itself as an object—just as the other ego, in turn, is aware of itself as an object because of being aware of itself as an object of the ego's consciousness. But, further, in this double reflective awareness of each being an object to both itself and the other; each is aware that this very double awareness is likewise known to the other. Accordingly, in the ego's reflective awareness that it and the other are known as objects to one another—and that this is known as well by the other, the ego is aware that the other, as with itself, is a knowing subject. In short, in its knowing that the other and itself both know that both are known as objects to (or by) each other, the ego knows that the other, like itself, is a reflectively knowing subject.[40]

It may be noted that in the case of a subject's projection of subjectivity on to another that is not a subject, the fact that this is called—which presumes that it can be ascertained to be—a "projection" further supports the claim that a distinction can be made between those others that are subjects and those that are not.

Additionally to be observed is that while a subject may erroneously project subjectivity onto a non-subject, it can never entirely take away the subjectivity of another bonafide subject. For any denial or negation of the subjectivity of another subject will incur at least the psychological resistance—if not the retaliation—of that subject, either (or both) of which reactions would be an expression of the subjectivity of the subject.

On the other hand, when the ego realises the other's awareness of it not to be reflective or of the nature of subject-and-object—and so itself not an "object" of the other's awareness, the ego does not find itself in an "ego vs. ego" power struggle—or contention—with the other. In such a situation, there is no need for it to mobilize its "ego-defenses" to overcome, protect against, or compensate for any objectification of itself—or, indeed, any sort of ego-vulnerability stemming from a sense, when in the presence of another ego, of, for instance, inferiority, shame, envy, embarrassment,[41] etc.

So it is that reflective self-awareness, capable of being aware that it is a subject or a "self," can become aware of whether or not the "other" is a subject or a "self." For Hisamatsu, it is just this reflective discrimination of itself in contrast to that which is not-itself or "other"—or, again, its "self-(or self-other-) consciousness"—that is the underlying dualistic distinction that the ordinary self makes : "Since ordinary self-consciousness innately contains a differentiation between itself and the other, ordinary self-consciousness may be said to be that differentiation which lies at the

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root of all differentiation."[42]

But, as was earlier intimated, with his reflective discrimination of himself, the ordinary man is in dualistic relationships equally with himself, (e.g., in terms of subject-and-object or mind-and-body), with what may now be called the "phenomenological negation" of himself in the form of 'that which is' not-himself or other-to-himself (e.g., I-and-thou or I-and-it), and with his not-self as either an "existential" or an "ontological" negation of himself (e.g., existentially as the possible negation of his subjectivity, selfhood, or "humanity", or ontologically as the possible negation of his very being).

Dualistic, reflective self (or ego)-consciousness, therefore, bespeaks neither a supposedly "autonomous" or "independent" self, ego, or consciousness, nor a so-called "solipsistic" subjectivity. Quite the contrary, it is always a correlative consciousness entailing subject and object, consciousness and non-consciousness, self and other, consciousness and being, affirmation and negation, self and not-self, being and non-being. Its subjectivity, far from being "solipsistic," is, exactly the opposite, under the constant threat of being restricted, oppressed, or otherwise denied precisely by other subjects in their subjectivity.

This ever present threat to the ego of the existential negation of its-"self" (or subjectivity, or personhood, or humanity) is sensed by the ego almost as soon as it arises. That one of the earliest, most basic, and persistent manifestations of the ego's affirmation of its-self should be its steadfast opposition to anything that strikes it as a dismissal of—or imposition upon—its subjectivity is not a mere accident, coincidence, or quirk. From the tenacious and often tearful recalcitrance of the child's "No! I will not," through the rebellious adolescent's repudiation of established norms and his (or her) defiant, "Don't tell me what to do," to the offended adult's indignant protest against all forms of "de-humanization," "People are personal 'selves' not impersonal 'things,' " the ego consistently affirms itself by staunchly resisting what appears to it to be a neglect or outright negation of its human subjectivity—or its-"self."[43]

Another possibility with regard to an undermining existential slight to itself as subject that shows the ego to be neither independent nor solipsistic has to do with its continuing need for at minimum the toleration (if not the appreciative understanding—or positive approbation) of other subjects. Exactly this need—or "want"—accounts for the especially piercing sting suffered by the ego when it has directed to it from other egos not simply a critical disapproval but a condescending ridicule or undisguised ostracism—and all the more so when it considers such ridicule or ostracism to be unwarranted. In fact, one of the most poignant and melancholy pangs of

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loneliness that can beset the ego results not so much from its being justifiably criticized as from its being grossly misunderstood. For to be misunderstood in any significant aspect or undertaking of its life is for the ego to have, to that extent, "lost communication" and to be, in that sense, circumscribed or negated in its subjectivity. Whether because of being gravely misunderstood, not properly appreciated, or for some other reason considered unacceptable or downright intolerable,[44] and so subjected to a lesser or greater measure of social proscription or actual institutional "solitary confinement," one of the severest threats to—or punishments of—an individual ego is the existential negation of its subjectivity through the limiting of its possibilities for "human" or "intersubjective" communication.[45]

As for the inexorable and ultimately inevitable threat to the ego of the ontological negation of its being as subject and object, this, of course, is far more difficult for it to ward off or to "stand against." Inasmuch as the ego's eventual ontological nonbeing (or death) does not have (to the ego) any overtly presentable—or objectifiable—content, it does not offer an actually confrontable object that the ego as subject can resist or oppose. Nonetheless, the ego apprehends the potentiality of its ontological nonbeing as an "object" of its awareness. For it is the ordinary man as a subject who is reflectively aware of the possibility—or inevitability—of his nonbeing or death, which latency—or contingency—he "cognizes" as an "object" of his consciousness. In his reflective consciousness that he exists or that he is alive, the ordinary man is reflectively conscious that he does not—yet—not exist or that he is not—yet—dead.

Dualistic, human self-consciousness in its awareness of be-ing and of not not-be-ing always is aware of be-ing at some time and in some place. For man, to be is to be now and here—and to have been (or not yet to be) then and there or here. In this sense, man in his actual temporal-spatial "presence" or "be-ing" is a now-being and a here-being, rather than a then-being (past or future) or, as Heidegger has chosen to characterize him, a there-being (i.e., a *Da-sein*[46]). However, it is true that in daydreaming (or other modes of phantasizing), in remembering or recalling, or in anticipatory planning, envisioning, or "projecting," the human being can imagine itself not to be "here", can imagine itself to be somewhere else, either in the present or any other time. But this very ability to be in one place at a certain time and to recall, envision, or "project" one self to be in some other place at the same time, and to be able to move back and forth between these realms of the actual, the recollected, the envisioned, and the projected, are all possibilities of man's reflective consciousness. Likewise, when the ability clearly to distinguish the actual, the envisioned, the recalled, the anticipated, or, when applicable,

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any falsely perceived realms or "worlds" is impaired, whether because of the effect of drugs, physical or mental illness, old age, or whatever, this is an impairment, failing, or aberration in the functioning of man's continuing ability to be reflectively self-conscious—i.e., to be reflectively conscious at once of himself, of his world, of time, and of space. Expressed in yet another way, there cannot be a "self-image" of any kind—realistic or idealistic, clear or confused, with its locus in any place in an actual or distorted present, an accurately or deceptively remembered past, or a soberly anticipated or wildly wished-for future—except that it be a function of the peculiar human capability to be reflectively self-conscious.

Ordinary, dualistic, human self or ego consciousness as that consciousness with the awakened and continuing ability to be reflectively conscious of its being conscious may thus be said, as examined so far, to incorporate in its functioning eight different but interconnected aspects : the capacity to be reflectively conscious of (1) itself, "I"; (2) its existence or be-ing, "I am"; (3) its being itself, "I am I"; (4) its being a self, "I am an I"; (5) its not being not-itself, "I am not not-I, and this (6) ontologically, "I am not non-existent or dead," (7) existentially, "I am not 'not a subject' or 'not a self," and (8) phenomenologically, "I am not any 'other' "—neither any "thing" other (especially since "I am not a thing"), nor any "one" other.

The ego's functioning dualistic self-awareness in which it is reflectively aware of be-ing in contrast to not-being, and of being itself in contrast to not being itself (or being not-itself) may, from this perspective, additionally be said to comprise its primary concretion or content and its primary context or relation.

Despite a seeming generalised abstractness, the ego's reflective discrimination of itself, "I," in dualistic—or polar—distinction to not-itself, "not-I," yields its primary concretion because just the several polarities of the dualistic self (e.g., self-not self, self-other, and self-world) provide the formative or enveloping content of the ordinary, personal human being—preceding (or subtending) what may be deemed the secondary contents associated with its being a human person. For example, it is the reflective awareness that "I am I" and that "I am not not-I" (either my own nonbeing, the "other," or "the world") which undergirds both the generic awareness tha "I am an I" and the specific awareness that "I am the particular I that It am." It is solely because the ordinary person is capable of being a reflectively self (or ego)-conscious "I" that it can be conscious of itself, on the one hand, as "an I" and, on the other hand, as the "distinctive I" that it is. It goes without saying, of course, that these three aspects of reflective self or ego consciousness are inextricably interwined. Nevertheless,

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between the ordinary man's being generically "an I" (or "an ego," or "a self," or "a subject," or "a person") and his being specifically "the unique I" (or person) that he is, the categorical—or determinitive—priority lies with the former. For the essential quality of the ordinary ego's being is its capacity to be a dualistically self-conscious[47] being, irrespective of the particularities of its be-ing—e.g,, its age, race, sex, religion, culture, psychological temperament, historical epoch, etc.

The far-reaching import of this priority is appreciated when it is realised that a human being's status, dignity, or right to be respected and treated as a human being—or self, is not dependent upon the specificities of its being. Quite the reverse, the often proclaimed 'rights of man' rightfully apply to any human person regardless of sex, race, age, nationality, and so forth. It is not, therefore, either accidental or incidental that the so-called "Golden Rule" is formulated as a universal: " 'Do' (or, sometimes, 'Do not do') unto the other"—i.e., the other human "person," and this without any stipulation of race, age, sex, religious or ethnic affiliation, and the like.

This is not to gainsay that be-ing a human being or self is, normally, to be a male or a female; to have a skin colour that is black, brown, white, red, or yellow; to have been brought up in and shaped by definite traditions—among others, social, cultural, economic, historical, political, religious, and philosophical; and, exceeding this, to have certain physical, biological, and psychological idiosyncracies that identify one as oneself and no "other." This notwithstanding, the primary or prototypical attribute that makes a human person a person or a self remains that of being able to be a reflectively self (or ego)-conscious being, or a self (or ego)-conscious "I." For lacking the reflective self or ego conscious "I," there would—or could—not be, in spite of the particular race, sex, age, or unique characteristics, any "human" content such as religion, philosophy, culture, socio-economic and political traditions and so on.

There can, then, be no "human" content—or contents—unless there is a "human" being; and there can be no "human" being in the sense of a reflective being (or a "subject" or a "self") unless there is an awakened and continuing capacity for reflective self-awareness—even though such self-awareness requires for its initial awakening a direct confrontation with another such self-awareness.[48] (A wolf-child, for instance, deprived of this interchange, does not come to an actualised reflective self-consciousness.[49]) But here, too, for this needed contact, the sole requirement is that the other being be able to be reflectively conscious of its be-ing—i.e., that it be a "self," and not that it be any prescribed sex, age, race, economic status, ancestral lineage, or whatever.[50]

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In sum, of more primordial significance to the ordinary ego than its reflective consciousness of being physiologically, psychologically, or socio-culturally male or female, introvert or extrovert, Occidental or Oriental, etc.,—which factors, to be sure, vastly influence its day-to-day life—is its sustentative reflective awareness of being aware and, therein, of itself ("I"), its be-ing ("I am"), and its being itself ("I am I").

Viewed in this light, it becomes clear that neither the content, the status nor the nature of the reflective being of the ordinary functioning self or ego is ever simply reducible to an "ontological-objectivity"; and that neither the content, the status, nor the nature of the reflective consciousness of the ordinary functioning self or ego is ever simply reducible to an "existential-subjectivity." With the dualistically self-conscious ego, its reflective being is always object-subject-be-ing, as its reflective consciousness is always subject-object-consciousness. As regards the ordinary human self, ego, or "I," "to be " always entails the ability to be reflectively aware, as "to be reflectively aware" always entails the ability to be aware of be-ing, This mutually related subject-object manner of reflective consciousness-and-be-ing, or object-subject manner of reflective be-ing-and-consciousness is more appropriately described as "ontological-existential," or, if abbreviated, "onto-existential." And it is just this infrangibly interfused mode of the ordinary I's reflective consciousness-and-be-ing that accounts for the correspondingly interlinked reflective awareness of its being, on the one hand, 'abstractly' or 'universally' "an I" (or object-subject), and, on the other hand, 'concretely' or 'particularly' the "uniquely individual I" (or subject-object) that it undeniably is.

Set forth in a somewhat altered expression, there can be no specific, irreplaceable, historical human being or "I" except that it be generically *a* human being or *an* "I"—and, furthermore, its dignity as a human person derives in the first instance exactly from that fact; namely, from being *a* person (and so a member of the class of all persons) and not from being the distinctive person that it is. Indeed, even the unrepeatable individuality of each and every personal human being is itself—precisely thereby—a general characteristic of being a person. Conversely, it is equally the case that there can be no generic (or "general" or "universal") reflective human being except that it be a specific human being, which, in its very reflective be-ing ("I am") or being itself ("I am I"), is not any other being—human or otherwise.[51]

This reflective awareness that the self-conscious ego has of itself besides being its primary concretion or primary content is also its primary context or primary relation. For underlying all of the many possible relations into which the ego may enter under whatever conditions of time, place, and

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the presence or absence of other beings, its main context or relation is itself as a reflectively functioning self-conscious "I" that "is", and which, in its be-ing, "is itself" in dualistic differentiation or "relation" to "not-itself"—whether that "not-itself" be phenomenologically an actual, determinate "other" with its distinguishable being, or the ego's own potential dualistic negation or non-being (either existentially—the suspension or suppression of its being as a subject, or ontologically—the termination of its very life as an animate being).

Immediately to be acknowledged is that the ordinary person may in some respects change or be different in differing contexts and relations—even to the degree, on occasion, of "transcending" itself. That is, at times (e.g., in *ekstasis* or ecstasy), the ordinary functioning self may temporarily "lose" itself by overcoming, "rising above," or "getting outside" the dualistic subject-object-structured-functioning of its reflective being-and-consciousness. This notwithstanding, its enduring manner of being as an ordinary self is still its awakened and ongoing recoverable ability to be a dualistically reflective being, reflectively conscious as well of any putative experience of having gotten "beyond" the dichotomizing consciousness of itself and not-itself.

To elucidate this, the experience of "rising above"—or "getting outside"—its dualistic subject-object consciousness is assimilated by the ego *as its experience* retroactively in terms of its dualistic subject-object consciousness. It is the ego as a dualistic subject that is aware of having evidently experienced the transcendence of itself (or its subject-object functioning)—which "experience" or "transcendence" becomes an "object" of the ego's awareness as that "of which" it is aware. As it is the reflective ego that is aware of having transcended itself in a particular place at a particular time and under a particular set of conditions, the context—or "matrix"—into which it integrates its "experienced self-transcendence" continues to be itself as an ordinary ego-conscious "I," standing in dualistie antithesis to the very "not-I" it professes to have experienced.

Expressed in another way, if at the moment of an alleged self-transcendence there is a reflective awareness of it, then, clearly, it would not be a pure transcendence. If, on the other hand, in the moment of self-transcendence there is not any awareness of it, then there is a gap in awareness that is later interpreted as a past moment of transcendence.[52] But this *post facto* interpretation is rendered by the dualistic ego, which albeit in that past moment may have been transcended is now no longer being transcended.

Hence, so long as the ordinary self in its functioning persists as an ordinary self, its primary concretion, content, context, and relation continue

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to be its reflective dualistic subject-object consciousness of itself, "I," in contradistinction to not-itself, or, "not-I."

With the ego's dualistic, reflective awareness of itself, accompanying its discrimination of such bipolarities as self-and-not-self, self-and-other, self-and-world, being-and-nonbeing (or existence-and-nonexistence), is its bipolar discrimination of positive value and negative dis-value. To the ordinary man, the distinction, for example, between being-and-nonbeing, or life-and-death, is seldom a neutral distinction. On the contrary, being, existence, or life is usually considered to be a (or "of") positive value, whereas nonbeing, nonexistence, or death, is, under most circumstances, considered to be a (or "of") negative disvalue.

But even within the province of being, the ego almost continuously judges and compares—i.e., evaluates, assesses, or appreciates—that which it encounters (as well as itself) not only generally in terms of better or worse, but also specifically in terms of good and evil, truth and falsity, beauty and ugliness, justice and injustice, what is and what ought to be, and so on. It is singularly the reflective, human being who, for instance, when looking upon another such being, inclines to be either grateful that "There but for the grace of God go I," or resentful that "It is always the other person who gets all the breaks."

Again to be noted is that in its reflective valuing and disvaluing, the ego is operating within a subject-object duality. To evaluate or to appreciate reflectively means that the ego as a subject makes an axiological judgment about that which is present to—or "before" it is an object. In its reflective consciousness of itself, not-itself, the other, the "world," or any aspect of that world, or in its reflective evaluation or assessment of that of which it is aware, the ordinary self (or ego) reflectively functions "is," and "is conscious" within the matrix of a dualistic, subject-object mode of consciousness-and-be-ing.

Suzuki has made reference to this in his own characteristic style :

> When a man declares, "I am," he is already thinking and thinking works [dichotomously], for there is first of all the thinker himself who has an object before him of which he thinks. All the thinking we humans do proceeds in this manner. There is no escaping from this dualism. Birth and death, beginning and ending, creation and destruction, start from here.[53]

And, in a related comment : "When we say that a thing exists, or, rather, that we live, it means that we live in this world of dualities and antitheses."[54]

Hisamatsu has dealt with this in other terminology : "Having

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differentiation, self-consciousness has form; and having form means that it undergoes objectification."[55]

Here Hisamatsu has utilised a concept long axial to Zen Buddhism—or to Mahāyāna Buddhism in general—to stress that reflective self-awareness while intangible in its subjectivity must, as subject-and-object, be said to have a "form." For ordinary self-awareness in addition to being reflectively aware of itself as an "object" differentiates itself from "not-itself"—whether as the unmitigated ontological negation of itself, the existential negation of itself as a subject, or the phenomenological negation of itself as represented by that which is other to itself. So, as Hisamatsu has argued :

> To the extent that self-consciousness is differentiated it is objectified.... For to be differentiated means to become an object, and to the extent that self-consciousness is differentiated and objectified it has form.[56]

At times the argument is a bit varied : "Whereas if something is not differentiated it does not become objective... to the extent that self-consciousness must be said to be differentiated it must be said to be objective and to have a form."[57]

Hence, though the ordinary self in its subjectivity is not an object and so seemingly without form—or formless, in distinguishing its subjectivity to itself and from the subjectivity of other selves, it objectifies itself (as well as the other selves) and comes, as a consequence, to possess a distinguishable form. Once more, in Hisamatsu's explanation :

> Ordinary self consciousness, in spite of being formless in itself, can still be differentiated, for example, from the formless self-consciousness of the other. Proof of this is that self-consciousness necessarily engenders the distinction between self and other, the other ever standing in contrast to the self. Containing this discrimination between I and thou, and I and he, self-consciousness comes to have its own form.[58]

As beheld by Zen Buddhism, the ordinary self (or ego)-conscious "I" is thus rent by an intrinsic dualism that derives from the very nature of its reflective be-ing-and-consciousness. This dualism assumes—and involves the ego in—a multitude of forms. Among the most pre-eminent are subject-and-object (or *noesis*-and-*noema*), mind-and-body, life-and-death, time-and-space, self-and-not-self, self-and-other, self-and-world, being-and-nonbeing (or √ existence-and-nonexistence), √ consciousness-and-non-consciousness, consciousness-and-reflective-consciousness, the-universal-and-the-particular, value-and-disvalue, or even, formlessness-and-form. For, in the Zen view,

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it is just the reflectively-conscious (or onto-existential) delineation of form from no-form (or formlessness) and of one form from every other form that accounts for the rise of dualism. So the observation of the aforementioned Third Patriarch of Chinese Zen, Seng-ts'an : "all forms of dualism are contrived by the ignorant themselves."[59]

From the Zen standpoint, consequently, another way to describe the dualistically functioning reflective self would be as a 'self-with-forms'—or, simply, a 'self-with-form.' This latter designation, 'self-with-form' would appear especially appropriate because in the Zen perception the chief form that subtends all of the forms of the ego's manifold dualism is its own differentiated form of itself ("I," "I am," or "I am I"). This re-expresses the contention that for Zen the ego's reflective differentiation of itself—or its reflective self-awareness—along with constituting the ego's primary concretion, content, context, and relation, is also the root-source of its multifaceted inner and outer dualism.

Earlier[60] it was maintained that the ordinary personal self's refletive self-consciousness is the basic context and the basic content of its dualism since without such self-consciousness there would not be a "self"—or a "person." Now again being stressed[61] is that the ordinary man's reflective awareness is the source of his dualism inasmuch as it is with his reflectively conscious discrimination of himself from not-himself that his underlying dualism comes into being. For the ego's reflective demarcation of itself from not-itself entails at once the "outer" ontological distinction between its own being and its own sheer nonbeing, the "outer" phenomenological distinction between itself and the other—or itself and "the rest of the world," and the "inner" existential distinction between itself as subject and itself as object. This is because the reflective awareness that it is itself ("I am I") and the reflective awareness that it is not not-itself ("I am not not-I")—in all of its implications, are, as wise likewise previously indicated, integral components of each other. It is not solely, therefore, as William James proclaimed, that the human self dichotomizes the world;[62] it also dichotomizes itself.

This may help make clear an additional form of the radical dualism in which the ordinary man is involved; namely, that of freedom and destiny. For although its reflective differentiation of itself is an "act" of the ego as a subject that "creates" its dualism and for which the ego, in that sense, is "actively" (or "freely") responsible, in this act of the dualistic circumscription of itself, the ego, in another sense, "passively"[63] (or fatefully") finds itself "given" to itself—not only "in the world" (as Heidegger has emphasized[64]) but also as an "object" given to itself as a subject.

In affirming, its own existence, "I" or "I am," or in declaring itself to

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be itself, "I am I," the ordinary self in an expression of its subjectivity "actively" (or "freely") marks itself off from "not-itself"—and, therewith, "defines" or determines" itself. Regarded in this vein, it is the ego that stakes out, cuts off, or "decides" itself against "not itself."

However, in this "determination" or "deciding" of itself, the ego concomitantly finds itself given to itself as already "determined"—e.g., as a male or a female, as belonging to one racial group or another, or, above all, exactly as functioning human or personal being with a reflective awareness that has distinguished "itself" from "not-itself."

Ordinary human reflective self or ego consciousness may thus be said to be co-incidentally an act undertaken by the ordinary self and a fact that the ordinary self finds given to itself. Not that it is given by any one or any thing "other" to itself. To the contrary, it is the nature of reflective self-consciousness to comprise concurrently a creative act of the ordinary self's freedom and a given fact of the ordinary self 's destiny. It is the ordinary man in his dualistic, reflective freedom who discovers himself to be destined, as it is the ordinary man in his dualistic reflective destiny who realizes that it is his lot to be free.[65]

Stated otherwise, the ordinary I in no sense "exists" prior to its initial reflective awareness of itself.[66] Quite the reverse, the ego first comes into "being" with the "act" of its reflective predication of itself—i.e., with its awakened, functioning reflective self-consciousness that it expresses in its reflective self-affirmation, "I," "I am," or "I am I." But in this "act" of reflective self-affirmation in which it predicates or "brings into being" its existence, the ego finds itself given to itself as already existing.[67]

As the ego's "being" in no wise precedes its actualized reflective consciousness or its "acting," neither does it actualized reflective consciousness or its acting precede its being. Its being, its actualized reflective consciousness, and its acting are all coterminous. Solely in its "freely acting" does it find—or come to "know"—that it has been "destined" to act, to know, and to be. Conversely, solely in its "destined be-ing and acting" does it find—or come to know—that it is reflectively "free" to act, to know, and to be. Betokening its actively reflective onto-existential modality of being-and-consciousness—or being, consciousness, and acting (or "doing"), the ordinary self's freedom accounts for its being destined, as the ordinary self's destiny accounts for its being free. It is the ordinary man alone who has the freedom to be destined, as it is the ordinary man alone who has the destiny to be free.[68]

Unalterably, in this freedom-and-destiny form of the ego's basic dualism, it is the ordinary I in the freedom of its subjectivity that is reflectively aware of its given—and so "objective"—destiny.

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These, then, are among the major reasons for the Zen emphasis that it is owing to the ordinary man's reflectively distinguishing consciousness that he acts—or "inter-acts"—with reference to himself, not-himself, the other, or the "world" as a subject dualistically conscious of that which has been reflectively distinguished, and which, thereby, is positioned before—or "in front of"—him as an object. This is especially noticeable in the ordinary man's use of objects as "tools" or "instruments." Because of his being a subject aware of what is "not himself" as an object, man's use of an object not-himself as a tool or instrumentality for his own ends is not always in a constructive harmony with the natural and human worlds, but is often in a destructive disharmony with those worlds. Of all beings, the human alone can—and too frequently does—seek the indisputable conquest and subjugation not only of inanimate nature but of other animate beings, human and non-human alike. It is, for instance, singularly man who undertakes with sustained effort to harness, control, and direct—in ever increasing measure— the inanimate forces of nature, to domesticate animate beings different from himself, and to enslave other beings of his very own kind. (It may be noted, parenthetically, that it is again solely the human being who deliberately—or "self-destructively"—abuses itself).

Ironically, the human use of another subject-self, person, or human being as an instrumentality or a "means" is a violation of the integrity, subjectivity, or humanity of the user as well as of the used. For the ego cannot with impunity appropriate or make use of (whch means as an "object") just any "other." In so far as it does use another subject-self or person as an instrument, tool, or "objective means," this de-humanization of another human being is a de-humanization likewise of the human de-humanizer. It will be recalled[69] that human subjectivity in its very root or origin is generically linked with and dependent upon human inter-subjectivity. In order for one human subject to emerge, there has to be an encounter with at least one other actual or about-to-be human subject. Furthermore, in this needed inter-subjective encounter, it is the generic quality of the other subjects' subjectivity as such—i.e., its general ability to be reflectively aware of being aware—and not the specific or distinctive qualities of that particular subject that is determinative for the initial rise of human subjectivity. From this it follows that the constituitive existential (whatever the social or legal) obligation of the "human" being to actually be human or humane (i.e., to bear and to express its subjectivity in a manner that befits or seeks to augment or to enhance subjectivity *per se*) and not to be inhuman or inhumane (i.e., not in any way to debase or otherwise to violate the integrity of subjectivity *per se*) is an

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obligation of the human being not only to itself and to its particular group but to all of humanity. The desecration of any one person's subjectivity, consequently, is the desecration of every person's subjectivity. Put another way, any human being's inhumanity toward—or against—any other human being is an inhumanity towards—or against—all human beings.[70]

But even apart from the ego's calculated or wilful (and so avoidable) contravention of the subjectivity of other human beings, the ordinary self while necessarily having its be-ing "with-others-in-the-world" (as Heidegger has insisted) must, as a dualistically discriminated self, also inevitably have its be-ing "against-others-in-the world." Indeed, that it can be related "with" or "against" others in-the-world is possible solely because the ordinary self does reflectively differentiate itself from all others and from the world. Its being linked together with others in-the-world is, therefore, concomitantly its being distant or excluded from others and from the world. In this sense, the functioning, reflective self is never simply "in-the-world"; it is also at the same time "outside"[71] the world. As already observed,[72] the reflective distancing of the functioning subject-self that enables it to affirm and to "be-with—or to "be-in," is, coincidentally, a negating distancing that removes the subject-self from that which it affirms—which it "is not," or, which it is "against," or, which it is "not-in." The ego in its dualistically reflective functioning as a conscious subject, accordingly, is an ever regressing (or ever receding) subject, always "separated from"—even as it "belongs to"—those objects of which it is conscious.

In the ordinary man's reflective, dualistic, subject-object mode of be-ing-and-consciousness, that 'which is conscious' functions as a reflectively conscious or knowing subject in relation to the object 'of which it is conscious'—the place or "*topos*" of each, as a result, being "distant from" or "exterior to" the other. In the words of Suzuki: "The dualistic intellect [or 'mind,' or 'subject'] always keeps its object away from itself."[73] For Suzuki, "this may...be called the objective way of thinking, because by this method the thinking always goes away from the thinker."[74]

The specific reason for this is that to be an "object" means to be "externalized"—i.e., "separated" or "at a distance," located "before" or "in front of" some subject. Something "exists" (or "stands-out") as an "object," as has herein been consistently maintained, correlative to the awareness of some subject. An object is, perforce, that "of which" some subject is conscious. So it is that there can be no object except that it be an object to—or for—a subject.

With something becoming an object exclusively when known as such by a subject, the subject in its reflective—or dualistic—knowing or conscious-

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ness thus puts (or finds) that which it knows or is conscious of "outside" itself. This is the binary disjuncture—or fracture—in all ordinary, subject-object knowing. Again, as articulated by Suzuki: "knowledge, as the term is generally used, is the relationship between subject and object. Where there is no such dichotomous distinction, [ordinary] knowledge is impossible."[75] This "ordinary" knowledge is sometimes referred to, in Mahāyāna Buddhist terminology, as "relative" knowledge. In a *sūtra* closely affiliated with Zen Buddhism, *The Lankāvatāra Sūtra*, it is stated: "The knowledge of the relativity-aspect (*paratantra*) rises from the separation of subject (āśraya) and object (ālambana)."[76]

Indigenous to man's reflective knowing or consciousness, therefore, is an ineluctable diremption: the object that is known with its locus "before" or "in front of" the subject by which it is known is set "apart from" or 'outside" that subject. But in putting—or finding—the object "outside" itself, the ego as a dualistic subject puts—or finds—itself "outside" the object.

In its reflective consciousness of itself, not-itself, the other, the "world," or any aspect of that world, the ego as a dualistic subject ever remains "on the outside," separate or distant from that of which it is conscious. With regard to its own consciousness of itself, while the ego knows itself *to be* a subject—or a "knower," as a dualistic or ever-regressive subject it can never know itself *as* a subject—or a "knower."[77] It can only know itself as an "object-known "[78]

Just as the ordinary or dualistic "I" can not possibly doubt itself as doubter, neither can it ever know itself as knower. That it can not doubt itself as subject-doubter is not, however, a matter of an indubitable or apoditic self-certainty; it is rather a matter of an insurmountable self-alienation. For although, in doubting, what is doubted is always an object that attests to a subject-doubter, the subject-doubter can never "get to," "contact," or know itself as a subject-doubter. Quite the reverse, the dualistic, reflective being-and-consciousness of the ego which is aware that it doubts (or that it is aware)—and, hence, which is aware that it "is," is a split or alienated being-and-consciousness. In its being aware of its being aware—and therewith of its be-ing, the actively functioning, "reflect-ing," or "assert-ing" I that asserts itself to be conscious and "to be" (I am aware that I am aware, therefore I am) is a subject-I or a subject-being. However, the I that is "reflect-ed upon" or that is "assert-ed" to be conscious or "to be" is, precisely thereby, an object-I or an object-being. The ego in its dualistic subject-object—or "split"—consciousness is a dualistic subject-object—or "split"—being. To express this another way, the ego in its dualistic, reflective self-consciousness-and-

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being is a bifurcating—and, therein, bifurcated—self, consciousness, and being. The subject that is conscious—or that "is," in knowing or being conscious that it is conscious—or that it "is," is conscious of itself—and "is" to itself—as an object. So the ego as subject in its dualistic, reflective self-awareness-and-being is elusive or "strange" even to itself.[79]

And, in fact, it is this very "estrangement" of the ordinary human subject both from itself as subject and from its object that constitutes, in Zen's understanding, one of the primary forms of the problem of the ordinary man in his initial, dualistically reflective, subject-object mode of be-ing-and-conciousness. As enunciated by Suzuki: "When we are faced with this bifurcation, when subject and object oppose one another,[80] the result is the anxiety and fear which trouble us all...."[81] For it is not simply that "when we have this bifurcation, subject and object, there is always a logical contradication";[82] there is always as well an existential—or an onto-existential—contradiction. In dualistically knowing himself ("I") or that he is ("I am"), the ordinary man knows that he does not truly know himself, that he does not truly know who (or what) he is; just as in dualistically being himself ("I am I") or knowing himself to be himself ("I am aware that I am I"), he knows that he "is" not truly himself. Hence the unique yet ubiquitous need of every ordinary ego or self "to find and to fulfil" itself.

So it is that in the Zen comprehension, the dualistic or "ordinary" human being as subject, person, self, ego, or I confronts within and without the singularly "human" imperative—or task—not alone truly to "Know Its-Self," but also truly to "Be Its-Self." Again, as set forth Suzuki:

> All forms of anxiety come from the fact that there is somewhere in our consciousness the feeling of incomplete knowledge of the situation, and this lack of knowledge leads to the sense of insecurity and then to anxiety with all its degrees of intensity. The "I" is always at the center of whatever situation we may encounter. When, therefore, the "I" is not thoroughly known, such questions and thoughts as follows never cease to torment us:
>
> "Has life any meaning?"
>
> "Is all really 'vanity of vanities'? If so, is there any hope of taking hold of what is truly worthwhile to attain?"
>
> "I am thrown into the whirlpool of brute facts, all given, all

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limited, all absolutely definitely unchanged, etc. I am helpless; I am the plaything of fates. Yet I long for freedom; I want to be master of myself. I cannot make my choice; yet a decision, one way or another, is imperative. I do not know what to do. But what am 'I' who really stands at the back of all these puzzling and harassing questions.?"

Where then is the secure ground I can stand on without any sense of anxiety? Or, what is 'I'? For I know 'I' may be the secure ground itself. Could this be the fact which I have not been able to discover so far? The 'I' must be discovered. And I shall be all right.[83]

Needless to say, it is just the discovery—or "Self-actulization"—of this nondualistic, reconciled, unproblematic, or True I that is the central concern of Zen Buddhism.

The I in search of I
Lost and alien in its own world
Knowing...not knowing
Being...not being
Under the pale of the one, the other
Not really either
Not really neither.

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Notes

1. This is a revision of the first chapter of the writer's doctoral dissertation, "The Zen Understanding of Man," submitted to the Graduate Board of Temple University (Philadelphia PA) in April, 1969. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are by the writer.
2. For an already published further elaboration of this, see "The Human Situation and Zen Buddhism" in D.T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm and Richard DeMartino, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 169ff.

3.a See below, p. 81.
3.b See below, fn. 9.

4. See "*The Cúla-Mālunkyasutta*" in *The Majjhima-Nikāya* (*The Middle Length Sayings*), Vol II, translated by I.B. Horner (London: The Pali Text Society, 1957), pp. 97-101.
5. These are early Buddhism's well-known "Four Noble Truths" (in Pali, *Cattāri Ariyasaccāni*).
6. In Pāli, this is *sammā ditthi* (in Sanskrit, *samyak dṛṣṭi*). Although often translated "right views," it has also been translated "right understanding" (see, for example, Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught* [New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1974], p. 45 and I.B. Horner, "Buddhism: the Theravāda," in R.C. Zaehner ed , *The Concise Encyclopedia of Living Faiths* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1959] p. 289), and even "right theory" (see A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism* [Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1970], p. 101).
7. *Homo sapiens* and *homo sapiens sapiens* are a species and a sub-species under this genus.
8. D.T. Suzuki, "Lectures on Zen Buddhism," in D.T. Suzuki, Erich Fromm, and Richard DeMartino, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 26.
9. As herein employed, the designation "ordinary" always refers to man in his initial situation as a human, personal being. Whether appearing in such phrases as "ordinary human," "ordinary self," "ordinary ego," "ordinary I," "ordinary person," or "ordinary subject," it is intended to apply to all human beings in their initial human condition of personhood and not just to some as opposed to others.
10. Shin'ichi Hisamatsu, "The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness," *Philosophical Studies of Japan*, II (1960), 77. This naturally suggests a comparison with Hume's renowned statement: "For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself* I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at anytime without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception." (David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967] Bk. I, Pt. IV, Sec. vi, p. 252.)
11. Seng-ts-an, *On Believing in Mind*, as translated in Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, *Manual of Zen Buddhism* (Kyoto: The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1935), p. 39.

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An almost identical position has been taken by Paul Tillich: "Subjectivity is not an epiphenomenon, a derived appearance. It is an original phenomenon, although only and always in polar relation with objectivity." (Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology, Volume I* [Chicago: The University of Chicago-Press, 1951], p. 173.)

12. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, "The Philosophy of Zen," *Philosophy East and West*, I, No. 2 (July, 1951), 5.

13. Shin'ichi Hisamatsu, "Shinbutsu no Shozai" ("The Place of the True Buddha"), *Toyo-Teki Mu* (Oriental Nothingness), (Tokyo: Kyobundo, 1942), p. 51.

14. Shin'ichi Hisamatsu, "Some Philosophical, Religious, and Aesthetic Aspects of Zen Buddhism, Part I," an unpublished lecture delivered at Harvard University on October 3, 1957. The English translation of this lecture, presented at that time by the writer, was prepared in collaboration with Dr Hisamatsu himself and with Dr Hisamatsu's assistant, the Reverend Jikai Fujiyoshi.

15. In this understanding there cannot be any "pre-reflective" *cogito*; for before the initial advent of reflective self-consciousness there is neither subject nor object—and so no *cogito*. For Sartre's renowned opposing view, see Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, translated by Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. li-liii, 74-76, *et passim*.

16. See below, especially pp. 88-89.

17. See below, pp. 88 and 95-96.

18. Yung-chia, *Poem on the Zealization of the Way*, as quoted in Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, "Some Aspects of Zen Buddhism," *Studies on Buddhism in Japan*, I (1939), 23. This terminological interchangeability would seem to be in evidence as well in the reasoning of William James. "I maintain [that] a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates [plays] the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of 'consciousness': while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content.' In a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing. And since it can figure in both groups simultaneously we have every right to speak of it as subjective and objective at once." (William James: "Does 'Consciousness' Exist ?" *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods* I, No. 18, September 1, 1904; quoted from John J. McDermott, ed., *The Writings of William James* [New York: The Modern Library, 1968], p. 172.)

19. See below, fn. 30.

20 Hisamatsu, "Some Philosophical, Religious and Aesthetic Aspects of Zen Buddhism, Part I."

21. For Buber's classic treatment of this theme, see Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, translated by Ronald Geogor Smith (Ediburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1950), especially pp. 3-9 and 62-68.

22. This term, although not its exact meaning, is adapted from Leibniz's *Monadology*. (See especially No. 14)

23. This may be compared and contrasted with the understanding of Merleau-Ponty: "The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is

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nothing but a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself projects." (M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, translated by Colin Smith [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976], p. 430.)

24. Martin Heidegger in emphasizing the "with others in the world" (*Mitsein* and *In-der-Welt-sein*) aspect of man (or *Dasein*), appears not to take equal cognizance of the contradictory aspect of each man's not being—and, in that sense, being separated or cut off from—the others and the world. Man, initially, is not only "with others" and "in the world," he is also "not others" and "not in the world." So man in his initial human situation finds Being—even as it is revealed to him—always concealed from him.

25. See below, especially pp. 107.

26. Hisamatsu, "Some Philosophical, Religious, and Aesthetic Aspects of Zen Buddhism, Part I."

27. For an eminent statement of the contrary view, see Francis Bowen, *The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton* (Cambridge: Sever and Francis, 1863), pp. 126 ff.

28. This is not to be identified with Sartre's "non-reflective" or "unreflected" consciousness. (See Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Transcendence of The Ego*, translated by Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick [New York: Octagon Books 1972], pp. 41, 47, *et passim*; also Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 74 *et passim*.)

29. Cf Edmund Husserl, *The Paris Lectures*, translated by Peter Moestenbaum (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), p. 13.

30. As a strictly limited sensory awareness is not to be confused with consciousness, neither is a strictly limited consciousness to be confused with "reflective" or "self" consciousness. Many lower forms of life would appear to exhibit sensory awareness—e.g., to specific external stimuli such as light, heat, sound, odours, etc. Consciousness—in the meaning of a pervasive or centrally integrated capacity for both general and specific inner and outer awareness, sensation, and feeling—would seem to be confined to those higher forms of animal life that possess a brain. But consciousness does not, *per se*, inevitably denote or connote the awakened and ongoing ability to be conscious of being conscious—or, "reflective" consciousness. An organism's "unreflective" seeing of a naked member of the opposite sex of its own species is not the same as the organism's being able to "know" that it is seeing a naked member of the opposite sex of its own species—or, indeed, being able "to know that it knows." For this "reflective" knowing can proceed beyond seeing and knowing the nakedness of the other to a "reflective knowledge" of whether one is oneself naked or not—and whether the other may "reflectively know" this or not. It follows, accordingly, that to be seen naked by a member of the opposite sex of one's own species without such a "reflective knowing" (actual or assumed) on the part of both the seer and the seen will never cause the slightest embarrassment to either.

31. Cf. Jung's insistence: "The mere thought that there is a tremendous psychological difference between consciousness of the existence of an object and 'consciousness of the consciousness' of an object borders on a quibble that hardly need answering." (C.G. Jung, "Foreword to [D.T.] Suzuki's *Introduction*

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to Zen Buddhism." in (C.G. Jung, *Collected Works* Vol. 11 [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969], p. 545.)

32. This can be supported by statements of Descartes himself and of Augustine, who preceded Descartes in this line of argument. Conducting a dialogue with "Reason" in his *Soliloquia*, Augustine wrote : "R. Do you, who wish to know yourself, know that you exist ? A. I know it. R. How do you know it ? A. I do not know. R. Are you conscious of yourself as simple or composite ? A. I. do not know. R. Do you know that you are moved ? A. I do not know. R. Do you know that you think ? A. That I know. R. Therefore, it is true that you think. A. It is true." (Augustine, *The Soliloquies*, Bk. II, ch. 1. Translated by Thomas F. Gilligan in *The Writings of Saint Augustine*, Vol. I [New York: Cima Publishing Co., 1948], pp. 381-2) Subsequently, in a more explicit exposition in his *De Civitate Dei*, Augustine wrote: "Where these truths are concerned, I need not quail before the Academicians when they say: 'What if you should be mistaken ?' Well, if I am mistaken, I exist. For a man who does not exist can surely not be mistaken either. . . . Therefore, from the fact that, if I were indeed mistaken, I should have to exist to be mistaken, it follows that I am undoubtedly not mistaken in knowing that I am. It follows also that in saying that I know that I know, I am not mistaken. For just as I know that I am, so it holds too that I know that I know." (Augustine, *The City of God*, translated by David S. Wiesen [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968], Bk. xi, ch. xxvi, p. 533) Approximately twelve-hundred years later, Descartes, in his *Discours de la Methode*, wrote: "I noticed that whilst I thus wished to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the 'I' who thought this should be . . . . I saw from the very fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it very evidently and certainly followed that I was . . . ." (René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, in *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross [Cambridge: The University Press, 1967], Vol. I, p. 101.) For, as Descartes maintained in his "Reply to the Second Set of Objections," "when we become aware that we are thinking beings, this is a primitive act of knowledge derived from no syllogistic reasoning. He who says, '*I think, hence I am, or exist*," does not deduce existence from thought by a syllogism, but, by a simple act of mental vision, recognizes it as if it were a thing that is known *per se*." (*The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Vol. II, p. 38.) In other words, to be able reflectively to "question" or to "doubt" is to be able to know (and to know that one knows) that even to be "deceived" or "in error" is still, precisely thereby, "to be." The critical factor, consequently, is the reflective awareness of being aware—regardless of the specific nature or content of the awareness of which one is aware, e.g., whether it be "doubting" or "entertaining the possibility of being deceived or mistaken" with respect to one's be-ing, one's being aware, or one's being aware of being aware. Finally to be noted is that whereas in *The City of God* quotation, Augustine appears to move from 'knowing that one is' to 'knowing that one knows that one is,' the understanding in the *Soliloquia* quotation would seem more to resemble that being set forth in this paper; namely, the 'knowing that one is' is an inherent aspect of 'knowing that one thinks'—or, again, of 'being aware of being aware.'

33. It is probably some order of this phenomenon that John Locke had in mind

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when he exclaimed: "It [is] impossible for anyone to perceive without perceiving, that he does perceive." (John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by Peter H. Nidditch [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975], Bk. II, ch. xxvii, sec. 9, p. 335.) From the perspective of the analysis being undertaken in these pages, however, just as a distinction is to be made between simple consciousness and reflective consciousness, so a distinction is also to be made between simple perception (or simple experience) and reflective perception (or reflective experience).

34. Dr. Jung's comment (see fn. 31) notwithstanding, this is the difference in focus between consciousness of an object and consciousness of the consciousness of an object. For while the reflective awareness of awareness is itself awareness of an object and, like all awareness of objects, entails a subject that is aware of the object, this consciousness of consciousness (of an object) points to the "ever receding nature" of the dualistic subject that is aware of an object. See also below, pp. 106-107.

35. See above, fn. 33. Cf. Heidegger's assertion : "When *Dasein* [i.e., the human being] does not exist . . . it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not." (Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson [New York: Harper and Row, 1962,] p. 255.) Also his later statement: "Man alone of all existing things . . . experiences the wonder of all wonders : that there are things-in-being (*dass Seiendes ist*)." (Martin Heidegger, Postscript to *What is Metaphysics ?* Quoted from Herbert Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement* [The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1965] Vol. I, p. 284) Sartre has written : "Man is the being through whom nothingness comes to the world." (Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* p. 24) It should rather be said that man is the being through whom being and nothingness—as well as the "world"—come to the world. See also below, fn. 36.

36. This could also be put by saying that to be reflectively aware that "x is" is to be reflectively aware that "x is not 'not'"; and that to be reflectively aware that "x is not" is to be reflectively aware that "x is not 'is'." Stated more succinctly: "is" is-not "not"; "not" is-not "is."

37. See above, fn. 30.

38. See below, fn. 50.

39. See below, footnotes 47 and 50.

40. Cf. the observation of Hobbes : "When two, or more men, know of one and the same fact, they are said to be conscious of it one to another; which is as much as to know it together." (Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960], ch. vii, p. 41).

41. As was suggested in fn. 30, it is unlikely that even an extremely modest maiden would be ruffled or embarrassed if espied naked by a strange male infant or animal. Similarly, there would be a radical difference in the reaction—both of oneself and of the "others"—to one's clumsily stepping into the wrong room, tripping, falling down with a loud thud, thereby interrupting the meal of a group of inhabitants of a hotel, and to one's inflicting the same awkward indiscretion upon a group of inhabitants of a zoo. But precisely because an ego is not vulnerable to (and so need not protect itself from) being embarrassed by an infant or an animal, since the latter do not possess a reflective, subject-object mode of

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consciousness, when an ego under the impact of an unbearably intense experience of joy or sorrow seeks a "human" sharing of that experience with an "other," the desired—or, indeed, needed—"sym-pathetic" or "com-passionate" sharing can never really occur with an infant or an animal—albeit the ego's own fondest and most beloved infant or pet-animal.

42. Hisamatsu, "Some Philosophical, Religious, and Aesthetic Aspects of Zen Buddhism, Part. I."

43. Most revealing, in this regard, is that even Camus, who declared, "I proclaim that I believe in nothing and that everything is absurd," (Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, translated by Anthony Bower [New York: Alfred Knopf, 1947], p. 10), could still assert that "rebellion, in man, is the refusal to be treated as an object. . . ." (*ibid.*, p. 250.)

44. It should be noted that frequently no more than a person's being egregiously different in some way from the accepted norms of a human group can cause the group to regard that person, in effect, as being intolerable.

45. In fact, when the very capacity for intersubjective or "human" communication is temporarily (or more permanently) lost (as, for example, in a severe psychosis), there is no longer a human subject, self, or person. It is just such a prolonged non-personal or, in that sense, "non-human" existence of a being that was formerly a human person or self that is commonly referred to as a "vegetable" existence. (See above, page 84.)

46. See Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, pp. 27 and 171; also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger, Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), p. xviii.

47. Interestingly, in English the term self-conscious has at least two possible meanings: the onto-existential meaning intended here, i.e., one's being able to be reflectively conscious of being reflectively conscious—and, consequently, of existing or be-ing; and the psychological meaning—which is not unrelated to the onto-existential meaning, i.e., one's being reflectively conscious of oneself in a specific situation as an actual or imagined selected (or focal) object of the reflective consciousness of some other subject—or subjects. (See above, fn. 41.) This latter, psychological self-consciousness may occur with varying degrees of intensity, depending on the extent to which one feels oneself vulnerably exposed —or "naked"—as a special object of the reflective consciousness of some other subject—or subjects.

48. One of the deeper insights of the Biblical Adam and Eve myth is that they awakened to their reflective self-(other) knowledge (or "reflective self-[other] awareness") together. In the interpretation being offered here, the pivotal realization of their newly acquired self-consciousness is not so much the reflective awareness that they were naked, as it is the reflective awareness that they *were*. Co-ordinate with the reflective knowledge of existing or "be-ing" is the reflective knowledge of "not be-ing" and having "not to be." With the emergence of a dualistically discriminating consciousness, one comes reflectively to differentiate not only "to live" but also "to die." Hence, with the eating of the fruit of the tree of reflective self-consciousness, one is "certain to die." See especially Genesis 2:17 and 3:7.

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49. See below, f.n. 50.

50. Cf. asseverations by: Friedrick Heinrich Jacobi, "The I is impossible without the Thou." (Quoted from Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, translated by Ronald Gregor Smith [New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971], p. 209); Fichte, "The consciousness of the individual is necessarily accompanied by that of another, that of a Thou, and only under this condition possible." (Quoted from *ibid.*); and George Herbert Mead, "Selves can only exist in definite relationships to other selves." (George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society* [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974], p. 164.) That what is required for the self's initial emergence is contact with another actual (or on-the-verge-of-being-actual) self and not merely a mirror or a robot constructed to respond as if it were self-conscious is because of the peculiarly "human" reciprocal subject-(object-) subject interplay involved. That is, the 'about-to-be-ego's readied consciousness is initially "cut off" and forced back upon itself to become "reflective" (against its unimpeded inclination simply to go out from itself) only by its privative, negating objectification by another actual or similarly burgeoning ego. The reason for this is that solely with its objectification by another self is the newly emerging ego's consciousness checked and thrown back to "reflect" upon itself thereby becoming "self-conscious"—or a "conscious (subject-) self." This objectified delimitation of itself is privative or negating since the emerging ego's consciousness-qua-subjectivity is, to that extent, "taken away" by the subject-consciousness (or subjectivity) of the other self—whose own subject-consciousness (or subjectivity) is being reciprocally objectified and "taken away" by the crystallized because delimited subject-consciousness (or subjectivity) of the emerging ego. In short, the other ego asserts its subjectivity in objectifying and negating the emerging ego's subjectivity, just as the emerging ego asserts its subjectivity in objectifying and negating the other ego's subjectivity. In this sense, each ego affirms its-self and its subjectivity against the objectifying curtailment-negation of that subjectivity by the other ego. So the ego's initial reflective awareness of itself is a dualistic awareness of itself and not-itself-of, itself as object at once to itself and to another subject-self that is "not-itself." All this, it should be noted, is mutually and coincidentally involved in the appearance of reflective, subject-object, ego consciousness. The ego's subjectivity is objectively "take away" or denied even as it arises. Indeed, that it can initially arise or come to be (which means to be reflectively—or "dualistically" delineated) is exactly because it is negated in an objectification-delimitation of itself that is not an expression of itself. Looking into a mirror or encountering a robot cannot bring about this non-self-expressive objectfying curtailment-denial of an incipiently arising subjectivity. For in the case of the ego's own objectification of itself—e.g., by looking into a mirror, its subjectivity as an ever regressing subjectivity eludes it but is not really "stripped away," inasmuch as that very objectification is an expression of the ego's subjectivity. This explains why there is never in the ego's objectification of itself the existential threat to its being as a subject (and the consequent need for ego-defences) that inheres in its objectification by another ego. Should the "other" to an emerging ego be a robot (however programmed), that it is a "robot" means precisely that it lacks the subjectivity to resist objectification—which further means that it lacks the subjectivity to objectify. Only that which can resist objectification can itself

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objectify. A robot, therefore, cannot effect the impeding objectification-negation of a 'would-be-ego's consciousness that is initially needed to return it to itself. The only way this could occur would be if the robot could somehow directly express the subjectivity of its human constructor-controller. Put another way, the limiting objectification-negation of subjectivity by another subject as well as the resistance to it is a matter of reflective subject (or subject-object) consciousness, and not of any merely operational or functional behavior. This also explains why a wolf-child reared exclusively in the company of animals without an actual or 'would-be' ego does not come to an actualized, dualistically circumscribed, reflective self-consciousness.

51. This may be compared and contrasted with the understanding of Martin Buber: "A legitimate philosophical anthropology must know that there is not merely a human species but also peoples, not merely a human soul but also types and characters, not merely a human life but also stages in life. . . . Even as it must again and again distinguish within the human race in order to arrive at a solid comprehension, so it must put man in all seriousness into nature, it must compare him with other things, other living creatures, other bearers of consciousness, in order to define his special place reliably for him. Only by this double way of distinction and comparison does it reach the whole, real man who, whatever his people or type or age, knows, what no being on earth but he can know, that he goes the narrow way from birth towards death, tests out what none but he can, a wrestling with destiny, rebellion and reconciliation, and at times even experiences in his own blood, when he is joined by choice to another human being, what goes on secretly in others." (Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, p. 123.)

52. That the ego distinguishes an occurrence of self-transcendence from a deep, dreamless sleep or from a lapse into unconsciousness is not the result of a direct awareness of either of the three events. Rather, such a distinction is an inferential "reconstruction" that the ego makes after the re-activation of its reflective consciousness—possibly based partly on some carry-over effect of enriched well-being, refreshed restfulness, or a degree of confusion. Indeed, in the case of a momentary loss of consciousness or "black out," the ego may never be quite certain as to whether it did actually lose consciousness or "pass out."

53. Daisetz Suzuki, "The Oriental Way of Thinking," *Japan Quarterly*, II, No. 1 (January-March, 1955), 51-53.

54. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, "Zen Buddhism," *Momumenta Nipponica*, I, No. I (January, 1938), 51.

55. Hisamatsu, "Some Philosophical, Religious, and Aesthetic Aspects of Zen Buddhism, Part I."

56. *ibid.*

57. Hoseki Shin-ichi Hisamatsu, *Zen to Bijutsu* (Kyoto: Bokubisha, 1958), p. 48. (Published in an English translation as *Zen and the Fine Arts* [Tokyo: Kodansha, 1971]).

58. Hisamatsu, "Some Philosophical, Religious, and Aesthetic Aspects of Zen

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Buddhism, Part I." Cf. Plotinus: "for from that fact that there is determination; each has its form . . . ." (Plotinus, *The Enneads*, translated by Stephen MacKenna [New York: Pantheon Books, Inc., 1957], V.I. 7., p. 375.)

59. Seng-ts'an, *On Believing in Mind*, as translated in Suzuki, *Manual of Zen Buddhism*, p. 94.

60. See above, pp. 97ff.

61. See above, p. 88.

62. "One great splitting of the whole universe into two halves is made by each of us . . . '*me*' and '*not-me*' . . . . Each of us dichotomizes the Kosmos in a different place." (William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I [New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950], pp. 289-290.)

63. This is sharply at variance with the position propounded by the mid-nineteenth century Scottish philosopher, Ferrier, who held, "the *ego* is never passive. Its being is pure act." (James Frederick Ferrier, *Philosophical Works*, Vol. III [Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1875], p. 135.) It is just as much at variance with Sartre's opposite position: "the ego, being an object, is *passive*." (Sartre, *The Transcendence of the Ego*, p. 79.)

64. See above, fn. 24.

65. Again, for a profoundly different notion, see Ferrier, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

66. This is almost completely contrary to Sartre's interpretation: "In fact the consciousness which I have of the 'I' never exhausts it, and consciousness is not what causes it to come into existence; the 'I' is always given as having *been* there before consciousness. . . ." (Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* p. 103). Cf. also C. G. Jung: "[a] child who cannot yet say 'I' . . . still remains in a universally psychic state common to all children, or common to all human beings before they acquire consciousness." (C. G. Jung and S. Hisamatsu, "On the Unconscious, the Self, and Therapy—A Dialogue," *Psychologia*, XI, Nos. 1-2 [June, 1968], 26.)

67. In this understanding, Adam and Eve first become personally responsible "human" beings with the actual act of "eating" the fruit "of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil"—which is to say of "'dualistically discriminating' or 'reflective' knowledge," or, therefore, of "reflective consciousness." For it is through the act of "eating" that they come to be reflectively aware that they *are* and, consequently, that they are *naked*—and, moreover, that they have in fact already eaten. The freedom—and the responsibility—for carrying out the "act" of the eating arises only with the given "fact" of having already eaten. Put differently, Adam and Eve do not—and, indeed, cannot—possess the ability to comprehend "reflectively" (and so "responsibly") the injunction "not to eat" until they have already in fact consummated the act of eating. This same point could also be made by asking: How, antecedent to the "eating," can Adam and Eve "know" that to obey is "good" and to disobey is "bad" or "evil" when they do not as yet have any "knowledge of good and evil" ?

68. It is this that explains (as would also seem to be one of the intentions of the Adam and Eve myth) why the ego, as a dualistic subject, in performing a human

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act can never assume total responsibility (and therefore credit) if the act or its result be judged "good," or disavow any responsibility (and therefore discredit) if the act or its result be judged "bad."

69. See above, p. 98 and fn. 50.

70. It would appear that this understanding in some form was at least part of the rationale behind the effort after World War II to get recognized and established in international law as a legal category of war crimes "crimes against humanity." This criminal genre was provided for "in Article 6 of the Charter annexed to the ['Allies'] Four-Power Agreement of 8 August, 1945, providing for the establishment of the International Military Tribunal for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis . . . [and again] in Article 5 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East established on 19 January, 1946, by a Proclamation of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Far East." (See Hersch Lauterpacht, *International Law and Human Rights* [New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1973] pp. 35-37.)

71. This "outside" in which the self as subject is "outside" its object—as its object is likewise "outside" it as a subject—is not to be confused with the "standing outside" of *ekstasis* (see above, p. 100), which is the "getting outside" (usually with regard to a particular object at a particular time) of the very dualistic subject-object structure itself.

72. See above, p. 90.

73. Suzuki, "Lectures on Zen Buddhism," Suzuki, Fromm, and DeMartino, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 54. Interesting, in this connection, is Hegel's contention: "Now it is the endeavour of philosophy to *prove* such a unity, to show that it lies in the very nature of thought and subjectivity, to be inseparable from being and objectivity." (*Hegel's Logic*, translated by William Wallace [Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1975] p. 99.)

74. Suzuki, *Japan Quarterly*, II, No. I, 53.

75. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, "Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih, "*Philosophy East and West*, III, No. 1 (April, 1953), 32. Hegel notwithstanding, this seems also to be a widely encountered position in recent Western thought. Thus, the early nineteenth century Scottish metaphysician, Sir William Hamilton, wrote: "*Knowledge*, in general, *is a relation between a subject knowing and an object known*. . . ." (Quoted in Francis, Bowen, *The Metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton*, p. 139.) Later in the century, the English thinker, Herbert Spencer, declared: a thing cannot at the same instant be both subject and object of thought." (Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Psychology* Vol. I [New York: Appleton and Co., 1897], p. 148.) In the early part of this century, the English philosopher, W.T. Stace, similarly proclaimed: "knowledge is the relation of subject and object . . . ." (W.T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy* [London: Macmillian & Co., Ltd., 1920], p. 361.) And again: "thought involves the distinction between object and subject." (*ibid.* p. 337.) On the continent, Martin Buber, too, acknowledged that "according to the customary manner of speaking 'to know' means, in effect, 'to regard a thing as an object.' At the bottom of its lies the relation of subject and object." (Martin Buber, "Philosophical and Religious World View" [1928], translated by Maurice Friedman in Martin Buber,

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A Believing Humanism [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967], p. 130.)

76. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, *The Lankāvatāra Sútra* (London : George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), p. 60.

77. This is really what is most telling in the Humean pronouncement quoted in fn. 10 of this paper. For though Hume cannot know himself *as* a subject, he certainly knows himself *to be* a subject when he writes (to add a few italics) : "For *my* part, when *I* enter most intimately into what *I* call *myself*, *I* always stumble [etc., etc.]." The same is to be said of a kindred exclamation by William James: "Let the case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognize emphatically as a phenomenon), is only a careless name for what, when scrutinized, reveals itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The 'I think' which Kant said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the 'I breathe' which actually does accompany them." (William James, "Does 'Consciousness' Exist ?" in McDermott, *The Writings of William James* p. 183).

78. This may be considered alongside another assertion of Kant's: "Certainly, the representation 'I am,' which expresses the consciousness that can accompany all thought, immediately includes in itself the existence of a subject, but it does not so include any knowledge of that subject . . . ." (Immanual Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Normon Kemp Smith [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965], B. 277, p. 246) That is, "I have no *knowledge* of myself as I am but merely as I appear to myself," (*ibid.*, B 158, p. 169.) Cf. also C.G. Jung: "Even when I say 'I know myself.' an infinitesimal ego—the knowing 'I'—is still distinct from 'myself.' " (Jung, *Collected Works* Vol. 11, pp. 504-5.)

79. This would appear to be diametrically opposed to Sartre's understanding: "Consciousness of self is not dual." (Sartre, *Being and nothingness*, p. lii.) Again: "the first consciousness of consciousness is not positional . . . because it is one with the consciousness of which it is consciousness." (*ibid.*, p. liv.) Broaching this matter from a Christian vantage point, Reinhold Niebuhr has written: "The self knows the world, in so far as it knows the world, because it stands outside both itself and the world which means that it cannot understand itself except as it is understood from beyond itself and the world." (Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, Vol. I [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964], p. 14.)

80. Cf. the observation of the celebrated German historian of philosophy, Wilhelm Windelband: "all thinking, even consciousness of self, involves the opposition of subject and object . . . ." (W. Windelband, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, Third Edition, translated by Herbert Ernest Cushman [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921] p. 370.

81. Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, "Buddha and Zen." *The Middle Way*, XXVIII, No. 3 (November, 1953), 90; reprinted in D.T. Suzuki, *The Field of Zen* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 14.

82. Suzuki, *The Field of Zen*, p. 84.

83. Suzuki, "Lectures on Zen Buddhism," Suzuki, Fromm, and DeMartino, *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, pp. 66-67.

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6

The Conflict Between Analytic Philosophy and Existentialism in Buddhist Perspective

M.W. PADMASIRI DE SILVA

> "There is a well-known textbook contrast between the traditions of British and Continental philosophy; that British philosophy is empirical, down-to-earth, and sober in expression, while that of the Continent tends to be speculative, metaphysical, and either obscure in utterance or, if not, to have the special sort of clarity that goes with an ambitious rationalism. This contrast is, of course an absurd caricature."[1]

The Tar Baby and the Bear

BRITISH analytic philosophy has often been described as sober, prosaic clear and down-to-earth whereas the Continental philosophical traditions are considered obscure, speculative, passionate and even anti-rational. These differences, of course, may be more than differences of style and method; maybe they are rooted in a cultural and historical heritage. But some philosophers who reflect on the possibility of a dialogue between these two traditions feel that this contrast may be an exaggerated caricature rather than a reasoned study of their similarities and differences.[2]

In this paper I wish to present the view that though there are differences in style and method, their conclusions are not always antithetical and in fact their methods can supplement each other in a deep and comprehensive attempt to understand the human predicament today. As one who has grown within an Asian philosophical tradition, it is perhaps possible to cut across the narrowness which emerges out of an exclusive adoration of any *one* of these traditions. In this respect the philosophy of Buddhism is in a position to accommodate the apparent conflict that exists between British analytic philosophy and continental existentialist philosophy.[3] This in brief is the basic concern of my exploration into comparative philosophy here.

In a short paper of this sort it would not be possible to go through the

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whole panorama of philosophical concerns common to these traditions; it would be wise to pick out a single philosophical issue and, if possible, a central issue that cuts across these traditions. I shall pick up the problems relating to the 'person' concept and present it through the perspectives of the analytic, the existentialist and the Buddhist philosophies.

When we speak of the 'British analytic tradition' as different from the Continental tradition of existentialist philosophy, we are interested in its general features and not the finer differences within its fold. But it would be necessary to lay down at the start some of the meanings of the concept of philosophical analysis, as well as the unifying goals of philosophical analysis common to different philosophers within the analytic tradition.

The understanding of a philosophy is often attempted by placing it against contrasting philosophical positions. What is broadly referred to as 'analytic philosophy' has partly acquired its individuality by what it rejected rather than by what it positively upheld. It is a philosophy which brought back philosophical inquiry down to earth from its avowed metaphysical heights and exposed the vacuity of the speculative enterprise. It is a tradition which brought back philosophical activity within the confines of clarity and specific goals of inquiry. The traditional metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, the rationalist metaphysics of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza, the idealism of the Hegelian philosophies—all this fell before the critical scrutiny engineered by the analytic tradition. By a general extension of this principle, it has not been infrequent for philosophers to push existentialism too into this grand metaphysical tradition. Anyway, some of the flamboyant and ultra-philosophical techniques of the existentialist have certainly irritated the searching eye of Ayer and Carnap. Existentialism has even been described as a revival of traditional metaphysics in a fashionable attire.

Both controversies and attempted dialogues between the British analytic tradition and the Continental tradition have been thrown over each other's heads. This breakdown of communication in the context of a militant attack by the analyst on existentialism may be likened to the encounter between the 'bear and the tar baby', for virtually they are in a mutual quagmire.

The British analytic tradition grew up into maturity through the work of Moore and Russell and found variegated expression in the work of Ryle, Wittgenstein, Austin and Ayer. The meaning they gave to the term 'philosophical analysis' was not uniform. Moore considered the clarification of concepts as the central concern of philosophical analysis; Russell

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considered analysis capable of enumerating the various constituents of existing complexes in addition to providing clearer definition of certain terms. The early Wittgenstein too followed Russell's logical atomism : the function of analysis was to resolve all descriptive complex propositions into elementary ones.[4]

Ryle was interested in systematically misleading expressions and made a pointed analysis of category mistakes. Though Ryle's work differs from the styleof later Wittgenstein, it has a typical Wittgensteinian thesis in treating philosophical issues as consequent on the misunderstanding of the logic of concepts.[5] Wittgenstein, in his later writings, also remarked that analysis had a therapeutic function. Philosophers are the victims of an intellectual cramp, and analysis can cure them from the malady of philosophical bewilderment. Austin thought that apart from getting at the cramping rigidities that generate philosophical bewilderment, it is necessary to describe the actual working of language. Thus analysis, which was originally described in terms of 'definition' and 'reduction', was later concerned with 'description' and 'elucidation'. In the work of Austin and Strawson, analytic philosophy had not merely a therapeutic role but a systematic role in describing and ordering the essential features of language.

In spite of these shifts of meaning regarding the meaning of the word 'analysis' in the development of the British analytic tradition, the basic temper and style of inquiry offers a clear contrast to the existentialist philosophical tradition. Even when they engaged in a kind of systematic and synthetic concern, the meticulous regard for the meaning of words and their subtle nuances did not escape their searching eyes. This is something that had gone into the character of British philosophers. Thus the temper and style of British analytic philosophy has acquired a special quality of its own, much like the special flavour of pure Sri Lanka tea or Brazilian coffee.

The existentialist reacted against the British analytic tradition, pointing out the sense of aridity that pervaded their philosophical discussions. The preoccupation with language threw into the periphery the problems relating to the human predicament and the meaning of life.

Kierkegaard was the first to use the word 'existence' in the way that contemporary existentialists use the concept of existence. In ordinary usage the word 'existence' connotes the existence of things and beings as different from that which is fictional, imaginary and illusory. Kierkegaard thought that even human beings often lived in the way that inorganic things existed, as their lives were mechanical, alienated and lacked a sense of direction and awareness of human freedom. Such existence was con-

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sidered as 'inauthentic' existence. Thus authentic existence was the ideal of the existentialist and it was their mission to awaken man and stir him so that he would be alive to the human predicament and assert hisreal freedom.

Due to the sense of anonymity that pervades modern life the adherence to doctrines of determinism and the immersion of the individual in total systems, individual freedom has disappeared from the human setting. The existentialist ethic is built on a re-affirmation of human decision, responsibility and commitment. In making an attempt to awaken man to this lost human freedom, the existentialist is not offering a linguistic analysis of the words 'existence' and 'freedom'; he is also not offering an elucidation of such concepts by pure argument. Rather the existentialist is attempting a phenomenological presentation of the human situation which would result in a basic change of perspective, and to this end his presentation is intense, dramatic and even agonising. "They want the facts about human freedom, as they conceive them, to be not merely accepted, but absorbed by each person for himself, so that when he has absorbed them, his whole view of life will be different. Someone in the process of reading and understanding an Existentialist philosopher ought to be in the grip of a mood which actually transforms his way of seeing the world and his place in it."[6] That is the reason why the existentialist reacted against ethical formalism and a plea to 'interiorise' morals and make it something personal and concrete.[7]

While the existentialist focussed interest on situations of 'heightened consciousness' and intensity, the analyst sought for the most humdrum situations and prosaic contexts. In this respect we find Sartre supplementing his heavy philosophical work *Being and Nothingness* by a more dramatic presentation of the theme in *Nausea*. Kierkegaard's *Either/Or* is in a similar way a powerful presentation of conflicting life ideals through a semi-literary technique that it has been described as the "Summons to decide between alternate philosophies of life."[8]

The existentialist is impatient with the person who will spend a lifetime studying the linguistic subtleties of a concept. To use an analogy mentioned by the Buddha, the existentialist calls man to be alive like the "man whose turban is on fire." Existential disquiet does not provide time to reflect on trivialities like the meaning of a word.

I have presented briefly the conflict between the analytic philosopher and the existentialist and thrown into relief their basic divergence. But a close look at their doctrines, unhampered by the contrast in philosophical method, may impel us to have a second look at this apparently unbridgeable difference. Though one sort of philosophy uses the language of logical

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rigour and the other that of fiction and drama, they may be sometimes saying the same thing. The observations of Iris Murdoch in her work, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*, are worth recording : "Philosophy in England, working with its own independent native empiricism, and in spite of serious differences of techniques, has travelled a parallel way. It might even be argued that recent continental philosophers have been discovering, with immense fuss, what the English empiricists have known since Hume..."[9] Murdoch says that though British analytic philosophy looks "unambitious in scope" and "rigorous and dry in technique" when compared with the more flamboyant Continental counterparts, there are particular insights common to the two traditions.

To cite an interesting example in this respect, in the novel *Nausea*, Sartre presents a picture of the ego with a strong Humean flavour : "The 'I' that goes on existing is merely the ever lengthening *stuff* of glue sensations and vague fragmentary thoughts."[10] In fact the study of the 'I', 'self' or the 'person' in these two traditions appears to be a very rewarding venture.

THE HUMAN PERSON IN EXISTENTIALIST AND ANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES

Existentialists add a new dimension to the understanding of the 'person' concept. Their central concern here may be described as an attempt to distinguish between 'fake' and 'real' existence. A person can be biologically distinguished from a thing or a plant, but in point of fact some men live like things, plants and machines. This kind of existence is described by the existentialist as inauthentic existence. Of course a logical analyst may say something similar : "A person is distinct from a (mere) thing, and that any human being, in so far as he is a person, is in consequence of this status to be treated in a special manner."[11]

Though the analyst accepts such an analysis of the person concept, the existentialist is saying that *among men as such* there are some who live like things : the man who punches tickets from morn till night, the man who sinks his identity in the anonymity of the crowd, the one who plays the role of the waiter, one whose sense of freedom is nullified by the spell of authority and the dictates of conventions. If men are subject to such forms of self-deception, organized forms of 'false consciousness' and 'bad faith', we are not dealing with *real* persons but with phantoms.[12]

This picture of the human person is not an academic text-book study, but emerges in the lives of those who have succumbed to the depersonalizing tendencies in the contemporary world today. "The advance of technology, the increasing demands made upon the individual by our affluent

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society; the appearance of groupism, the emphasis on large-scale organization, the emergence of leisure as a problem...the decline in individuality... all these factors have contributed to the crisis in identity."[13]

A study of contemporary life styles in literary, and socio-psychological works brings to the surface the phenomenon of the 'identity crisis' so passionately expressed by the existentialist. The bureaucrat is immersed in his files, the worker is converted into a machine and the advertiser is busy creating pseudo-desires in his consumer which leaves him running after a never-ending spiral of wants. Leisure is an escape from the drudgery of work and it temporarily drowns one's discontent with the job. The buzz of city life exposes him to a never-ending variety of external stimuli, adding a sense of diffuseness which invades the self. Absence of an inner purpose makes it possible for pseudo-life styles to eat parasitically into their routinized lives. Such crippled and fragmented personalities keep on running from their own selves into compulsive activities like motor racing, drug addiction and television. By a consistent refusal to look at oneself closely, we create blocks and barricades which prevent the growth of self-knowledge. Lack of genuine self-knowledge and self-direction are the clearest features of persons emerging in this context.

The analytic philosopher is, of course, not interested in lamenting our lost nature, except bad habits in the use of words and concepts. But through their detached analysis of the person concept they do come to conclusions which enrich the existentialist analysis rather than generating a perennial conflict. The analytic approach raises the question whether we have a coherent concept of the person and examines the logical grounds on which the concept is upheld. Here are some of the logical features of the person concept they have brought to the surface: Persons have aims and purposes of their own and they are the source of values they generate; they are capable of taking decisions and accept responsibility for their acts; in the legal world they have rights and duties and are capable of being punished; not only does a person take decisions but also advances reasons for his actions, thus exercising his disposition to be rational.[14] Persons also have memories, thoughts, feelings, and can communicate with others. The person concept has also to be logically justified by an analysis of personal identity. I must continue to exist and be capable of acknowledging that I am the same individual who read the newspaper, had tea and did marketing...[15]

Going through this very brief sketch of the 'person concept' we see that persons have aims and purposes of their own are the source of the values they generate, capable of making decisions and accepting responsibility for their acts. These are precisely qualities which are not being exercised due

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to the condition of alienation that has entered the lives of the contemporary man. The existentialist is not much concerned with the logic of personal identity as he is, for instance, absorbed in the question of authentic existence. But these facets of person concept may, after all, supplement each other rather than exist as a base for perennial conflict. Though there is a divergence of philosophical method in these approaches, the analytic and the existentialist approaches to the study of persons may supplement each other and converge in many ways by giving us a more comprehensive picture of the human person. A study of early Buddhist philosophy in general and the analysis of the person concept in particular suggests that such approaches are combined in a philosophy like early Buddhism, which provides a more comprehensive base. My essay is basically an essay in exploration, and in what follows I shall keep the discussion at the level of such an exercise in comparative philosophy.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EARLY BUDDHISM

The philosophy of the Buddha is a critique of speculative metaphysics; it has an underlying empirical stance in approaching problems, though the 'experientialism' of the Buddha is different to British empiricism; it respects the powers of reasoning, logic and analysis, but clearly points out the limitations of pure reason and logic; the Buddha admonishes people to seek a transcendental truth but presents a path which develops man's natural dispositions. There are students of Buddhism who have discovered strands of analytic philosophy and an empiricist stance in Buddhism,[16] but yet the Buddha does not spend his analytic powers on seeming trivialities. Like any of the full blown existentialists, Buddha directly points his finger to the suffering man. The Buddha did not pursue any theoretical questions unless they had a bearing on human suffering, and his philosophy and psychology are primarily designed to answer the questions—what is suffering and what is the way out of suffering? The urgency with which this question propelled him in search of an answer has been likened to a man's turban being on fire. Is it not possible to respect the best claims of the analytic tradition in philosophy and yet delve deep into the most significant existential questions of suffering, tragedy, anxiety and alienation? This is an impression which emerged out of my own reading, understanding and an absorbing interest in the dialogues of the Buddha.

I cannot, of course, go into all the general features of the philosophy of Buddhism here, as I decided to go into the problem of the human person in Buddhism. But the general framework of the philosophy of Buddhism will always lie in the background. It is because it combines

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the best in the analytic and existentialist traditions that it can do a number of things: Buddhism is a critique of speculative metaphysics but it presents a general picture of man and the universe; the Buddha considers that false beliefs arise due to a misreading of the grammar of the subject-predicate sentence and their conventional form, but considers the psychological roots of egoism as important as the linguistic roots; the Buddha isoften deeply involved in epistemological issues, but never loses sight of the basic ethical quest of man and its practical implications; the Buddha makes a distinction between ethical and psychological questions but sees a deep inter-linking of these fields.[17] It is because of these qualities that the philosophy of Buddhism offers a venue for the meeting of British analytic philosophy and existentialism.

The fact that the material on 'personal identity' lends itself to analytic study has already been shown by some scholars.[18] How does the Buddha reject the soul and yet uphold in some sense 'a continuing person' which is the agent of moral action and responsibility? A close analysis of the arguments discussed by the Buddha will show that the Buddhist concept of the human person rejects a permanent soul but accepts a sense of continuity in the context of moral action. There is a person who acts and reaps the consequences but there is no permanent soul; the person is not exclusively identical with the body or consciousness, but is a psycho-physical being who is subject to change and may be explained in terms of a causal nexus.[19]

K.N. Jayatilleke comments on this issue: "At first sight it would appear that the doctrine of "no-soul" (*anattā*) is incompatible with the concept of personal responsibility. But it is shown that it is not so."[20] If so, what is the Buddhist concept of the person that would fall in line with the doctrine of egolessness?

Jayatilleke answers the question: "The psycho-physical process continues in a state of flux and maintains a relative individuality within cosmic existence. To distinguish one serial process from another we use the term 'person' in a conventional sense despite the lack of a permanent substratum."[21] Jayatilleke makes a case for a concept of the human person which reconciles the doctrine of egolessness with the doctrine of moral responsibility. In this manner the application of analytic techniques helps us to make a coherent concept of the human person in Buddhism.

While analytic examination helps us to bring out the logical, linguistic and conceptual roots of 'egoism', an existentialist presentation helps us to unravel its emotional, psychological and phenomenological underpinning. This is a task which I have attempted in detail elsewhere; here I shall restrict myself to the salient points.[22]

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The doctrine of the Buddha helps us to understand the nature of the basic *indeterminacy*, *ambiguity*, and *formlessness* which pervades the 'false consciousness' of modern man. In the words of Jacobson, an area of research to which the message of the Buddha has pointed reference is "the basic indeterminacy of the human creature, the ambiguity and the formlessness at the centre of their lives, and with their tendency to try to fix their identity upon some cluster of transient identifications with which they become involved in learning to live in a particular time and place."[23] Jacobson concludes that the Buddha's brilliant grasp of this predicament is found in his teaching about *anattā*."[24]

The Doctrine of Egolessness

The doctrine of egolessness may be grasped by making a sharp analytic examination of the concept or by a phenomenological presentation of situations of a dramatic kind. In teaching the doctrine of egolessness, the Buddha has pointed out that the belief in an indestructible ego is an illusion and that such a belief causes both intellectual and emotional hazards. There is no ego entity existing apart and independently of those physical and mental processes that constitute life. The illusion of the ego can take two basic forms: eternity belief which upholds that there is an unchanging ego which is immortal, and the annihilationist belief which says that the ego is destroyed with death. A clear understanding of these two forms of ego beliefs helps us to diagnose the problems pertaining to the crisis in identity.[25] I remarked that such an understanding can be attained by both analytic and phenomenological techniques, but this is only up to a point. The deeper grasp of the doctrine of 'egolessness' goes beyond both analysis and phenomenology to an intuitive process developed by the techniques of meditation in Buddhism. At this point, the techniques of understanding used by the Buddha goes beyond both British analytic philosophy and existentialism.

Thus it may be said that there are two levels of *understanding* the doctrine of egolessness: a first-level understanding when both analytic and phenomenological techniques may be used, and a second-level of intuitive understanding which goes beyond the two traditions of analytic philosophy and existentialism.

Let me get to a closer look at the doctrine of egolessness. The 'bias towards egocentricity' has to be broken on the intellectual, emotional and ethical levels.[26] In this respect the reading of a *sutta*, for instance the 'Snake Simile' (*Alagaddūpama Sutta*), can be a venture of absorbing interest. It provides the logical and psychological roots of egoism and an

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understanding of its contents has to be followed by careful contemplation. Here the Buddha points out that the belief in an ego or unchanging Self is derived from an identification with any one or all five aggregates: body, feeling, perception, conative dispositions, and consciousness. The belief in 'I' and 'me' generated by these ego beliefs is in fact the cause of anxiety, fear and worry. The practical application of the doctrine of egolessness can be an aid to deal with the identity crisis.

I mentioned that the 'ego illusion' can take five forms in relation to the five aggregates. Let me take the body for instance: The people who are untrained in the doctrine of the Buddha, "regard body as the self (*attā*, Skt. *ātman*), they regard the self as having body, a body as being in the self, the self as being in the body." They are enamoured by the body and cling to it, and because of clinging there comes a lure upon them. They pay full attention to the body and its concerns. This body is viewed from three bases: when the ego illusion emerges on craving they think "This (body) is mine," when it emerges on conceit they think, "I am this," and when it emerges on wrong views they think "This is myself." The same pattern works in relation to the other five aggregates of feeling, perception, dispositions, and consciousness.

The narcissistic man, proud of his body, is trying to fix his identity on the evanescent sands of his physical beauty or on something else like wealth and caste. If a person is proud of his attainments, exaggerates them and feels infuriated when someone gives a lower estimation of his actions, he suffers from an inflated sense of vanity (*māna mada*). If he feels frustrated and loathes his body and has a dislike of his own self he is given to feelings of self-hatred, which is a manifestation of wounded narci-ss ism. Mourning and melancholia and depression are forms of ego collapse. That such contradictory attitudes like narcissistic self-love and self-hatred and ambivalent desires like the desire for annihilation (suicide) and the desire to live all stem from a basic ego illusion, was one of the greatest psychological insights of the Buddha.

In this respect it has to be mentioned that the ego illusion has two forms, the eternity view and the annihilationist view. Like the narcissistic man who is excessively attached to the body, thinking that that is his self, those who inflict torture on the body and commit suicide are also making a similar confusion. The compulsive other-directed behaviour of the man who is constantly running from his self and the man who fears solitude are refusing to enjoy a moment of quietude and calmness which is the very base of self-knowledge. The Don Juan type who, in his search for pleasure, runs away from the threatening boredom which overtakes him is also another expression of the 'sickness of the self'. The antidote for all these

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forms of sickness and alienation are given in the paths to self-knowledge presented by the Buddha.

Diverse facets of ego-attachment provide the base for identity problems. Narcissism, self-hatred, loneliness and boredom have found expression in either the classical forms of the Kierkegardian 'sickness of the self' or the more modern forms of rebllion and compulsive behaviour.

The psycho-physical complex which goes to make the individual (and which we in conventional language describe as a *'puggala'*) has a built-in disharmony, an uneasy balance which generates anxiety, dread, loneliness and boredom. But people do not want to make any acquaintance with this inner disquietude, the silent discord that lives in the inner most recesses of their minds.

The strength of the existentialist writings lie in the presentation of this human predicament. But as I have shown elsewhere, they are weak in diagnosis and moreso in therapy.[27] Some of their own writings display ambiguities of existential anguish with a very confused understanding of its roots.[28] But the dimension of the person concept they discuss is certainly something that deserves serious study and, moreso, in the Buddhist context.

The Buddhist diagnosis of identity problems is found in the linkage between the doctrine of *anattā* (egolessness) and *dukkha* (suffering, unrest, boredom, emptiness, alienation etc). It is the strong attachment to the ego that is regarded as the stem of anguish. The Buddhist dialectic of emotions is so subtle that it is possible to discern shadows of the ego in the very bosom of existential anguish. The doctrine of egolessness has to be worked on a sharp 'razor's edge'.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Our analysis of the human person and the crisis in identity has shown that a Buddhist can respect both the analytic and existentialist traditions in philosophy. On the side of the analytic tradition, the linguistic, logical and the conceptual roots of egoism deserve study; on the side of the existentialist tradition, the emotional, psychological and phenomenological aspects deserve study. The linguistic habits that have eaten into our daily lives have to be cleared. But often even if we intellectually accept the *anattā* doctrine, the emotional roots may be too deep. That is why there is a need to follow the existentialist in accepting that certain truths have to be *realized* and appropriated, rather, than merely rationally demonstrated. At this point the Buddhist analysis goes beyond both the analytic and the existentialist approach, searching for a more deeper understanding and

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possibly an 'intuitive' grasp of the doctrine of egolessness.

Perhaps the conflict between the analytic and the existentialist traditions (or some variation of these trends) will continue to keep our fragmented lives apart—or even the fragmentation of the disciplines we study—but there is no necessity that it should be so. Time has come for philosophers to walk across fenced barriers and search for a more comprehensive mehod of understanding the human person.

Notes

1. Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore ed., *British Analytic Philosophy*, (London, 1966), p. 5.
2. *ibid.*
3. For a study of early Buddhism inspired by British analytic philosophy, see K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (London, 1963). For a study of Buddhism in existentialist perspective, see Padmasiri de Silva, *Tangles and Webs* (Sri Lanka, 1976).
4. Morris Weitz, "Philosophical Analysis", *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. I., pp. 97-105, ed. Paul Edwards, (London and New York, 1967).
5. Justus Hartnack, *Wittgenstein and Modern Philosophy*, (London, 1962), p. 90.
6. Mary Warnock, *Existentialism*, (London, 1970), p. 2.
7. Mary Warnock, *Existentialist Ethics*, (London, 1967), p. 56.
8. Soren Kierkegaard, *Either/Or*, Vol. I, trans. D.F. Swenson and L.M. Swenson, (New York, 1959).
9. Iris Murdoch, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*, (Connecticut, 1965), p. viii.
10. Iris Murdoch, *Sartre: Romantic Rationalist*, p. viii.
11. Arthur Danto, "Persons", *Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*, Vol. 6, p. IIO.
12. The existentialist presentation of the human person as a phantom was first discussed by me in the Malalasekera Memorial Lecture, published under the title, *Persons and Phantoms*, (Sri Lanka, 1976).
13. Ruitenbeck, *Varieties of Modern Social Theory*, (New York, 1963), p. 3.
14. Arthur Danto, "Persons"... p. iii.
15. *ibid.*
16. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*.
17. For a discussion of this point see, Padmasiri de Silva, *An Introduction to Buddhist Psychology*, Macmillan, London, (Forthcoming).

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18. R. Rajapaksa, *A Philosophical Investigation of the Ethical Hedonism and the Theory of Self Implicit in the Pāli Nikāyas*, unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, London, 1975.
19. *ibid.*
20. K.N. Jayatilleke, *The Principles of International Law in Buddhist Doctrine*, (Leyden, 1967), pp. 490-91.
21. *ibid.*
22. See Padmasiri de Silva, *Persons and Phantoms.*
23. Nolan Pliny Jacobson, *Buddhism: The Religion of Analysis*, (London, 1966), p. 61.
24. *ibid.*
25. See Padmasiri de Silva, *Persons and Phantoms.*
26. Nyānaponika Mahā Thera, *The Snake Simile*, (Sri Lanka, 1974), p. 6.
27. Padmasiri de Silva, *Tangles and Webs.*
28. *ibid.*

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7

Buddhism and Marxism in the Socio-Cultural Context of Sri Lanka

GUNAPALA DHARMASIRI

BUDDHISM and Marxism are nebulous concepts and a particularly unfortunate feature of these concepts is that contradictory phenomena are very often grouped under them. This becomes clear when one sees many of the varying ideologies and practices passing under the names Buddhism and Marxism. Because of the unwieldy nature of these two concepts a clarification of the methodology adopted in this paper would be in order.

By Marxism I will be referring to the original writings of Marx and Engels, which I take to be the central teachings of Marxism. Buddhism as practised by ordinary Buddhists in Sri Lanka will be referred to as popular Buddhism and it will often be contrasted with the original teachings of the Buddha as found in the Pali canon. These teachings of the Buddha will be referred to as early Buddhism. However, popular Buddhism and early Buddhism should not be regarded as two exclusively separate things because there are many live relations between the two. The methodology adopted here will be, first, to see points of justifiable criticism which Marxists could level at various aspects of popular Buddhism. Here I shall insist that the defects of popular Buddhism could be remedied in terms of the teachings of the Buddha himself without invoking the help of a Marxist critique. In terms of such a criticism a rehabilitation of Buddhism could be achieved. Then I shall go on to consider some problems that could arise between Marxism and the rehabilitated form of Buddhism in the socio-cultural context of Sri Lanka. Because of the many theoretical problems involved in a comparison between two doctrinal systems, Buddhism and Marxism, I shall, to a certain extent, have to be somewhat speculative and theoretical. I hope that this will not cloud the practical

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problems involved in this discussion.

An examination of the relationship between Buddhism and Marxism has become an extremely relevant issue for Sri Lanka today. Marxism offers itself as one of the best solutions, if not the only solution for the economic and social problems of the contemporary world. Marxist ideas have provided fruitful methods in the world for ameliorating the social conditions of the poor and working class people. Considering the complexity of economic problems the Third World is facing today, many people think that Marxism is the only way of salvation for such countries and many governmental policies in underdeveloped countries have been significantly influenced by Marxist theory and ideology. If Marxism can be one of the most effective or the only solution for the economic problems of countries like Sri Lanka, would the existing cultural institutions like Buddhism come into conflict with the ideals of Marxism? This is the question we propose to examine in this paper.

The traditional Buddhist answer to this question would be that religion is something practised in solitude and politics is something to do with government and society and therefore religion has nothing to do with politics. One must try to find one's own salvation by leaving society and entering into a secluded life. But this type of attitude is becoming more and more a luxury which society cannot afford to allow its members to have. With the world becoming smaller every day and with an unprecedented growth of population, social relationships are getting to be more and more close and complex so that an individual is hardly able now to extricate his personal problems from social ones. When a man adds a single child to the world today, there are truly global repercussions. Thus it is becoming increasingly difficult to separate individual life from social life. When a man leaves his society to seek his own salvation, there can be drastic socio-moral implications. On the other hand, to uphold the maintenance of many religious institutions which have become stereotyped, decadent, social institutions, performing no sensible social service, would certainly amount to committing a moral and a social crime. Particularly, in countries like Sri Lanka the maintenance of such institutions could easily become an economic burden to society and an attempt to help the existence of such morally decadent so-called religious institutions is a form of promoting the perpetuation of positively immoral institutions within a society. Therefore, there is every reason for Buddhists to have to come to a realization not only of the relationship between Buddhism and society but also of the relationship between themselves and society at large. Therefore there is the need for this type of Buddhist-Marxist dialogue.

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What are the commonly accepted points of disagreement between Buddhism and Marxism? Buddhists accuse Marxists of being too materialistic, consequently undermining spiritual values, and of preaching the use of violence as a means of socio-economic emancipation. Marxists accuse Buddhists of being idealistic, that is, of not paying enough attention to the power of matter to enslave or emancipate man and of pursuing egoistic modes of salvation thus forgetting their obligations to participate in the society at large and ameliorate the conditions of the suffering social classes. Thus they accuse each other of being socially harmful systems of thought or social movements. We shall have to see whether such criticisms are justified.

There are certainly many aspects of popular Buddhism that can easily be subjected to the criticism of a Marxist or of any sensible person. Though the Buddha preached his doctrines as a social morality as well as a means of individual salvation, in the course of historical evolution his teachings became stereotyped and his followers institutionalized. Also, as a result of inevitable social pressures and processes, various socio-cultural elements crept into the fold of institutionalized Buddhism and in due course changed some of the central teachings of the Buddha beyond recognition. Popular Buddhism as it is practised in many parts of the world today is a result of such historical evolution. Some of the theoretical as well as practical aspects of this popular Buddhism can be seen to have had disastrous social effects, particularly in the socio-cultural context of Sri Lanka today.

Most of these changes, can of course, be regarded as the inevitable results of the historical evolution of religion. A religious system attracts all sorts of followers and for many, for whom the real purpose of that religion goes unnoticed, it ceases to be a religion and transforms itself into a mere socio-cultural institution. Once it becomes the public cultural property of the society the common man tries to adapt it to meet his various mundane psychological needs, as for instance the need for emotional security and mental consolation in problems he faces in his day-to-day life. Thus religion becomes another form of mundane social institution fulfilling man's mundane needs. That is why the popular manifestations of various religions have to be seen more as the creations of ordinary men to fulfil their mundane needs than as religious institutions serving any significant spiritual function. Because of their socio-cultural nature such institutions gradually become the seat of various types of vested interests.

Though illustrations can be drawn from any religion to illustrate this situation, I shall limit myself to some examples from popular Buddhism in Sri Lanka today. (The following observations should not, of course, be

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taken as generalizations because there can be genuine exceptions and also because of the difficulty of making generalizations about human phenomena.) Some of the most important monastic establishments have come down from our late periods of history as centres of wealth and landed property and they have brought with them the attendant evils of the social structure of the past periods and consequently such monastic establishments have, for all practical purposes, come to represent absolutely nothing more than the immoral caste-ridden feudal social structure of the medieval society of Sri Lanka.

Because they constitute some of the chief monastic centres of Sri Lanka they set a pattern for other monastic establishments, thus exerting a devastating influence on the practice of contemporary monasticism. Also, socially and economically, this situation breeds disastrous effects, such as asserting the supremacy of a particular caste or castes and the perpetuation of a feudal social structure. Actually the caste system has come to permeate the whole structure of the Buddhist Sangha and has come to constitute the social basis of the Sangha so that virtually the only criterion for admission to various sects of the Sangha has become caste. When these types of sub-human or inhuman features are embedded within the core of the Sangha, the question arises whether the Sangha can consistently work as a force in promoting humanistic values in the society of today. To take a theoretical aspect of popular Buddhism, the doctrine of Karma has been interpreted to mean a full-fledged theory of determinism which turns man into a helpless creature waiting for his destiny to unfold whatever forms of pain or happiness it may bring. It dulls man's initiative and the spirit of progress. It is in this context that Marx's dictum, "Religion is the opiate of the masses", becomes relevant to the context of our popular Buddhism. The emphasis on rituals has been so exaggerated as to make them ends in themselves. The Buddha is transformed into a super-god or transcendent being so that it is common for ordinary Buddhists to believe in the Buddha as a kind of salvific God from whom, merely by making offerings and performing rituals, men would be able to obtain salvation. For all practical purposes, popular Buddhism preaches, and continues only as, a variegated complex of rituals and superstitions. Though this, perhaps, adds to the charm of village life, this form of religious romanticism only perpetuates a social *status quo* which silently militates against the economic and human emancipation of man in Sri Lanka today.

Against the background of a Marxist analysis of man and society, the evils of popular Buddhism in a Lankian socio-cultural context can be made stringently evident. However, to exorcise the evil spirits of popular Buddhism should we turn to Marxism? One could say that to a great

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extent the remedy for the evils lies within the fold of Buddhism itself, or, in other words, that an internal criticism can be made in terms of the original teachings of the Buddha himself. Thus the spirit of Buddhism itself constitutes the critique of the cancerous undergrowths of popular Buddhism. The Buddha preached economic moderation for laymen and a communistic distribution of wealth for monks. Monks were to serve humanity at large and this was regarded as a method of serving themselves as well. The Buddha did not subscribe to the pseudo-distinction between altruism and egoism. He was the first religious teacher in history to preach the essential and necessary equality of all men (*cattāro vaṇṇā samasamā*) thus upholding the intrinsic worth of human nature. The fundamental basic of social philosophy for the Buddha was the emphatic rejection of caste or any other similar distinctions among human beings. The doctrine of Karma was a psychological principle to explain why people suffer for what they have done and Karma was one of eight causal factors[1] that influenced human behaviour. The Buddha placed great emphasis on human initiative.[2] He consistently rejected the primacy of rituals and took great pains to point out that he was no super-human being but only another human being whose only difference from others was that he had come to realise certain important and useful truths. What he tried to communicate to men was the necessity of a personality change that comes through a concentrated cultivation of moral principles.

Thus the defects of popular Buddhism could be remedied in terms of an internal criticism coming from within the fold of Buddhism itself. If popular Buddhism is reconstituted in terms of early Buddhism, would this form of Buddhism come into collision with Marxist principles? The problem boils down to the question whether early Buddhist teachings are compatible with Marxist teachings. Though there can be a few controversial problems, one could safely say that in general there are many significant agreements between the two. There is no doubt that the Buddha was not only a religious teacher but also a revolutionary born into a decadent and degenerating Brahminical social structure. He tried to infuse into society spiritual and human values in their dynamic and living forms. The Buddha gives an evolutionary view of society as opposed to the then prevalent Brahminical view of a divinely ordained static view of society.

This agrees, in spirit, though not in method, with the Marxist theory of society as an evolutionary process. The Buddha discusses his view in the *Aggañña Sutta*.[3] To quote from a summary of the *Sutta* made by O.H. de A. Wijeysekera, "When the earth had been formed and vegetation of low, then higher grade, had evolved, till at length the earth brought forth an abundance of cereals, there developed agricultural life, and human families and households came into existence. As households came into existence

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food began to be stored, land came to be divided among individual owners and boundaries had to be set up, thus giving rise to rights of property. Now some one of greedy disposition would encroach upon another's property. The rest would take him to task and charge him with trespass. Thus strife and injustice entered into the life of humans, necessitating the institution of protective and punitive measures, till at length a ruler was chosen by the people's consent (*sammata*) to maintain justice, the rest giving their support to him, that is to say, like law abiding citizens."[4]

In the *Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta*[5] the Buddha states that vice breeds in society owing to poverty and poverty is due to the maldistribution of economic goods. This *Sutta* "relates, in the form of a legend, how a king of the past provided all ward and protection to his subjects but failed to provide wealth (*dhana*), that is to say, economic security, to the needy for their subsistence and maintenance, and how on account of that poverty as a social phenomenon came to be prevalent. Poverty drove the individuals to theft and misappropriation, because they needed to have a living."

It is true that the ideal form of government for the Buddha was a benevolent monarch, the king being elected and appointed by the people (*Mahasammata*) rather than self-elected. The functions and qualities attributed to him and his kingdom manifestly show that in spirit the Buddha wished for a form of government where the citizens' wishes are consulted and respected and where the national wealth is distributed on an equitable basis as far as possible. The ideal monarch will never rest happy until all the subjects in his kingdom are securely settled and content with their economic provisions and livelihood. The Buddha openly condemns the king who selfishly sits on the throne yielding to indulgence in sense-pleasures and drunk with the intoxication of authority (*issariyamadamatta*)[6]. It is said that subsistence is essential for social security.[7] If there is poverty in his kingdom the king is held responsible for it and it is his primary duty to see that his subjects get their basic economic needs.

It also should be mentioned that early Buddhism does not have a sophisticated theory of economic distribution. It was a primitive form of response to the problem of poverty and consisted mainly in giving wealth to the poor. A retiring monarch advises his son and heir to the throne: "Dear Son, whosoever in thy kingdom are the 'have-nots', to them let wealth be given."[8] An individual may righteously (*dhammena*) earn wealth and use it righteously, sharing it with others,[9] but hoarding up food and wealth is condemned[10] as strongly as is squandering money.[11] The moral evils arising from a greedy disposition towards wealth or property are specially mentioned : such greed leads to avarice and wickedness.[12] A significant feature to be noted here is that the Buddha appeals to moral princi-

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ples like loving-kindness and compassion for fellow human beings and to the moral consequences of anti-social behaviour such as avarice and wickedness, in order to encourage men not to hoard to share their wealth with others, and to be moderate and content with one's share. All these admonitions were aimed at the ideal of equitable distribution of economic wealth of the community. The reason for such moral exhortations aimed at individuals was that the Buddha regarded the society as composed of psychological units—men—and he believed that if an enduring change in society is to occur it should start with a moral transformation of the basic atomic units. Marxism diverges here from Buddhism in so far as Marxism preaches a social transformation in terms of a dramatic economic change on a large scale. However, though the Buddhist social aim does not quite reach the communist ideal of common ownership of property it seems clear that the Buddha was trying here to approximate to that ideal when he was emphasizing an equitable distribution of wealth. And, as a confirmation of this point, it should not be forgotten that the Buddha clearly envisages the communistic ownership of property as the perfect ideal state when he recommended it for the monks. For laymen his exhortation was to try to approximate to this ideal as far as possible because he probably thought that the communist ideal required a personal moral perfection of a decidedly high degree.

In the early Buddhist literature it was thought proper to tax the prosperous provinces heavily so that some of their wealth could be distributed among the poor and the needy. This idea is illustrated with the help of a story about a king called Seri.[13] Here the Buddha seems to approve the idea that the ruler could justifiably tax or take from the abundance of the rich and give to the poor and the needy. Distribution of wealth to the needy is the first of the four bases of popular service of a king, the other three being kindly speech, sagacious conduct and feeling for the common good. The organized distribution of wealth (*dāna saṃvibhāga*)[14] is typical of the financial aspect of the Buddhist king's policy, and amounts in practice to an equitable (*sama*) distribution of wealth (*Dhana saṃvibhāga*)[15] in his domain.

The Buddha's concept of the Sangha community shows that for him too the communistic state was the ideal state of affairs but he thought that to realise this ideal another accompaniment was necessary: the moral perfection which had to be cultivated and attained by individual efforts. He considered private property to be a hindrance to spiritual progress and hence recommended that spiritual aspirants should enter the order of monks where the ideal social medium for spiritual progress could be found. Thus the Buddha believed that the realization of the perfect communist

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society needed a parallel development in moral progress among the participants in such a society.

When the Buddha was advocating his welfare economics he accepted the existing socio-economic class structure as given. What he tried to do was to change the hearts or attitudes of the people working within that structure. Any social system, even the communist society, can have some form of classes. What was important for the Buddha was one's moral duties in relation to one's station in society. What mattered was the quality of one's duties within one's station because in any society whatsoever one will always find oneself in one station or another.

The ultimate ideal of the Buddha's teachings was to create the free man who was the master of himself by freeing him from the shackles of irrational and immoral tendencies (i.e craving, hatred, and ignorance: *lobha*, *dosa*, *moha*) that dominate and plague him by reducing him to a status below the human level. The attainment of this ideal did not necessarily require a retiring into forests for seclusion and meditation because once the Buddha said that what made a truly religious person was not the mere plunging into the forest life but a life of wisdom (*vijjā*) and moral conduct (*ācaraṇa*)[16] though traditionally the monks have tended to go into seclusion for meditation and the Buddha too at times praised forests as quiet places for meditation. On the other hand, though seclusion may be useful for spiritual realization, the monks were always instructed to lead a busy social life once they had achieved their spiritual realization. The Buddha himself led a busy social life instructing people and even advising kings on political matters.

What I have been trying to show is that popular Buddhism could be rehabilitated in terms of early Buddhist teachings to be a dynamic social factor that could be useful for society today. Also I tried to show that the fundamental tenets of Buddhism were quite compatible with the socially beneficial aspect of Marxism. Now we must turn to Marxism in detail and see whether it could co-exist with the rehabilitated form of Buddhism.

Marxism is both a theory and practice, the latter based on the former which is regarded as an articulation of the nature of reality. In other words, it is a teaching to be practised. A central concept necessary for the understanding of Marx's philosophy is his idea of the materialistic basis of society. When he talked of materialism he did not mean the crude and abstract materialism of natural science which believes that all mental phenomena could be reduced to crude matter as their substratum but he spoke of "naturalism or humanism (which) is distinguished from both idealism and materialism, and at the same time constitutes their unifying

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truth."[17] Marx says that his attempt is to "set out from real, active men and on the basis of their life process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process. . .Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding form of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development, but men, developing their material production and their material intercourse, alter along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life."[18] Erich Fromm observes, "In contrast to Hegel, Marx studies man and history by beginning with the real man and the economic and social conditions under which he must live, and not primarily with his ideas. Marx was as far from bourgeois materialism as he was from Hegel's idealism—hence he could rightly say that his philosophy is neither idealism nor materialism but a synthesis: humanism and naturalism."[19]

Man has a very active part to play in the process of history. Marx believes that history should be understood as based on the fact that men are "the authors *and* actors of their history."[20] Man plays an important role in producing his material life as well because "by producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life."[21] Later on in *Capital* Marx formulates the idea that man makes his own history "And would not such a history be easier to compile since as Vice says, human history differs from natural history in this, that we have made the former, but not the latter."[22] This shows that Marx believed man to be not a passive participant in the materialist process, but an active creator. This is emphasised again in the *Theses on Feuerbach*: The materialistic doctrine (in contrast to Marx's view) concerning the changing of circumstances and education forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that the educator himself must be educated. This doctrine has therefore to divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society (as a whole).

"The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can only be comprehended and rationally understood as revolutionary practice."[23]

Concerning the problems of the nature of man Fromm summarises Marx's position: "In arguing against Bentham, Marx said: To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog's nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, *must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as* modified in each historical epoch.[24] It must be noted that this

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concept of human nature is not, for Marx—as it was not either for Hegel —an abstraction. It is the *essence* of man—in contrast to the various forms of his historical *existence*—and as Marx said, "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual."[25] It must also be stated that this sentence from *Capital* written by the 'Old Marx' shows the continuity of the concept of man's essence (Wesen) which the young Marx wrote about in the *Economic & Philosophical Manuscripts*. "In line with this distinction between a general human nature and the specific expression of human nature in each culture, Marx distinguishes...two types of human drives and appetites: the *constant* or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the *relative appetites* which are not an integral part of human nature but which 'owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication.[26],[27]

Marx conceived the ideal man as a free man who had control over himself. He says "being does not regard himself as independent unless he is his own master, and he is only his master when he owes his existence to himself. A man who lives by the favour of another considers himself a dependent being. But I live completely by another persons's favour when I owe to him not only the continuance of my life but also its *creation*, when he is at its source. My life has necessarily such a cause outside itself if it is not my own creation."[28]

Very often people tend to confuse a crude form of communism with Marx's idea of communism. It would be enlightening to see how Marx criticized and rejected this form of crude communism which "appears in a double form: the domination of material property looms so large that it aims to destroy everything which is incapable of being possessed by everyone as private property. It wishes to eliminate talent etc., by *force*. Immediate physical possession seems to it the unique goal of life and existence. The role of *worker* is not abolished but is extended to all men. The relation of private property remains the relation of the community to the world of things. Finally, this tendency to oppose general private property to private property is expressed in an animal form: *marriage* (which is incontestably a form of *exclusive private property*) as contrasted with the community of women, in which women become communal and common property. One may say that this idea of the *community of women* is the *open secret* of this entirely crude and unreflective communism. Just as women are to pass from marriage to universal prostitution, so the whole world of wealth (i.e. the objective being of man) is to pass to the relation of universal prostitution with the community. This communism, which

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negates the personality of man in every sphere, is only the logical expression of private property which is this negation. Universal envy setting itself up as a power is only a camouflaged form of cupidity which re-establishes itself and satisfies itself in a different way. The thoughts of every individual with private property, are *at least* directed against and *wealthier* private property, in the form of envy and the desire to reduce everything to a common level; so that this envy and levelling in fact constitute the essence of competition. Crude communism is only the culmination of such envy and levelling-down on the basis of a *preconceived* minimum. How little this abolition of private property represents a genuine appropriation is shown by the abstract negation of the whole world of culture and civilization, and the regression to the *unnatural* simplicity of the poor and wantless individual who has not only not surpassed private property but has not yet even attained to it. The community is only a community of *work* and of *equality of wages* paid out by the communal capital, by the *community* as universal capitalist. The two sides of the relation are raised to a *supposed* universality; labour as a condition in which everyone is placed, and *capital* as the acknowledged universality and power of the community."[29]

How does man liberate himself and create himself? It comes through work. For Marx life is a process and an activity. Labour is the main form of activity. Labour can alienate man when he does not dynamically participate in it and like it, e.g. when his labour is exploited by others or when he dislikes what he is doing. Therefore man's self-realization comes mainly through the emancipation of labour when labour becomes the self-expression of man.[30] Fromm comments: "Marx's central criticism of capitalism is not the injustice in the distribution of wealth: it is the perversion of labour into forced, alienated, meaningless labour, hence the transformation of man into a "crippled monstrosity..." The truth is that for Marx the situation of a worker in a Russian 'socialist' factory, a British state-owned factory, or an American factory such as General Motors would appear essentially the same. This Marx expresses very clearly in the following:

> 'An enforced *increase in wages* (disregarding the other difficulties, and especially that such an anomaly could only be maintained by force) would be nothing more than a *better remuneration of slaves*, and would not restore, either to the worker or to the work, their human significance and worth.'
>
> 'Even the *equality of incomes* which Proudhon demands would only change the relation of the present-day worker to his work into a relation of all men to work. Society would then be conceived as an abstract capitalist.' [31]" [32]

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For Marx the aim of socialism was to create the unalienated free man. This he elaborates in the third volume of *Capital*: "In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all social formation and under all possible modes of production. With his development this realm of physical necessity expands as a result of his wants; but, at the same time, the forces of production which satisfy these wants also increase. Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis."[33] For Marx the ideal state of affairs was a state of men who were actively related to the world through work, thus leading creative lives having mastered themselves and achieved independence. He valued this freedom so much that he said "Freedom is so much the essence of man that even its opponents realize it...No man fights freedom; he fights at most the freedom of others. Every kind of freedom has therefore always existed, only at one time as a special privilege, another time as a universal right"[34]

Now the problem is if the popular Buddhism is rehabilitated in terms of early Buddhism, whether this new form of Buddhism would be compatible with Marxist principles. Considering Marx's view of man and the ideal society he envisaged, there does not seem to be any apparent reason for such an incompatibility. Actually Marx hoped for a high degree of spiritual development in man. The process of de-humanization and alienation of man that had resulted from the capitalistic structure could be stopped only by destroying that materialist structure. And to master oneself and stand on one's feet requires a significant amount of self-realization and self-mastery, which means a high degree of moral and spiritual integration. For the Buddha the ideal man was the *arahant* who had completely destroyed craving (*lobha*), hatred (*doṣa*) and ignorance (*moha*). The *arahant* is a free man who had mastered himself in the sense that he is not subject to the sway of his irrational emotions but is capable of rationally regulating his interchange with society and nature. The irrational forces and influences coming from outside cannot affect him because

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he has changed his attitude towards the world which for him is no longer the world that was before his realization of the ultimate moral ideal. The ideal moral end becomes the ultimate criterion for morals and conseque ntly all moral propositions become hypothetical as relative to that end. Marxist morality too attains this hypothetical status in relation to the ideal society and the man it tries to create.

Though the Buddha and Marx agree, to a certain extent, on the general features of the ideal man, they seem to differ significantly on the methods adopted to achieve this end. Marx apparently gives an exclusive emphasis to changing the materialistic basis of society, while the Buddha emphasises the subjective transformation of man, though, however, it would be wrong to say that he exclusively emphasises this aspect because he accepted the fact that material environment could have an effect on man's spiritual and moral development, as is evident in his creation of a communistically organised monastic order which he regarded as the ideal social medium for rapid progress in moral and spiritual matters. Here, the problem is whether man can attain the Marxist ideal of self-mastery and independence purely in terms of a socio-economic transformation without making a parallel change in the human psyche.

Though Marx had placed exclusive emphasis on the necessity of change in the materialist basis, there are many places where he has tacitly accepted the significance of the subjective aspects of man's life. He accepts "that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances."[35] It is true that when man initiates actions his initiating thoughts are again the products of his material environment. But nevertheless, one cannot discount the specific and unique individual element that each man contributes to his environment. The way a capitalist would react to the capitalist situation contradicts the way a Marxist would react to it though they both may be living in the same environment. In *The German Ideology* it is stated that "thought, for example, is the thought of a particular, definite individual, it remains *his* definite thought, determined by his individuality and the conditions in which he lives."[36] Thus in thoughts there are two factors involved : one's individuality and the conditions in which one lives. Also, we saw earlier how Marx accepted the necessity of educating the educator as well as how he described the process of man making his own history. And Marx himself by propounding his philosophy tried to appeal to persons' minds to change the materialistic structure of society and initiate action to hasten the advent of communist society. Thus we see Marx himself tacitly accepting the significance of the importance of the subjective element in social processes.

A Marxist could maintain, as we discussed above, that this subjective

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factor, though important, would be automatically changed once the materialistic basis is changed. To discuss whether this would be possible is to take up a highly speculative issue, because for the birth of the perfect communist society, where Marx's ideal man would come into being, it requires that the whole of humanity should have attained this communist end, an ideal the remoteness of which makes it practically a transcendent ideal, thus removing it far from the empirical issue.

But, to speak from our experience, it would seem highly difficult to create Marx's ideal man purely from a change of economic factors. His ideal man is a free man who has mastered himself, dealing with nature in a very rational way and sharing things with others and these features require a high sense of moderation, compassion and understanding. To me it seems that Marx has clearly under-estimated the real complexity of man, particularly his psyche. Or it may be that he did not have time to go into this problem as might be surmised from Engel's famous letter to Mehring where Engels says that Marx and he "had neglected (by emphasising the formal aspects of relationship between the socio-economic structure and ideology to study) *the manner and mode of how ideas come into being.*"[37] However, the findings of depth psychology, notably of Freud and Jung, point to man as immensely complex and as one whose psyche seems to have got its own system of peculiar behaviour and causation in the interactions of psychic factors. A Marxist would say that all these psychological peculiarities could be explained in terms of the socio-economic structure in which a given individual is placed. But to clarify this issue a little more, it may be relevant to look at the findings of child psychologists who have studied the behaviour of children from infancy where behaviour is clearly not affected by the ideological factors operative in their environments. Their findings definitely point to the existence of feelings of possessiveness, jealousy, inferiority and superiority and many other psychological features that would militate against the working of a happy communistic social structure. Research findings of scientists like Konrad Lorenz and of psychologists like Anthony Storr[38] point strongly to the fact that anti-social attitudes are inherent in man's psychological make-up, irrespective of the socio-economic structure in which he finds himself.

And also, the theoretical problem whether it is mind or matter that is primary may be important here. Marx says that it is matter that is primary while the Buddha accepts the equal importance of both (*viññāṇ-paccayā nāmarūpam, nāmarūpaccayā vinñaṇam* :) name and form have consciousness as their condition or their cause and *vice versa* while maintaining that mind could ultimately control matter. This question is

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partly an experimental issue which is being hotly debated now internationally. The fact that mind can act as an independent causal factor and control matter seems to be gaining evidence in terms of psychical research findings, notably in terms of psychokinesis. There are many distinguished scientists and thinkers who maintain that the existence of paranormal psychical phenomena is beyond dispute.[39] It is true that some tend to treat this evidence as highly controversial at present and we can only wait for a great clarification of the issues involved.

These complex phenomena indicate that the human psyche is a problem worth grappling with in itself. Without making a systematic effort at controlling the turbulent psychic and mental phenomena, it seems difficult to hope for the birth of the rational and sensible man that Marx wished for.

What all these factors show is that Marx has not given sufficient attention and emphasis to the psychic or mental side of man. If Marxism is willing to engage in a dialogue with Buddhism, I think, it is here that Marxism would be able to learn something valuable about an important aspect of man that it has neglected so far.

On the other hand, it may be said that Buddhism too has to learn something from Marxism. It is true that the Buddha said significant things about social philosophy, how material circumstances can affect man etc. But the full implications of his social teachings were never worked out and even many of his explicit social teachings were, unfortunately, hardly put into practice successfully as a working social philosophy. However, he did successfully apply his teachings to organise the monastic order but that too, unfortunately, as an institution, in the process of history, amounted to a flight from the common society. Though the Sangha has contributed some useful services to society and still continues to do so on educational and moral matters, it has now primarily come to be a parasitic social institution perpetuating a mass of rituals and superstitions in the name of Buddhism. Even if its defects are remedied and the Sangha rehabilitated in terms of the Buddha's teachings, still it will have to seriously rethink its role in society. As the economic and social complexity of modern society is increasing at an unprecedented rate breeding an enormous amount of economic and social evils and problems, religious institutions like the Sangha will be necessarily forced to find genuine reasons for their existence which otherwise would be an expensive burden to society.

Though the Buddha did emphasize the beneficial effects of social morality, Buddhism does not make a sustained effort to understand man in terms of society and man's obligations to ameliorate social evils and

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find solutions to social problems. Marxism's basic effort is to understand man in terms of society and for this it makes a deep analysis of the workings of the social structure which in the capitalist society functions to the detriment of spiritual and moral values of man. The most important fact that Marx was able to illustrate was man's obligations to society at large. If Buddhism is to learn the most valuable lesson Marxism could teach, Buddhism will have to make the concept of salvation meaningful in a much wider context than it has done hitherto. One can, of course, find one's own salvation by leaving or ignoring society. But this raises the basic moral question whether one is here shirking one's social obligations when one tries to find one's own salvation in an egoistic way, and this moral question is getting more and more significant and important every day in the society of today. In a sense man owes his being and existence to society. When this is conceived in terms of contemporary welfare society, man has enormous obligations towards his society for providing him with security, health and education, or in short, for making him what he is. Therefore, it will be extremely difficult for him to extricate himself from the social nexus where he is situated. Man is a social being. The truth of this statement is so obvious that people have become oblivious to its deep significance.

What is needed now is a re-emphasis of this obvious truth. It is in this context that it becomes an immoral act to leave society to find one's own salvation when one's society is beset with problems. Theoretically, we saw how the Buddha has left enough room in his teachings for the addition or elaboration of this dimension of social involvement. What is needed now is such an elaboration and its practical application. For example, if the Buddha has said that maldistribution of wealth leads to immorality then it is clearly an obligiation for Buddhists to rectify any such maldistribution they find in their societies and attempt to reclaim morality from economic shackles. It is clearly high time that Buddhists in monastic as well as in lay institutions should try to justify their forms of existence, institutional as well as personal, in terms of a new dimension of dynamic social involvement and the Buddhist would be able to learn much from Marxism as to why and how this should take place.

When popular Buddhism is rehabilitated so that it can co-exist with Marxist social ideals, what form would such a new Buddhism take ? Many old things of course will disappear. Monastic order will be a spiritually as well as a socially dynamic force. It will be reclaimed of its inhuman or sub-human sub-structures like the caste and fedual structures. It should be made into an intelligent, socially viable and flexible institution, as a spiritual but not a social retreat, open for intelligent mature persons to

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enter and leave as they like. The Sangha with its communistic economic basis would provide foretaste of the ideal Marxist society. Cultural aspects and rituals could be retained without their attendant evils. For example, the Kandyan Esala Perahera could be retained minus its feudal structure and many of the Buddhist rituals could be retained as symbolical forms of respecting a great moral leader etc. etc. (The ideal of Nibbana, which means moral perfection and the stoppage of rebirth, should be treated, as the Buddha emphasises, as an ideal realizable in this life itself. And the theory of rebirth should be treated not as a blind belief but only as a hypothesis to be verified on experimental ground).[40]

Lastly, it has to be pointed out that there are certain things that both Buddhism and Marxism will have to learn from somewhere else. This need arises in the search for a satisfactory solution to the problem of deterioration of religious and political structure in their essential meaning. One can justifiably say that though the Buddha's intentions were certainly good in founding Buddhist institutions, the latter have progressively deteriorated to such a decadent state that at some points the present-day Buddhist institutions clearly stand for the very immoral ideals that the Buddha was vehemently fighting against. One may ask whether, if Buddhism can be subject to such a pitiful form of evolution, it would be a sensible thing to invoke early Buddhism to rectify the present evils because it will be again open to the possibilities of deterioration. However, this argument should not be made specific to Buddhism because it can be equally relevant to Marxism.

All new philosophies start with a revolutionary spirit as a revolt against an existing state of affairs. Buddhism started as a strong revot against the Brahminical caste-ridden static society. Christ started hils rleigion as a revolt against a society full of priest-ridden paralysing religious institutions. But it soon became another static institutional structure full of profane evils. Then Protestantism came up as a revolt against the regimented institutionalisation of Catholicism but only to settle down very soon to a state hardly distinguishable from the latter. Innumerable similar examples could be given to illustrate how revolutionary movements, in the process of history, eventually approximate to a state of affairs hardly distinguishable from that against which they originally revolted. And, Marxism as a revolutionary movement has not been an exception to this rule.

In fact many thinkers are of the opinion that in many Marxist countries the way Marxism operates is not significantly different from the way a religion operates.[41] Marxism has a group of prophets like Marx, Lenin etc. The extreme this can go to is well illustrated in the case of Mao Tse-tung who is practically looked upon as a saviour god by his adherents.

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Unfalsifiability as is a characteristic of many Marxist teachings is the case of propositions of many religions. It has metaphysical beliefs like the universal dialectical process and it looks forward to an eschaton, the Communist Society, the possibility of actual realisation of which is so remote, because of its all-perfect nature, that the Communist Society is in effect a transcendent ideal. Marxism has its group of institutions like the Kremlin, and its own community, the Marxists, who share a similar set of beliefs and a group of rituals like mass rallies, etc. etc. This process can make Marxism easily settle down to another form of static religion which will be perpetuating only a group of beliefs, institutions and rituals. In such a state the nominal Marxists will just hope and wait for the dawn of Communist Society. The Marxism in turn will have become the opiate of the masses.

Such will be the resultant process within Marxist countries when the revolutionary spirit with which they started dies down gradually, as in the case of religions, and settles down to a state similar to capitalism. Some thinkers say that this process is now evident in Russia even though Marx has insisted on the need to keep the revolutionary spirit alive against the capitalist modes of thinking. It is said that Mao was fighting against this process of lapsing, by means of his cultural revolutions. However, here, there is always the danger that such cultural revolutions themselves might easily lapse into a type of ritual. The point I am trying to make here is that the revolutionary spirit has to be a perpetual movement or process and neither Buddhism nor Marxism has found a satisfactory way to keep this process alive. This is a problem for which they both have to try to find an answer.

A discussion of another issue might be important here. How does the Marxist idea of revolution square with Buddhism ? As Fromm says, it is relevant to remember here that Marx's idea of revolution is notably different from the ordinary western idea of revolution. The western middle class, in the English, American and French revolutions, believed that revolution in terms of mere force could breed a new and better social order. But, as Fromm says, "Marx saw that political force cannot produce anything for which there has been no preparation in the social and political process. Hence that force, if at all necessary, can give, so to speak, only the last push to a development which has virtually already taken place, but it can never produce anything truly new. 'Force,' he said, 'is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one.'[42].....force, for Marx, could have at most only a transitory significance, never the role of a permanent element in the transformation of society."[43]

However, it should be noted, as Engels mentions, that while Marx

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believed that "England is the only country where the inevitable social revolution might be affected entirely by peaceful and legal means,"[44] he nevertheless emphasised the therapeutic value and therefore the need of revolutions for the "production of this communistic consciousness" "on a mass scale."[45] But if there is nothing strong enough to revolt against the idea of a revolution might become a superfluous idea. In the light of the gradual nationalization processes that have taken place in countries like Sri Lanka, Marx's idea of a peaceful revolution might be the relevant method to be employed in such contexts. Buddhism will have no grievances against such a method.

But when a revolt has to be made against a well-established and socially entrenched capitalist structure or a malevolent dictatorship, it is sure to involve violence and bloodshed. What would the Buddhist's attitude be to such a situation? The answer is of course that he could and will use violence. Violence is an irremovable thread in the fabric of any human society. Ruling and the replacement of one set of rulers by another always involves violence *to a greater or lesser degree.* The history of any country, including Buddhist countries, shows this clearly enough. All that the Buddhist can aspire to is that in his society violence should be resorted to with the least possible frequency. He will see violence as a necessary evil which, however, must be avoided as far as possible. He can have, as I have pointed out above, no objection to the aims of Marx but he is bound to seek the realisation of these aims in the most peaceful, non-violent way possible.[46]

Notes

(Pāli texts referred to are editions of the Pāli Text Society, London.)

1. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV. 230.
2. Personal initiative: *ārabbhadhātu. Aṅguttara Nikāya*, III. 337, 338.
3. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 80-98.
4. O.H. de A. Wijesekera, *Buddhism and Society*, Colombo: The Bauddha Sahitiya Sabha, 1952.
5. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 58-79.
6. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I. 100.
7. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 65.
8. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 61.
9. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, IV. 336; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, II. 66, 68.
10. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 90; *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 87.
11. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, I. 87.
12. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 289.

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13. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, I. 58.
14. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 145.
15. *Dīgha Nikāya*, III. 61, 65.
16. *Dīgha Nikāya*, I. 101.
17. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, tr. T.B. Bottomore, in *Marx's Concept of Man* by Erich Fromm, New York: Ungar Publishing Company, 1971, p. 181.
18. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology*, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1964, pp. 37-38.
19. Erich Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, p. 11.
20. Marx and Engels, *Marx-Engels Gesantausgabe*, ed. D. Rjazanow, Berlin: Marx-Engels Verlag, 1932, I, 6, p. 917. As quoted by Fromm, op. cit., p. 13.
21. *German Ideology*, p. 31.
22. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1954, Vol. I., p. 372.
23. *German Ideology*, ed. R. Pascal, New York: International Publishers, 1939, pp. 197-198. As quoted by Fromm, op. cit., p. 22.
24. *Capital*, Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co., 1906, Vol. I, p. 668.
25. *German Ideology*, New York, p. 198.
26. "Heilige Familie," *Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe*, V, p. 359.
27. Fromm, op. cit., 24-25.
28. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, p. 138.
29. *ibid.*, p. 124.
30. *Capital*, Chicago, pp. 197-198.
31. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts*, p. 107.
32. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 42-43.
33. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1962, Vol. III, pp. 799-800.
34. Quoted by R. Dunayevskaya, *Marxism and Freedom*, with a preface by Herbert Marcuse, New York: Beekman Associates, 1958, p. 19, as quoted by Fromm, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
35. *German Ideology*, Moscow, p. 50.
36. *ibid.*, p. 285.
37. Letter of July 14, 1893, as quoted by Fromm, op. cit., p. 22, f.n. 3.
38. Konrad Lorenz, *On Aggression*, New York: Bantam Books, 1971; Anthony Storr, *Human Aggression* London: Penguin Press, 1968.
39. Arthur Koestler, *The Roots of Coincidence*, London: Hutchinson, 1972.
40. For example: Ian D. Stevenson, *Twenty Cases Suggestive of Reincarnation*, New York: Society for American Psychical Research.
41. Trevor Ling, *Buddha, Marx and God*, London: Macmillan, 1966;
Raymond Aron, *Progress and Disillusion*, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1972 pp. 274 ff.
42. *Capital*, Chicago, Vol. I, p. 824.
43. Fromm, op. cit., pp. 23-24
44. *Capital*, Moscow, p. 6.
45. *German Ideology*, Moscow, p. 86.
46. This paper was first read at a symposium on Christianity and Marxism at Lewells Fatima House, Kandy, Sri Lanka, in 1974. A Yugoslav translation by Ven. Bhikkhu Nāṇajívako appeared in *Marxisam U Svetu* ("Marxism in the World"), Belgrade: Communist Publishing Co., June, 1977.

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8

*Martin Buber and Oriental Religions**

MAURICE FRIEDMAN

MARTIN Buber's encounter with Oriental religions is an important one. Until his death he remained actively concerned with comparative mysticism. Although Oriental religions was not his central field of scholarship, he was for years Professor of Comparative History of Religion at the University of Frankfurt and did, in fact, deal in a scholarly manner with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Taoism. His concern with mysticism in Taoism, Hasidism and Zen, and with Eastern thought, became a steady dialogue; it was an integral part of his path, of his being.

It was this dialogue, this bringing of himself, which made his study of Asian thought and culture neither objective nor subjective. Gershom Scholem, in his well-known attack on Buber's interpretation of Hasidism. claims that Buber gave nothing to Hasidism because he freely selected or used things in terms of his own existential philosophy, as if Buber were born with that philosophy and then looked around and found things to support it. Actually, it is the other way around. Buber was in dialogue with Hasidism many years before his philosophy developed. Dialogue is not mere subjective and arbitrary selection. Buber illustrates this with some comments which relate to the meeting of East and West in an essay on "China and Us", an address he gave at a conference on China in 1928 in Heppenheim, where he was living at the time. In this essay he tells about a talk he had with Rabindranath Tagore, the great Hindu philosopher, poet, and, some say, holy man. Tagore raised a question about Zionism. He had always admired the Jewish people, their love of peace, their scholarship, but he felt that there was a great danger that the establishing of a Jewish homeland in Palestine might result in too great an

* This essay is a much expanded version of "Martin Buber and Asia", *Philosophy, East and West*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (October 1976).

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influence of Western ways. What he wanted instead was to see Palestine more in the image of the East as he saw it, that is, minus the industrialism that the West had. Buber was not unsympathetic to this view. On the contrary, Buber tells how in 1901, as editor of *Die Welt*, the official Zionist journal of Theodor Herzl, he met with Herzl in the Zionist Central Bureau in Vienna to discuss his editorial activities. On the wall of the room where they met hung the new Palestine relief map which had just reached the bureau. After a brief greeting Herzl led Buber at once to the map and began to point out to him the economic and technical future of the land. His finger glided over the deserts and there were terraced settlements; it glided over an empty plain and there arose in powerful rows the factories of a hundred industries; it led over the Bay of Haifa, and, through the force of his words, Buber beheld the "future port of Asia." Finally his finger returned to the Jordan, and Herzl recited to him the plan to erect a mighty dam that with its energy would supply the total economic life of the land. And now his finger tapped on a point of the map, and he cried: "How much horse power has Niagara ? Eight million ? We shall have ten million !" Buber stood entranced before this magic work. He felt how the Jordan-Niagara Falls sprayed over him, and at the same time he had to smile: how remote that was, how unreal ! No, it was not for that, thought the young man, that we served; not to take part in the Americanization of Asia had we inscribed Zion's name on our banner. God be thanked that this was only a dream!

Only long afterward, many years after Herzl's death, did it become clear to Buber that at that time it was Herzl—and not he—who had meant the real Palestine. For Buber, at that time, it was "das geliebte und Gelobte"—the beloved and the Promised Land that had to be won anew, the land of the soul and of the message, the land in which the miracle of redemption should reach fulfilment. For Herzl, in contrast, it was a wholly particular land with wholly particular geographical und geological characteristics, and, therefore, also with clearly determinable technical possibilities which he not only knew but also beheld.

Does this mean, asks Buber, that the choice is inescapable between the maximum possible horsepower on the one hand and the way toward redemption on the other ? No, and this too Buber confesses to learning only many years later. If Asia cannot escape going the way of Europe and America, technicalization may still be kept as a means and not allowed to become an end. This means a limit should be set to technical progress precisely at the point where it injures the unity and the truth of life[1].

Buber felt that what Tagore had said was said in a heartfelt manner.

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But he believed that it was removed from the reality of the situation. Buber pictured to himself a man who proposed to erect a great symbol on the top of a mountain and who was carrying it all the way to the top. Should someone say to this man that he could get to the top much faster without the symbol, he could only reply that his whole purpose of going to the mountain top was to take the symbol there. Buber maintained that the same is true of the industrial civilization of the West. We carry it and it carries us. It is not that Buber did not see the evils of that civilization; he just did not think it was possible to throw it out and go backward. When he looked at the development of Japan and India, he doubted that even they could be spared a similar route.

In the face of this situation. Buber asks, "What can China have to say to us today ?" Here he makes an important distinction about dialogue that *shows* that it is not a matter of arbitrary selectivity. We cannot take over Chinese art or wisdom in the sense in which the eighteenth century took the art of engraving and turned it into a very charming chinoiserie. Nor can we take over the noble sayings of Confucius and treat them as universal. That, Buber says, is the real sin against the spirit. The real receiving can only take place as the receiving of a living reality with the forces of one's own life. How does one receive such a reality ? Buber holds that every genuine culture has had, not an idea, but an image of man, which is the human standing above it. i t is only from our situation and our dialogue with that image that we can receive from the unique reality embodied in every culture.

Neither Hinduism nor Buddhism remains a central part of Buber's later thought as do Taoism, Hasidism and Zen, but they play an important part in his early developmental thinking. The distinguished American philosopher W. T. Stace accomplished the remarkable feat of remaining a naturalist philosopher, while in the later part of his life becoming a mystic close to the spirit of Aldous Huxley's *Perennial Philosophy*. In his book on *Mysticism and Logic*, Stace refers to the famous story of the conversion that Buber tells in "Dialogue" (*Between Man and Man*) and Buber's *Meetings*. In this story Buber relates how he gave up his tendency to mystic ecstasy after he found he was not really present for a young man who, in despair, had come to see him and was later killed in the First World War out of that same despair. Stace explains this in terms of there being no mysticism in Judaism, and from this error he deduces the explanation for Buber's critique of mysticism. This is exactly backwards in at least three respects. First, there *is* a mysticism in Judaism. Second, as Buber has often said, it is the events in one's life, for example, the First World War in his, which really bring decisive change in one's thought, and

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not actual influences. But third, Buber was concerned with Hinduism before he became concerned with Hasidism and Jewish mysticism. In a 1901 essay on the great German mystic Jacob Boehme, Buber quotes Ludwig Feuerbach's statement that the meeting between men—between I and Thou—is God, only to state that we are closer to St. Francis and still closer to the Vedānta. He may not have understood the Vedānta fully at that point, because he was very concerned with the I, but nonetheless, he explicitly rejected I and Thou in favour of the unity of the I. Three years later Buber came into close contact with Hasidism, a form of popular communal Jewish mysticism, which he spent a lifetime interpreting and retelling its legends and stories. The first important product of his withdrawal from Zionist political activity to the study of Hasidism was his book, *The Tales of Rabbi Nachman*. In his next book, *The Legend of the Baal Shem* (1908) he speaks not only of ecstasy but also of a communal mysticism of joy and service and of love and humility as the reality found between person and person. In the Preface, he speaks of legend as "the I and the Thou," the first place where he explicitly spoke of I and Thou in a positive way. Yet, in 1909, the very next year, Buber brought out a book called *Ecstatic Confessions*, as far as I know the first mystical anthology. It included many Christian Western mystics but it also included Sri Ramakrishna and the whole range of Eastern mysticism, too. In the Introduction, entitled "Ecstasy and Confession," Buber takes a Vedāntist position in striking contrast to what he had said of Hasidism:

> Not suspecting that the poor individual "I" contains the "World I," most mystics have connected their experience with God, and have made of it a multiform mystery. Only in the primitive word of India is the "I" proclaimed that is one with the "All" and with the "One." The unity which the mystic experiences when he has brought all his former multiplicity into Oneness is not a relative unity, for the ecstatic man no longer has outside of himself others with whom he has community. It is the absolute, unlimited Oneness which includes all others.

That is a clearly nondualistic statement. In 1910 at the first German sociological conference, Ernst Troelsch attempted to introduce mysticism as a different type of religious social grouping from church, denomination, and sect. Buber rejected this attempt on the grounds that the mystic in his ecstasy knows no communal or social reality; he stands in isolated relation to God. In "Ecstasy and Confession," however, Buber speaks of the paradox that all mystics want to communicate, and in so doing enter the reality

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of the I and the Thou, the Many and the One. "We turn inward and listen, and we do not know which sea it is that we hear." Buber was closer here to the qualified nondualist position of Rāmānuja than to Śaṇkara, even though he was seemingly referring to Śaṇkara and unqualified nondualism.

In the book, *Daniel*, written in 1913, Buber refers to the Vedānta unmistakably, though, not by name, as one of the false paths that we can take on the way to the "final teaching." *Daniel* was not Buber's final teaching, but he imagined it was. But the experience of this wrong path confirms that the unity that was found outside the world can be won again in the world. In *I and Thou* (1923), where he arrived at his mature philosophy, Buber speaks of two teachings of mystic union, one of absorption, as in the Gospel of John, and the other of identity, as in the Vedānta. He rejects the philosophies underlying these two teachings without denying the mystical experience itself, which he reinterprets as either the soul's becoming whole and one, or as the person meeting the Thou with such intensity that in that meeting both I and Thou are forgotten. Buber criticizes the tendency of many mystics to turn mystic experience into a mystic philosophy and proclaim either a monism or nondualism. This does not mean that Buber's mature philosophy is a dualistic one, as Stace and many others imagine. *I and Thou* does not fit either of the two categories, dualist and nondualist. Yet there is a decisive change here that goes along with Buber's almost ascetic renunciation of his own natural tendency to ecstasy. For he refers to these as "phenomena of the brink" and declares that sunlight on a sprig of maple is closer to our lived life than all ecstasies. In *The Spirit af Orient and Judaism*, written in 1916, he contrasts a Greco-Western emphasis upon stasis and the visual with a general Asian spirit of movement and dynamism, and he includes Judaism in this Asian tendency.

Buber's relation with Taoism is more complex. Taoism, Hasidism, and Zen, I would claim, are three mysticisms of the "particular," which give the lie to the Perennial Philosophy that there is some one essence in all of mysticism. At the very end of my monograph on "Buber's Encounter with Mysticism,"[2] I tell how a Zen master visited Buber in Jerusalem with an American disciple. While the Zen master remained silent, the American disciple talked volubly to Buber and explained that there was one essence of all mysticisms. When Buber asked somewhat sternly, "And what is that essence ?" the Zen master got up and vigorously shook Buber's hand ! Buber, in any case, did not believe in that type of comparison that leaves out the uniqueness of each religion. He was a pupil of Wilhelm Dilthey, whose phenomenology left room for the unique. He certainly understood and utilized the typological method. But he also believed that you had to

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know each phenomenon in its uniqueness, and quarrelled with that aspect of comparative religion that looks only for resemblances.

The influence of Taoism came relatively early in Buber's thought, and unlike the Vedānta persisted in his mature thought. While on the one hand Buber seemed to reject some aspects of Taoism that he had earlier espoused, on the other this dialogue with Taoism remained of central importance to him throughout his life. Buber's long essay on "The Teaching of the Tao", published in 1911, as an afterword to the *Parables of Chuang-tzu*, had a great impact on the German Youth Movement. Buber was one of the idols of German youth, not because of what he wrote on Hasidism, but because of his publication of Chuang-tzu and his essay "The Teaching of the Tao". In this essay Buber was not concerned so much with metaphysical thought as with being as embodied in what he calls the "central man". In this connection he dealt with Lao-tzu, whose path he saw as pointing to the "perfected" or "completed" man—an image of the human which cannot be spelled out or analyzed. He compared this way many times to the Heraclitean Logos, to Heraclitus whose sense of the opposites was close to the *yin* and *yang* of the Tao. Each thing reveals the Tao through its unity of existence, he declared. Thus the Tao is found only in the manifoldness of all things. Here we have unmistakably the mysticsim of the particular and the concrete.

In the introduction to his book *Hinweise*, the German original of *Pointing the Way* for the most part, Buber said that he only included in these "hints" those essays that he could still stand behind. When I translated *Pointing the Way*, I declared to Buber that he could not fully stand behind "The Teaching of the Tao", because it speaks of a unity which he went beyond in *I and Thou*. "You are right", Buber replied. "Yet I have to include this essay as an indispensable part of my way. I had to go through this encounter with mysticism in general and the Tao, in particular, to reach my own independent thought." And his independent thought bears important traces of Taoism without the concept of unity.

In "The Teaching of the Tao" Buber wrote.

> The Tao is the path of things, their manner, their peculiar order, but it exists as such in things only potentially. It comes out only in the contact with others. Then it becomes active. If there were metal and stone without Tao, there would be no sound. They would have the power of sound, but it does not come out of them if they are not struck. Thus it is with all things.
>
> So the Tao of things only becomes actual and manifest through contact

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with the world of the perfected man. Here is a clear presentiment of Buber's mature philosophy of dialogue. All creating, from the point of view of this teaching, means nothing more than to call forth the Tao of the world.

One of the things that is most puzzling to Westerners who come to Buber's thought, including many Christian theologians who have been deeply influenced by that thought, is that he keeps insisting that there can be an I-Thou relation with trees and cats and stones. He does not mean that the tree is a dryad that winks at you as you go by, but that there can be some active reciprocal contact. In a book of Thomas Merton's called *The Way of Chuang Tzu*, there is a story called "The Wood-carver", which is not only a remarkable representation of the philosophy of meeting, but actually explains one of the most obscure parts of *I and Thou*. In *I and Thou*, Buber says there are three types of I-Thou relations : the I-Thou with nature, the I-Thou with fellow men, and the I-Thou with "spiritual essences." The German original of this Platonic-sounding phrase was *geistige Wesenheiten*. What Buber meant was nothing Platonic at all. He was speaking about art. The sculptor looks at the marble, let's say. He does not see the finished form in it, yet, he meets the possibility, and the form is a product of that meeting. I know a fine sculptor who went to Vermont to get a particularly hard marble. She needed that encounter with it in order to produce what she did. This sense of meeting is very clear in Michelangelo's "Prisoners" in Florence : they are not fully carved out of the stone so that you can see the meeting between Michelangelo and the marble in the very process of emerging into form.

In the story of the wood-carver, as Merton retells it, Khing, the master carver, made a bell stand of precious wood. When it was finished, everyone who saw it was astounded, and they said it must be the work of spirits. When the Prince of Lu said to the master carver, "What is your secret ?" Khing replied,

> I am only a workman. I have no secret. There is only this : When I began to think about the work you commanded, I guarded my spirit, did not expend it on trifles that were not to the point. I fasted in order to set my heart at rest. After three days fasting, I had forgotten gain and success. After five days I had forgotten praise and criticism. After seven days I had forgotten my body with all its limbs. By this time all the thought of your Highness and of the court faded away. All that might distract me from the work had vanished. I was collected in a single thought of the bell stand. Then I went to the forest to see the trees in their own natural state. When the right tree appeared before

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my eyes, the bell stand also appeared in it, clearly, beyond doubt. All I had to do was to put forth my hand and begin. If I had not met this particular tree, there would have been no bell stand at all."

Buber says in *The Knowledge of Man*[3] that the sculpture is neither the expression of the human soul, nor the impression of a natural object, but that it is the meeting between the world of man and the world of things. "What happened ?" replies the wood-carver. "My own collected thought encountered the hidden potential in the world. From this live encounter came the works which you ascribe to the spirits." This is one remarkable example of Buber's affinity to Taoism.

The second is the whole concept of *wu wei*, sometimes misunderstood in the West as nonaction. It is nonaction only in the sense that it is not the Western type of action. It is not the action which intervenes and interferes. It is the action of the whole being. In "The Teaching of Tao", Buber spends a good deal of time contrasting two types of action, the one which interferes in the web of things, and the other which, instead of interfering, rests in the work of the inner deed, but is an affecting of the whole, where things happen as you will them, and yet you seem to be doing nothing, where you rule people and yet they do not know that they are ruled. He relates this to the will, the willing person. There is no longer any division between him and what is willed. What is willed becomes being. The perfected man does not interfere in the life of things, he does not impose himself on them, but helps all beings to their freedom. Through his unity he leads them to the unity, he liberates their nature and their destiny, he releases Tao in them. In the life together of human beings, the ruler rules in the same way. He guards and unfolds the natural life of the kingdom. To do this he does not use violence; he just makes a gesture with his hand. What he wants to happen happens, and yet the people think that they are ruling themselves.

This is indeed what is in the teaching of Lao-tzu. The real ruler takes all the suffering of others on himself; he bears the country's need and pain; that is what it means to be the kingdom's king. This is very similar to a Hasidic story that Buber retells. Moshe Leib of Sasov learned to love by coming to an inn where he heard one drunken peasant ask another, "Do you love me ?" "Certainly I love you", replied the second, "I love you like a brother." But the first shook his head and insisted, "You don't love me. You don't know what I lack. You don't know what I need." The second fellow fell into sullen silence, but Moshe Leib said, "But I understood. To love another is to know his need and bear the burden of his pain and his sorrow." "The true ruler liberates the individual from this dominion of

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the multitude", says Lao-tzu, or in Buber's words, "He makes the crowd no longer a crowd." That is one of the most important sentences in Buber's later thought. In criticizing Soren Kierkegaard who says, "The crowd is untruth", Buber says, "Our task is to make the crowd not bundled, but bound", to "de-crowd the crowd."

There are other passages, to be sure, where Buber seems to be abjuring Taoism. For example, in *Daniel* (1913), he refers to the nondifferentiation of the opposites in what is clearly a reference to Taoism. Important as it is in getting a glimpse of the whole, this nondifferentiation is still not the fullness of real life, Daniel says. At the end of "The Teaching of the Tao", Buber compares Heraclitus and Lao-tzu at length, where there are many extremely interesting resemblances of the harmony of opposites, the tension of the bow and the lyre, the *yin* and the *yang*. Forty-five years later in the essay "What Is Common to All" (in *The Knowledge of Man*), Buber speaks of the tendency of modern man to flee into collectivism or into individualism in order to escape from the true human task of building the common cosmos through the common logos, creating and adding onto the common world through common speech-with-meaning. To Buber, Heraclitus' injunction to follow the common is of the essence, yet he uses a Taoist story to illustrate the opposite. This is the legend of a country where people are asleep for six months of the year and are awake for six months of the year. It is when they are asleep, the Taoist legend implies, that they are in the true reality. Buber also recounts in this connection the famous story about Chuang-tzu, who dreamt he was a butterfly, and when he awoke he was not sure whether he was Chuang-tzu who had dreamt he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he was Chuang-tzu. For all that, the evidence is overwhelming that Taoism remains extremely important in Buber's thought.

In the controvery between Gershom Scholem and Buber, Scholem criticizes Buber in part because Buber said that the life of the Hasidim-these Jewish communal mystics, was best represented through the legends. But the legends, Scholem points out, were not written down often until fifty or sixty years later, whereas the formal doctrines, in which these Hasidic masters continued the development of the Lurian Kabbalah, were written down right away. Buber replies that the significant thing is not when they were written down. Just as Buber spent a lifetime trying to rediscover the oral origins of the Bible in his translation of the Bible with Franz Rosenzweig, so here, too, the oral is more important to him than the written. Buber cites Hasidism, Taoism, and Zen as three mysticisms in which the legends reveal the life of the mystics more faithfully than the formal doctrines all through oral transmission, which is only written down many years later.[1]

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In "China and Us" (1928) Buber states that while he does not think that Confucianism, with its reverence for the ancestors, has much to teach the West, there is something that China has to give us, namely, the Taoist teaching of *wu wei*, the nonaction which is really the action of the whole being. He says that we have begun to learn that success is of no consequence. We have begun to learn that all historical success is really contradicted in the fact, in its realization. We have begun to learn that the really powerful existence does not yield historical success : it endures across generations, making its way underneath the surface of historical fashion. We have begun to learn this in a negative fashion, in a downright foolish manner. But there where we stand, or there where we shall soon stand, we shall directly touch upon the reality from which Lao-tzu spoke.[5] This statement was made five years before Hitler came to power in Germany. It is particularly significant that there is an exact parallel here to what Buber himself does with the notion of the "suffering servant" in Deutero-Isaiah, and also in his Hasidic chronicle-novel, *For the Sake of Heaven*, namely, that the hidden reality which works in the depths of history may be the truly powerful one. In "The Cause and the Person", (from his autobiographical fragments, *Meetings*) Buber tells of a friend who found himself in conflict with Theodor Herzl at a Zionist congress. Herzl had publicly wronged this man, who was a member of the Democratic faction to which Buber belonged, and there was no way to undo the wrong. Buber asks, "Might there not be yet another reality, different from that of obvious world history—a reality hidden and powerless because it has not come yet into power ?" Might there be "men with a mission who have not been called to power and yet are, in essence, men who have been summoned ?" Is success the only criterion ? Is there perhaps a 'dark charisma" which confirms the man who is accorded no historical success, whose success is anonymous, who perhaps does not have any success ? The parallel between "China and Us" and "The Cause and the Person", both written within the same year, is striking.

We cannot understand Buber's central work to which his thought led, and from which the rest came, namely, *Ich und Du, I and Thou*, unless we understand the Taoist concept of *wu wei*. If we look at Part Two of *I and Thou*, we discover that everything that Buber says about the free man who wills without arbitrariness is, in fact, the direct application in almost the same words of what he wrote in "The Teaching of the Tao" about the perfected man of the Tao, and the contrast with the man who intervenes and wants to *make* things happen is also the same. The free man is he who wills without arbitrary self-will. He believes in reality, the real solidarity; he believes in destiny and that it stands in need of him. He

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knows he must go out to the meeting with the other with his whole being. The matter will not turn out according to his decision, but what is to come will come only when he decides from his genuine ability to will. He must sacrifice his puny, unfree will, controlled by things and instincts, to his grand will, which sets out to find destined being. Then he intervenes no more, but at the same time, he does not merely let things happen. He listens to what is emerging from himself, to the course of being in the world—not in order to be supported by it, but in order to bring it to reality as it desires and has need of him to be brought with the human spirit in deed, human life, and death.

The man of I-It is really the anti-*wu wei* man; he is the self-willed man who has no trust but wants to *make* things happen. He wants to effectuate them. This is the exact same contrast Buber makes in "Elements of the Interhuman" (*The Knowledge of Man*) between the educator and the propagandist. The educator does not have a truth, but he trusts that the seed sown in the soul of the other will spring to light in its own way. The propagandist has no trust, and so he wants to manipulate through loudspeakers to make the thing happen as he wills it. The anti-*wu wei* man has no grand will, only a self-will which he passes off as a real will. The unbelieving core in the self-willed man can perceive nothing but unbelief and self-will, establishing a purpose, and devising a means, the means here and the end there. When in thought he turns to himself, he knows this. So he spends most of his time turning his thoughts away from himself. This can lead only to that despair, that wisdom of foolishness which comes when the I-It man reaches the bottom, and *then* we have the beginning of the turning toward real meeting.

In "The Wordless Depths" section of "Dialogue" (*Between Man and Man*), Buber says he knows from his unforgettable experience that there is a state in which the bonds of the personal nature of life seem to have fallen away from us, and we experience an undivided unity. "But I do not know what the soul willingly imagines and indeed is bound to imagine, that in this I had attained to a union with the primal being or the Godhead. This is an exaggeration no longer permitted to responsible understanding." What is permitted to responsible understanding, Buber suggests, is a recognition of an undifferentiated prebiographical unity hidden beneath all biographical change, development, and complication of the soul. In experiencing that unity, we naturally experience nothing else. We experience an absence of all otherness. "But in the actual reality of lived life, the man at such a moment is not above but beneath the creaturely situation", says Buber, "the situation which is mightier and truer than all ecstasies."

The enormous influence of Taoism upon Zen makes it not surprising

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that Buber later became interested in Zen Buddhism. Although it did not have a lasting impact on his thought, Buber was interested in Buddhism *per se* at least as early as Taoism. His little essay on "Buddha" written in 1908 or earlier is striking precisely for its total de-emphasis of historical Buddhism, something for which he later, mistakenly, criticized Zen. The Buddha enlarged the ground of the Vedānta, not with an idea but with a deed. He rejected all positions and negations, refused all solutions of antinomies for the sake of the "Path". The Buddha is the Prometheus of India whose deed has no expansion in space and no duration in time. His deed is not effected; it grows out of the moment, out of eternity. Like Siddhārtha, the hero of Hermann Hesse's novel by that name, Buber separated himself from those around Gotamo but not from him.

The Buddha-word for the parthenogenesis of the soul is: return, reincarnation. The mother of the deed is the deed of an earlier life. The knowing of Gotamo is a being. Buddha beholds the things, is the things, beholds the world, is the world. His negation, his refusal is nothing other than the completed, perfected being. The perfected being is the end and the bliss and its own limit and the Nothing. It is the fulfilled deed. "Asia speaks. Not the historical-geographical category 'Asia'. It is the voice that receives us in the refuge of the primal words. It does not instruct. It protects, it comforts, it heals."[6]

Almost fifteen years later in *I and Thou*, the classic statement of his mature philosophy of dialogue, Buber once again speaks of the Buddha's "noble silence" about metaphysical questions, which has its theoretical base in the fact that fulfilment is beyond the categories of thought and expression and its practical base in the fact that such questions do not contribute to a life of salvation. "The primal condition of salvation is undivided confrontation of the undivided mystery." Like all true teachers he does not wish to impart an opinion, but to teach the way." He denies only the assertion that man cannot walk in the way and asserts only that Unborn, Uncreated, Unformed without which there would be no way. But the mature Buber rejects the goal of the cessation of pain and release from the cycle of births.

> If we did know that there is a return we would not seek to escape it, and we would long not indeed for gross being but for the power to speak in each existence in its own way and language, the eternal *I* that passes away, and the eternal *Thou* that does not pass away.

The Buddha's becoming aware of the events in our body is almost the opposite of our physical insight with its certainty about the senses. "Nor

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does he lead the united being further to that supreme saying of the *Thou* that is made possible for it. His innermost decision seems to rest on the extinction of the ability to say *Thou*." Buber recognized, of course, that the Buddha knows the saying of the *Thou* to men, as in his direct speaking to his disciples. But he does not teach it. He certainly knows too, in the silent depths of his being, the saying of *Thou* to the primal reality. This act too is a relational event that has taken no substance, a response to the *Thou*. But about this response the Buddha reserves silence. In *I and Thou* Buber places a value on historical Buddhism that he had denied it in "Buddha" : The Buddha's succession among the peoples, the "great vehicle", contradicted him magnificently by addressing the eternal human *Thou* under the name of Buddha himself. "And it awaits as the Buddha that is to come, the last of the age, him by whom love is to be fulfilled."[7] Thus we can only follow the Buddha so far and no further without being disloyal to "Real life is meeting."

More than a quarter of a century later in his essay on "Religion and Philosophy" in *Eclipse of God,* Buber used the Buddha to illustrate his paradoxical concept of the "Absolute Person" and its corollary, the assertion that "the personal manifestation of the divine is not decisive for the genuineness of religion." The Greek philosopher Epicurus teaches that there are gods—immortal and perfect beings who live in the spaces between the worlds without power over the world or interest in it—gods whom we should worship through images and rites, though they take no notice of us. "Here", Buber states, "is a kind of dogma and also a cultic practice, and yet clearly a philosophical rather than a religious attitude." Buddha, in contrast, treats the gods of popular belief, so far as he deigns to mention them at all, with calm and considered goodwill, not unmixed with irony. One may worship them, but *they* pay homage to the "Awakened One," freed and freeing from the wheel of births. But Buddha also knows a genuinely divine, an "Unborn, Unoriginated, Uncreated", if only in this wholly negative designation about which he refuses to make any further assertion. "Yet he stands related to it with his whole being. Here is neither proclamation nor worship of a deity, yet unmistakable religious reality." What is decisive for the genuineness of religion is that I relate myself to the divine as to Being which is over against me, though *not* over against me *alone*.[8]

Buber encountered Zen Buddhism in its texts, in the writings of D.T. Suzuki, and in sporadic meetings with Zen masters and students, including Suzuki himself whom I brought together with him in New York in 1951. In Buber's essay, "The Place of Hasidism in the History of Religions" (*The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism*)[9], the major contrast is between

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Hasidism and Zen. This essay bears out my assertion that both Hasidism and Zen, like Taoism, are mysticisms of the particular. They do not rest on the bond of the Absolute with the Universal, or the general. In his essay on "Religion and Philosophy" (*Eclipse of God*), Buber says that philosophy tends to be the bond between the Absolute and the general, whereas religion is the bond between the Absolute and the particular. When I asked him about the Hindu Vedānta, he replied that Hindu philosophy is one thing, but lived experience is another.

In "The Place of Hasidism in the History of Religion" Buber tells how, after the death of Rabbi Moshe of Kobryn, one of his disciples was asked, "What was the most important thing to your master?" He thought for awhile and said, "Whatever he happened to be doing at the moment." Then Buber quotes a Zen question, "What is the word that saves, the word that wipes out the sin of millions of eons?" to which the Zen master's answer is, "What is right under your nose!"

In both Hasidism and Zen, the teacher is the person who, through immediate contact with the disciple, transmits the message intact. Buber says, "I know of no two religions comparable to Hasidism and Zen in which the transmission from generation to generation is so important." And this teaching is very often not merely some objective handing over, but rather very personal. In the Hasidic tale, which Buber entitles, "Not to Say Torah but to Be Torah" (*The Early Masters*), Rabbi Leib, the son of Sara, says, "I went to the Maggid of Mezritch not to hear him say Torah but to see him lace and unlace his felt boots." Buber cites the closely parallel Zen story of the man who complained that he served the master for three years without receiving any spiritual instruction. The master responds in surprise, "How can you say that you received no spiritual instruction ? When you brought me tea, did I not take it ? When you bowed, did I not bow ?" Truth in both, Buber says, is not found in a content of a teaching, but in human existence itself. And the relation between teacher and disciple is central.

Then Buber comes to the contrast between Hasidism and Zen, and this is subtler and less evident. He suggests that Hasidism is the one mysticism in which history remains important, the one mysticism where the seemingly incompatible spheres of revelation and illumination do meet. Zen Buddhism, in contrast, although it is a part of Mahāyāna Buddhism, which is historical, is itself largely nonhistorical. He elaborates on the nature of Zen as a mysticism of the particular by quoting such statements as "This earth is the Pure Land of the Lotus, this body is the body of the Buddha," and "Nirvāṇa is Saṁsāra." Nonetheless, according to Buber, the concern for the particular in Zen is essentially a way of getting away

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from intellectualism. It is a way of understanding the Buddha nature in oneself. Hasidism, in contrast, is concerned with uplifting the fallen sparks to their divine source, with the created task of redemption of those people, animals, and things with which one has to do. Buber understands of course, that the Zen Buddhist is not concerned with "salvation". But in Hasidism it really is a matter of a redemption that takes place between us and the things. Hasidism says that God is in our prayers, that God is prayer. But it does not see God as the substance of the soul. Even the relationship of the most intimate reciprocity remains a relationship Even the most personal mysticism rests in the shadow of the historical revelation. Even the most personal teaching arises out of the bond of. the historical teaching. In Israel, all religion is history, including mystical religion.

Zen diverts the knowledge of the transcendent from discursive thought. The things themselves do not matter, but their nonconceptual nature is a symbol of the absolute which is superior to all concepts. In Hasidism, the things themselves do matter, Buber suggests, for it is a mysticism in which time is hallowed. It is ironic that one of the attacks that Scholem makes on Buber is precisely on this point. He claims that the Hasidim were interested in the particular only to nullify it, that they really were Gnostics and Neo-Platonists concerned with the Transcendent. Buber's response to this, which Scholem does not respond to, is that there were two streams within Hasidism—one, that of the founder, the Baal Shem Tov, in which the hallowing of the everyday for its own sake is emphasised; the other, that of his great disciple the Maggid of Mezritch, in which the particular is mainly of importance as a stage of a dialectical process in which it is finally nullified in order to reach the transcendent. In his writings on Hasidism (with the exception of his chronicle-novel, *For the Sake of Heaven*), Buber did not emphasise this second stream. In this Scholem's criticism is partially justified, for many people in the Western world took their understanding of Hasidism from Buber, just as they used to rely solely on the interpretations of D.T. Suzuki for their understanding of Zen. What is not justifiable is Scholem's failure, after his chapter on "Hasidism" in *Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism*, which agrees in all central respects with Buber, to ever acknowledge that the first stream existed at all. Instead, he urges his readers to dismiss Buber's interpretation of Hasidism as entirely invalid.[10]

There is one point in which I myself must criticise Buber's contrast between Hasidism and Zen. I agree that Hasidism is set in the historical tradition of redemption as opposed to individual salvation or enlightenment. But I cannot fully agree with what Buber says about Zen focusing

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on discovering the Buddha nature within oneself. The Buddha nature is not just inside oneself. It is in all things—a nondual duality which is simultaneously the One and the ten thousand things. In this respect I find Hasidism closer to Zen than Buber does, though this nondual duality is still not *dialogue* with the other in its otherness, as in Buber's philosophy and his interpretation of Hasidism.

Religion is often taken to be a movement away from mundane reality to the spirit floating above it. Zen Buddhism says no such movement is possible : there is only the one spirit-sense reality. It says, secondly, that it is our reason that has created the impression that there are these separate worlds of spirit and sense-intellect. This differs strikingly from the Hindu Vedānta with its statement that this world is *maya*, or illusion, and that Brahman is reality. Instead, we have the remarkable statement that the "one" and the "ten thousand things" are identical, that "nirvāna *is* sāmsara". It is our minds that bifurcate existence into body and spirit, the one and the many. We cannot overcome our existential dilemma by fleeing from the many to the one ; for this very attempt to overcome dualism leads us to still another dualism—that of the one as opposed to the many. One must instead go right to the concrete particular which at the same time is the Buddha Nature. There is no process here of abstracting from concrete reality, of uncovering the essence and shucking off this world. There is no Hindu *nāma-rūpa*—no world of name and form which is to be understood as merely that and therefore illusion. On the contrary, the very particularity of things, their very name and form is the only means through which one can attain enlightenment. A Japanese Zen woman goes out and sees the morning-glory vine on the bucket she means to draw water from. She goes to the next farm for her water and writes a *Haiku*; "Oh morning glory with bucket made captive, I beg for water." She and the morning glory are one, the distance is overcome, but in a very specific manner. It is not as if there were one essence or absolute that could be abstracted from the two apart from their particularity. The particularity is preserved.

Zen is just the everyday life—pulling up carrots in the garden, peeling potatoes in the kitchens.

> Walking is Zen, sitting is Zen,
> Whether talking or remaining silent, whether moving or standing quiet, the essence itself is ever at ease.

One finds the "essence" just as much in the movement of the world as in the nonmovement. In that sense, Zen is like Taoism : it does not cling to one opposite or the other.

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Straight runs the path of non-duality and non-trinity.
Abiding with the no-particular which is in particulars,
Whether going or returning, they remain for ever unmoved . . .
This very earth is the lotus land of purity,
And this body is the body of the Buddha.

The Buddha Nature, the particulars, and the no-particulars are all one reality.

When D.T. Suzuki came to Sarah Lawrence College once to speak to our Philosophy Seminar, there was a Hindu woman from my class in the History of Religions who joined us at supper beforehand. "Do you believe that God is in the sugar bowl?" Suzuki asked her. "Yes," she replied, and he rejoined, "So do we." "Do you believe that God is in you?" he pursued. "Yes," she again replied, and he again assented, "So do we." But then he asked her, "Do you believe the same God is in the sugar bowl and in you?" This time when she said Yes, he countered, "That is where we differ!" It is not the same God, even though it is not a different one. It is neither two nor one. The Buddha Nature is to be comprehended in and through birth-and-death, and birth-and-death must somehow harbour the Buddha Nature in it. Nirvana *is* samsāra.[11]

In *The Knowledge of Man* Buber asserts that the perception of one's fellow man as a whole, as a unity, and as unique is opposed by the analytical, reductive, and deriving look between man and man that dominates in our time.

> This look is analytical, or rather pseudo-analytical, since it treats the whole being as put together and therefore able to be taken apart—not only the so-called unconscious which is accessible to relative objectification, but also the psychic stream itself, which can never, in fact, be grasped as an object. This look is a reductive one because it tries to contract the manifold person, who is nourished by the microcosmic richness of the possible, to some schematically surveyable and recurrent structures. And this look is a deriving one because it supposes it can grasp what a man has become, or even is becoming, in genetic formulae, and it thinks that even the dynamic central principle of the individual in this becoming can be represented by a general concept. An effort is being made today radically to destroy the mystery between man and man. The personal life, the ever near mystery, once the source of the stillest enthusiasms, is levelled down.[12]

Similarly, there is much in both Zen Buddhism and Taoism which raises serious questions about the assumption of most of the intellectual currents

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of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that *analysis* is the way to reach reality. If I assume that all things are really reducible to their component parts, that means I have already found what I believe to be the basic reality—whether it be Marxist dialectic, economic determinism, Freud's or Jung's theory of the libido, or the analytical categories of the linguistic philosopher. Lao-tzu, in contrast, defines sanity as not wanting to measure the measureless, untouchable source of reality, and Zen says that if you begin to reason about the substance you see before you, you at once fall into the error.

> It is like the boundless void which cannot be fathomed or measured. This universal mind alone is the Buddha and there is no distinction between the Buddha and sentient beings . . . You have but to recognize that *real mind is expressed in these perceptions, but is not dependent on them on the one hand, nor separate from them on the other* . . . you should refrain from seeking universal mind apart from them or abandoning them in your pursuit of the Dharma . . . for there is nowhere in which the Way cannot be followed. [italics added]

Martin Buber in *I and Thou* has a remarkably similar passage in which he says: "If you explore the life of things and of conditioned being you come to the unfathomable, if you deny the life of things and of conditioned being you stand before nothingness, if you hallow this life you meet the living God."

In my dialogues with Suzuki, Nishitani, Chang-Chi-Chen, and a number of Western Zen scholars, I have not found important divergence from this similarity between Buber and Zen. On the other hand, in an intensive dialogue lasting for a number of months with my former colleague Richard De Martino, whose term "non-dual dualism" expresses just what I have been trying to say, there has been such divergence. This is because De Martino insists on seeing Buber's "I-Thou" philosophy as a dualism essentially similar to the subject-object dualism which it is held to overcome. It is also because, in contrast to Buber who holds that the I-Thou relationship comes first in the life of the child and only then the I-It, De Martino holds that the I-It relationship is the basic experience, a sort of "fall" which can only be overcome by getting through the "Great Doubt Block". Into his existential interpretation of Zen, De Martino imports concepts of Reinhold Niebuhr's and Sartre's that sharpen unduly the differences between Buber and Zen. Basically this is a question of philosophical anthropology, how one understands man as such. There is also a difference, to be sure, between the Rinzai understanding or *satori* as

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sudden enlightenment and Buber's gradual bringing of the world of I into the world of Thou in which the swinging between the two poles is a necessary part of this redemptive movement. In this Buber is perhaps more akin to the Taoist sense of the swinging opposites of *yin* and *yang* than to Zen. However, the Soto sect of Zen and even many scholars of the Rinzai sect deny that *satori* is a once for all matter, however much the experience of enlightenment itself may appear to be a decisive breakthrough.

What we can conclude is that, while largely overlooked except by such Zen scholars as Nishitani and Hisamatsu, Buber's dialogue with Oriental religions, and with Taoism and Zen in particular, is of great importance, second only to his dialogue with Christianity. This can be brought out through one last illustration—Buber's interpretation of the Hasidic concept of *kavana*, or intention, its affinity with the philosophies of action implicit in Hinduism, Taoism, and Zen Buddhism, and the social ethic that grows out of these related approaches to action.

In "The Life of the Hasidim", the introductory section of *The Legend of the Baal-Shem*, Buber describes *kavana* as a wholehearted service of God that does not mean turning away from one's fellows or from the world. All that is asked is to do everything one does with one's whole strength—not the denial of self and the extirpation of the passions but the fulfilment of self and the direction of passion in a communal mysticism of humility, love, prayer, and joy. Fulfilment and redemption do "not take place through formulae or through any kind of prescribed and special action," but through the *kavana* that one brings to one's every act. "It is not the matter of the action, but only its dedication that is decisive." In Hasidism, as Buber interprets it, it is not the doctrine that is important but the way of life, the image of the human. Words are of importance when they manifest life, not when they take its place. The Baal Shem once refused to enter a synagogue because it was crowded from floor to ceiling and wall to wall with prayers that had been uttered without real devotion. Even the right mood is of no avail if the motivation is wrong: the man who prays in sorrow because of the bleakness which burdens his spirit does not know the real fear of God, and the man who prays in joy because of the radiance of his spirit does not know the love of God. His "fear is the burden of sadness, and his love is nothing but empty joy." Honest grief, in contrast, is that of a man who knows what he lacks, while the truly joyful man is like someone whose house has burned down and who begins to build anew out of the deep need of his soul: "Over every stone that is laid, his heart rejoices."

Once the Maggid of Mezritch let a sigh escape when, as a young man, he was poor and his baby was too weak even to cry. Instantly a voice said;

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"You have lost your share in the world to come." "Good," exclaimed the Maggid. "Now I can begin to serve in good earnest !" *Kavana* does not mean that what is important is "purity of heart" but that one must bring oneself with all one's possibility of response into every action. This is the Hasidic image of the human: "Only he who brings himself to the Lord as an offering may be called man." This bringing of oneself is no once-for-all commitment but an ever-renewed finding of direction, a responding to the call in each new hour.

The Hasidic demand that we discover and perform our own created task, that we channel the passion of the "evil" urge into the realization of our personal uniqueness, that we act and love with *kavana*, or inner intention, implies the strongest possible rejection of all those ways whereby we divide our lives into airtight compartments and escape becoming whole. Becoming whole does not mean "spiritual" wholeness or the wholeness of the individuated Self within the unconscious (to use the language of Jung). It means that personal wholeness, the necessary corollary of which is the wholeness of our lives. When one disciple of Rabbi Bunam asked another, "To what purpose was man created ?" the latter replied, "So that he might perfect his soul." "No, indeed," said the former. "He was created so that he might lift up the heavens!" Our true wholeness is not the perfection of our "immortal soul" but the fulfilment of our created task. Only the latter brings our personal uniqueness into being in integral relation with the creation over against which we are set. To make our goal spiritual perfection, consequently, means a foreshortening of our personal existence.

The rabbi of Kotzk explained the biblical injunction, "Ye shall be holy unto me," as the demand not for perfection but for authentic humanity: "You shall be holy unto me, but as men. You shall be humanly holy unto me." We are not asked to be superhuman saints but to be holy in the measure and manner of the human, in the measure and manner of our personal resources. This is a seemingly easier demand than perfection, but, in fact, it is harder; for it asks you to do what you really can do rather than despair over what you cannot. We take our ideas and ideals with grim seriousness, says Martin Buber, but we do not allow them to have a binding claim upon our everyday lives. "No amount of hypocritical piety has ever reached this concentrated degree of inauthenticity !" Our wretchedness is due to the fact that we do not open our lives to the holy, Buber adds and then concludes: "A life that is not open to the holy is not only unworthy of spirit, it is unworthy of life". This is not a question of being punished for being "unworthy." It is a matter of the meaning of life itself.

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To open our lives to the holy does not mean to rise above our situation. It means to bring our situation into dialogue with God. The openness to the holy does not mean leaving the everyday for a higher spiritual sphere but "hallowing the everyday" through a genuine openness to what meets you. "Whoever says that the words of the Torah are one thing and the words of the world another," said Rabbi Pinhas of Koretz, "must be regarded as a man who denies God." The rabbi of Rizhyn imposed upon a confirmed sinner a terrible penance : "From now until you die, you shall not utter a single word of prayer with empty lips ; but you shall preserve the fulness of every word." The sinner himself had brought the rabbi the long list of his sins to have penance imposed upon him. The rabbi's response not only demanded a sincere inner repentance but a wholehearted turning of his existence. Only thus could a man who was used to living moment by moment in inner division bring the whole of his intention and the whole of his life into prayer. "What does it amount to that they expound the Torah !" cried Rabbi Leib, son of Sara. "A man should see to it that all his actions are a Torah and that he himself becomes so entirely a Torah that one can learn from his habits and his motions and his motionless clinging to God." The rabbi of Kobryn taught :

> God says to man, as he said to Moses: "Put off thy shoes from thy feet"—put off the habitual which encloses your foot, and you will know that the place on which you are now standing is holy ground. For there is no rung of human life on which we cannot find the holiness of God everywhere and at all times.[13]

The true opposite of "the habitual" is not the extraordinary or the unusual but the fresh, the open, the ever-new of the person who recognises the unique situation in which he or she stands as the ground of hallowing and hallows the everyday.

"He who knows the action that is in inaction, the inaction that is in action is wise indeed," says the *Bhagavadgītā*. "The way to do is to be," says Lao-tzu. Gandhi's *satyāgraha*, truth-force or nonviolent direct action; the Buddha's refusal to give or accept injury; Lao-tzu's *wu-wei*, the action of the whole being that flows with the Tao and does not interfere; the importance of *kavana*, or inner intention, of Hasidism—if there is one thing that is in common to all of these, it is a philosophy of action that makes doing integral with being and rejects any ethic that is less than a claim on the whole person. This also means that we ought not to deny or neglect action for the sake of inwardness. We cannot achieve wholeness by

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going inward and leaving the outward secondary and inessential, anymore than we can achieve it by going outward and neglecting the inward. If we have such a split between inner and outer, then our so-called "inner, essential self" is going to atrophy, and it will not be a real person at all.

The Buddha's refusal to deal with metaphysical matters—with "questions that tend not to edification"—focuses us in on what we are doing in the here and now. Zen, too, stresses that real action and real being have to do with "this moment", the now, with where we are now and what we are doing now. The most important thing to Hasidism is whatever one happens to be doing at the moment; for *kavana* means being present in the present, being a presence to others and allowing them to be present to oneself. The centre of Taoism, similarly, is "The way to do is to be." This statement is entirely misinterpreted if one thinks its means turning inward and away from the beings with whom one lives. Lao-tzu, in contrast, teaches an oscillating interaction between inner and outer, for the Tao is not located in any particular place. "You do not need a window for better seeing," says Lao-tzu. "Rather abide at the centre of your being." But the Tao is never found except through opening one's centre to one's fellow beings and the world : "A sound man's heart is not shut within itself."

If there ought to be no dualism of "sacred" words and "secular" words, neither ought there be a dualism between words and silence. When the Yehudi discovered that a young man had taken a vow of silence for three years except for the Torah and prayer, he called the young man to him and asked him why it was that he did not see a single word of his in the world of truth. When the young man justified his silence by talking of the "vanity of speech," the Yehudi warned him that he who only learns and prays is murdering the world of his own soul. "What do you mean by the 'vanity of speech'?" asked the Yehudi. "Whatever you have to say can be vanity or it can be truth." In contrast to the currently popular dualism between "words" and "feelings", Lao-tzu, like the Yehudi, says, "Real words are not vain and vain words are not real." A *real* word embodies the movement of the Tao between being and being. A *vain* word prevents this movement of the Tao. It shuts the Tao out and hides itself away; for it will not risk itself, it will not give itself. The way of Taoism, like the way of Zen Buddhism and of Hasidism, is *inner* and *outer* both, and it is *between*. "He who is anciently aware of existence is master of each moment," says Lao-tzu. I do not have to split my existence into a phenomenal "unreal" present as opposed to a "real" but not present essence somewhere transcending it. I can

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take each moment as it comes. "What more do I need to know of origin than this ?"[14]

Notes

1. Martin Buber, *Der Jude und Sein Judentum. Gesammelte Aufsätze und Reden* (Cologne : Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1963) "Herzl vor der Palästina-Karte (Aus meinen Erinnerungen, 1944)", pp. 804-807.
2. Maurice Friedman, "Martin Buber's Encounter with Mysticism", *Human Inquiries: Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, Vol. IX, 1970.
3. Martin Buber, *The Knowledge of Man. A Philosophy of the Interhuman*, ed. with an Introductory Essay (Chap. 1) by Maurice Friedman, trans. by Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith (New York : Harper Torchbooks, 1966).
4. Martin Buber, "Interpreting Hasidism", trans. by Maurice Friedman, *Commentary*, Vol. XXXVI, No. 3 (September 1963), pp. 218-225.
5. Martin Buber, *Pointing the Way*, ed. and trans. by Maurice Friedman (New York : Schocken Books, 1974), "China and US", pp. 121-125.
6. Martin Buber, *Ereignisse und Begegnungen* (Leipzig : Insel Verlag, 1917), "Buddha".
7. Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, 2nd ed., trans. by Ronald Gregor Smith (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 90-93.
8. Martin Buber, *Eclipse of God. Studies in the Relation between Religion and Philosophy* (New York : Harper Torchbooks, 1957), "Religion and Philosophy", trans. by Maurice Friedman, p. 27 f.
9. Martin Buber, *The Origin and Meaning of Hasidism*, ed. and trans. with an Introduction by Maurice Friedman (New York : Horizon Press, 1972).
10. Gershom Scholem, *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York : Schocken Books, 1971), "Martin Buber's Interpretation of Hasidism", trans. by Michael A. Meyer, pp. 227-250.
11. The passages on Zen above and below are based on Maurice Friedman, *Touchstones of Reality : Existential Trust and the Community of Peace* (New York : Dutton Books, 1974), Chap. 6—"Journey to the East," pp. 109-115.
12. Buber, *The Knowledge of Man*, "Elements of the Interhuman", p. 80 f.
13. Martin Buber, *Tales of the Hasidim. The Later Masters*, trans. by Olga Marx (New York : Schocken Books, 1961), p. 170—"Everywhere".
14. My discussion of *kavana* and of the Philosophies of action of Hinduism, early Buddhism, Taoism, and Zen and their implications is based on my book *Touchstones of Reality* (note 11), Chap. 8—"Hasidism and Contemporary Man" and Chap. 14—"Toward A Social Ethic". As such, the final responsibility for these interpretations and conclusions is mine not Buber's. But I am greatly indebted to Buber's interpretations of Hasidism and his telling of Hasidic tales.

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9

*Heidegger and Zen on Being and Nothingness: A Critical Essay in Transmetaphysical Dialectics**

CHARLES WEI-HSUN FU

I

It has often been said that the pursuit of Being is the central theme of Western metaphysics while the inquiry into Nothingness is the primary task of Eastern metaphysics, notably Taoism and Mahāyāna Buddhism. There is of course, a great ring of truth in this philosophical observation. For one thing, in the Western metaphysicians' overzealous and overconfident quest for Being (or ultimate reality) as well as for Truth (or absolute certainty), Nothingness is first and foremost conceptualized as privation of being or sheer nonexistence, and any expression or statement about Nothingness is consequently considered meaningless or untrue, logically or ontologically. The only exceptional case seems to be that of Martin Heidegger, despite the apparent fact that the question of Being and the question of Truth constitute likewise the twofold *leit motif* of his thinking.[1] For Heidegger's unique exploration of the meaning or truth of Being is not a mere restating of the traditional metaphysical question concerning Being and its Truth but is in a deeper—transmetaphysical—sense a Copernican breakaway from all the traditional onto-theo-logical answers to the question. Being is thus no longer taken for granted ontologically as the most universal, indefinable, self-evident, or highest concept; it is instead re-approached by way of *Daseinsanalytik* (Heidegger I) and *Seinsdenken* (Heidegger II) as a paradoxical thinking-matter of hermeneutic circularity.[2] Truth is, in this connection, ontologically reoriented as the unconcealedness (*alētheia*) or clearing (*Lichtung*) of Being—prior to the onto-theo-logical distinction

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between truth and untruth—in the historical destiny (*Geschick*) of Western metaphysics since the times of Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides. Furthermore, Nothingness in Heidegger's thinking is not an anti-Being onto-theo-logically opposite to Being; it is, on the contrary, existentially and ontologically disclosed, so as to help us divulge the meaning of Being, whatever that may be.

While noting Heidegger's epoch-making contributions in his radical reshaping of the Western metaphysical mind, I shall nonetheless argue in this article that Heidegger's Copernican revolution in thinking does not and cannot emancipate him successfully from the perdurant and deep-rooted entanglements of Western onto-theo-logic, in spite of his various attempts at disclosing and redisclosing the meaning of Being as well as of Nothingness in relation to Being. I shall, in particular, contend that Heidegger's thinking totally ignores the transmetaphysical parity of Being and Nothingness with all beings, that his *Seinsdenken* vacillates, without a definitive resolution, between onto-theo-logical unicentrism and trans-onto-theo-logical multi-perspectivism, and that he never comes to understand the transmetaphysical truth that the so-called question of Being and Nothingness is ultimately "null and void" and should, therefore, be dissolved into the question of man's self-awakening and self-transformation into the True Manhood of Tao. In the light of my convinced view that Zen is the final culmination of Buddhist thought, I shall attempt a provisional construction—as a matter of pedagogical device (*upāya-kauśalya*)—of what may be called "the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness" in ten stages, in order to shed some Zen light on the transmetaphysical limitations of Heidegger's thinking on Being and Nothingness. My conclusion will be that Heidegger's lifelong task of overcoming Western onto-theo-logic can be accomplished completely and once for all by way of transforming his own *Seinsdenken* into the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness in their humanly perpetual interplay.

II

Near the end of *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger states that "our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's Being remains only *one way* which we may take. Our *aim* is to work out the question of Being in general. The *thematic* analytic of existence, however, first needs the light of the idea of Being in general, which must be clarified beforehand."[3] There is, from the outset, a philosophical dilemma deeply imbedded in the Heideggerian approach to the question of Being : a genuine hermeneutic of Dasein is ontologically impossible without presupposing our clear

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understanding of the meaning of Being itself; it is, however, humanly impossible for us to divulge any meaning of Being without understanding, first ofall, the existential-ontological constitution of Dasein. As we shall see subsequently, this very dilemma within the Heideggerian hermeneutic circularity can be transmetaphysically resolved by means of dissolving Heidegger's question of Being into that of man's *nirvāṇic* self-awakening and self-transformation. Heidegger himself is never awakened, throughout his philosophical life, to the transmetaphysical need for such a Zen Buddhist "turn" (*Khere*);[4] his own shift of perspective from *Daseinsanalytik* to *Seinsdenken* only intensifies the dilemma in question, without showing any sign of ultimate emancipation from the question of the meaning or truth of Being, the question that is transmetaphysically misleading from the Zen point of view. At any rate, Heidegger seems to be philosophically confident in *Sein und Zeit* that his *Daseinsanalytik* does at least provide us with a preliminary but necessary clue to the phenomenologico-ontological uncovering of the meaning or truth of Being. It is in this hermeneutic light that he thinks he has discovered the existential meaning of Nothingness in *Sein und Zeit* despite his failure there to deal with Being itself directly.

What is the existential meaning of Nothingness, then ? In his existential analysis of the basic state-of-mind of anxiety or dread (*Angst*), in contradistinction to fear that always involves some detrimental entity within-the-world, Heidegger tries to reveal phenomenologically the obstinacy of the threatening "nothing and nowhere within-the-world." When in falling we flee into the "at-home" of publicness inauthentically, we flee in the face of the "not-at-home", which must, Heidegger says, be conceived as the more primordial phenomenon of Dasein's way to be from the existential-ontological point of view. In order to illustrate the existential nature of Nothingness, Heidegger stresses the anxiety of Dasein's Being-towards-death, in which "Dasein finds itself *face to face* with the 'nothing' of the possible impossibility of its existence."[5] Some twenty years later, Heidegger explicitly *ontologizes* the existential meaning of death-as-Nothingness, that "Death is the shrine of Nothingness, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothingness, death harbours within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothingness, death is the shelter of Being."[6] In *Sein und Zeit*, however, the ontological meaning of death-as-Nothingness is not explicitly disclosed.

The existential meaning of Nothingness is phenomenologically generalized when Heidegger tries to disclose care (*Sorge*) which is Dasein's Being-

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thrown-projection-in-the-world, as Being-the-basis of nullity or nihilationality (*Nichtigkeit*). Thus, existential nihilationality is said to basically characterize the thrown projection—authentic or inauthentic—of Daisen. Heidegger admits at this stage that "the *ontological meaning of the notness* [Nichtheit] of this existential nullity is still obscure. But this holds also for the *ontological essence of the 'not' in general.*"[7] It is not difficult to understand why Heidegger I is not successful in bringing to light the ontological meaning of Nothingness in relation to Being. The principal reason lies in the fact that to Heidegger I "Being is always the Being of a being,"[8] though "the Being of beings 'is' not itself a being."[9] To reveal the ontological meaning of Nothingness in relation to Being itself, therefore, Heidegger is impelled to attempt a genuine ontological "turn" by shifting his thinking-perspective from *Daseinsanalytik* to *Seinsdenken*. Two of his most important essays, *Was ist Metaphysik* ? and *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, both of which are worked out one year after the publication of *Sein und Zeit*, are strongly indicative of the beginning of such a "turn".

In *Was ist Metaphysik* ? Heidegger clarifies the essential distinction between Nothingness (*das Nichts*) as existentially revealed by anxiety and the "not-beings" pure and simple (*das schlechthin Nicht-Seiende*) as the complete negation of all beings, and asserts that "Nothingness is more primordial than the 'not' and negation."[10] But what does he mean by "more primordial" (*mehr ursprünglicher*) here ? Although Heidegger does not make the point clear, it seems to me that he has two inseparable meanings in mind: existential and ontological. When he says that "anxiety reveals Nothingness,"[11] he is referring to the existential meaning of Nothingness already disclosed in *Sein und Zeit*; when he says that "Nothingness itself nihilates" (*Das Nichts selbst nichtet*)[12] as well as that "Nothingness does not remain the indeterminate opposite of beings but reveals itself as belonging to the Being of beings,"[13] he seems to be referring to the ontological meaning of Nothingness underlying its existential meaning. It can be said, then, that Nothingness' nihilation is ontologically prior to and makes ontologically possible the ek-sistential transcendence of Dasein as the "seat-holder for Nothingness" (*Platzhalter des Nichts*), and that Dasein's transcendence is in turn ek-sistentially prior to and ek-sistentially makes possible scientific existence, logical negation, metaphysicals peculation, and so on. Heidegger, however, makes no further attempt in this lecture-essay at ontological enrichment or deepening of the existential meaning of Nothingness, for no ontological clarification is given at all of the meaning of "Nothingness itself nihilates", of the "Being of beings", or of the relationship between Being itself and Nothingness that nihilates. Near the end of the essay, Heidegger reorients the essential nature of

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metaphysics as "the basic occurrence of Dasein,"[14] and states that "because the truth of metaphysics dwells in this groundless ground [*der abgründige Grund*] it stands in closest proximity to the constantly lurking possibility of deepest error."[15] But again, no ontological indication is made of the meaning or nature of "this groundless ground". Instead, Heidegger simply and enigmatically concludes his lecture with an age-old Western metaphysical question: "Why are there beings at all, and why not rather Nothingness ?"

It is very interesting and significant to note in this regard that "the groundless ground" is unequivocally identified in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* with Dasein's finite freedom, in the grounding of which is the essence of grounds or reasons said to originate. Freedom as "the reason of reasons" or "the origin of the principle of sufficient reason" is now said to be "the 'abyss' (*Ab-grund*) of Dasein, its groundless ground."[16] What Heidegger means to say here is that the essence of reasons is grounded upon the essence of truth, or more clearly, upon the inner possibility of ontological truth (truth concerning the Being of beings) that makes possible all kinds of ontic truths (truths concerning beings in their Being); and the essence of truth is in turn grounded upon the transcendence or finite freedom of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. The essence of truth, which is and must be bifurcated ontically and ontologically, is only possible given what Heidegger himself calls the Ontological Difference (the "not") between Being and beings. We can see very clearly that Heidegger at this turning point is still wavering between the perspective of *Daseinsanalytik* and that of *Seinsdenken*, for he only suggests in this essay that the ground of (or reason for) the Ontological Difference in question is nothing but the transcendence—finite freedom—of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, in the ek-sistential—though not strictly ontological—sense that Dasein's ability to differentiate beings from Being "must have struck the roots of its own possibility in the ground of the essence of Dasein."[17] Thus, the Ontological Difference mentioned in this essay is mostly dealt with in the ek-sistential and quasi-ontological way, whereas its deep and profound ontological/transontological meaning Heidegger II tries very hard to divulge in his later period is completely missing in the essay.

Two decades later Heidegger adds a preface to the third edition of *Vom Wesen des Grundes* in which he thoughtfully remarks, in retrospect, that the above-mentioned sister-essays have not accomplished the necessary task he originally intended. He now wishes to say that Nothingness in *Was ist Metaphysik ?* is "the Not of beings and thus is Being experienced from the perspective of beings," and that the Ontological Difference in *Vom Wesen des Grundes* is "the Not between beings and Being." Further, although "the nihilating Not of Nothingness" and "the nihilating Not of the

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Difference" respectively treated in the sister-essays are not identical, they are the Selfsame (*das Selbe*) in the sense that they both belong together (*zusammengehören*) in so far as the Being of beings reveals its own essence. Thus, both the ek-sistential and quasi-ontological meanings of Nothingness in the sister-essays are now ontologically/transontologically deepened, enriched, and unified into the Selfsame, wherein not only Being and beings belong together (the Ontological Difference) but Being and Nothingness as well. The question now is: What is the Selfsame ? And what is meant by the belonging together of Being and Nothingness ?

In 1943 Heidegger adds a postscript to the fourth edition of *Was ist Metaphysik* ? where he states that "Nothingness as the 'other' than beings is the veil of Being."[18] Thus, the belonging together of Being and Nothingness is in reality understood by Heidegger II in terms of the ontological *disparity* between Being and Nothingness : Nothingness as the veil of Being is no more than the withdrawal from appearing or presencing of Being itself, which temporo-historically manifests and conceals itself, yields and withdraws itself at the same time. Heidegger II, who is now looking upon Nothingness from the perspective of *Seinsdenken*, advises us to "experience Being in Nothingness" :

> . . . to experience in Nothingness the vastness of that which gives every being the warrant to be. That is Being itself. Without Being, whose unfathomable and unmanifest essence is vouchsafed us by Nothingness in essential anxiety, everything that "is" would remain in Beinglessness (*Sein-losigkeit*).[19]

In 1949, the same year when Heidegger II adds a preface to *Vom Wesen des Grundes*, a new introduction is also added to the fifth edition of *Was ist Metaphysik ?* in which the essential nature of the enigmatic question "Why are there beings at all, and why not rather Nothingness ?" is reoriented as follows :

> How did it come about that beings take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every "is" while that which is not a being is understood as Nothingness, though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten? How did it come about that with Being It really is nothing and that Nothingness really is not ? Is it perhaps from this that the as yet unshaken presumption has entered into all metaphysics that "Being" may simply be taken for granted and that Nothingness is therefore made more easily than beings ? That is indeed the situation regarding Being and Nothingness.[20]

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But how does Heidegger II handle this "situation regarding Being and Nothingness" ? The final conclusion regarding the so-called "belonging together" or "selfsameness" of Being and Nothingness he has reached after more than two decades of philosophical struggle is simply what he says in "*Humanismusbrief*" : "Being nihilates—as Being. . .The nihilating in Being is the essence of what I call Nothingness. Therefore, because it thinks Being, thinking thinks Nothingness."[21] In other words, there is in reality no such thing called the "belonging together" or "selfsameness" of Being and Nothingness in Heidegger's *Seinsdenken*, for Being is now said to nihilate itself as Nothingness, which is none other than the withdrawal from presencing of Being, instead of Nothingness' nihilating itself in and through anxiety—let alone anxiety's revealing Nothingness. Heidegger's early *Daseinsanalytik* of the existential meaning of Nothingness is thus finally dissolved into his thinking on Being, upon which Nothingness has become ontologically parasitic. It is in this sense that the question of the belonging together of Being and Nothingness does not and cannot really arise to Heidegger. In fact, Heidegger II only speaks of the belonging together of Being and beings, of Being and man (as the shepherd, guardian, or neighbour of Being), of Being and thinking (as a trans-onto-theo-logical thanksgiving or homecoming to Being), as well as of Being and language (as the house or primordial Saying of Being). Nothingness, which acts the most crucial role at the turning point of Heidegger's thinking, is unfortunately brushed off by Heidegger II, who now thinks that "the essential nature of thinking is determined by what there is to be thought about : the presence of what is present, the Being of beings,"[22] wherein lies the primordial source of Western metaphysics.

III

At the beginning of *Sein und Zeit* Heidegger speaks of the philosophical necessity for explicitly restating the question of the meaning or truth of Being, and states that "our provisional aim is the Interpretation of *time* as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."[23] As a matter of fact, the question of Being itself is in his *Daseinsanalytik* "turned", if not dissolved, into the question of the Being (way to be) of Dasein's thrown projection or ek-sistential transcendence within the temporo-historical horizon of Being, whereas Being itself remains ontologically aloof. As Heidegger himself says, " 'There gives' Being—not beings —only in so far as truth is. And truth *is* only in so far as and as long as Dasein is."[24] Heidegger admits at the end of the book that the question of the meaning or truth of Being itself rather becomes more questionable.

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As he asks : "How is this mode of temporalizing of temporality to be Interpreted ? Is there a way which leads from primordial *time* to the meaning of *Being* ? Does *time* itself manifest itself as the horizon of *Being* ?"[25] As we shall see, Heidegger's temporo-historical approach to the Being (way to be) of Dasein as Being-in-the-world is later renewed and extended in his *Seinsdenken* to Being itself, which is said to manifest itself in the West as the historical destiny of its own lighting and concealing.

On two rare occasions Heidegger II tries to approach Being itself directly, with little success, however. He once gives a linguistic (grammatical and etymological) analysis of the word "Being" by way of showing different contextual implications of the various "is"-sentences. Consider the following "is"-sentences he has analyzed : (1) "God is," (2) "The earth is," (3) "The lecture is in the auditorium," (4) "This man is from Swabia," (5) "The cup is of silver," (6) "The peasant is to the fields," (7) "The book is mine," (8) "Red is the port side," (9) "The dog is in the garden," (10) "Over all the summits/is rest." Heidegger suggests that the "being" uttered in these "is"-sentences discloses to us in a diversity of meanings : (1') really present, (2') (believed to be) permanently there, (3') takes place, (4') comes from, (5') is made of, (6') stays, (7') belongs to, (8') stands for, (9') running around, and (10') prevails, lies, or holds sway.[26] The diversity of definite meanings cited above gives, Heidegger claims, "the clearest proof that in order to be determinable Being must be indeterminate."[27]

On another occasion Heidegger asks directly, "Yet Being—what is Being ?" His own answer is, first, tautological, that "It is It itself"; second, negative, that Being is not any being (*Seiendes*), be it a rock, an animal, a work of art, a machine, an angel, God or the ground of the world; third, vague or ambiguous, that "Being is the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from man."[28] Thus, on both occasions Heidegger II does not disclose to us the ultimate meaning of Being itself. He does, however, approach Being indirectly on many other occasions and try to divulge the meaning or truth of Being in various ways.

Let us examine first Heidegger's temporo-historical characterization of Being. According to Heidegger II, the history of Being in the West happens to be, paradoxically speaking, "the history of the oblivion or forgetfulness of Being escalating itself."[29] The Western oblivion of Being begins with the ontological differentiation of beings from Being—as a unique "flash of Being"—in early Greek philosophy, then beings as such in their entirety are said to be revealed to the Greek philosophers as *physics* ("nature"), which denotes "self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and

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linger on."[30] In other words, Being is said to have revealed itself for the first time in Western metaphysics as the presencing (*wesen*) of present beings. Heidegger himself says, "In the beginning of its history, Being opens itself out as emerging (*physics*) and unconcealment (*alētheia*). From there it reaches the formulation of presence and permanence in the sense of enduring (*ousia*). Metaphysics proper begins with this."[31] Since then, Being in the historical destiny of Western onto-theo-logic has gradually been conceptualized or hypostatized as Idea, Substance, Beingness, God, etc. and the truth (unconcealedness) of Being has also been transformed to the certainty of representational thinking in the propositional form. With the rise of the Cartesian tradition in modern philosophy, man himself has finally affirmed his own subjective will, which now turns all beings into representational objects and which conceptually and wilfully manipulates them. Nietzsche's doctrine of Will to Power can be, in the Heideggerian sense, considered the final culmination of modern metaphysics of subiectity (*Subiectität*).[32]

I must contend that Heidegger's temporo-historical characterization of Being in its clearing/concealing as the historical destiny of Western metaphysics is utterly untenable and unjustifiable. Heidegger asserts that the beginning of Western thought is "the veil that conceals the origin—indeed an unavoidable veil,"[33] and that the persistent confusion of beings and Being in the historical destiny of Western onto-theo-logic must be considered "an event (*Ereignis*) and not a mistake."[34] But Heidegger certainly knows well that "The style of all Western-European philosophy—and there is no other, neither a Chinese nor an Indian philosophy—is determined by the twofold 'beings—Be-ing'."[35] Then, on what ground is Heidegger entitled to claim that the Western oblivion of Being is Being's own affair or the fateful withdrawal of Being itself? Isn't it too strange or misleading to speak of the somewhat Hegelian temporo-historical necessity of the rise and development of Western onto-theo-logic as a matter of Being's clearing and concealing? And how does Heidegger explain the fact that there has never been any such necessity "revealed" by Being in the entire historical development of, say, Buddhism and Taoism? Furthermore, according to Heidegger II, "When we say 'Being', it means 'Being of beings'. When we say 'beings', it means 'beings in respect of Being'."[36] How does he know, then, that Being itself reveals and withdraws itself at the same time, unless he has already known what Being itself is—but he doesn't. Last but not least, Heidegger asserts that the truth of Being as the lighting or clearing itself remains concealed for Western metaphysics,[37] though this concealment is not a defect for metaphysics; he further states that "all refutation in the field of essential thinking is foolish. Strife among thinkers is the

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'lovers' quarrel' concerning the matter itself. It assists them mutually toward a simple belonging to the Selfsame, from which they find what is fitting for them in the destiny of Being."[38] But, how can Heidegger II himself say that his thinking on Being as a matter of overcoming Western metaphysics is itself not a transmetaphysical refutation of or corrective to all the traditional metaphysical systems of thought? How can he say that thinking on Being is not deeper and more profound than other kinds of essential thinking such as Parmenides' or Meister Eckhart's, since he does make some hermeneutically evaluative statements, that "no thinker [such as Parmenides]. . .understands himself,"[39] that "He who thinks greatly must err greatly,"[40] and so on. If Heidegger himself is not firmly convinced that his radical reshaping of the Western metaphysical mind is a Copernican revolution in thinking, then how can he make a rather normative statement that we should rediscover the trans-onto-theo-logical way back to the primordial ground of Western metaphysics, and how can he make a negative judgment on our global technological dominance today as a deplorable result of the Western forgetfulness of Being? Isn't there a philosophical necessity for Heidegger II to evaluate the pros and cons of each and every metaphysical thought in a hierarchical order on the basis of his *Seinsdenken*, which he himself certainly considers the most appropriate philosophical way in our destitute time for the urgent task of overcoming he Western onto-theo-logical entanglements?

Heidegger II has, therefore, misled us in suggesting that the historical destiny of Western metaphysics is Being's own affair. But his creative discovery of the origin of Western metaphysics in terms of the twofold or belonging together of Being and beings deserves our special attention, for the twofold of Being and beings, the Ontological Difference, or Being-as-*Ereignis* in Heidegger's *Seinsdenken* can be considered transmetaphysically more primordial than Being itself, which Heidegger has never been able to deal with directly and successfully. Heidegger apparently realizes this point as early as 1949. In his postscript to the fourth edition of *Was ist Metaphysik*? (1943) Heidegger says, ". . .It pertains to the truth of Being that Being indeed comes-to-presence without beings, [but] that a being never is without Being." In the fifth edition (1949), however, the word "indeed" (*wohl*) is altered into "never" (*nie*) without Heidegger's own explanation. As we can see, this emendation completely changes the contextual implication of the original text respecting Being's relation to beings. According to Professor Richardson's observation, the "formula of 1943 emphasizes the primacy of Being and implies the ontological difference but does not name it as such. The formula of 1949 names it *as such*."[41] But why has it become necessary for Heidegger II to make

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another shift to the perspective of Ontological Difference within his *Seinsdenken* ? The philosophical reason here is very simple : It is completely out of the question for Heidegger to tackle the problem of Being itself, if any, by any human means, and he knows it well. The only thinking-alternative left to him is to get back to the primordial source of Western metaphysical thinking, the source which discloses to Heidegger the beginning of the Greek philosophers' ontological differentiation of beings from Being. What does Heidegger mean by the Ontological Difference, then ?

Heidegger's Ontological Difference is, in one word, (the presence of) the two-fold (*Zwiefalt*) of Being and beings, Being and man, Being and thinking, and Being and Saying in their simple oneness (*Einfalt*), or is the belonging together and mutual ap-propriating of Being and beings, etc., in the Selfsame by virtue of the Selfsame. After his creative hermeneutic re-reading of Parmenides' most famous words—the words traditionally interpreted in terms of the identity of Being and thinking—as "for the same : taking-to-heart is so also presence of what is present,"[42] Heidegger concludes, ". . .the essential nature of thinking is determined by what there is to be thought about : the presence of what is present, the Being of beings. . .the twofold of beings and Being. . .is what properly gives food for thought. And what is so given, is the gift of what is most worthy of question."[43] He also says, "For us, the matter of thinking is the Selfsame, and thus is Being—but Being with respect to its difference from beings."[44] Transmetaphysically, the most crucial issue here is : If thinking differentiates beings from Being, as Heidegger says, then what is the Selfsame (*das Selbe*) that is trans-onto-theo-logically primordial and makes possible the ontological differentiation in question ? It seems to me that the essential key to the answer—whereby Heidegger could be expected to ultimately resolve the ever-puzzling problem of Being in the West—is to be found in one of Heidegger's latest and most important lecture-essays *Zeit und Sein*, where Heidegger says, "What remains to be said ? Only this : Ap-propriation ap-propriates [*Das Ereignis ereignet*]. In saying so, we say the Selfsame in terms of the Selfsame about the Selfsame."[45] But unfortunately, Heidegger does not really understand himself when he says it. It is my transmetaphysical judgment that Heidegger II is, in making such a deep and profound utterance, on the final cross-road of his own where he must decide in which direction he is to move, the way of trans-onto-theo-logical multi-perspectivism or the way of onto-theo-logical unicentrism. It is also my transmetaphysical contention that, despite a strong Heideggerian possibility of moving toward trans-onto-theo-logical multi-perspectivism, Heidegger II as the last "essential thinker" (*der wesentliche Denker*) in the Western metaphysical tradition is never awakened from his own quasi-trans-onto-

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logical slumber, wherein lurks the ever-haunting question of Being.

The Heideggerian way of trans-onto-theo-logical emancipation from the Ontological Difference—the way that remains a mere possibility to Heidegger—must involve two inseparable points: (1) negatively speaking, a transmetaphysical overcoming of all the temporo-historical ways of divulging the meaning of the Selfsame, which is trans-onto-theo-logically deeper and more primordial than the so-called Being, whatever that may be; (2) positively speaking, a complete naturalistic reorientation of the Selfsame, which is transmetaphysically prior to the ontological differentiation of Being and beings. For example, there is a very strong naturalistic tendency in Heidegger's essay *Das Ding*, in which Heidegger's rather artistic expression on the thinging of the thing or the worlding of the world seems to be somewhat "liberated" from the temporo-historical occurrence of Being's clearing/concealing. Heidegger says figuratively thus:

> This appropriating mirror-play of the simple onefold of earth and sky, divinities and mortals, we call the world. The world presences by worlding. That means the world's worlding cannot be explained by anything else nor can it be fathomed through anything else..... the inexplicable and unfathomable character of the world's worlding lies in this, that causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the world's worlding. As soon as human cognition here calls for an explanation, it fails to transcend the world's nature, and falls short of it. The human will to explain just does not reach to the simpleness of the simple onefold of worlding.[46]

The words, that, "...causes and grounds remain unsuitable for the world's worlding," in the above-quoted passage are particularly significant from the transmetaphysically naturalistic point of view, but Heidegger never really understands his own words here. Let us cite one instance to illustrate this point. In *Der Satz Vom Grund* Heidegger attempts a trans-onto-theo-logical reading of a short poem composed by Angelus Silesius in 1657, the poem which I render into English literally as follows:

> The rose is without why; it blooms, because it blooms,
> It heeds not its own self, asks not, whether man sees it. [47]

But the poem in question can, if re-translated as follows, reveal most deeply and profoundly the transmetaphysically naturalistic sense of Zen mirroring man's ultimate awakening from all the human questions and answers concerning Reality or Being:

> The rose *is* (wonderful being)—no "why" (true emptiness);

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it blooms, just so (*tathatā*) blooms,
it is mind-less (*wu-hsin*) of its "own-being" (*svabhāva*),
is thought-less (*wu-nien*) of whether man sees it.

Isn't it transmetaphysically interesting and significant to note that "true emptiness" (*chen-k'ung*) and "wonderful being" (*miao-yu*) are two inseparable and ultimately identical ways of expressing the Mahāyāna Buddhist seeing things-as-they-are (*yathābhūta-darśana*) in their ontological nondifferentiatability in the light of the Middle Way ? Isn't it also interesting and significant to point out that suchness or just-so-ness is another naturalistic way of expressing the ultimate Selfsame of "true emptiness" and "wonderful being" ? And above all, what a "miraculous" coincidence that both this poem and the *Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch* speak of no-mind (*wu-hsin*) and no-thought (*wu-nien*)—unfathomably pointing to the perfect *satori* attained by what Zen Master Lin-chi calls "True Man with no Status" (*wu-wei-chen-jen*) ? But alas, Heidegger never comes to realize such a Zen meaning in the poem in question, for he is still desperately seeking Being as the "A-byss" (*Ab-Grund*) or the "groundless ground". Thus, he says in the same book, "Being 'is' the A-byss, in so far as Being and ground are the Selfsame, in so far as Being 'is' groundingly, and only in so far as Being has no ground."[48] Has Heidegger ever divulged the meaning of Being at all—and clearly ? If yes, why has he never disclosed it to us ? If no, why has he never tried to realize the transmetaphysical dissolvability of his own misleading question of Being? Since the question of Being "has become still more questionable"[19] at the last stage of Heidegger's *Seinsdenken*, as he himself admits, then why can't he abandon or leave behind this very question with which he is obsessed throughout his philosophical life ? The answer seems to me very simple: It never occurs (*Es nie ereignet*) to Heidegger that, in order to leave behind the question of Being transmetaphysically, he must make another—and final—radical attempt at transforming what he calls "thinking" (*Denken*) into what Zen Buddhists call "awakening" (*wu* or *satori*), wherein lies man's ultimate emancipation from all the onto-theo-logical fixations of language, thought, and reality. From the Zen point of view, Heidegger's thinking on Being is to be considered a human fixation of the *question* of language (as the house of Being), of thought (as an ontological thanksgiving to Being), and of reality (Being itself). That is why Heidegger's thinking on Being from the beginning vacillates between transmetaphysical multiperspectivism and onto-theo-logical unicentrism.

Heidegger's Being as the A-byss remains a quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical

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mystery, and provides a peculiar ground for all kinds of onto-theo-logical unicentrism, which invokes "Godhead", "the Divine Reality", "the Divine Principle", "the Divine Source", "the *Mysterium Tremendum*", Being-itself", or the like, as the last resort with which to replace God or Creator-deity. By asking the question of Being and trying to divulge the meaning of Being in terms of Ontological Difference, Being-as-*Ereignis*, and so on, Heidegger not only has failed to overcome the Western onto-theo-logical entanglements, but is self-trapped into a quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical pitfall called the "A-byss", which is said to provide a "mysterious" no-ground for all kinds of onto-theo-logical unicentrism. It is in this sense that the quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical nature of Heidegger's following words, for instance, can be fully uncovered.

> Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy is the essence of divinity to be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought or said what the word "God" is to signify. . . the thinking that points toward the truth of Being as what is to be thought has in no way decided in favour of theism. It can be theistic as little as atheistic.[50]

Heidegger's thinking on Being may be neither theistic nor atheistic. But, has he ever realized the fact that his thinking on Being provides a quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical "A-byss" for theism alone, and never for atheism? Has he ever realized the true Middle Way between theism and atheism by way of seeing things-as-they-are ? [51]

IV

Zen Buddhism is the final culmination of Buddhist thought for two primary and inseparable reasons. Firstly, Zen has creatively inherited and critically evaluated all the preceding Buddhist teachings in a hierarchical order (*chiao-hsiang-p'an-shih*),[52] and transmetaphysically leaves behind all the formulated Dharmas of Buddhism, so as to embody perfectly the ideal Dharma that is none other than the Middle Way itself. According to Bodhidharma, the first patriarch of Zen, there is what he calls "a two-fold entrance to the Tao," namely "entrance by reason" (*li-ju*) and "entrance by practice" (*hsing-ju*). As I understand it, the final culmination of Buddhist teachings in Zen consists in the fact that it ultimately absorbs "entrance by reason [the formulated Dharma]" into "entrance by practice [the ideal Dharma]," in order to recapture, so to say, the *nirvāṇic* self-awakening (*satori*) of the Buddha beneath the *bodhi* tree at *that* transtemporal

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and transhistorical moment—the "eternal now". That is why Zen must emphasize "no establishment of words and letters" (*pu-li-wen-tzu*)—for the Buddha was said to utter no word at all for 45 years after his enlightenment—as well as "a special transmission outside the formulated Dharma" (*chiao-wai-pieh-ch'uan*)—for the human realization of the ideal Dharma is essentially a matter of "transmission from the selfsame mind to the selfsame mind" (*yi-hsin-ch'uan-hsin*) and nothing else. That is why Zen must also insist on "directly pointing to man's [original] mind" (*chih-chih-jen-hsin*) and "self-awakening of one's Nature into the Buddhahood" (*chien-hsing-ch'eng-fo*), for, according to Zen, the *alpha* and *omega* of Buddhism lies in our *nirvāṇic* emulation of the Buddha's unexcelled and perfect enlightenment (*anuttara-samyak saṃbodhi*).

Secondly, Zen is the final culmination of Buddhist teachings also in the sense that it is a great and perfect convergence and synthesis of Buddhist transcendentalism and Taoist naturalism. Zen's total absorption of the natural way of Taoist metaphysics/transmetaphysics enriches and deepens its own realization of (1) the nondifferentiatability of *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra* in everyday life, (2) the transmetaphysically naturalistic parity of Being and Nothingness with all beings, and (3) the naturalistic nature of man's ultimate emancipation from all the onto-theo-logical fixations of language, thought, and reality as well as of his *nirvāṇic* self-transformation into the True Manhood of Tao, which Chuang Tzu beautifully characterizes as "the perfect man claims no-self, the spiritual man claims no-merit, and the sage claims no-name."[53]

Thus, Zen has no formulated Dharma of its own and is completely liberated from all the Buddhist doctrines. Nonetheless, Zen does develop its own unique and peculiar quasi-formulated Dharma for the sole purpose of emancipating the Zen students from all the formulated Dharmas, which include, paradoxically, the very quasi-formulated Dharma itself. In other words, Zen's own quasi-formulated Dharma is no more than a peculiarly and thoroughly practical technique, which is employed to help the Zen students remove instantly their "great doubt-block" (*ta-yi-t'uan*), if any, in front of the so-called "gateless gate" (*wu-men-kuan*) to sudden awakening (*tun-wu*). This quasi-formulated Dharma of Zen can be provisionally and pedagogically reconstructed and characterized as "the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness."

Since the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness is a quasi-formulated Dharma of no doctrinal substance, it cannot be expressed in any traditional Buddhist way. Hence the various shocking, queer, paradoxical, or trans-contradictory expressions in Zen, such as *kōan* (*kung-an*) exercise, paradoxical poetic lines, Zen exclamation, Master Yün-

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mên's "one-word barrier" (*yi-tzu-kuan*), calligraphy at one stroke, the "never disclose thoroughly" technique, the Vimālakirti-like "no-word about no-word," transmetaphysical puns, and so on. Indeed, Zen language is a transmetaphysical expression of any sort, e.g., gesture, painting, responding to the ringing bell, etc., ingeniously exhibiting the Zen man's *satori*-experience and pedagogically helping the Zen aspirants achieve their own final breakthrough with all the *saṃsāric* barriers or ego-centric entanglements. Against Heidegger's conception of language that functions as the historical house of (the truth of) Being or as the primordial Saying of Being itself, the Zen man insists on the transmetaphysically naturalistic and pedagogically provisional nature of Zen language or expression. In short, Zen language can be said to be a spontaneous and improvisational expression mirroring the dialectical selfsameness of True Emptiness (*chēn-k'ung*) and Wondrous Being (*miao-yu*) in their humanly perpetual interplay in the transmetaphysically naturalistic context of "everyday is a good day".

Abundant examples can be cited from the classical texts of Zen to illustrate the above point. The first and most celebrated *kōan* in the *Wu-mēn-kuan* (The Gateless Gate) concerns the Zen man's multi-perspectival divulging—as a matter of skilful means only—of the transmetaphysical meaning of the word *wu*, which literally means "nothing". A monk once asked Master Chao-chou, "Has a dog the Buddha Nature or not?" Chao-chou immediately replied, "*Wu*!" *Wu* here could literally mean "No, the dog has no Buddha Nature." It could also mean "Nonsense! What kind of question is this?" It could also carry the transmetaphysical meaning of Nothingness or Emptiness. The word could, indeed, carry all the inexhaustible meanings of the transmetaphysically Selfsame expressible as *wu-wu* (nothingness-nothingness), *k'ung-k'ung* (emptiness-emptiness), or *ju-ju* (it-is-as-it-is-ness or suchness-suchness), and yet it may not convey any particular meaning at all. Chao-chou's one-word reply "*wu*" could simply show his own Vimālakirti-like "no-word about no-word." What a great contrast between Chao-chou's *wu* and Heidegger's Nothingness as the veil of Being, and what a great difference between the former's transmetaphysical pun and the latter's language as the Saying (*Sage*) of Being! Another typical example is found in the 65th *kōan* of the *Blue Cliff Record*, in which the Buddha was said to give no answer for a long while when a non-Buddhist asked him: "I don't ask you about 'there *is* (*yu*) a word' I don't ask you about 'there is *no* (*wu*) word' either. What is it, then?" The Buddha's no-answer for a long while here is indicative of the Zen man's complete emancipation from and spontaneous forgetfulness of all the human questions (and their answers) about Being and Nothingness. The transmetaphysical dialectics of *yu* (Being) and *wu* (Nothingness)

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in Zen expressions is thus a far cry from the Heideggerian thinking on (the question of) Being.

Since the Zen expression on Being and Nothingness is no more than a pedagogically provisional means, which is used to liberate us from the onto-theo-logical fixation of Being and Nothingness, as well as from the (Heideggerian) quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical divulging of their respective meanings, what is the essential nature of (the transmetaphysical dialectics of) Being and Nothingness from the perspective of Zen? What does it mean to say, from the transmetaphysically naturalistic viewpoint of Zen, that the Heideggerian question of Being (and Nothingness) is "null and void?" To give an intelligible answer to this question, let us cite from Zen Master Ta-chu Hui-hai's *Essential Entrance into the Way of Sudden Awakening* (*Tun-wu-yao-tao-ju-mēn-lun*) a passage I render into English as follows, which is remarkably suggestive of Zen's transmetaphysical dialectics of *yu* (Being) and *wu* (Nothingness):

> . . . Question: "How do you mean by saying that 'to see neither *yu* nor *wu* is to see the true body of the Buddha'?" Answer: "*Yu* arises because of *wu*; *wu* appears because of *yu*. Originally, *yu* cannot be said to arise, hence *wu* cannot be preserved. Since *wu* cannot be preserved, whence can *yu* be obtained? Both *yu* and *wu* co-arise because of their belonging together. Since this is the case, they both are not immutable. To liberate oneself from these dual views is to see the true body of the Buddha." Question: "But even *yu* and *wu* cannot be sought, on what ground can the true body [of the Buddha] be established?" Answer: "It is because you ask such a question [that the true body of the Buddha is established]. If no such question is asked, then the name "the true body" will not be set up. Why so? This is just like the case of a bright mirror: when it confronts something, it shows the image of the object; when it confronts nothing, it shows no image at all."[54]

This passage discloses to us the following points regarding the transmetaphysical dialectics of *yu* and *wu*: (1) *yu* and *wu* belong together, not in the Heideggerian sense that Nothingness is ontologically parasitic upon Being, but in the transmetaphysical sense that both *yu* and *wu* are merely a functional—not substantive—name, and that the multi-perspectival ways of divulging the ontological/transontological meanings of *yu* and *wu* are entirely dependent upon the various conditions of the mind. Zen, which inherits and enriches the transmetaphysical doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyavāda*) in the *prajñāpāramitā* literature elaborated by Nāgārjuna and his

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Mādhyamika followers, takes both *yu* and *wu* as two ontologically equal ways of seeing things as they are. From the transmetaphysical perspective of Mahāyāna and Zen, *yu*, *wu*, and all beings are "emptied" (*śūnya*) of their "own-being" (*svabhāva*), and none of them can be said to be or not to be independently of the others. *Yu* is that which discloses the ontological nature of all beings in their holistic context of relational origination. Metaphorically, *yu* is the great ocean, and all beings constitute the totality of all waves and ripples, but both *yu* and all beings are trans-ontologically the Selfsame. *Wu* is a transmetaphysically functional name that is devised to deepen and enrich the ontological relationship between *yu* and all beings as ultimately devoid of their self-nature. It is in this sense that *wu* is ontologically deeper and more profound than *yu*, though *wu*, *yu* and all beings maintain their transontological parity by virtue of the Selfsame and make up the transmetaphysically multi-perspectival ways of divulging the Selfsame.

(2) *Yu* and *wu* belong together *dialectically*, not only in the sense that they are ontologically dependent upon each other, as we have seen, but also in the sense that their respective ontological/transontological meanings can be humanly enriched by way of the dialectical interplay of metaphysics (of *yu* and *wu*) and transmetaphysics (of the Selfsame) in the Zen man' "everyday-mindedness that is the *Tao*" (*p'ing-ch'ang-hsin-shih-tao*)—the universal *Tao* of the Zen man whose *satori*-experience is ever-renewable and ever-enrichable through a (particular) mind-body in everyday life. In the dialectical process of everyday *satori*-experience, the Zen man's understanding of *yu* as the ontologically holistic context of all beings is deepened and re-deepened, enriched and re-enriched, in accordance with his "*nirvāṇic* practice after self-awakening" (*wu-hou-hsiu-hsing*).[55]

(3) But the transmetaphysical dialectics of *yu* and *wu* is itself a pedagogically provisional construction, for the dialectical interplay of *yu* and *wu* in everyday life is humanly meaningful only so long as we speak of *a particular* Zen man's *satori*-experience, or of *a particular* Zen man's emancipation from the onto-theo-logical fixation of as well as from the quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical thinking on, both Being and Nothingness. From the transmetaphysically naturalistic point of view, which is not really any particular point of view differentiatable from all the onto-theo-logical or quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical points of view, nothing can be said of *yu* and *wu*, for even the transmetaphysically Selfsame itself is no more than a functional name, which is skilfully employed to indicate the transmetaphysical "emptiness" of (i) *wu*, *yu*, and all beings, (ii) their ontological/transontological relationships, and (iii) the provisional differentiation, on the highest level of man's thinking, of the transmetaphysically Selfsame and

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the ontological duality of *yu* and *wu*. When Heidegger says, "What remains to be said? Only this: Ap-propriation ap-apropriates. In saying so, we say the Selfsame in terms of the Selfsame about the Selfsame,"[56] his thinking-perspective comes very close to the transmetaphysical position of Zen. Unfortunately, it is due to his own quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical positing of Being and thinking on Being that he never reaches *that* ultimate stage of transmetaphysical naturalism in Zen. Master Hui-hai's transmetaphysical point—that if the transmetaphysical question about the true body of the Buddha (as well as the metaphysical question about *yu* and *wu*) becomes "null and void", then the name "the true body" itself (or the transmetaphysically Selfsame) will become "null and void" altogether—can, therefore, be considered a great Zen corrective to Heidegger's *Seinsdenken*. Like all the preceding Mahāyāna teachings, Zen never deviates from the Mādhyamika reorientation of the Middle Way that, to quote Chi-tsang's words, "refutation of all perverted views is itself the correct view" (*p o-hsieh-hsien-cheng*). In short, the transmetaphysical dialectics of *yu* and *wu* is a quasi-formulated Dharma of Zen provisionally constructed to reflect beautifully the Zen man's unexcelled and perfect *satori*-experience which can be likened to a bright mirror that Master Hui-hai, Hui-nêng the Sixth Patriarch of Zen, and Chuang Tzu have all spoken of.

(4) The transmetaphysical functionality (nonsubstantiality) of the true body of the Buddha, whose name is dependent upon the very question about the body, and the metaphor of a bright mirror in Hui-hai's passage suggest to us that the transmetaphysical dialectics of *yu* and *wu* is a spontaneous and effortless (quasi-theoretical) manifestation of the Zen no-mind in its moment-to-moment *nirvāṇic* practice. The transmetaphysically dialectical projecting (*fang*) and recalling (*shou*) of both *yu* and *wu* by the Zen no-mind is profoundly indicative of Zen's creative inheritance and practical enrichment of the "idealistic" formulated Dharmas of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the *Tathāgata-garbha* thought, which is variously developed in the *Śrī-Mālā-sūtra*, the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, the *Awakening of Faith* and other neo-Mahāyāna texts. In the same book we have mentioned, Master Hui-hai makes this "idealistic" or "metapsychological" point abundantly clear. As he says, "I am not versed in Zen, and have no Dharma to show you" "*Ju-ju* (suchness-suchness) means immutability; it is thus named because of the suchness of the mind"; "Since the mind does not appropriate the two sides, how can there be the middle? If the mind can achieve this as-it-is, then we call it the middle way, that is, the true way of the *Tathāgata*": "The emptiness of all forms is nothing but the no-mind itself in all realms, and *vice versa*"; and so forth. From the transmetaphysical perf spective of the Zen no-mind, Heidegger's quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical-

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lighting and withdrawing of Being is in reality the no-mind's dialectical projecting and recalling of Being and Nothingness in their humanly perpetual interplay, and nothing else.

It can, therefore, be said that the history of Zen is the trans-temporo-historical history of the transmission from the selfsame no-mind (of Zen masters) to the selfsame no-mind (of their disciples) in so far as we speak of any particular Zen man's *nirvāṇic* self-awakening and its everyday manifestation. From the highest perspective of transmetaphysical naturalism, wherein no distinction between particularity and universality is to be made, even the no-mind becomes a mere name and the question about the no-mind will not arise. Thus, Master T'ung-an warns us in his Zen poem "The Seal of the Mind" as follows:

> Tell me what the seal of the mind looks like,
> And who dares to transmit such a seal!
> Serenely has it [the Selfsame] never changed its no-form for ages;
> To call it "the seal of the mind" is already a misnomer.
> You must know:
> Originally its Nature is profoundly empty,
> Just like a lotus in the flame of the red stove.
> And don't say the no-mind is the Tao,
> For the no mind is still a barrier [to the Tao].[57]

To illustrate the Zen no-mind's dynamically dialectical projecting (or casting) and recalling (or withdrawing) of both *yu* and *wu*, let us cite two most significant and interesting examples from the Zen *koans* well recorded and preserved today. For instance, Master Tê-shan once wanted to order at a small restaurant some *tien-hsin*, which literally means "pinpoint the mind" but is commonly used to mean (Chinese) refreshment or confectionery. According to the story in the *Chih-yüeh-lu* (The Record of Pointing to the Moon), the old lady who was about to sell some Chinese cakes to the Master asked him, "If you answer well a question I have here, you can have the *tien-hsin*. The question is this. The *Diamond Sūtra* says, 'The past mind cannot be obtained, the present mind cannot be obtained, the future mind cannot be obtained.' May I ask you what sort of *hsin* (mind) you want to *tien* (pinpoint)?" Master Tê-shan was said to have no word.[58] He was apparently outsmarted by the old lady in the Zen technique of the dialectical projecting and recalling of *yu* and *wu*. Another example is Master Ma-tsu Tao-yi's double-talk on the *yu* and *wu* of the mind and the Buddha :

> A monk asked, "Why do you say that the mind is the Buddha?" The Master replied, "Because I have to stop the baby's crying." The monk

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asked, "How is it, then, when the baby's crying is stopped ?" The Master replied, "Not the mind, not the Buddha." The monk asked, "How do you instruct a man who upholds none of them?" The Master answered, "I just tell him, 'Not a thing.' " The monk again asked, "Suppose you happen to meet a man free from all these entanglements, what would you say?" The Master said, "I would simply let him experience the Great Tao."[59]

(5) Finally, the Zen no-mind's dialectical projecting and recalling of *yu* and *wu*, as a dynamic and spontaneous manifestation of the Zen man's ever-renewable and ever-enrichable *satori*-experience, is ultimately a human matter of complete self-transformation into the "True Manhood with no Status." The True Man of Tao can handle human affairs in the spirit of non-affairs (*wu-shih*), and live and act in the spirit of naturalness (*tzu-jan*) and non-action (*wu-wei*). The True Man as a *nirvāṇic* artist of life does not wish to abide in the realm of the unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*), nor does he try to escape from the realm of the conditioned (*saṁskṛta*). Many examples can be cited from the Zen classics to show the transmetaphysically natural way of the True Man's everyday life, such as P'ang-yün's "drawing water and carrying firewood," Chao-chou's "Go and wash the dishes," Nan-ch'üan's "Everyday-mindedness is itself the Tao," Yün-mên's "Everyday is a good day," Pao-fu's "Go and have a cup of tea," Lin-chi's "When tired, go to bed," Hui-hai's "Walking or staying, sitting or lying: all these are nothing but the Tao," and so on. What a great contrast between the Zen man's everyday naturalness and the Heideggerian inauthentic Dasein's everyday averageness! What a great difference also between the Zen man's *nirvāṇic* self-awakening and self-transformation and the Heideggerian authentic Dasein's ek-sistential self-transcendence! Heidegger's existentialist distinction between authenticity and inauthenticity is grounded upon his quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical divulging of the meanings of Being and Nothingness, whereas the Zen man is totally free from the question of Being and Nothingness, hence the transmetaphysical pointlessness or groundlessness of the existentialist distinction in question. The Heideggerian man in our destitute time is said to be ontologically homeless and must, therefore, release himself into the openness of that-which-regions (*das Offene der Gegnet*), the mystery, to which he is said to belong originally.[60] The Zen man remains transmetaphysically nonabiding in any place at any time, thus responding to the change and transformation of all things as it is without any slightest contravention, mental or physical. The Heideggerian man's crossroad, ek-sistential or ontological, turns out to be the most perfect meeting point to the True Man of Tao, such as Master

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Chao-chou. That is why he spontaneously answered, "East gate, west gate, south gate, north gate," when a monk asked him, "What is [the original face of] Chao-chou?"[61]

V

To conclude this article, I shall present a pedagogical construction of the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness in ten stages or levels, as a matter of Zen Buddhist hierarchical classification of all the Buddhist and non-Buddhist conceptions or misconceptions of Being and Nothingness as well as of all beings. This construction is based on two guiding principles I have in mind : (1) *philosophically* speaking, the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness in ten stages is grounded upon the Mahāyānist transmetaphysical multi-perspectivism, which has been variously developed and enriched in Chi-tsang's doctrine of "twofold truth on four levels" (*ssu-ch'ung-èrh-ti*), Yogācāra's doctrine of "three natures and three non-natures" (*san-hsing-san-wu-hsing*, T'ien-t'ai's doctrine of "the perfectly harmonious threefold truth" (*yüan-jung-san-ti*), Hua-yen's doctrines of "the perfect harmony of six forms" (*liu-hsiang-yüan-jung*), of "ten profound gates" (*shih-hsüan-mén*), and of "the harmonious interpenetration of four Dharmadhātus" (*ssu-fa-chieh-yüan-jung-wu-ai*), and so on. As to the transmetaphysical multi-perspectivism of (Chinese) Mahāyāna philosophy, it is itself grounded upon transmetaphysical naturalism, wherein Taoism and Zen perfectly converge. Transmetaphysical naturalism as a self-cancelable quasi-theoretical device is in truth no more than an artless, wholesome, and spontaneous transmetaphysical reflection of the True Man's total awakening to the transmetaphysically Selfsame as-it-is in the strictly naturalistic sense. The main reason for the Taoist-Zen vindication of transmetaphysical naturalism is simply this : if and when we realize the fact that no onto-theo-logical or quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical thinking can in any way disclose to us the ultimate meaning, if any, of the transmetaphysically Selfsame, then the best philosophical conclusion to be reached is that we leave behind spontaneously all the questions and answers *humanly* created—as both the Buddha and Chuang Tzu have exemplified, without adding up any more formulated *Dharma* or no-*Dharma* as a mere philosophical waste. (2) *Religiously* speaking, the True Man of Tao with a great compassionate heart (*mahākarunācitta*) must and does consider it his own Bodhisattvic mission to help those aspirants for Buddhahood realize deeply the transmetaphysical importance of a *nirvāṇic* reorientation of their *saṁsāric* life, the ultimate nondistinction betweem the Buddha Nature and all (the sentient) beings, and so on, by way of providing them with a quasi-

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formulated Dharma, such as the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness—the dialectics that can provisionally function as a pedagogical, skilful means for their sudden awakening. My following reconstruction is, therefore, merely a provisional philosophical restatement of Zen masters' skilful *satori*-technique in the ultimate light of transmetaphysical naturalism.

The first, lowest stage is that of man's *saṁsāric* (worldly) fabrication of and *ātmanic* (ego-centric) attachment to the hierarchical order of all beings in existence and value. The everyday averageness and inauthentic falling of Dasein as Being-in-the-world in Heidegger's *Daseinsanalytik*, the "spirit of seriousness" or "bad faith" in Sartre's phenomenological ontology, the worldling's existential loss of meaning in Victor Frankl's logotherapy, the having mode (as against the being mode) in Eric Fromm's radical-humanistic psychoanalysis, the fundamentalist acceptance of the "six realms of existence" in popular Buddhism, and so forth, are all indicative of man's *saṁsāric* entanglements at this stage.

The second stage is that of the worldly philosophers' and scientists' ontic dissolution and differentiation of Being into various realms of beings, such as the realm of scientific investigation, the realm of empirical facts, the realm of mathematical existence, and so on. Thus, logical positivists reject any metaphysical statement as empirically meaningless; Freudian psychoanalytic scientism launches a devastating attack upon religion and philosophy as a human illusion; and dialectical materialists dogmatically vindicate materialist dialectics and the doctrine of matter-in-motion as the only absolute reality, as against metaphysics as an unscientific, bourgeois ideology. At this stage, man is never what Kant calls "a metaphysical animal."

At the third stage, we find the (Western) metaphysicians' onto-theo-logical bifurcation of Being and Nothingness in favour of Being. In most metaphysical or theological doctrines in the West, Nothingness is simply privation of being, a very uninteresting and negligible philosophical notion. Aside from Heidegger, there are two other modern philosophers in the West who are also seriously concerned with the question of Nothingness, namely Hegel and Sartre. Both of them, however, fail to see the essential nature of Nothingness, and ultimately favour Being. Despite his conceptual identification of Being and Nothingness, Nothingness eventually disappears in Hegel's absolute idealism, in which the Absolute Spirit becomes the dialectical substance or Being. In Sartre's phenomenology, in spite of his ontological identification of Being-for-itself with Nothingness, Nothingness as the ever-nihilating consciousness, pre-reflective or reflective, is said to refer to human reality. Thus, Nothingness in both Hegel and

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Sartre is a *substantive* name, that is, either conceptually substantive (as pure nothing) or phenomenologically substantive (as human consciousness). Both Hegel and Sartre favour Being instead of Nothingness: Hegel's Nothingness is immediately dissolved into Becoming, which is Being in the dialectical process; Sartre's Nothingness is nothing but *Being*-for-itself, a very peculiar kind of Being and not Nothingness in the transmetaphysically functional sense. Moreover, Sartre's Being-for-itself that is Nothingness is ontologically parasitic upon Being-in-itself and not vice versa. In general, Nothingness in Western onto-theo-logic is a philosophical anathema.

At the fourth stage, we see Heidegger's ontologically *functional*—not substantive—differentiation of Being and Nothingness. Heidegger's creative discovery of both existential and ontological meanings of Nothingness is a great contribution in the history of Western metaphysics. But his gradual abandonment of existential Nothingness in favour of ontological Nothingness as the veil of Being or the concealing-aspect of Being draws him to the direction of quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical mysticism, which provides the ultimate A-byss or unfathomable ground for onto-theo-logical unicentrism, rather than to the direction of transmetaphysical multi-perspectivism, which can emancipate Heidegger II from the ontological parasiticality of Nothingness upon Being. Heidegger says, "To cultivate the beings only in the forgetfulness of Being—that is nihilism. . .to press inquiry into Being explicitly to the limits of Nothingness and to draw Nothingness into the question of Being: this is the first and only fruitful step toward a true overcoming of nihilism."[62] But the True Man of Tao would ask Heidegger: "How can you really overcome nihilism, since you have never realized the ontological parity of Being and Nothingness?"

At the next, fifth, stage, we see the Heideggerian accentuation of the primordiality or primacy of Being over Nothingness. Heidegger says, "Courage can endure Nothingness: it knows, in the A-byss of terror, the all but untrodden region of Being, that clearing whence each and every being returns into *what* it is and is able to be."[63] Paul Tillich's courage to be in the state of existential anxiety or despair (Nothingness)—the courage whose ultimate source is said to be the "God above God"[64]—is a conspicuous example which illustrates the neo-Christian theologians' onto-theo-logical borrowing or degeneration of Heidegger's Being as the quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical A-byss. Even Heidegger's own posthumous words, "yet only a god can save us" ("*Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten*")[65] can be used as a clear proof for my contention that Heidegger's philosophical indecision on the crossroad of his *Seinsdenken* has finally turned out to be a stumbling block to his complete transmetaphysical emancipation from onto-theo-logical unicentrism.

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The sixth stage is the first step taken by the Mahāyāna philosophers to overcome Heidegger's *Seinsdenken*, by means of a provisional accentuation of the transmetaphysically functional primordiality of Nothingness over Being. The Mahāyāna accentuation of the primacy of Nothingness (*wu*) or Emptiness (*śūnyatā*), as found in the doctrine of "the egolessness of all things" (*sarvadharmanairātmya*) or "the emptiness of all things" (*sarvadharmaśūnyatā*) which originates in the early Buddhist doctrines of nonsubstantiality (*anātman*) and relational origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*), is pedagogically intended to show a provisional corrective to any ontic assertion of any being or entity, any onto-theo-logical grasping of Being, or any quasi-trans-onto-theo-logical approach to Being. If all these one-sided views in favour of Being or beings are refuted or corrected, then Nothingness or Emptiness as a functional name will have to "vanish" altogether. That is why the Mahāyāna philosophers speak of the various kinds of emptiness, notably 18 emptinesses,[66] from the standpoint of transmetaphysical multi-perspectivism, and warn us to avoid the danger of "stubborn emptiness" (*wan-k'ung*) or "one-sided emptiness" (*p'ien-k'ung*), that is, emptiness hypostatized or conceptualized as an entity.

At the seventh stage, we see the Mahāyāna Buddhist transmetaphysical nondifferentiation and equalization of Being and Nothingness, as a self-corrective to the previous provisional vindication of the functional primacy of Nothingness or Emptiness. The Mahāyāna transmetaphysical expressions, such as "the sameness of all things" (*sarvadharmasamatā*) or "form is emptiness, and emptiness is form", are used to dispel any misunderstanding that Buddhism is negativistic or escapist. This is a real beginning of the dialectical interplay of Being and Nothingness and of metaphysics (of Being and Nothingness) and transmetaphysics (of the Self-same), on the basis of transmetaphysical multi-perspectivism. In this transmetaphysical dialectics, not only are Being and Nothingness declared nondifferentiatable by virtue of the Selfsame, but are *nirvāṇa* and *saṁsāra*, *prajnā* (wisdom and *avidyā* (ignorance), *paramārtha* (supreme truth) and *saṁvṛti* (worldly) truth), etc., as well.

At the eighth stage, the transmetaphysical dialectics of Being and Nothingness is deepened and concretized in the various neo-Mahāyāna ways of multi-perspectival coloration of Being and Nothingness in their transmetaphysical parity with all beings. Thus, Being, Nothingness, and all beings are now dialectically merging into "the perfect harmony of the threefold truth of the provisional, the empty, and the middle" (Tien-t'ai), into "the *Dharmadhātu* of nonobstructed mutual ap-propriation or belonging together of Principle and events and of events and events" (Hua-yen), and so on. The previous "negativistic" emphasis on the functional

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primordiality of Nothingness over Being is at first transformed dialectically into the transmetaphysical nondifferentiatability and Selfsameness of Being and Nothingness, which is itself, at this final stage of the formulated Dharma, further transformed into a direct, dynamic, positive, and naturalistic reaffirmation of all beings, all of which are now transmetaphysically reoriented by way of the dialectical interplay of Being and Nothingness.

The question arises : what is the ultimate nature of this dialectical interplay? And *who* or *what* makes this dialectical interplay possible? We find the answer at the ninth stage, where the dialectical interplay of Being and Nothingness is (disclosed to be) performed by the True Man's no-mind, as a matter of spontaneous and skilful projecting and recalling of Being and Nothingness in the dialectical process of everyday life. At this stage, we witness the Zen Buddhist ultimate emancipation from all the human fixations of language, thought, and reality, as well as from all the formulated Dharmas in regard to Being and Nothingness. The famous Zen metaphor of the twofold sword, that is, the sword to kill and the sword to save, is a most interesting illustration of the Zen master's dynamic, effortless, and dialectical projecting and recalling by the no-mind itself provisionally differentiated into Being and Nothingness—the no-mind which is the truest human mirror wondrously reflecting the it-is-as-it-is-ness of the transmetaphysically Selfsame.

At the highest stage, the stage of transmetaphysical naturalism, nothing can really be said. Even the trans-tautological expressions like Emptiness-Emptiness, Suchness-Suchness, or Nothingness-Nothingness (*wu-wu*) appear transmetaphysically superfluous, though humanly significant. Since he has left behind all the human-created questions and answers, metaphysical or transmetaphysical, the True Man of Tao does not (have to) worry about the transmetaphysically Selfsame; he simply and naturally lives and acts as a *nirvāṇic* artist of everyday life. At this stage, Zen must be liberated from Zen itself. Meanwhile, poetry and art take the place of metaphysics and transmetaphysics. Heidegger's own trans-tautological expressions, such as "the world worlds" or "the thing things", as well as his naturalistic poetic lines, such as "Forests spread; Brooks plunge; Rocks persist; Mist diffuses; Meadows wait; Springs well; Winds dwell; Blessing muses,"[67] seem to suggest profoundly a wonderful possibility for him to turn to the direction of transmetaphysical naturalism. But his quasi-onto-theo-logical attachment to (the question of) Being has become a "great doubt-block" to his self-awakening to the transmetaphysically Selfsame in the Taoist-Zen sense, as well as to his self-transformation into the True Manhood of Tao with no Status.

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NOTES

1. See Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger*, Rohwohlt Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1973, p. 35.
2. For Heidegger's discussion on hermeneutic circularity, see "A Dialogue on Language", in Peter D. Hertz, tr., *On the Way to Language*, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 1-54.
3. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Harper & Row, 1962, p. 487.
4. In this article I follow the widely accepted view that there is a "turn" in Heidegger's philosophy, and speak of the *Daseinsanalytik* (analytic of Dasein) of Heidegger I and the *Seinsdenken* (thinking on Being) of Heidegger II.
5. Heidegger, *Being and Time*. p. 331.
6. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, tr. by Albert Hafstadter, Harper & Row, New York, 1971, pp. 178-179. (I have changed "Nothing" to "Nothingness".)
7. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 310.
8. *ibid.*, p. 29. (I have changed "an entity" to "a being".)
9. *ibid.*, p. 26. (I have changed "an entity" to "a being" and "entities" to "beings".)
10. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am. Main, 1967, p. 6.
11. *ibid.*, p. 9.
12. *ibid.*, p. 11.
13. David F. Krell, *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, Harper & Row, 1977, p. 110. (I have changed "The nothing" to "Nothingness".)
14. *ibid.*, p. 112.
15. *ibid.*
16. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, pp. 68-69.
17. Heidegger, *The Essence of Reasons*, tr. by Terrence Malick, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1969, pp. 27-29.
18. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, p. 107.
19. Heidegger, *Existence and Being*, ed. and tr. by Werner Brock, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1949, pp. 353-354. (I have made some slight change of the English translation.)
20. Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, rev. ed., New American Library, New York, 1975, pp. 278-279. (I have changed "Nothing" to "Nothingness".)
21. Krell, *Heidegger*, p. 238. (I have changed "Nothing" to Nothingness".)
22. Heidegger, *What is called Thinking?* tr. by J. Glenn Gray, Harper & Row, New York, 1968, p. 244.
23. See Heidegger's preface to *Being and Time*.

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24. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1963, p. 230.
25. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 488.
26. Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 3rd ed., Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1966, p. 68.
27. *ibid.*, p. 69.
28. Krell, *Heidegger*, p. 210.
29. Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1969 p. 56.
30. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, tr. by Ralph Manheim, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959, p. 14.
31. Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, tr. by Joan Stambaugh, Harper & Row, New York, 1973, p. 4.
32. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Vol. II, Neske, Pfullingen, 1961, pp. 450-454.
33. Heidegger, *What is called Thinking* ? p. 152.
34. Heidegger, *Wegmarken* p. 200.
35. Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken* ? Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1961, p. 136.
36. Heidegger, *What is called Thinking*? p. 227.
37. Krell, *Heidegger*, p. 211.
38. *ibid.*, p. 216. (I have changed "Same" to "Selfsame").
39. Heidegger, *What is called Thinking*?, p. 185.
40. Heidegger, *Poetry*, p. 9.
41. W.J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd ed., Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1974, p. 565.
42. Heidegger, *What is called Thinking* ?, p. 241.
43. *ibid.*, p. 244. (I have changed "duality" to "twofold".)
44. Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, tr. by Joan Stambaugh, Harper & Row, New York, 1969, p. 47. (I have changed "Same" to "Selfsame".)
45. Heidegger, *Sache*, p. 24.
46. Heidegger, *Poetry*, pp. 179-180.
47. Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, Neske, Pfullingen, 1957, p. 69.
48. *ibid.*, p. 185.
49. Heidegger, *Sache*, p. 91.
50. Krell, *Heidegger*, p. 230.
51. For the Buddhist Middle Way between theism and atheism, see my "Buddhist Approach to the Problem of God", in S.A. Matczak, ed., *God in Contemporary Thought: A Philosophical Perspective*, Learned Publications, New York, 1977, pp. 155-181. (The reader should beware of several misprints in the article.)

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52. In his recent essay "Zen and Buddhism" Professor Masao Abe gives a very good interpretation of *chiao-hsiang-p'an-shih* (*kyōsō-hanjaku* in Japanese) as follows : "Certain of the great Buddhists and Buddhist scholars who later became founders of new sects had a very serious and keen religious concern as to what was the genuine spirit of Buddhism and as to which sūtra most clearly and sufficiently represented that spirit. From such a concern, *kyōsō-hanjaku*, i.e., the evaluating and grading of the various sūtras by new and profound standards, was developed. Accordingly, *kyōsō-hanjaku* is not merely an arrangement of or classification of the Mahayānā sūtras into a system or a synthesis, but is rather a critical and creative founding of a new Buddhist system on the basis of what was believed to be the true spirit of Buddhism." *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (June 1976), p. 241.

53. See the Chuang-tzu, ch. 1. See also Burton Watson, tr., *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1968, p. 32.

54. For the original Chinese text see *Zen no goroku* [The Recorded Sayings of Zen], Vol. 6, *Tongo yōmon* [Essential Entry to Sudden Awakening], Chikuma Shobo, Tokyo, 1970, p. 80. (My translation.)

55. As Gary Snyder says, "That Satori is not the end of Zen training. It's the beginning of Zen training. This is where Suzuki and all the other writers on Zen are misleading. Satori does not end anything, but opens up the world of Zen practice to you." See Dom Aelred Graham, *Conversations : Christian and Buddhist*, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1968, p. 65. Suzuki himself did misspeak occasionally on the matter. He says, for instance, "It (Zen) is, therefore, extremely flexible in adapting itself to almost any philosophy and moral doctrine as long as its intuitive teaching is not interfered with. It may be found wedded to anarchism or fascism, communism or democracy, atheism or idealism, or any political or economic dogmatism." See his *Zen and Japanese Culture*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1959, p. 63.

56. See Note 45.

57. See *Ching-tê ch'uan-têng-lu* [Record of the Transmission of the Lamp]. in *Taisho shinshū daizōkyō*, Vol. 51, p. 455. (My translation.)

58. See *Chih-yüeh-lu* [The Record of Pointing to the Moon], in *Hsü-tsang-ching* [*Zokuzōkyō*], Vol. 143, Shin Wen Feng Print Co., 1977, p. 342.

59. See the same reference in Note 57, p. 246. (My translation.)

60. Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, Neske Tübingen, 1959, pp. 48-50.

61. See *Pi-yen-lu* (The Blue Cliff Record), in *Taishō shinshū daizōkyō*, Vol. 48, p. 149. See also Thomas and J.C. Cleary, tr., *The Blue Cliff Record*, Vol. 1, Shambhala Publications, Boulder, 1977, p. 59.

62. Heidegger, *Einführung*, p. 155.

63. Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, p. 103.

64. Paul Tillich, *The Courage to Be*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1952. p. 186.

65. See Heidegger's conversation with the *Spiegel* correspondent, in *Spiegel*, No. 23/

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1976 (May 31, 1976), pp. 193-219. According to the agreement between Heidegger and the *Spiegel*, the conversation was published only after his death.

66. The various numbers of emptiness include, in addition to 18 emptinesses, 2 emptinesses, 3 emptinesses, 4 emptinesses, 6 emptinesses, 7 emptinesses, 11 emptinesses, 13 emptinesses, 16 emptinesses, 19 emptinesses, 20 emptinesses, and so on.

67. Heidegger, *Poetry*, p. 14.

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10

Nagarjuna, Aristotle, and Frege on the Nature of Thought

ASHOK K. GANGADEAN

INTRODUCTION

My aim in this paper is to develop a perspective in which we may best understand the central teaching of Nāgārjuna. This master dialectician, founder of the Mādhyamika tradition, introduced a radically new way to understand the nature of thought, the workings of natural language, the origins of human experience, of objects, of the world. This instruction, presented as the essential teaching of the Buddha, revealed that thought and all objects of thought are *śūnya* (empty, void and devoid of essence, self-identity, substance), that the self and all entities arise co-dependently (pratītya-samutpāda), and that the liberation of consciousness emerges with the silence of the middle way (madhyamā pratipad) between *all* opposites or contraries. That this therapeutic and transformational instruction presented itself as a radically new perspective in the Indian tradition may be seen in the fact that it was as critical of the earlier Buddhist tradition as it was of the Hindu tradition. The latter developed an absolute substance ontology of the self (ātma) while the former rejected this and developed the no-substance ontology of the self (anātma). Nāgārjuna discovered the middle way between these opposite ontological extremes. For Nāgārjuna these dialectical complements, as mutually exclusive and incompatible as they may appear, spring from a common ontological delusion, an essentialistic mentality with a compulsion to take things to be self-existent and absolute (svabhāva).

Nāgārjuna's form of therapeutic dialectic, which involves a radical transformation of consciousness, could not have emerged until both ontological extremes or complements (ātma and anātma) had manifested themselves. For this dialectic moves precisely by finding the middle way between complements. Indeed, it is revealed that *all thought* (experience and the world) arises in opposition and is pervaded by contrariety, that

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experience is the projected superimposition of polarities which can never be synthesized or essentially unified.

Of course Nāgārjuna's dialectic with its recognition of the dual, polar oppositional origins of thought is not restricted to the Indian philosophical tradition. One aim in this paper in fact is precisely to show how the same dialectical pattern inexorably plays itself out in the development of Western logical theory. It is with this interest that I choose to focus on the logical theories of Aristotle and Frege. The classical logical framework in the Western tradition which dominated thought for over two thousand years was founded by Aristotle, and the revolutionary innovations in logical theory introduced by Frege a century ago launched the contemporary mathematical logical tradition. My interest, though, is not to present the logical theories of these two masters but rather to show that two complementary paradigms are playing themselves out in each logical framework, paradigms for thought which are as mutually exclusive and contrary as they are dialectically bound. I shall attempt a *dialectical* reconstruction of the complementary paradigms which shape the views of Aristotle and Frege. Thus, a guiding question in this paper is : How *would* Nāgārjuna view the evolution in logical theory from Aristotle to Frege ? My model for an answer is Nāgārjuna's own dialectical critique of the evolution in ontology from ātma to anātma.

Let me develop this analogue a bit. The ātma ontology is shaped by a paradigm or prototype—a monistic ontological model in which all beings are manifestations of the one absolute Ātma-Brahman. This model proscribes and prescribes a language which may be more or less coherently developed. By contrast, the ontological model of the Abhidharma tradition is that of a language form in which there are no substances but only a plurality of momentary dharmas (ultimate qualities which are elements of existence) which constitute the world and experience. This prototype determines a different language form, a different system for understanding and interpreting experience. This paradigm too may be more or less coherently developed. The critical point to notice is that both traditions are shaped by different ontological paradigms each having inherent limits and reflecting different ontological languages or systems of meaning. Viewed from *within*, each language views the other as being alien, incoherent and false. They appear to be mutually exclusive and incompatible. However, Nāgārjuna took an *external* perspective in which the two language-paradigms, precisely because they were contrary and incompatible, are found to be dialectically bound complements sharing a common ontological mentality. Nāgārjuna's dialectical critique involved

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a form of discourse which was radically different from both the ātma and anātma languages.

In a similar way I shall attempt to show that the logical language of Aristotle is shaped by a paradigm or prototype which is a dialectical complement of the paradigm which determines Frege's logical language. My aim in this paper is to uncover the paradigms in their pure form and show that they are complements, each of which is inherently incomplete in accounting for thought and yet both of which are necessary constituents of thought. As dialectical complements the two paradigms represent the polar extremes in which thought dependently co-arises. From Nāgārjuna's dialectical point of view the two paradigms are indeed irreconcilable and proscribe the range of possible logical interpretations of thought. It is here that we find the true meaning of pratītya-samutpāda : that thought (experience, world) is the projected superimposition of two complementary paradigms. On this interpretation of Nāgārjuna it becomes crucial to discern the polar paradigms in their pure form in order to grasp how thought arises.

My first task, then, is to excavate the complementary paradigms in their pure forms. This is a difficult task since the shaping paradigms of the logical frameworks of Aristotle and Frege are actually presented in a mixed and incoherent way. The challenge here is to perform a dialectical reconstruction in order to uncover the logical paradigms or languages in their unmixed and internally coherent form. This is why my interest here is not to present the actual logical theories or interpretations (semantics) developed by Aristotle and Frege, but rather to see through their semantics as we recover the original complementary shaping paradigms. We shall see that from a dialectical point of view the semantics of Aristotle and Frege are incoherent and involve the mixing of paradigms (paradigm-crossings). The mixing of paradigms (a global "category mistake") results from the drive to theoretical completeness, that is, the attempt to fully account for the commonly recognized features of thought within one theoretical paradigm. But since a given paradigm is *inherently* limited and conceals as much as it reveals, a healthy need for completeness can only be satisfied through the mixing of paradigms, a premature attempt to synthesize what is beyond synthesis. From the point of view of dialectical critique a paradigm works best when its limits are made manifest. It is only when complementary paradigms are thus clarified that the middle way of the Mādhyamika can be discerned. It took centuries for the paradigms of ātma and anātma to emerge with sufficient purity and clarity for the dialectical middle way to be found.

In beginning this task of uncovering the complementary paradigms of

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the Aristotelian and Fregean logical frameworks it would be useful to introduce some terms. I shall use the term "semantics" for the philosophical theory or interpretation of thought. A semantics is a logical theory of the nature of thought. I call the shaping paradigm behind the Aristotelian logical framework "intensional semantics" (IS), and the paradigm of the Fregean framework "extensional semantics" (ES). *IS* and *ES* are dialectical complements polar opposites, mutually incompatible and each capturing a primitive feature of thought. I call the dialectical account of thought of Nāgārjuna "dialectical semantics" (DS). *DS* is *not* another paradigm but rather the perspective in which thought is seen as the projected superimposition of *IS* and *ES*. This is not a synthesis but a synoptic construction of a bi-focal understanding. This is the dependent coarising of thought. By the way, the term "thought" is used in a broad sense which includes human consciousness and worldly experience as this is manifested in natural language. *DS* then is an account of the nature of natural thought and language.

It is timely to give a preliminary sketch of the paradigms of *IS* and *ES*. Again, a paradigm is a model which determines a language, so *IS* and *ES* are different logical languages. Semantic concepts such as truth, reference and predication have different meanings in each language. *IS* and *ES*, being dialectical complements, are extreme polar opposites which delimit the range of possible semantics. Any given undialectical semantic theory falls within these two extremes and to varying degrees mix the two paradigms. For example, from the dialectical point of view the semantics of Aristotle and Frege are particular and material rather than general and formal. For each is enslaved to mixed paradigms while *DS* harnesses and plays through paradigms. Wittgenstein in his *Investigations* rightly warns us of the compulsive enslavement philosophers often suffer in service to a particular paradigm. It is one thing to be exercised by a paradigm, another to work a paradigm through. The dominance of paradigms over theoretical understanding has been pervasive in logical theory. The Mādhyamika seeks to liberate understanding from bondage to paradigms. In this respect *DS* is truly formal semantics, all material semantics falling within its dialectical limits.

SECTION 1

PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF IS AND ES

PREDICATION

The primary semantic concept in the logical theories of Aristotle and

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Frege is *predication*. Each presents a different model of predication and this term has different meaning in each theoretical language. For Aristotle all thoughts have a predicative structure, predication being a relation between a logical subject and predicate. This means that predication is *generic* for thought: singular, general, relational and compound propositions are all predicative. In this semantic paradigm any logical type of term may enter into the logical subject or predicate. Predication consists of two terms positively or negatively joined. The constituent terms specify *concepts*, so predication is a *sense relation between concepts*. Not every term may be significantly predicated of another, in fact most possible combinations of terms are impredicable, their combination failing to be a well-formed conceptual content or proposition. In this language category rules determine which terms may significantly conjoin to form a proposition. These are the two primary features of *IS* : that predication consists of a *sense* relation between terms, and that all thoughts are predicative. We shall see that these two features are inseparably bound. The term "intensional" in *IS* accentuates the facts that predication is a *sense* (intensional) relation.

By contrast, predication in the Fregean language is *extensional*, hence "*ES*". Predication is logically singular and atomic, consisting of the juxtaposition of the logical subject and predicate. The logical subject for Frege is always and only a *singular* term, that is, a term which stands for an individual *object*. The predicate term is a *concept*, that is, a *general* term which stands for a property or relation. There is a radical asymmetry between subject and predicate since the subject term can never be predicated, and the predicate term can never be a subject of predication. These two terms are juxtaposed and it is important to notice this for Frege insists that there is no logical copula which affirmatively or negatively joins subject and predicate. Instead they are immediately joined in such a way that the predicate term (an incomplete function) is "saturated" by the object term. Frege rejected the classical "*S* is/isn't *P*" model of predication and introduced a new paradigm taken from mathematics which treats an elementary or atomic proposition as a function together with its argument: Fx. The "x" indicates the singular term or referring expression and it saturates the predicate function "F", which is the predicate expression standing for a concept or general term. The critical point in this semantic is that predication is a relation between a *concept and an individual object* designated by the singular term. General propositions (like "All persons are mortal"), for example, are not predicative but have a very different logical form. The predicative relation here is the relation of a concept being *true or false of* the object, or of the object *instantiating*

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the concept. This is a *truth-relation* (extensional) and not a sense relation. This paradigm of predication is accordingly designated "extensional' Again, the two primary features of *ES* are that predication is logically singular (atomic) and that it is a truth relation between concept and object.

Whereas predication in *IS* is a sense relation between two terms and is generic (*all* thoughts being predicative), in *ES* it is a truth relation between concept and object and is singular and atomic (only singular propositions and relational propositions involving multiple individuals in ordered sequence being predicative). I wish to show that the predicative paradigms of *IS* and *ES* are dialectical complements. This has not been obvious since the *rhetoric* of philosophical logic has been confused. When Frege introduced his new and revolutionary paradigm for thought it was presented as displacing and rendering obsolete the previous classical paradigm of Aristotle. Frege's new logical language presented itself as being (at least potentially) complete and adequate and correct and rejected the Aristotelian logical language as being inadequate and incorrect. Thus, viewed from *within* Frege's framework the Aristotelian logical theory is naturally viewed as invalid as an account of thought. However, when we gain some dialectical distance and view both languages *externally* it begins to emerge that these two theoretical models, which do indeed compete and are incompatible at one level, are dialectially bound and complementary. Each model elucidates a polar extreme of dual consciousness and each is found to presuppose each other in a dialectical account of predication. At the same time each paradigm is inherently incomplete (as *all* paradigms are) and eclipses thought as much as it elucidates it.

Let us examine the two paradigms more closely. Thought co-arises in polar contraries. One limit of thought is *exterior* as consciousness reaches out to actual immediately presented particular objects. Extensional thought takes this movement as primary and primitive-extension being the logical relation between thought and immediately given entities. The concern of thought here is *truth* and *ES* attempts to capture thought as a medium of truth. On the other hand, the contrary limit of thought is *internal* as consciousness reaches into its inner conceptual life where it plays with ideas in their rich possibilities. This inner predicative dance of concepts is not primarily concerned with truthful description of actual existent objects, but rather with intelligible possibilities of *sense*. Intensional thought takes this interest of consciousness as primitive, intension being a logical relation between concepts. *IS* is primarily concerned with elucidating this feature of thought. So, *ES* is a semantics of *truth* and *IS* is a semantics of *sense*.

I am not suggesting that these two polar features of thought, sense and

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truth, are incompatible or alienated from each other. On the contrary, the challenge for semantics is precisely to explain how they come together and are complementary. Rather I am suggesting that the "essentialistic" strategy of bringing them together in an essential unity and identity inevitably collapses, for precisely what the Mādhyamika questions is the assumption that thought constitutes one univocal, essential and self-identical unity. Essentialistic criteria of unity and oneness are shown to be incoherent and instead *a* dialectical model of unity and identity is presented, in the metaphor of pratītya-samutpāda. As we further explore the virtues and limits of the paradigms of *IS* and *ES* we shall see that each strives to encompass both poles of thought only to fall short in incoherence.

SYSTEMATIC OPPOSITION BETWEEN *ES* AND *IS*

In proceeding with this preliminary sketch it is important to appreciate the *systematic* opposition and contrast between the two paradigms. Each paradigm involves a distinct language which has a certain internal *coherence* so that the primary semantic concepts form a network of mutually determined meanings. These semantic concepts (predication, reference, truth, meaning, proposition, concept, negation, individual, name, object, etc) are systematically ambiguous between the two languages. It becomes critical now to disambiguate these concepts and properly locate them within their respective languages. It is in this way that the two complementary paradigms are to be purified.

First, let us see how the semantic concepts hang together in the paradigm of *IS*. Here *thought* is conceptual content and the units of thought, propositions, are distinguished from the various *acts* of thinking such as judging, asserting, stating, etc. Thoughts (propositions) in *IS* are sense contents which are immediately presented to awareness. Predication is the logical structure of propositions, so intensional predication must not be confused with judgment or assertion. Judgment is the valuation of the truth or falsity of propositions; it is an *assessive* act of thought. Assertion is the expressions of judgment in the form of a statement (an expressive act of thought). Judgment and assertion are *thought-acts* which are primarily concerned with truth, but propositions (predications) are thought-contents (not acts) which are presentations of conceptual sense. These thought-contents may in turn enter into a variety of expressive or linguistic (speech) acts such as asserting, commanding, questioning, etc. A predication in *IS* then does not make a truth claim or even purport truth. It is rather a potentiality for truth, that is, it is a *possibility* which may be true-or-

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false. A predication merely specifies a state of affairs (a possibility) and not a fact (an existent state of affairs). Thus, *IS* is a semantics of possibility and sense or intelligibility, not a semantics of actuality, fact or assertibility.

By contrast, thought in *ES* is *ascriptive* or *assertive* content which is primarily concerned with truthful description of the world, with presentation of *facts*. The primary interest of thought here is with the existential, the actual, with what *is* the case. Extensional thought reaches out directly to entities which are actually presented. Thought is primarily *referential* and deals with the ascription of concepts to objects which are immediately given in reference (*referents*). Thought is identificatory and in this language propositions take the form of statements or judgments which present the actual. In this logical language propositions are essentially bound up with thought-acts of judgment, assertion, identification, and naming or referring. The extensional model of predication captures this feature of thought through the truth-relation between an atomic concept and a referent; it consists of a concept being *true or false of* an object. The logical subject of predication must be a singular term whose logical function is to designate an actual individual object to which the logical predicate (the concept) applies. The logical subject is primarily a referring expression which functions in the thought-act of reference. Reference is a logical act of identification which is performed by a thinker. Thus, in *ES* the terms "proposition", "predication." "reference", "object", etc., have very different meanings from similar terms in the language of *IS*. In *ES* predication is bound up with assertibility and truth conditions and is referential, while in *IS* it is primarily concerned with intelligibility, with sense-conditions and is conceptual.

While the logical subject in *ES* is a referring expression, a singular term which designates an actual individual object, the logical subject in *IS* is a concept (of *any* type, whether singular, general, relational, etc) which specifies a *conceptual* object. Concept-objects are possible objects which may or may not also be existentially actual. These possible objects are of different types: individual, universal, relational, state, etc. This means that the term "object" in the language of *IS* has a very different meaning from the term "object" in *ES*. Let us use the term "essent" for the objects of thought in *IS* and "referent" for the objects of thought in *ES*. Referents are actual individual objects while essents are generic possible objects. Correspondingly, the term "reference" has a unique meaning in *IS* where the logical subject is said to specify an essent. Reference in *IS* is called "specification". So, the logical subject *specifies* a conceptual object (essent) which is taken as a possible entity. Of course possible entities

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in IS have their own form of conceptual actuality and determinacy as well as their own sense of "existence". It would be helpful in following through in our systematic disambiguation of the two languages to use the term "being" to indicate the form of actuality and existence of essents. The contrast between the two paradigms begins to emerge in greater relief: *IS* is a semantics of sense conditions intelligibility, possibility, essents and being and *ES* is a semantics of truth conditions, assertibility, actuality, referents and existence.

TWO SENSES OF "ONTOLOGICAL"

The complementary languages of thought each has its own sense of the "ontological". Ontology in *IS* deals with essents and being, while in *ES* it deals with referents and existence. These ontological poles constitute the dialectical limits of thought. The evolution of ontology in Western thought has oscillated between the poles of being and existence. On the one hand we find certain intensional ontologists gravitating towards the pole of *being*, discerning essents (which need not exist empirically) as the truly real objects : Plato, Descartes, Husserl, for example. Plato's forms are essents, Descartes' ontological proof of God reveals an infinite being, and Husserl speaks of idetic objects in his phenomenology. On the other hand we find extensional ontologists moving to the existential pole : Hume, Sartre, Quine, and even Descartes at one stage in his *Meditations*, to pick out a few obvious examples. For these thinkers the real entities which make up the world are referents : Hume's immediately presented percepts, Descartes' ontological proof of the "I" in the second Meditation, Sartre's existential "thing" which is without name and form and which is, *qua* essence, nothing, and Quine's logical subject as an indexical pronominal "this", the bound variable in quantification. And of course some ontologists tried to synthesize both poles in the same paradigm : Aristotle and Frege, for example. Aristotle attempts to bring together essent and referent in his analysis of primary beings (*ousiai*) which unify matter (this) and form (such). Frege postulates the sense/reference distinction as two semantical functions of one and the same logical sign. Both attempts at synthesis mix the paradigms, are paradigm-crossings. Frege, for instance, attempts to bring together both languages of thought in one model—"sense" is taken from *IS* and "reference" is taken from *ES*. Both semantic functions are attributed to one and the same postulated semantic sign. This attempted synthesis sets up a deep tension and ambivalence in Frege's logical theory.

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We shall see shortly why this strategy of synthesis of the two languages of thought falls into dialectical incoherence, the "single bind".

LOGICAL SUBJECTS IN ES ARE PRONOMINAL

The two ontological poles of thought stand in radical contrast : if we begin with the *referent* we are naturally led to the Sartrian extreme of an entity, an immediately given "this" which is conceptually vacuous and in this respect no-thing, having neither name nor form. It is a "something" which is inexhaustible in its existential presence and stands over against conceptual thought. When Descartes encounters the existential "I" in his second Meditation he encounters it as "something" which is indeterminate and without essence, as a *that* rather than a *what* : he says,

> "But I do not yet know sufficiently clearly what I am, I who am sure that I exist. . . I am something real and really existing, but what thing am I ?. . .I know that I exist and I am seeking to discover what I am, that 'I' that I know to be"[1]

This conceptually indeterminate "I" is the existential extreme without essence or being. The "pure" logical subject is here apprehended indexically in pronominal reference. The logical subject is devoid of conceptual-descriptive content. It is given pronominally as an "it" and is taken independently of any predicative determination and is logically prior to characterization. Thus, the logical subject in *ES* is an existentially given "something" which can satisfy or instantiate various concepts. Being conceptually indeterminate it is, from this point of view, sheer potentiality. But in its pronominal referential mode it is fully determinate and actual. *ES* presupposes that the genuine logical subject is a pure referent which is an existential individual. Later we shall face the question of criteria of individuation for such pronominal referents.

LOGICAL SUBJECTS IN IS ARE CONCEPTUAL

On the other hand, as we turn to the logical subject in *IS* we find that we begin with some pure *essent* or being which is given to thought as the conceptually determined subject—a "such" or "what". Here we have a *nominal* subject which is conceptually determined, defined through some essence, of a particular ontological type, and descriptively identified. The subject

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thus apprehended is a particular "something" which is *specific*, and we speak of it as specified by the logical subject expression, a logically proper name. In *IS* a name is a unity of concepts and an *essent* (the object specified by a conceptual subject term) is the object apprehended through some essential determination. Essents exhibit *intensional* generality since they are apprehended by thought as possible objects, whether or not they happen also to be existentially actual. In IS the term "general" has a different sense from generality in *ES* where it connotes a class with individual members. Generality in IS has to do with possibility and with a specification of a category. The contrast between classificatory or quantificational generality and specificational or categorial generality is explained below. The point being stressed here is that essents are presented to thought as possible objects with intensional generality. An essent is at once conceptually determinate (actual) and existentially indeterminate.

The terms "singular" and "general" are systematically ambiguous between the two languages. In *IS* the logical subject is conceptually specified and this means that logically proper names in this language are conceptual, whereas, in *ES* the logical subject is pronominally referred to and the logically proper names are conceptually vacuous, as Russell and Quine have insisted. Singular terms in *IS*, being conceptual, always function in terms of intensional generality; they specify essents of particular ontological types. An essent is always of some species and carries this form and generality with it. In *ES*, however, singular terms, being pronominally referring expressions, designate individual members of some class. But here too we find a form of extensional generality lurking in the referential determination of individuals. This is why Quine finds primary reference in existential generalization. The singular term in *ES* must be pronominally designated from a presupposed quantificational domain of individuals, and it is the function of existential quantification to pronominalize the variable in order to achieve the reference of singular terms. In other words, the singular term in ES has its corresponding form of generality too.

BRACKETING EXISTENCE IN ES AND IS

We conclude this preliminary presentation of the two paradigms by pointing out some further critical ambiguities between the two languages. First of all we must be careful to separate the notions of the *actual* and the *existential*. It is one thing for an object to be actual, another for it to exist.

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For in *IS* the objects of thought (essents) are conceptually actual and determinate whether or not the object specified also happens to be existentially actual. The essent indicated by the conceptual singular term "the present king of France", for example, is conceptually determinate even though such an object happens not to exist (is existentially indeterminate). The existential status of essents is irrelevant to their function in predicative formation. All that is required for intelligible predication is that the essent specified by the logical subject be a *possible* object. Since there are categorical constraints on conceptualization in *IS* not all expressions succeed in specifying an essent. Thus, while the present king of France is a possible object, "the round square" is not. The existential status of an essent is bracketed for purposes of predication. This is a restatement of the earlier point that predication in *IS* is of the possible and specifies a possible state of affairs. The semantic laws of sense are independent of existential status.

But existential status must be equally bracketed in thought formation in *ES*. Failure to disentangle the concepts of reference, truth and existence has led to much confusion in contemporary logical theory. To be a referent does not mean to exist. The identification of referent with existent object is unavoidable when the domain of quantification is assumed to range over existent individuals. But this need not be assumed. It is an extra-logical dogma which must be dropped when considering the language of *ES* in its pure form. If, for example, the domain of quantification (reference) is taken to include all objects immediately presented to awareness, whether in waking experience or in dream, then a referent might be an object which failed to exist (assuming that dream objects do not exist). It would nevertheless be a genuine referent which may be pronominally referred to and the subject of extensional predication. We may even have a true predication if the predicate turns out to be a *true of* the referent in question. Thus, truth, too, must be separated from existence. The point is that a referent in *ES* may be *pronominally* determinate (actual) even though it fails to exist. So both languages have this in common—each brackets the question of existence as far as predicative formation is concerned. But "existence" remains equivocal between the two languages. While an *essent* is conceptually determinate (actual) and pronominally indeterminate, a *referent* is pronominally determinate (actual) and conceptually indeterminate. Logical subjects in both languages have *some* determinacy or actuality independently of existential status.

The ambiguity in the term "exist" is easily overlooked when we take an immediately given perceptual object as the model of an existent object. For precisely what is in question is what is "immediately given". In *IS*

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"the object" is apprehended conceptually as an essent (even though in this case the essent also happens to exist) which may enter into predication. But in *ES* "the object" is apprehended pronominally and we may go on to consider which concepts apply to it, whether it *satisfies* some concept. I have been suggesting that "the object" is systematically ambiguous here and in that ambiguity we find two distinct types of existence. The pronominal existence of a referent is located in a world of atomically distinct objects which are not structured categorically and do not fall into ontological types. The conceptual existence of an essent is found in a world where objects are categorically bound and are always of some type. There is a world of difference between an essent and a referent.

TWO SENSES OF "ONTOLOGICAL" AND "TRUE"

We begin to find a shift in the centre of gravity of each model of predication. In *ES* the predominant weight is found in the atomic *predicates* and the primary interest is in *identifying* the objects in the domain of reference which *satisfy* or *instantiate* a given predicate-concept. The question of ontology has nothing to do with the type of object or the category of the concept but only with *what is the case*. Thought is essentially wedded to truth since thought consists in applying predicates to objects which are pronominally specified. But in IS the centre of attention is given to the subject, the essent which is conceptually given, and the primary interest is in apprehending this object intelligibly. Here thinking is primarily concerned with the *type* of thing the subject is for this determines the *sòrts* of concepts which may intelligibly apply to it. The primary interest of thought in *IS* is to discern the nature of the subject since this determines what may or may not be true of it. Ontology in *IS* deals with the *kinds* (types) of things there are, hence with what *may be true*. Thought determines truth *status*, but not truth value.

This is another way of putting the earlier contrast that *ES* is a language of truth-conditions and a semantics of existence while *IS* is a language of sense-conditions and a semantics of being. Thought in ES is nominalisation and truth is referential. That is, since thought or predication consists in the identificational (ascriptive) application of a nominal atomic concept to a pronominal referent, truth arises when this nominalization is satisfied. Truth is correct nominalization or identification. For this reason the *meaning* of a thought is identified with its conditions of truth. The concepts

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of meaning and truth are inseparable in *ES*. But we have seen that in *IS* thought is conceptual and predication consists of a sense relation between concepts. This paradigm involves a *conceptual* model of truth in which the question of truth of a given predication is mediated by sense. Thought is liberated from truth determination and takes flight in the realm of the intelligible and the possible. Let us reserve the term "meaning" for thoughts in *ES* and "sense" for thoughts in IS. The very concept of *significance* is ambiguous in the two languages and this involves a critical difference in the respective notions of truth.

SUMMARY

In this preliminary sketch of the two paradigms for thought it begins to be clear that there are two distinct languages shaped by the two paradigms. *ES* begins with one pole of thought, the pronominal referent which is conceptually indeterminate, and proceeds to account for thought taking the referent as primitive. The result is a language in which all the semantic concepts fall into a network of mutually determined meanings having systematically different senses from comparable terms in the complementary language of IS. On the other hand *IS* begins with the essent as the object of thought and taking this as primitive develops a coherent network in which the semantic terms take on mutually determined unique meanings. We begin to see a radical contrast between the two languages and systematic ambiguities in the primary semantic concepts : predication, truth, name, subject, predicate, reference, meaning, singular term, general term, etc. Let us now focus in greater detail on each of the two languages and trace the internal systematic connections between their respective semantic concepts. We shall then be in a better position to appreciate the strategy of meditation which is appropriate between such complementary languages.

SECTION 2

THE LANGUAGE OF EXTENSIONAL SEMANTICS (ES)

THE NAMING MODEL OF PREDICATION

In *ES* the primary logical subject is an immediately given "this", a pure referent which is conceptually vacuous and pronominally determinate.

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Being conceptually empty it is in this respect "nothing" and it is pronominally designated. The logical subject in *ES* is pronominal and indexical. In this respect there is an implicit variability that comes with conceptual indeterminacy. The logical subject as pronominal referent is indistinguishable from other referents in the domain of thought, for it lacks identity and individuality apart from the assignment of identifying concepts. Wittgenstein saw this clearly in the *Tractatus* where he points out that a name has meaning only in the context of a proposition. But if the logical subject in *ES* is a pronominal referent, we find here also that the concept is a *nominal*, and predication is nominalization; predication is the application of a nominal-concept to a pronominal referent. The term "concept" in this language must be carefully distinguished from this term in *IS*.

Concepts in *ES* are descriptive names, like labels, which are *atomic* and logically independent of other descriptive nominals. This is so whether the expression is an object-word or a property-word. Russell showed, for example, that definite descriptions were "really" concept-words, and Quine went further to show that even natural proper names like "Socrates" were equally to be seen as concept-words or descriptive terms. Both these theorists are rightly correcting an incoherence in Frege's language and clarifying the paradigm of *ES*. The other side of the same point is to see that all concepts in *ES* are nominals like definite descriptions and proper names. The relation between proper names and pronominal objects is the relation of atomic predication in *ES* : a nominal-concept is true or false of some pronominal object. This is the naming model of predication.[2]

ATOMICITY AND GENERALITY OF CONCEPTS

It must be stressed that nominal-concepts are *atomic* in the sense that they are logically independent of each other in meaning and function. This is so whether the nominal is a name or a property word; these are logically on a par in *ES*. Property-words and relation-words in *ES* are of the same logical type as descriptive nominals and ordinary proper names, and alike apply to pronomical referents—they are all true or false of referents. And just as descriptive nominals and ordinary proper names are logically atomic, property-nominals and relation-nominals are also atomic. For example, the nominals "the Morning Star" and the "the Evening Star" are logically independent in nominal meaning and happen to apply to the same referent. Similarly, "Socrates" and "philosopher" are atomically discrete nominals, as are the nominals "person" and "mortal". For all concept-terms are logically independent and never stand in immediate logical relation : *there*

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are no conceptual relations in ES. Concepts can only be applied directly to referents and these extensional (truth-relational) predications are then truth-functionally *associated.* Thus, for example, if I wish to render "All persons are mortal" in *ES* it would take the following form :

$$(x)\,(\text{Person}_x \supset \text{Mortal}_x)$$

And here it is explicit that the concept words "person" and "mortal" are *not* immediately connected in sense but the atomic predications "P_x" and "M_x" are *associated* in a truth-functional connective "$\supset$". And *all* thoughts in *ES* are truth-functionally compounded.

This is an essential feature of *ES* : concepts are atomic and are best understood as nominals. This makes concepts in *ES* fundamentally different from concepts in *IS* where they are intensionally connected and anatomic. In *ES* concepts are logically associated in external truth-functional relations. Concepts never stand in immediate relation and are always mediated by a truth relation. Here we may notice in striking analogy to David Hume's phenomenalist language in which "ideas" (as copied from impressions or percepts) are anatomic and discrete and were merely *associated* in thought. Names in this language designate bundles of impressions which were somehow associated. Similarly, in *ES* concepts are discrete and independent and stand in *logical associations.*[3]

Generality and Individuation

The challenge for *ES*, in which the logical subject is pronominal and the concepts nominal, is to account for the unity and identity of individuals in the domain of discourse. The logical subject as pronominal referent is indeterminate and requires the collecting and "bundling" (binding) function of a quantifier or generalizer. For since concepts are atomic and are logically associated it is necessary to indicate how discrete atomic predications are to be identified in the *same referent.* Each pronominal referent, each indexical occasion, would be distinct and independent and there would be no unified individual instantiating simultaneously a range of concepts. The primary function of *generalization* or *quantification* in *ES* is to *bundle or bind* the different pronominal referents into one individual. Such an individual is a logical construction from generalization : the individual is *class* (cluster) of discrete pronominal referents which satisfy the same nominal-concepts or predicate functions. This is the point behind Quine's "insight" that pronouns are bound variables. Quantification is classification and generalization is quantitative in a numerical sense. We begin to

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see that concept-terms in *ES* are *general* nominals (nominals need not be singular) and that nominals and pronominals are meant for each other, as names are meant for objects.

The implication of this is that predication in *ES* is at once atomic *and* general : for a singular term (pronominal) is a generalized indeterminate variable which is bound to a domain of referents. Thus, for example, if "G" is a concept-nominal "person" then "G_x" is a concept-function (predicate), where "x" is a variable pronominal which is indeterminate and incomplete without the range of possible values being specified : and this is indicated by the generalizer or quantifier, as in "(x) Gx", which is an atomic predication in *ES*. So-called "instantiation" ("Ga", where "a" is a given individual constant or value of the variable "x") presupposes a *r ange* of possible values of the variable, which means that quantification-generalization is required. Thus, instantiation in *ES* presupposes generalization as a contextual background. For this reason the primitive and atomic form of predication involves a quantifier and the true logical subject in *ES* is the *domain* of quantification. So predication in *ES* is *atomic* since concepts are atomic and discrete, and *general* since the individual variable arises in a context of generalization which specifies the range of values of the variable. Individuation (instantiation) presupposes generalization since an individual is precisely *a bound variable*, where a generalizer binds a variable to a range of values. An individual is a class of atomic predications in which the members are logically associated in truth-functional relations. Thus, in *ES* generality arises with the pronominal variable and the quantitative generalizer functions by specifying the domain of possible values of the variable. Individuation presupposes generalization, and the latter operates quantitatively since binding a variable to a range within a domain defines a *class* of atomic instances which are numerically or pronominally differentiated. This is why Frege identified the generalizing function with the quantificational function.

SINGULAR AND GENERAL NOMINAL-CONCEPTS

In order to grasp the meaning of "singular term" in *ES* we must discriminate two senses of "general" : concept terms like "red" are general in the sense that they have different *instantiations*, they apply to different pronominal referents, and we may call this "instantial" generality. Pronominals are general in the sense that they are *variable* and collect or *classify* different concepts or nominals : the same pronominal can instantiate or take as a value different concept-nominals and in this sense it classifies

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them. This is called "classificational" generality, and the quantifier is in this sense a classifier when it binds a variable and bundles nominals. For example, in the *ES* transcription of the ordinary statement : "All persons are mortal"

$$(x), (P_x \supset M_x)$$

the quantifier binds the variables to the universal domain of pronominals and *also* associates or bundles the two nominals "person" and "mortal" in an anaphoric cross-reference to one and the same "x".

The singular term in *ES* is precisely the pronominal which is bound by a quantifier, that is, the singular term is the quantified or generalized *variable*. Once we have distinguished the two senses of "general" we see the sense in which singular terms are classificatory and general.

Both senses of "generality" are tied to a form of indeterminacy or potentiality. For the concept or predicate function "G" has an empty space which is marked by an "x" and this incompleteness defines the predicate-generality and potentiality to take different instances as values; and the "x" displays the indeterminate variability of the pronominal which is *open* to different assignments of values. It should be noted that both senses of "general"—the instantial generality of concept-nominals and the classificational generality of singular terms (quantified pronominals)—are *quantificational* in origin; for to instantiate is to be *one* case and to classify is to collect many cases into *one* class. In *ES* generality is indicated through the category of *number and quantity*. This is the origin of calling *ES* "quantification theory". We shall see shortly that this is not the case with generality in *IS* which is qualificational and conceptual.[4]

INDIVIDUALS AND IDENTITY

In *ES* the domain of "individuals" is quantitatively and numerically given and consists of pronominal referents which are conceptually indeterminate. Without the nominal (atomic concepts) which form their own conceptual domain the referents cannot be differentiated and specified by singular terms. Individuals are classified pronominals, and a singular term is a rigidly designated pronominal which satisfies a range of nominals or predicate functions. In this sense the domain has access to both pronominals and nominals. In thought (predication) an individual is identified by use of certain of its nominals or concepts. It is through such nominals that it may be uniquely singled out.

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UNRESTRICTED PREDICABILITY

In the preliminary sketch of *ES* in section 1 we focused on the object of thought as referent and it began to emerge that a language of thought was shaped by this. Here we begin to see that concepts as atomic and nominal, equally shape the form of this language of thought. The atomicity of concepts must be stressed since an implication of this is that the objects of thought in *ES* are not constrained by ontological type, nor are the concept-nominals constrained by categorial relations. This means that atomic predications are not governed by category rules and predicability in *ES* is unrestricted. In this language any concept may be predicatively joined with any referent significantly and the result is a proposition which is true or false. There is no *nonsense* in this language, and meaningless is tantamount to syntactic ill-formation or ungrammaticalness. This is a fundamental difference between the two languages, for the in *IS* predicability is constrained by category rules. One feature of the typeless world of *ES* is that negation is extensional and exhausts the conceptual range. For example, if "W_x" is the predicate function "x is wise" then the *opposite* of this is not the logical contrary "x is un-wise", which applies only to the category of kinds of things which can be wise, but the logical complement "x is non-wise" which applies to all referents in the domain which are not-wise. Negation in *ES* is therefore extensional and is indicated by the truth-functional operator :

"Wx" and "$\sim$Wx"

Thus, "negation" has a unique meaning in *ES* and indicates complementary opposition whereas in *IS* the primary opposition is *contrariety*.

ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC PREDICATION

Since concepts are atomic and discrete and never enter into conceptual sense relations, predication becomes a truth-synthesis between a nominal and a pronominal. Each concept remains within its own atomic predication and conceptual relations are always mediated by truth-functions which associate atomic propositions. For this reason it is natural that analyticity must be specified in terms of extensional criteria of truth relations. Analyticity is defined in terms of *necessary truth*. Kant's intensional criterion of conceptual containment is ruled out not because it involves a messy metaphor but because it is inherently unsuited to the language of *ES*. Quine's legitimate scepticism concerning this intensional form of

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analyticity was *required* by his extensional language. Analyticity as a sense relation between concepts is *required* in *IS*, whereas analyticity in *ES* can only be a form of truth relation.

The same holds for *entailment* as a logical relation between propositions. Here too it must be explicated in terms of truth-functional relations rather than sense relations. Because of the atomicity of nominals the strongest relation possible in *ES* is the truth relation and intensional sense relations cannot arise. The validity of an argument therefore depends upon truth relations.

The atomicity of nominal-concepts and predication naturally leads to the position that thought (predication) is synthetic, for the application of a nominal to a pronominal referent leaves no room for intensional analyticity and the truth-functional relations between atomic predications are logical *associations* which are synthesized and constructed. No wonder Quine is sceptical about analyticity and embraces all thought as synthetic !

SUMMARY

We have found that the language of *ES* is thoroughly extensional with the logical subject as pronominal referent, logical predicate as concept-nominal and predication as atomic nominalization. *ES* is a semantics of extensional truth-conditions since extensional thought arises in the truth-relation of satisfaction. The concept of pronominal reference is indexical and involves a thought-act in which identification of referents is achieved through nominalization and individuation. Individuals are bundles of nominals and singular terms are quantified or generalized pronominals. The logical subject turns out to be the whole domain of referents which are inherently conceptually vacuous. Since concepts are atomized this makes them nominals and it is through nominals that the referents are identified and differentiated into individuals. A form of generality arises both with nominals and pronominals, and primary atomic predication involves generalization through a quantifier. Concepts, being atomic, conform to the paradigm of nominals and there can be no conceptual relations in this language. The challenge for *ES* is to account for the supposition of a pronominal referent and to explain how nominals (concepts) may be applied to referents which are conceptually vacuous and indeterminate, hence undifferentiated. The presupposed domain of individuals is problematic in *ES* since on the one hand the logical subject is a pronominal and the referents are without identity, and on the other the concept is

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nominal and of a different logical type from the referent. Since individuals must have conceptual determinacy and identity the challenge for *ES* is to account for individuals which are at once pronominal referent *and* conceptually determinate. Individuals can only be logical constructs from the two types of terms which constitute extensional predication. This consequence of *ES* is of great interest to the Mādhyamika.

SECTION 3

THE LANGUAGE OF INTENSIONAL SEMANTICS (IS)

While *ES* is a nominalizing language in which concepts are nominals and predication is a form of naming, we find that *IS* is a conceptualizing language where names are conceptual and predication is a form of conceptualization. *IS* takes the conceptual pole of thought as primary and attempts to give a coherent and complete account of thought from this starting point. The primary object of thought here is the *essent* (in contrast to the pronominal referent), that is, the logical subject as conceptually given. In this language the primary semantic concepts are given quite different meanings from similar terms in *ES*. The terms "predication", "logical subject", "concept", "name", "singular term", "general", "individual", "reference" are presented in a conceptual network of mutually determined meanings. Let us now trace these internal systematic connections as we just did for *ES*.

The term "concept" in *IS* is critically different in meaning from that term as used in *ES*. We have seen that in *ES* concepts are atomized, hence nominalized, but in *IS* concepts are *anatomic* and stand in monistic internal relations. This means that the language of *IS* moves in the direction of *logical monism* and is thoroughly conceptual. Concepts do stand in sense relations and predication consists of a sense relation between two concept-terms. While *ES* atomizes concepts so that they may be related (associated) truth-functionally, *IS* anatomizes concepts so they remain categorized in a monistic network of sense relations in which there are genuine logical (sense) *connections* between concepts. So, the very meaning of "concept" is systematically ambiguous between the two languages. This *anatomic* feature of concepts in *IS* shapes and determines the form of this language. Let us examine how this is so.

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PREDICATION AS GENERIC AND CONCEPTUAL
CATEGORIES, CONTRARIES AND QUALIFICATION THEORY

First, we shall focus on the notion of a *concept in general.* Concepts have an oppositional structure in *IS*—every concept is bound up with its contrary, and a term when taken together with its logical contrary forms a special formal concept called a *category*, a concept in its most *generic* form. Thus, if "C" is a particular concept (say, "wise") and "un-C" its logical contrary ("un-wise") then "C" and "un-C" taken together comprise a category or *absolute* concept /C/ (= "C-or-un-C", where "or" is inclusive). "/C/" represents a category and exhausts a conceptual domain. The context of a *category* is different from that of a *class.* In *ES* we saw that the domain of discourse is a universal (quantificational) class of all referents. But in *IS* the domain of discourse is a category which is generic and qualitatively given. While *ES* is quantification theory, *IS* is qualification theory.

We may formally indicate the contrary opposition in conceptual form using a "+" for one and a "—" for its contrary : "+C" and "—C" are contraries and the absolute or category-concept is "/C/" (= "+/-C"). This means that a generic concept or category is indeterminate in contrariety and may be differentiated into "+C" or "—C". Contrary opposition, as pointed out earlier, must not be confused with complementary opposition in *ES* where a given term "T" stands in extensional opposition to its *negation* "non-T". This difference may be seen in the fact that "+C" and "—C" are *privatives* and hence internally bound within the category, while "T" and "non-T" are extensionally distinguished and not categorically bound. Contraries are intra-categorial privatives and are qualitatively bound. The meaning of one presupposes the meaning of the other. A category, then, is not a class and is not extensionally or quantitatively defined. It specifies a qualitative or conceptual domain of thought which may be differentiated into its determinate contraries. The very meanings of "negation" and "opposition" in *IS* differ from these terms in *ES*. A formal feature of concept formation in *IS* is that every determinate concept excludes or displaces its logical contrary. This exclusion function is an essential part of the meaning of any determinate concept.

The difference between a class in *ES* and a category in *IS* may be seen as follows : a class is the extension of a nominal, that is, collection of items to which the nominal truly applies. Since each nominal is discrete and atomic there is no such thing as a category in *ES*. By contrast a category is a conceptual domain which comprises the range of conceptual specifications. For example, the term "/ colour/" is an indeterminate range of possible

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colour-concepts which are specification of /colour/, e.g., red, blue, green, and so on. The specifications (essents) of a category are *particulars* which are determinations within that category. A category is an intensional unity of possible determinate concepts. The relation between a category and its concepts is intensional specification and determination. The more determinate in sense a concept is the more specific and particularized. We may thus speak of the items of a category as "particulars", where no quantitative or numerical criteria are imported. The process of concept formation within a category is called "qualification", and *IS* is a categorial logic or qualification theory.

In *IS* all terms are *concepts*, from the most specific to the most generic, from universals to particulars. The conceptual domain is a hierarchical structure ranging from the most specific and differentiated concepts (singular concepts) to the most inclusive and undifferentiated generic categories. Singular terms form one extreme of this conceptual range and the widest categories fall at the other extreme. There are degrees of specificity in concept formation, and a relativity in objectification (nominalization). That is, every concept, at whatever degree of specificity or particularization, specifies an *essent* (objects of thought in *IS*) which may be the logical subject in predication. A recursive principle of nominalization of concepts is at work, so no concept is debarred from becoming the logical subject of a thought. The converse is also true in that no concept is excluded from being a logical predicate and being predicated. There is therefore a relativity and symmetry in logical subject and predicate *terms* in IS. I stress the word "term" here since concept-terms *enter into* logical subject and predicate and are not to be identified with the latter.

Conceptual Monism and Categorial Logic

The reason for this is to be found in the fact that in *IS* concepts are *anatomic* and form a network of distinct concepts which are nevertheless inherently bound in sense connections or conceptual containment. We have seen that in *ES* the atomicity of concepts shaped the form of that logical language, and here too the fact that concepts are anatomic and form a monistic unity determines the form of the language of *IS*. The conceptual



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form of *IS* may be represented in the following figure which depicts the total predicative structure in a monistic unity :[5]

This "tree" structure shows the sense structure of *IS* taken as a whole. Each category-term is located at some node in the tree structure, and each type-term is located at the end of some branch of the tree. In this graphic picture of the predicative structure the arrows indicate the path of predicability. That is, only those terms which are joined by these arrows are significantly predicable. The capital letters indicate category terms and the small letters indicate types of individuals in the language. Instead of considering the predicative possibilities of any two given terms in isolation, all terms of the language are taken together simultaneously in their predicative possibilities.

The tree structure shows the predicative form for any intensional language. It depicts the conceptual monism in which concepts are bound together in differentiation and containment. Thought formation (predication) is a *particularization* of this monistic categorial structure. Not all concepts stand in the relation of connection or containment, for those terms which are not joined in a continuous line are not co-predicable. To join concepts which are impredicable produces nonsense, a category mistake. The distinction between sense and nonsense is a formal feature of the language of *IS*. The category structure of the language (that is, of any particular intensional language) determines significant predicability. Here we find a fundamental difference with the language of *ES* where there are no type differences between objects and no category structure governing predicability. The anatomic structure of concepts entails conceptual or logical monism which is shown in the tree structure. This structure as a whole is the ultimate unit of discourse, particular predications being relative specifications of the monistic conceptual domain.[6]

The immediate effect of conceptual monism (anatomism) is that predication is *generic*. That is, all thoughts are predicative in form, whether singular, general, relational or propositional. This Leibnizian ideal of a common predicative structure for all thought makes sense only when the relativity of concept formation and objectification is grasped. One movement in the conceptual domain is to greater differentiation and specifications. The limit of this movement of differentiation is the conceptual saturation and specificity which is called the "singular term". There are degress of *particularization* as we proceed to the "roots" of the tree structure, the end points being the locus of the individual-types in the language. But at any point in the structure a given concept may be nominalized (objectified) and made the subject of predication, whether it be an individual object, a relation, a property, or a state of affairs. Nominalization

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of concepts (subject formation in predication) is recursive and applies at any level of conceptualization, including whole predications or propositions. An *essent*, then, as the object specified by a concept, may be of *any* type—individual, property, relation or state of affairs.

This may be seen more clearly if we explicate further the following notions: singular, general, particular, universal, generic, specific. First of all, all of these terms have unique meaning in the language of *IS*. "Reference" in *IS* is *specification*; we say that a concept term *specifies* some object or essent. The individual object or essent is a *particular*. Concepts are more or less specific and generic. A concept with wider conceptual range is more generic, and one with more dense or condensed conceptual range is more specific. The movement towards specification is particularization or differentiation.

A singular term (concept) in *IS* is a conceptual unity of categories. We may say in this language that a category specifies a *feature* of objects while a particularized feature is a *property*. For example, the category term/ "colour/" specifies the *feature*, of "being coloured" (generically), and a given particularization of this feature is a specific *property*, red, or green or blue, etc. So, an *individual* is specified by a singular term and constitutes a unity of features and properties. The individual is conceptually saturated, determinate, actualized and fully differentiated. Differentiation takes place through the contrary opposition in which the presence of a property, for example, displaces all other properties in that category.

The criterion of individuation, then, is not quantitative but qualitative. An individual is a unity of features and is always of some *type*. An entity which manifests two features which are not categorially connected *cannot* be an individual, and *must* be counted as composite. For example, in Descartes' dualistic ontology a person takes the features of/thought/and /extension/, the primary features of mind and body, and these features are mutually exclusive and not connected in the category structure. But since both features are attributed to a person, it is necessary (in *IS*) to take the person to be composite or dual and not an individual. In *ES* what may be *counted* (in terms of pronominal reference and quantitative criteria) as *one* is treated in *IS* as composite, by categorial criteria. An individual in *IS* is a categorial unity, and this sense of unity is not numerical.

To say that an individual is always of some *type* is most significant in the language of *IS*. For this means that it is at the same time a *species* of a genus or category. The singular concept "socrates", for example, is a particular, specific and differentiated from other individual persons. But at the same time "socrates" is a /person/, a specification of a generic category. In turn, the concept "person" is relatively specific and is itself

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a unity of features, e.g., /thinking/, /extended/, /motion/, /coloured/, etc. But relative to "socrates" it is general or generic. This shows the relativity of the terms "singular" and "general" in *IS*, that there are degrees of specificity and genericity. Thus, to say that an individual is of a type is to indicate that it is at the same time generic in conceptual content. Individuals are differentiated but never discrete in the sense of being atomic and independent in conceptualization. Generality in *IS* is not quantitative (as in *ES*) and is best understood as *generic*. And "singular" here means *specific* and *particular*. Another way to put this is that a general term is in some sense a universal and a singular term a particular. These are relative designations and, again, are not to be interpreted in quantitative, extensional terms of classification We begin to see more clearly the difference between classification and categorization.

Particulars are not conceptually atomic but always bound up with other particulars. We may see this in the example of /colour/. The category /colour/ is the conceptual range of all possible colours. This feature may be particularized in the differentiation of some specific colour, for example, red. With respect to/colour/, red is specific and individual; it is a particular. But though it is differentiated from other colours, blue, green, yellow, etc., it is at the same time bound up with these and other specific colours in the category of /colour/. So the essent *red* is a particular of some type. At the same time, "red" may be taken as general, as a generic concept, since it may be further particularized in "this red" where a more specific case of red is indicated. But "red" as a *type* of particular, is not only connected in contrariety and differentiation with other particular colours and in the feature of /colour/, but also conceptually connected with other categories and features, namely, all those categories in the categorial structure which are connected with it: space, time, texture, motion, etc. This is what it means to say that no concept is atomic; it is always part of a wider conceptual structure. This stands in striking contrast to property terms in *ES*, where they are discrete and atomic particulars as in the phenomenalist language.

Similarly, the singular term "socrates" is differentiated by contrariety from other individual persons, but is nevertheless a /person/, and in the sense organically and conceptually connected in identity to other persons in the conceptual domain of this category. What differentiates Socrates from other persons are his specific properties, *any* and *all* of them. No essential property or attribute is needed to constitute his identity. At the same time all of his features, which are shared with other persons, are essential to his being Socrates. At the level of features all persons are one. At the level of property specification they are individuated and particularized

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But an individual is at the same time *featured*, and this ties it to other members of the same type. Thus, "socrates" is at the same time specific and generic (i.e., singular and general). This is the distinction which is behind Aristotle's discussion of essential and accidental attributes. Features are essential to the identity of any individual and specifies its type. Property determinations (i.e., particularizations of features) are "accidental" relative to the *type* level of differentiation. However, Socrates' properties differentiate him from other /persons/ and at level of differentiation (at the level of individuation within the type) properties *are* essential. This seems to solve the puzzlement concerning essential and accidental "properties". The concept of an individual in *IS* as a categorial unity of features and properties render redundant the assumption that there is some additional substratum in which the features and properties inhere and are unified, and it dispels the illusion that some one special attribute must be singled out as essential for the unique identity of the individual.

It becomes clear that the terms "generic" and "universal" in *IS* are tied to potentiality and indeterminacy. The category /colour/ is universal and generic since it may be particularized in infinite ways, it is potentially *any* colour. Indeed, the notion of potentiality (as a kind of possibility) is formally tied to the meaning of a category. The model of general to singular may be seen in the example of /colour/ to red. In this specification */colour/* is generic and *red* is specific and singular. In the pair, "red" and "this red", the former is generic and the latter specific. An absolute individual is reached if and when conceptual specificity reaches a limiting saturation point. So, the pair, "person" and "socrates", on this model, is such that the former is generic and the latter specific; and in the pair "animal"/ "person", the former is generic and the latter specific. The concept "socrates" is the full specification of "person', assuming that Socrates realized his full potentiality of being a person.

CONCEPTUAL UNITY AND REDUNDANCY OF SUBSTANCE

At this point it should be pointed out that the conceptual unity in "red" and "socrates" are on a par, are precisely analogous, and there is no need to postulate some underlying substance or substratum as a unifying *thing* holding the features and properties together. We saw that in *ES* the individual is a cluster or collection (class) of nominals. That is the inevitable outcome of conceptual atomism. But in *IS* the individual is a genuine unity since the constitutive concepts are inherently connected as indicated in the model of the tree category structure. For this reason there

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is no need to postulate a substance to collect or unify the individual, for it is already conceptually unified. This makes substance (in that sense) obsolete in the purified language of *IS*. On the other hand we have seen that an individual in *IS* is not atomic and substantial but is essentially part of the whole categorial structure which is monistically united. Spinoza was, in effect, developing the ontological analogue for this conceptual (logical) monism. Just as he pointed out that individuals are like modes of the one true substance, which is the World or God, we find in *IS* that the individual, as particular, is a relative specification of the whole monistic conceptual domain. We begin to see that the anatomic or monistic conceptual language points to the same sort of language form as we find in Spinoza's ontological monism, or in the ontological monism of the Hindu ātma tradition.

BRACKETING EXISTENCE IN IS

It was pointed out in section 1 that existential import is irrelevant to conceptualization and predication. For any object of thought, whether presented "immediately" in sense perception, or presented in a dream, in fiction, or in mathematical and scientific thought, is an *essent*. How we distinguish between an essent which "exists" and one that fails to "exist" is irrelevant to the language of *IS* and predication. This is not to say that the distinction is unimportant, only that it plays no significant part in accounting for predication and thought formation or conceptualization. In this sense the question of existence as a form of determination may be bracketed, as Husserl recommended in his phenomenological analysis. We begin to see two senses of being *actual*: all essents are conceptually determinate and in this sense actual, whether it happens to exist or not. Existential actuality is independent of conceptual actuality and can neither add to nor detract from it. Thus, an essent is fully actual conceptually at its level of specification, whether it exists or not This was, of course, noticed by Kant when he pointed out that "existence" is not a predicate in the sense of adding to conceptual determinacy.

ANALYTICITY AND SENSE RELATIONS

Finally, it becomes clear that in *IS*, where predication is generic and consists of sense relations between concept-terms, sense relations between concepts need not be analytic, in the Kantian sense of conceptual containment.

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The fact that this book on my desk is /coloured/ is *analytic*, since to be a book is to be /extended/ and this means to be /coloured/. But *that this book is red* is not analytic but synthetic. The features of objects are analytically given in the categorial structure (category containment), but the specifications of the features are not determined or necessitated. This points to a different model of identity from the one which distinguishes between essential and accidental attributes. For in *IS* features are essential (constituting the identity and definition of the *type* of thing) but properties are not. The property determinations of a thing are contingent and the predications of them are *synthetic conceptual relations.*

Of course the account of logical entailment in *IS* will be different from that in *ES*, for here the origin of entailment is to be found in the genuine analytical sense relations which hold between concept-terms. The key to analyticity and entailment is not in truth relations (as in *ES*) but in necessary sense relations. And these are given in the category structure. So, validity here is not a matter of truth relations at all.

SUMMARY

Of course this has been sketchy and a great deal more might be said to develop this paradigm in detail. The points to be stressed in this context are that the language of *IS* is shaped by conceptual anatomism or monism, and this involves a generic concept of predication in which all thoughts involve relations between concepts, where all terms are conceptual. The distinction between singular and general terms is relativized to the monistic conceptual domain which is differentiated in a categorial structure. This structure has two limits—one is the undifferentiated, which is the all-inclusive category and the transcendental unity of the language, while the other is the discriminated types of individuals which are most differentiated and particularized. The natural outcome of this logical monism is that all terms, at any degree of specificity, specifies an essent which may be nominalized as the logical subject of predication. An essent in this form is an object which is conceptually determinate and actual, whether it happens to exist or not. Singular terms are categorial unities of features and properties which require no additional substantial unifying entity. In this monistic language of concepts the categorial structure as a whole becomes the ultimate unit of discourse of which particular predications are mere relative specifications. We find here a parallel move in this logical language to the ontological monism found in Spinoza or in the ātma tradition. This feature of *IS* is of special interest to the Mādhyamika.

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SECTION 4

NAGARJUNA AND DIALECTICAL SEMANTICS (DS)

DIALECTICAL MEDIATION OF ES AND IS

So far the attempt has been to sketch out in pure form the paradigms of *ES* and *IS* in preparation for the mediation of the dialectical semantics (*DS*) of Nāgārjuna. We are now in a position to turn directly to Nāgārjuna's account of the nature of thought. Let us first review some of the main points. It has been stressed that there are two complementary languages of thought which are polar opposites semantically, and which delimit the range of possible semantics. *Any* semantic theory will fall between the two extremes and will arise through some incoherent mixing of the two paradigm languages.

On the one hand we have seen that *ES* begins with the object of thought as the pure pronominal referent which is conceptually vacuous and through atomizing its concepts nominalizes them into discrete terms. The primary notion of predication (thought formation) consists of applying nominal concepts to pronominal subjects, a relation of truth or satisfaction (the nominal being true or false of the pronominal). The relation of predication here is extensional, and not a sense relation between two terms. And since the concept-nominals are atomic and never stand in immediate relation, they can only be logically associated extensionally through truth-functions. Similarly, the device of quantifiers or generalizers are needed to bundle or collect (classify) the discrete nominals into one entity which is called the individual. In this language individuals are bundles or classes consisting of nominals which are true of the same conceptually indeterminate pronominal.

On the other hand it has been shown that the complementary language of *IS* is one in which predication consists of a sense relation between concept-terms. Predication is conceptualization and the predicative relation is a logical connection (not mere association) between concept-terms. The anatomism of concepts reveals a logical monism in which the language as a whole forms a categorial structure which determines the predicative possibilities in the language. The predicative relation is governed by this category structure which prescribes the permissible significant predications. A main feature of this language is that thought is categorial and objects of thought are always of some type. This feature makes clear that all terms are conceptual, from the most specific (singular) to the most generic (categories). A relativity in specification emerges which means that any term

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at any level of specificity or genericity may be nominalized into a term which may enter into the logical subject of predication. The reference of concepts are *essents* which are determinate and actual irrespective of whether they happen to exist or not. In this language reference is understood as specification and the particulars specified are seen to fall into a continuum from fully indeterminate to fully determinate. There is therefore no radical dichotomy in thought between singular concepts and general concepts, between universals and particulars. Furthermore, individuals are found to be categorial unities which are differentiated by particularized features and properties. And since any individual is thus unified conceptually, no additional substantial entity need be postulated in which the features and properties must inhere. So individual substance as a distinct atomic form drops out and we begin to see individuals as part of a larger integrated monistic whole which in no way threatens their conceptual distinctiveness. It is one thing to be atomically discrete and independent, another to be conceptualiy differentiated.

INTERNAL COHERENCE AND EXTERNAL CONTRAST OF IS AND ES

We have seen that each paradigm language achieves a certain internal coherence, and taken together stand in radical contrast. The semantic concepts of each language have special internal meanings which are determined by the paradigm as a whole. The semantic concepts are found to be systematically ambiguous between the two languages, and one cannot be imported into the other without the mistake of paradigm-crossing.

It is timely to note that the discovery of two complementary languages for thought is neither new nor surprising. In fact it is just another aspect of a common pattern which has been repeated over and over in different domains of philosophy, in both the Western and Indian philosophical traditions. For example, in the area of epistemology we find the rationalist tradition (Permenides, Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, etc) articulating one epistemological paradigm, while the empiricist tradition (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, etc) develops another epistemological language. In the area of ontology too we find philosophers gravitating toward one language paradigm (Plato, Descartes, Spinoza, Husserl) while another ontological tradition excavates a complementary paradigm (Berkeley, Hume, Russell, Quine). The two languages of logic, however, have been obscured, partly because of confused rhetoric. partly because of failure to distinguish clearly between semantics (the logical interpretation of thought) on the one hand, and the psychological, epistemological and ontological interpretations of thought, on the other. Frege gallantly led the way in de-psychologizing

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logical theory, but the influences of epistemology and ontology remained. Aristotle's logical theory, too, is a mixture of epistemology and ontology with semantics. The two complementary languages of thought begin to emerge in clarity only when semantics becomes truly *formal* and avoids psychologism, epistemologicism as well as ontologicism.

One clear example of the uncovering of two languages of experience is found in Descartes' *Meditations*. What emerges in the course of this work (whether or not it is explicitly recognized by Descartes) is that the language of mind, where /thought/ is the primary feature, and the language of matter, where /extension/ is the primary feature, are mutually exclusive and distinct. The features of /thought/ and /matter/ are found to be mutually exclusive and unconnected in the categorial structure. The challenge in this dualistic ontology is to explain how the two languages can nevertheless be related, and how they can apply to the "same" thing, the person. The mind/body "problem" is in this respect a problem of two complementary languages being somehow related. Descartes' way out was to dualize the person into two substances, mind and body, taking the person to be ontologically dual and composite. So attributions of the two features never apply to the same subject. But this still left the problem of explaining the *relation* between the two. Actually, the explicit recognition that there are two distinct languages did not emerge until Spinoza's *Ethics*. Spinoza pointed out that there were two distinct languages, the language of mind and the language of body, and his attempt at mediation was to treat them as radically distinct in sense but identical in reference, both equally adequately describing one and the same Being or Substance.

Another example of the emergence of the two languages arises in theology, where a distinction is made between the language of the finite and the language of the infinite, the language of creatures and the language of God. Here again a radical category distinction is found between finite created things which exist in time, and Infinite Being which transcends the world of time and "is" in a special sense. The challenge here, too, is to account for the differences between the two complementary languages as well as to explain the relation between them. The challenge of mediation in this context may be met in *one* way in the being of the Christ. The Christ is that mediating being which is fully finite creature and also fully infinite being. But how is Christ-being to be understood, if, indeed, it is to be *understood* at all? What is the model of mediation here ?

These are only two clear examples of the pattern of the emergence of complementary languages. In each case the challenge is to mediate the two without reductionism and without begging the question. It was pointed out earlier that in the Indian tradition the two complementary

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paradigms were manifested in the Hindu ātma tradition and in the early Buddhist anātma tradition. These complementary ontological languages obviously parallel the two logical languages which have been explicated in this paper. The ātma paradigm resembles *IS* in form and the anātma paradigm resembles the form of *ES*. As we turn directly now to the model of dialectical mediation of Nāgārjuna (DS) we shall examine more closely the different strategies for the mediation of the two paradigms.

ARISTOTLE/FREGE AND INCOHERENT MEDIATION

Incoherent mediation between complementary paradigm languages results first of all when it is not clearly seen that there are two *distinct* languages, and secondly, when, as a result of this, elements from two distinct paradigms are taken together as if they were merely *internal distinctions* within the same paradigm. This form of incoherence I have called "paradigm-crossing". I wish to suggest that the semantics of Aristotle and Frege suffer incoherence which result from paradigm (language)-crossings. What they take to be internal distinctions within their mixed paradigms are really external systematic ambiguities between different languages.

I suggested earlier that the Aristotelian paradigm, if purified, leads in the direction of *IS*, and the Fregean paradigm, when purified, gravitates towards *ES*. The *actual* semantics of Aristotle assumes that all thought is predicative, an assumption which naturally leads to conceptual monism, but his analysis of the primary logical subject combines one concept from *ES* (the "this" of pronominal reference) and one concept from *IS* (the "such" conceptual specification). The primary logical subject (the primary ontological being) combines an indeterminate conceptually vacuous "this" with an essential attribute, a "such" which constitutes the identity and being of the thing in question. The *model* for this combination is the matter/form relation: the matter of a thing is conceptually indeterminate and fully potential (a pronominal *this*), while the form of a thing is its essence, its defining and individuating conceptual *such*. Any primary being is taken to be a *unity* of these two aspects on the model of the matter/form relation. In other words, *within* the Aristotelian paradigm features from the two languages of thought are postulated to be *unified in one being*, and constituting the unity of such a being. But precisely what seems to yield internal coherence generates dialectical incoherence.

We find a similar paradigm-crossing in Frege's actual semantics. Again, what is presented as an internal *distinction* within his semantics is

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really an external systematic ambiguity between the two languages of thought. Frege's critical postulation ("discovery") of the sense/reference distinction at once preserves the semblance of internal coherence *and* generates the dialectical incoherence of a paradigm-crossing. For his semantics of "sense" leads to *IS* and his semantics of "reference" leads to *ES*. Frege's semantics assumes that there are atomic thoughts which consist of a predicate function (concept) being true or false of an *object* which is designated by the logical subject and which is always logically singular. His primary assumption is that predication is atomic and logically singular, and consists of the extensional relation between a predicative concept expression and the object referred to by the logical subject. But at the same time Frege insists that at the primary semantic level of thoughts predication forms a sense—or conceptual-content which is *prior* to reference. That is, he *also* assumes that predication forms a sense content or intensional thought, an assumption which is alien to *ES* and arises only in *IS*. I suggest that these two assumptions cannot be coherently reconciled or mediated *within* his semantics. Frege's attempt at mediation is to postulate that every *sign* has two semantic functions—sense and reference. Here too, as in Aristotle's semantics, we find the postulation of a *single* entity which ostensibly unites the features of the different logical languages. Each attempt to preserve internal coherence and achieve theoretical completeness only falls into the incoherence of a paradigm-crossing. Each falls into the "single-bind."[7]

ESSENTIALISTIC MENTALITY AND SYNTHETIC MEDIATION

Viewed from *within* the common assumptions of the Western logical tradition, the semantics of Aristotle and Frege appear to be fundamentally different, and, indeed, they are. Nevertheless, viewed in an external dialectical perspective they are seen as sharing a fundamental common assumption and mentality. The common mentality shared by these two theorists, and which is the common source of the dialectical incoherence of each, is *essentialism*. An essentialistic mentality is one in which it is assumed that the primary complementary features of thought, experience and world may be *unified* in one and the same entity, or *synthetically unified* in one paradigm, model or language. We have seen that Aristotle is essentialistic in this special sense since he postulates a unified self-existent primary being (*ousia*) which synthesises the complementary features of the two languages of thought. And in the case of Frege we noticed that he too postulates a unified self-existent logical sign which synthesizes the complementary features of sense (*IS*) and reference (*ES*). Essentialistic mentality assumes that there are self-existent entities, (whether objects of thought,

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elements of language, primary beings of the world or elements of experience) which unify (synthesize, instantiate) the complementary features of thought. But this assumption is precisely what dialectical mentality calls into question, precisely what dialectical semantics (*DS*) shows to be incoherent. This essentialistic mentality is as much shared by the complementary languages of thought (*IS* and *ES*) as it is by the complementary ontological languages of the Indian tradition (ātma/anātma).

HEGEL'S DIALECTICS REMAINS ESSENTIALISTIC

A gallant attempt to mediate dialectically between complementary paradigms was made by Hegel. But we find that this form of dialectical mediation suffers from the common essentialistic mentality. For Hegel's model of mediation is an internal categorial synthetic unity which is exhibited in the category tree structure presented earlier. The tree structure represents a triadic form of thought in which opposites are united and synthesized in a higher category, the most inclusive of which is absolute being, which is located at the "apex" of the tree structure. The localized model for Hegelian dialectical mediation is found in the notion of a category which both synthesizes and transcends its constituents polar opposites. For example, in the category of /colour/, the contrary opposites, "coloured" and "uncoloured", together constitute the absolute term /colour/. This category term encompasses both contraries "c" and "un-c" in a higher unity /C/. So, to be/coloured/is to be at once *either-coloured-or-un-coloured* and *neither-coloured-nor un-coloured* at the same time. The former is taken in the sense of indeterminate potentiality and the latter in the sense of determinacy. That is, the determinate law of excluded middle for intensional predication is transcended in a categorial unity, which itself is indeterminate as to being coloured· (having some specific colour) or uncoloured. So, a determinate law of excluded middle at the level of property specificity is superseded by an indeterminate *included* middle at the categorial level. But this categorial dialectic has its own logical form and does not escape the essentialistic mentality. The model for dialectical mediation here is internal to essentialistic thought for the ultimate limit of this dialectical movement is the Absolute. Far from avoiding essentialism, the Hegelian dialectic celebrates it in its highest form. For the essentialistic mentality is committed not only to being in an absolute form, but also to knowledge and truth in an absolute form. Essentialistic mentality is a form of absolutism, whether ontic, epistemic or logistic

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TWO FORMS OF ESSENTIALISM

Nor is essentialism avoided in the remarkable research found in Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. On the contrary, we find an essentialistic mentality shaping both his earlier work in the *Tractatus* as well as his later thought. The *Tractatus* is exemplary in its attempt to purify the paradigm of *ES*. Wittgenstein's critical revisions of Frege's semantics make explicit the nominalization of predication, the atomizing of concepts, and the pronominalization of objects. Wittgenstein carries *ES* to its proper consequences in showing objects to be in themselves conceptually vacuous and unthinkable. The language of the *Tractatus* is a form of *referential essentialism*. Although Wittgenstein struggles against *this* form of essentialism in his *Investigations*, he moves in the direction of the complementary language of thought and develops a form of *conceptual essentialism*. The former took naming and reference as primary, the latter focused on sense and rules of use. Referential essentialism assumes a naming model of meaning in which the referent is the meaning. Conceptual essentialism, by contrast, is that in which the essent, as what a concept specifies or the rules of *use* of a term constitute, is the meaning of expressions. Despite the pluralization of forms of language in the model of language games, Wittgenstein reaffirmed conceptual (sense) essentialism in the form of the rules of use or meaning within any given language game. In this respect he gravitates in the direction of *IS* in his later research. The dialectical evolution of his earlier to later work illustrates once more the playing out of the complementary paradigms of thought. Essentialistic mentality then manifests itself in both paradigms, in *ES* as referential essentialism, and in *IS* as conceptual essentialism. The common formal meaning of essentialism assumes self-identity and self-existence.

DS AS A THERAPEUTIC/TRANSFORMATIONAL DIALECTIC

In Nāgārjuna's dialectical thought we find a remarkable and unparalleled breakthrough in the history of human consciousness. Nāgārjuna discovered in the teaching of the Buddha a radical rejection of *all* forms of essentialism and absolutism. He found that all attempts of essentialistic mentality to give a coherent account of human thought and experience are bound to fail and fall into the incoherence of paradigm-crossings. His breakthrough was to give up essentialistic mentality in all forms and develop the alternative non-essentialistic "account" of thought and the origin of objects.

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SUPERIMPOSITION AS THE MODEL OF MEDIATION

A proper dialectical model for the mediation of complementary paradigms or languages is *not* one which leads to a *synthetic unity* (an assumption of essentialism), but rather one which accepts the mutual incompatibility and incompleteness of each compliment and *projects* or *constructs* thought *through* the *superimposition* of the two paradigms. The model of superimposition and projection does not attempt to synthesize or unite the complementary paradigms into one model or entity. On the contrary, the dialectical mediation of *DS* insists that the complements cannot be unified *and* that each is incomplete and must be taken "together" with its complement through superimposition. Instead, dual consciousness is found ot originate in a superimposition of the two paradigms. Human experience and the objects presented to consciousness arise through the dependent coarising of the two complements. Human experience and thought arises in the superimposition, it is the projection of irreconcilable duality. The deep and pervasive duality and contrariety found in all aspects of human experience is born from superimposition. But the duality of superimposition arises in śūnya. Consciousness itself is neither one nor dual but śūnya, like all objects. There is no "consciousness-in-itself" yet consciousness arises in pre-categorial and transcategorial superimposition.

This means that objects of thought (including the "self") are *metaphoric* constructs rather than essentialistic unities, whether on the model of *ES* or *IS*. *DS* takes metaphor as primary. Consciousness is not taken to be an original absolute unity in which thought is discriminated, but rather a non-essentialistic bi-focal understanding which projects unity through polarity and dual opposition. The complementary poles mutually arise (pratītya-samutpāda) and can neither stand apart nor together. They have no independent identity and are not independent elements which are to be synthesized.

Here we find the primary significance of *śūnya* (zero, emptiness, void). The śūnya of consciousness stands over against the *unity* (oneness) of essentialistic consciousness. The model of śūnya reveals a very different mentality from the model of unity (zero vs. one). Consciousness, according to Nāgārjuna has no inherent nature, no determinations, no characterization, neither name nor form. It neither exists nor fails to exist. In short, it is transcategorial and transparent. In this context it is clear that *DS* is not another essentialistic model in addition to *ES* and *IS*, but merely the mutual superimposition of the two. *DS* is not another theory and not a language which purports to describe reality or present the truth. Rather it is a therapeutic device for the radical transformation of consciousness

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beyond the duality and essentialism of *ES* and *IS*, a meditative method which reveals the transcategorial transparency of śūnya. Neither unity (one) nor duality (two) characterize consciousness, for consciousness is transparent, śūnya (zero).[8]

The model of superimposition of complementary paradigms as the co-dependent origin of dual thought (all discriminative consciousness being dual) rejects the essentialistic tendency to postulate or assume a unifying entity with independent identity. Śankara, the great dialectician of the Advaita Vedānta tradition, was influenced by Nāgārjuna and developed this model in the form of *adhyāsa*. For Śankara too all dual consciousness arises in adhyāsa. Superimposition, the dependent co-arising of consciousness in the form of thought, is a model which reaches back into the pre-rational, pre-conscious, pre-linguistic origins of thought. The predicative form of thought, whether in *ES* or *IS*, arises metaphorically or projectively in superimposition. In other words, predicative form is not taken as given and then literal and metaphoric discourse defined in terms of it. Rather, predicative form (dual consciousness) itself arises in metaphoric construction from superimposition. Neither paradigm is self-existent or independent, they co-arise, as do all things.

CHRIST-BEING AS AN EXAMPLE OF DIALECTICAL MEDIATION

The dialectical model of mediation leads to non-essentialistic account of Christ-being. Christ-being is dialectical in the sense that if taken in essential terms as one being which is both finite and infinite at the same time (two natures) it presents itself to understanding as being contradictory. And indeed it is, if taken essentialistically. But for a dialectical view of Christ-being "contradiction" is to be celebrated, for the being of Christ is śūnya, hence neither one nor two. Christ is not an entity with essential identity at all, neither a unity nor a duality. So-called "contradiction" is only "irrational" when incompatible features are attributed to one and the same thing. And we have seen (as with Descartes) that one way to avoid such contradiction is to dualize and distinguish two natures. Both moves are typical of essentialistic rationality. But in the model of dialectical *rationality* (understanding) the Christ is the dependent co-arising of two complementary paradigms of being, a being arising in superimposition. This is not to say that the Christ is unreal. On the contrary, Christ-being may be taken as an exemplar of all beings, as being śūnya, a being devoid of self-nature (*svabhāva*) and self-existence. Christ-being is neither immanent nor transcendent, neither unity nor duality. It is

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transcategorial, like all beings. It is only in this way that the Christ *can be* the real mediator, the saviour. Christ-being, as śūnya, devoid of essence, and co-arising in superimposition, may be taken as the model for the being of the *self*. We might equally have taken the example of Buddha-nature, as the exemplar of all beings.

DIALECTICS OF PREDICATION AND MEDIATION OF ES AND IS

If all thought arises in the superimposition of the two paradigms then the features of both languages will be found in all objects of thought, including the self. Let us focus now on the dialectics of predication. Predication itself arises in a metaphoric play of superimposition. For in both languages logical subject and logical predicate are taken as independent elements. Nāgārjuna's form of critique would show that if either *ES* or *IS* is taken independently predication is not possible. For, on the one hand, the challenge for *ES* is to account for the independent identity of the pronominal referent apart from conceptual determination. Or, conversely, to account for the applicability of conceptual nominals to an alien and independently given referent without identity. If both the pronominal referent and the nominal atomic concept are independently given, then predication as a *relation* becomes problematic. Dialectical analysis shows that the logical subject presupposes the predicate and the predicate presupposes the logical pronominal subject. Neither can have identity apart from the other. Furthermore, predication as a whole presupposes that entities are independently given, but the independent identity of individuals is not possible apart from predication. In other words, an essentialistic interpretation collapses in on itself. The synthesis of predication fails.

On the other hand, the same dialectical critique holds for *IS*. The logical subject, being conceptual, has independent identity. But how can it be specified apart from the conceptual predicates. There is nothing that can be *added* (or that needs to be added) to that which already has identity. If the logical subject has self-identity then further characterization becomes redundant, and the *analytics* of predication fails. The predicates would already be contained in the subject.

In the case of *ES* the logical subject is conceptually vacuous and the dialectical challenge is to account for its identity apart from the predicates. It seems that there are only predicates with identity. But if this is so then the predicates cannot apply to anything and predication fails. Conversely, in the case of *IS* the logical subject has independent identity and the

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challenge is to explain how predicates can be added at all to that which has independent identity, and the predicates become redundant.

The dialectics of predication are further intensified when we see that the two paradigms mutually presuppose each other and have no identity apart, i.e., they are dialectical complements which co-arise. The superimposition of both paradigms is required for predication to work. For the logical subject must be both dependent and independent in identity : it must have the referential independence of *ES* as well as the conceptual identity of *IS*; and the predicate must be both atomically discrete like the conceptual nominals of *ES*, as well as be conceptually dependent on the monistic categorial structure, as in *IS*. And the predicative *relation* can arise only if it is both analytic and synthetic at the same time : the subject and predicate terms being independent in identity means that the relation is a synthesis of the two terms in logical association; but the dependency for identity of subject and predicate means that there must be mutual containment which makes the relation an analytic relation. In this way the predicative relation is at once a truth relation and a sense relation. One apart from the other collapses. It is in this sense that each paradigm is dialectically incomplete. And each co-dependently arises with the other.

THE INCOMPLETENESS OF EACH PARADIGM

In terms of *DS* neither paradigm is self-existent and independent in identity. Superimposition does not mean that each complementary paradigm has independent existence or identity. Dependent co-arising is an alternative model of identity which shows that nothing has (essentialistic) self-identity. Identity and existence arise in superimposition.

Natural predication manifests both features of *ES* and *IS* at once. The natural subject is both pronominally given as conceptually vacuous *and* conceptually determinate and specified. The predicate term is at once an atomic nominal and conceptually anatomic. Predication is at once quantificational and qualificational. It is singular and general. The logical subject is both essent and referent.

In an essentialistic interpretation of predication one is forced to disambiguate and choose between *ES* or *IS*. It appears to be contradictory to combine in *one thing* the complementary features of the two paradigms. Or else the paradigms are simply mixed into one model in which the complementary features are treated as distinctions instantiated in one thing. Either the incompatibility of the features is recognized, and a choice is forced between them (the principle of excluded middle), or else they are

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taken to be compatible and made distinct aspects of one thing (the principle of non-contradiction). In either case the attempt falls into the *single-bind* and the model of superimposition and co-arising is wielded to remove this incoherence. There can be no one thing which instantiates the incompatible features of the complementary paradigms. And yet thought is incomplete without both. The dialectical solution is the recognition of the śūnya of things. Things are empty. Identity itself arises in superimposition. All things are devoid of self-nature or essence.

Thus, to characterize the Mādhyamika as teaching that all objects of thought and world are contradictory is a dogma of the essentialist. And to attribute to him the denial of the essentialistic laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction is a superficial distortion. For the Mādhyamika neither affirms nor denies. His teaching is not another theory, and does not purport to describe reality. It is rather a radical rejection of essentialistic mentality as a whole. *DS* is a therapeutic language designed to reveal the transparency (śūnya) of thought and world. It is transcategorial and transformational. It instructs us that Nirvāṇa is non-different from saṁsāra :

> "*Saṁsāra* (i.e., the empirical life-death cycle) is nothing essentially different from *nirvāṇa*. *Nirvāṇa* is nothing essentially different from *saṁsāra*.
>
> The limits (i.e. realm) of *nirvāṇa* are the limits of *saṁsāra*. Between the two, also, there is not the slightest difference whatsoever."[9]

And when the therapeutic transformation of *DS* is effected there is a "return" to true worldly consciousness and natural discourse. One finally *see through* thought and dialectically grasps the dependent co-arising of thought in the playful superimposition of the two paradigms. It becomes transparent that language and experience can only work with śūnya :

> "Whatever is in correspondence with *śūnyatā*, all is in correspondence (i.e. possible). Again, whatever is not in correspondence with *śūnyatā*, all is not in correspondence."[10]

The Mādhyamika teaches how natural thought and language is possible, that it cannot be accounted for in essentialistic terms. Thought arises and flows only in śūnya consciousness, only in /silence/.

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NOTES

1. Descartes' *Meditations*, extracted from pp. 24-27 of the translation by L.J. Lafleur in the Library of Liberal Arts edition.
2. Russell's logically proper names are good examples of pronominal subjects which are indexical. The distinction between such subjects and descriptive nominals led to his epistemological distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. He assumed that pronominal in *ES*, but pronominal reference functions differently in *IS*. It should be noted here also that Wittgenstein's *objects* in the *Tractatus* are good examples of pronominal referents. Wittgenstein explicitly saw that such objects are conceptually vacuous and unthinkable. This is why they could be apprehended only in the whole atomic proposition where they were thinkable through the nominal concept. It is also revealing that Wittgenstein took the constituents of atomic propositions (predications) to be two names. This is a good example of the naming model of predication.
3. While association was psychological in Hume's language, it is *logical* in *ES*. It should be noted here that "idea" in Hume's phenomenalist language was "copied" from impressions (percepts) and in this respect were nominals. For all percepts were atomic and quality-terms (ideas) were independent nominals.
4. It is noteworthy that Frege was primarily interested in developing a language to explore the foundations of mathematics. Quantification theory may be highly suited to express and explore the origins of the science of quantity and number. We shall see, however, that this virtue in exploring the realm of number is also a limitation in dealing with intensional thought and the category of qualification.
5. For a more complete discussion of the "tree" structure of intensional predication see my paper "Formal Ontology and Movement Between Worlds," pp. 170 ff.
6. Russell explicitly developed the philosophy of logical atomism, but the complementary theory of logical monism has not been explicitly developed. The closest analogue I know of to this may be found in the ontological monism of Spinoza's *Ethics*.
7. We are familiar with the metaphor of the "double-bind" which is a form of contradiction found by essentialistic thought. By contrast dialectical critique uncovers the inevitable incoherence in essentialistic mentality and this is called the "single-bind".
8. For a detailed development of this therapeutic model of *DS* see my paper "Formal Ontology and the Dialectical Transformation of Consciousness", which is forthcoming in *Philosophy East and West*.
9. Nāgārjuna's *Mulamādhyamikākarikās*, Chapter 25, verses 19-20; tr. by K. Inada.
10. *ibid.*, ch. 24, verse 14.

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11

Dionysus against the Buddha : Nietzsche's 'Yes' and the Buddhist 'No'

STEVEN HEINE

I

THE aim of Nietzsche's transvaluation (*Umwertung*) of all values is the Dionysian affirmation of the world exactly as it is without exception, subtraction, or selection. Nietzsche says 'no' to all conventional attitudes, views, and values in order to achieve a holy Yea-saying beyond assertion and denial, optimism and pessimism, tragedy and skepticism—a perpetual process of self-overcoming and self-domination. His three central doctrines —eternal recurrence of the same events, will to power, and overman—dislodge man from his attachment to a false sense of stability, the supposedly constant and presistent, the imaginary but mesmerizing "true" world perpetrated by philosophers and priests by pointing to the dynamic, ever-renewing innocence of becoming.[1] Zarathustra's awakening is a radical movement away from partial perspectives, such as the principles of logic and all truth-claims, which render static, rigid, and lifeless nature's continual transition-processes toward a joyful acceptance of and participation in "the nuptial ring of rings", the eternal circulation and recurrence of the same events entangled in the Moment. "My consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again . . . The world exists : it is not something that becomes, not something that passes away. Or rather: it becomes, it passes away, but it has never begun to become and never ceased from passing away—it maintains itself in both.—It lives on itself: its excrements are its food."[2]

Nietzsche contrasts the strength and courage of the Dionysian overman who affirms even the harshest suffering as a promise of life with the weariness and self-destructiveness of the Christian whose every action condemns life. "*Dionysus against the Crucified*", according to Nietzsche, is "the antithesis", the central point of his work which concludes his philosophical autobiography *Ecce Homo*.[3] Nietzsche also sets up a confrontation

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between the Buddha and the Crucified,[4] a contrast which highlights the seemingly ambivalent attitude he has concerning Buddhism. On the one hand, he dismisses Buddhism as a "weary pessimism", merely a tonic to soothe over-sensitized nerves rather than strengthen the spirit. Yet he contends that Buddhism, unlike all other religious and philosophical systems, is not a product of revenge, the will's self-negating revulsion against the passage of time, and that it represents an emancipation from the concepts of good and evil. He presents eternal recurrence as "the European form of Buddhism"[5] because both philosophies involve a willingness to endure nihilism and the aimlessness of the world eternally.

For Nietzsche himself there is no contradiction in his evaluation. Buddhism, he finds, is more consistent, realistic, and objective than Christianity, but no less decadent and exhausted. It does penetrate to the essentially meaning-less, value-less, and in-different ground of all perspectives and attitudes imposed upon reality, but then takes a decidedly pessimistic, withdrawing, and life-negating attitude towards this ground by fabricating the "holy lie" of *nibbāna*. "There are those," Nietzsche writes in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* in a veiled reference to Buddhism, "with consumption of the soul: hardly are they born when they begin to die and to long for doctrines of weariness and renunciation . . . They encounter a sick man or an old man or a corpse, and immediately they say, 'Life is refuted.' But only they themselves are refuted, and their eyes, which see only this one face of existence." In Nietzsche's hierarchical genealogy, the Buddha's "incomplete nihilism"[7] stands above both the Christian herd and the false masters or priests who subjugate it, yet below both the tragic poet whose art is the triumph of life and Zarathustra who is liberated from any sense of nausea, pity, or inadequacy.

Nietzsche's critique of Buddhism is crucial to his claim that the doctrine of eternal recurrence constitutes the final replacement of previous metaphysics and morality, next to which all other modes of thinking will ultimately perish.[8] The basis of eternal recurrence is the certainty that whatever happens in one's own life and the entire history of the world has already occurred and will continue to recur eternally in all of its details exactly the same way as it is occurring now.[9] Imagine, Nietzsche suggests, that a demon approaches you in your 'loneliest loneliness' and asks how you would feel if you had to repeat this life in the same succession and sequence once more and innumerable times more. Would this thought be the most oppressive burden you could ever bear, crushing you? Would it give you a paralyzing shock similar to the one given when the Buddha announces that all our problems derive from our self—until we discover that we do not have one? Or would it represent incomparable joy and the

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source of transformation? You must accept this fate because it will happen to you in any case. But think "how well disposed you would have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate confirmation and seal?" Eternal recurrence, according to Nietzsche, leads to greater life-fulfilment, a liberation from relations in the world in order to command relations, freedom from cyclical time through embracing it—"the closest approximation of a world of becoming to a world of being"[10]—whereas Buddhism is an escapist negation of the will, a way of non-existence, the inevitably weary aftermath of Upanishadic speculation.

Yet Nietzsche is unaware that the aim of Buddhist negation, as of his own transvaluation, is ultimately not negative because it constitutes a sustained attack on all partial views which conceal the dynamic nature of reality. Basic Buddhist notions such as the insubstantiality, impermanence, and dependent co-origination of all things release man from his problematic clinging to staticized objects. The middle path steers between the fabricated polarities of free will and determinism, eternalism (everything exists) and nihilism (nothing exists), logic and illogic. *Nibbāna* is timeless extinction, not of the world, but of the desires and delusions that defile it. More than Nietzsche realizes, his philosophy is strikingly similar to Buddhism in their denial of substance, the soul, the universal, and duration in favour of a view of the world made up of phenomena arising interdependently. They both analyze suffering in terms of a deceptive maze of one-sided misconceptions generated by ontological dis-orientation; and they propose liberation from the bondage of ignorance through the mastery of unconscious drives and the attainment of an eternal state absolutely free from attachment to things and to the self, transcendent of all duality, detached from mundane concerns yet infinitely creative. Also, Nietzsche and Buddhism share a disdain for non-edifying metaphysical speculation, theoretical knowledge as its own end, extreme asceticism, and ritual; a refusal to communicate that which cannot be spoken without distortion; an abandonment of theism as a false projection of subjective weaknesses and ideals; the full comprehending and overcoming of nihilism.

It is ironic that Nietzshe, whose task is the legitimation of nihilism as a trans-negative philosophical category, is insensitive to the subtlety and profundity of Buddhist negation, which denies the validity of any metaphysical position and takes a stance of lofty impartiality (*upekkhā*) beyond indifference and interference. The point, however, is not simply to portray Buddhism as a meaningful counterpart of Nietzsche. The Buddhist middle path, without clinging to any notion of will to power or the wager argument of eternal recurrence, may represent a more successful method than

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Nietzsche's transvaluation for rooting out the infectious metaphysical disposition, and giving man access to reality as it is without presuppositions or disguised judgements abstracted from and imposed upon it. Perhaps Buddhism would interpret Nietzsche's doctrines as hidden yet stubborn *viparyāsa* (mis-taken views). For the completion of Nietzsche's own mission, a confrontation between his philosophy and Buddhism—Dionysus against the Buddha—must be prepared. The issue is, not only how he would have to revise his appraisal of Buddhism, but his own views as well.

We are thus concerned with three inter-connected dimensions of Nietzche's relationship with basic Buddhism (as Nietzsche did not deal with and was perhaps unaware of the later Buddhist developments):[11]

1) How and why does Nietzsche undertake an interpretation of Buddhism in the light of his own philosophical development;

2) How do Nietzsche's central doctrines compare with the Buddhist four noble truths in terms of an analysis of suffering, proposal of a path to liberation, and disclosure of the ontological ground of awakening. This is our central area of inquiry;

3) How might a deeper understanding of Buddhist negation have changed Nietzsche's positions; and conversely, how effective is Nietzsche's critique of Buddhist "escapism"?

II

The starting point of reflection for both Nietzsche and Buddhism is man's existential predicament, as he is enslaved by both his reason and passions, constantly victimized by his own defence mechanisms. The central aim of these philosophies is to free man from this situation. Man's delusion is not merely blindness, an inability to see things in their true light, but a frantic clinging to misguided assumptions by one who forgets their subjective origin and mistakes them for having an objective basis. Delusion maintains that its views are the only possible ones, and in resisting any challenge to this claim, it robs itself of an acceptable view. Suffering is depicted as a self-imposed, self-perpetuating vicious cycle, a snare or entanglement always reinforcing itself, in contrast to the underlying harmony which is obscured by it. Man does not know himself because he is ignorant of the dynamic nature of reality. Realization of the latter is coterminous with man's awakening to his own nature. Liberation is the transition from an attachment to stability (which paradoxically represents instability and incessant differentiation) to the fundamental and

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creative identity of man and reality.

Nietzsche presupposes two attributes of man's being-in-the-world which correspond to the Buddhist ideas of causation, *pattica-samuppāda* (dependent co-origination) and *kamma*. First, the existence of substantive entities like atoms or egos is denied. There is no separation of doer and deed, nothing is isolated and independent. All phenomena arise in relations out of a multiplicity of conditioning factors; there are only doings which can be looked at in terms of the pattern or arrangement of what is done. Will to power designates a world comprising constellations of forces, exchanges of provisional, precarious fluxes ever arising and desisting. Second, man must bear the burden of his past deeds and their inevitable consequences which continue to bind him. Nietzsche and Buddhism both recognize that the individual, uneasy in the flux of impermanence and interrelations, reacts by objectifying his hopes into illusory fixed objects which he tries to grasp and stymie in an ultimately futile fashion, and that this obsession gives rise to an endless round of suffering and recurrence.

In Buddhism, *unmattāka* or existential circularity, the self-created and self-defeating spiral, is variously expressed in terms of the 3 *lakṣanas* or marks, 3 *taṇhās* or thirsts, 4 *kilesas* or defilements, and 12 *nidānas* or links of dependent co-origination.[12] All of these analytic terms apply to the individual in that they describe and account for the origins and effects of his suffering, and yet are universal in that they depict the conditioned nature of the whole phenomenal realm. The members of each group are inseparable, simultaneous, and overlapping. For example, the 3 marks portray an entanglement such that one who ignores impermanence posits an illusory concept of self leading to unrest and disillusionment. The thirst for existence, becoming, power, self-aggrandizement and the thirst for non-existence, morbidity, self-annihilation are conflicting tendencies which aggravate one another, leaving one acquisitive and powerless, helpless in his greed. The fact that non-existence is rejected as an unworthy extreme indicates the inadequacy of Nietzsche's interpretation of Buddhism. *Nibbāna* is not simply a pessimistic nothingness, but a middle path to be found between and beyond the polarities of being and non-being.

The central dilemma which concerns Buddhism is that man confuses his fabrications with real entities which are potentially fulfilling and enters a compulsive pattern of pursuit, exploitation, abuse, fear, anxiety, and distortion. The individual believes he has a unitary, indivisible self which can be satisfied by stable objects, yet neither of these deceptions has any authentic basis. Man clings-to-be and becomes attached to anything that

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seems to certify his existence, yet he is also in the predicament of ceasing-to-be, constantly undermining his own projects and cutting himself off from an open, undefensive, holistic approach to reality. He seems eternally thirsty, and when he quenches one thirst another is created; so he exists in an endless search for that which can never be attained because as soon as it is perceived it changes and is no more itself. Thus man never rests; he is always in a state of tension between subject and object, compensating for loss...and then compensating for over-compensations. From his desire emerges man's need for a breakthrough to a new dimension of awareness, and the false goals which make such a quest impassable.

Nietzsche agrees with Buddhism that, "the 'ego' subdues and kills: it operates like an organic cell: it is a robber and violent. It wants to regenerate itself . . . It wants to give birth to its god and see all mankind at its feet."[13] The cause of the self-destructive ego-predicament, he writes, is the sense of being overwhelmed by the persistent dissolution of time, over which one apparently has no control. Rather than lunging at things, however, man first lets them intimidate him, and then he responds blindly with self-righteous vengeance, impotent rage, misdirected fury. Revenge (*Rache*), the thirst for vindictiveness and punishment, is the "will's revulsion (or ill will) against time and its 'it was.'"[14] Faced with everything that has been and that dictates what shall occur, one's will to power paralyses itself as an angry spectator of all that is past and seemingly irreversible. It becomes a prisoner lost in solitude, despair, incomplete nihilism, empty revolt. Man strikes back with wrath and hostility, not realizing that it is just this reaction—hatred and resentment—which drives him to greater anguish.

Having lost confidence in his ability to overcome the weight of the onrushing past which leaves a meaningless, aimless world in its path, man allows his revenge to operate as an independent entity which seeks not his fulfilment, but the satisfaction of its own wicked, obsessive manoeuvring. Through revenge, will to power punishes itself, the man who should be its master, other people, all activity, the future, and ultimately the present. Direct, immediate experience becomes impossible. In calling itself 'punishment', revenge perpetrates a hoax to legitimate its existence: "it feigns a good conscience for itself with a lie."[15] By this name it endows its hostility with the semblance of right and justice. It covers its revolting nature with the appearance that it is meting out well-deserved punishment, turning to violence to achieve a false sense of courage. Revenge is the great curse responsible for the decadence and chaos of civilizations. Its main targets are those who have the true strength which can endure and affirm the abyss: "This instinct of revenge has so mastered mankind in the course

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of millennia that the whole of metaphysics, psychology, conception of history, but above all morality is impregnated with it. As far as man has thought, he has introduced the bacillus of revenge into things. He has made even God ill with it, he has *deprived existence* in general of its *innocence* . . ."[16]

III

Man dwells in a duplicitous world populated by his fabrications. Reality is not seen for what it is, but for what one wishfully expects it to be. Buddhism and Nietzsche are concerned not with the empirical, but the transcendental illusion; not with the matter of denying or affirming reality itself, but only those misconceptions which are superimposed upon it. The Buddha complains of those opponents who misrepresent his aim in their saying, " 'The recluse Gotoma is a nihilist, he lays down the cutting off, the destruction, the disappearance of existent entity.' But this, monks, [he retorts], is just what I am not, this is just what I do not say. . . "[17] Nietzsche's task is the dissolution of the "metaphysical need" to find constancy and stability: "If one is a philosopher as men have always been philosophers, one cannot see what has been and becomes—one sees only what *is*. But since nothing *is*, all that was left to the philosopher as his 'world' was the imaginary."[18] The metaphysical need to posit a substratum behind things arises from man's resistance to the flux and movement of life, known in Buddhism as *saṁkhāra-dukkha* (suffering as conditioned states). Preoccupation with duration and security is not only the problem of philosophers, but constitutes a deeply-imbedded tendency which permeates man's everyday attitudes and actions.

Yet reality, as a paradoxical groundless ground of delusion, remains indifferent to human error in a double sense: it is an undifferentiated unity not subject to the artificial bifurcations, such as being and becoming, reality and appearance, which supposedly define it; and it is unimpaired by man's obsession with "what is", or *ewig-gleichbleibenden* (the always-remaining-the-same).[19] Delusion is a dis-orientation relative to impartial identity, a narrow perspective to be sublated by an holistic, synthetic outlook. Man's goal is to reflect non-obstructively the in-difference of reality.

More fundamental than man's delusion is the condition upon which it is based and from which it emerges: the struggle for liberation from the disease of self-imposed limitations. Delusion cannot be understood apart from this context. The problem is not in things, but in how man reacts to what he believes things to be. It is not that objects cannot satisfy desire,

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but that desire creates the sense of lack which in turn creates objects and seeks to discover itself in its relation to them. It is not that the past cannot be overcome, but that revenge assumes its own impotence against time and tries to compensate with excuses, rationalizations, deceptions, and a host of demonic gestures and emotions. Yet the key to genuine fulfilment lies in the nature and structure of the delusion itself.

Desire is understood in Buddhism as a distorted expression of the longing for emancipation from all desire which mistakenly places the blame for the suffering it causes on a hostile, inadequate world. When desire runs its incessant course of manufacturing absence by its unyielding attachment to what it can never possess, it approaches the point of self-destruction. Whatever is of the nature of arising is also of the nature of cessation. The futility of his desire turns man inward to contemplation and self-analysis.

The cause of the metaphysical need is identified as a special, uniquely destructive thirst, *diṭṭhi-taṇhā*, the greed for dogmatic adherence to one-sided thought constructions. Belief in the concepts "I" and "mine" is paradigmatic of the frustrating snares with which man, in his speculative ramblings (*papañca*), gets caught up. Suffering is thus a matter of inauthentic thinking. As a combination of *nāma-rūpa* aggregates,[20] man is a sentient being who responds to pleasant and unpleasant sensations with conditioning attitudes, volitions, and desires which give rise to discriminative, judgemental consciousness that loses itself in its objectifications. This process can be overcome, however, by the emergence of *paññā*, non-discriminating, intuitive wisdom of being. *Paññā* is not an element outside of the aggregates. Associated with the fourth *khandha*, wisdom must be liberated from its normally clouded, concealed state so that it can unfold as the dominant tendency, no longer suppressed by thirst. As Rahula notes, "we must therefore clearly and carefully mark and remember that the cause, the germ of the arising of *dukkha* is within *dukkha* itself, and not outside; and we must equally well remember that the cause, the germ, of the cessation of *dukkha*, of the destruction of *dukkha*, is also within *dukkha* itself, and not outside."[21]

The Buddha's silence in "The Questions Which Tend Not to Edification"[22] is a therapeutic device to quiet the restlessness and agitation created by the proliferation of one-sided views. Buddha deflects the 10 questions posed as mutually exclusive alternatives of dilemmas and quadrilemmas not merely because he lacks an answer to a particular query, or even to illustrate that truth is indescribable or inexpressible, but to expose the inherent limitations of the logical-conceptual framework. The phrasing of every question already limits the response it expects by pre-supposing that

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there is such a thing as an adequate response, that the question-answer process can lead to a satisfactory conclusion. Silence does not signify the end of thinking, only the end of philosophy based on relative metaphysical stances. The Buddha's reticence re-orients thinking in terms of an introspective-existential analysis of the origins of suffering and the pragmatic task of its attenuation. "But on the complete fading out and cessation of ignorance, O priest, all these refuges, puppet shows, resorts, and writhings. . . are abandoned, uprooted, pulled out of the ground like a palmyra-tree, and become non-existent and not liable to spring up again in the future."[23] The unedifying quest, as that of the grieving mother in "The Parable of the Mustard Seed" who seeks medicine for her dead son, turns into the edifying search for freedom. Desire is transformed to noble craving, enlightenment-motivation (*saddhā*). *Diṭṭhi* becomes *sammā-diṭṭhi*, or middle way views which are undisturbed by sense impressions and will, neither fixed nor un-fixed, neither attached nor un-attached.

Sammā-diṭṭhi understands the sources of discontent, and begins to effectively dispose of these factors. The steps of the 8-fold path (including the *jhānic* trances) and the *Brahmavihāra*[24] stages are positive counterparts or antidotes to the self-destructive components of the dissolving chains of *kammic* causation. Meditation upon the causes and effects of desire reveals the ultimate non-existence of conditioning factors and of the self which is supposedly influenced by them. Since there is no self and nothing to which it can cling, the egoless individual is no longer obsessed by craving. He realizes the roots of his bondage as not something foreign or accidental, and achieves the annihilation of the fabrications, the bliss of ending the self-perpetuating schemes. He is no longer bound by attachment to the delusions of unconscious drives; nor has he made himself dead to living. Extinction of suffering is simultaneous with spiritual rebirth in the unconditioned realm of quietude and tranquillity; *nibbāna* is empty, wishless, signless, and deathless. The liberated state is called cessation-consciousness (*nirodha-samapatti*) to indicate that it is neutral to the possibilities of pleasure and displeasure, an indifference beyond joy and misery; and that it no longer resists or obstructs the dynamic flux of reality, making no object manifest. Positively, is is termed illumination (*aloka*), boundless insight which prevails over the darkness of ignorance by seeing through concepts—"a gaze that knows no horizon," and is without view-point.[25] *Paññā* is characterized by both equanimity and full clarity. "It is in the nature of things that a person who knows and sees as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces... (and) realizes the knowledge and insight of emancipation."[26]

Nietzsche also attacks logical thinking and its convoluted attachments. The principles of identity and contradiction, for example, presuppose the

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"apparent fact" of a self-identical "A", which is merely "a reconstruction of the thing."[27] By what value-standard, he asks, has it been determined that "the most logical and coldest thinking is supposed to be of the first rank?"[28] Although Nietzsche condemns logic as an obstruction to freedom and proposes its annihilation, he does not seek to replace it with a higher or intuitive wisdom, but rather by the release of will. The metaphysical need, according to Nietzsche, is fundamentally not a matter of discursive thinking, but of the weakness and decrepitude which uses logic to gain false security. An inability to withstand the nihilistic or essentially meaning-less ground of all values and perspectives gives rise to the "slander" of philosophy, the construction of unattainable and unknowable "true" realms, such as Hebrew-Christian God, Plato's Ideas, Kant's Noumena, which further man's debilitation. Thus/liberation for Nietzsche is not the emergence of illuminative insight, the Buddhist proposal which he mistakes for an example of exhaustion, but the awakening of a courageous attitude, *amor fati* (love of fate), the new formula for saying Yes by which one internalizes fate—it becomes the supreme possibility of man, identical with his creativity.

Revenge begins in weariness, but out of self-defence turns into revulsion toward that which threatens it; it is an antipathy "or secret raging against the preconditions of life, against the value feelings of life, against partisanship in favour of life."[29] Yet revenge is not a condition external to the will to power, of which it is a distortion. By will to power, Nietzsche does not mean the kind of selfish clinging or volitional greed for self-preservation which the Buddha rejects. "Willing is not desiring, striving, demanding: it is distinguished from these by the affect of commanding."[30] It is essentially the instinct to freedom in all things, the potentiality for overcoming and perfecting oneself, not merely a drive to preserve and protect one's territory. Like *paññā*, will to power functions through its apparent antithesis to free itself of entanglement and to realize its true nature. Both will and *paññā* affirm that there is an inexhaustible reservoir of spiritual strength, an original innocence, which when tapped can lead man to the finality (beyond cessation and recurrence) of the other shore: "And life itself confided this secret to me," says Zarathustra, "I am *that which must always overcome itself*".[31] Man's aim is not domination over others, but mastery over himself through the sublimation of his passions, impulses, and drives. Sublimation is the paradoxical process of preserving, carrying over, elevating as well as cancelling out. Man preserves his individual will in that he says yes to the will to power in all existence, but negates his will to self-preservation and self-esteem which are actually self-destructive. The "three metamorphoses" in *Zarathustra* symbolize this transformation: the

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spirit becomes first a camel who bears the burden of his and others' revenge, then a lion who asserts himself by forceful activity, and finally a child who responds to the world with innocence, wonder, and playfulness—"a self-propelled wheel."[32]

Once the will to power enslaves itself to the irreversibility of "it was", however, only a new understanding of time can liberate it. The notion of time is itself the ground for the transcendence of time; a delusion, like selfhood, which points the way out of bondage. For the Buddha, all time is a disease; he seeks its dissolution. For Nietzsche, linear time is the ailment; he seeks not the end of time but the fullest and most dynamic realization of time in the Moment. Nietzsche does not just say that revenge is revulsion, but that revenge is "the will's revulsion to time." The "it was" which resists the command of the will is revolting and contrary to the will. Revulsion against it develops in the will itself so that opposition to the will becomes part of the will. The will only appears because of the dilemma it has created. It endures and suffers from this opposition, thus suffering from itself. And it remains captive to the passing of "it was" precisely because it can be what it is only in relation to the passing and, thus, to its suffering.[33] The will wills its own passing, but through eternal recurrence it prescribes the conditions by which it can preserve and enhance itself even while it is destroying itself. There arises from both desire and revenge not only the need for deliverance and that which obstructs it, but ultimately the tools for overcoming all obstacles. Willing liberates. "For *that man may be delivered from revenge*: that is the bridge to my highest hope and a rainbow after protracted storms"[34]...as desire for things is transmuted into desire for enlightenment.

From the depths of the self-imposed labyrinth of revulsion emerges the eternal recurrence of the same events as the thread tracing the route to freedom, self-control, and the sublimation of the will to power. Buddhism believes that desire violates the essence of life, which is change, by trying to retain, stabilize, and prevent the flux from flowing—by isolating points in impermanence which it believes constitutes a real present, thus becoming preoccupied with past and future. *Nibbāna* is the breakthrough to eternity—the timeless or unborn realm—that has no relationship to time, and thus can no longer be confronted with the whims of time's passing. Nietzsche does not wish to abolish time or relations in time. Yet he does not simply affirm through eternal recurrence all the inconsistencies of the causal matrix of man's activity. He affirms courageously, selectively, and with discipline in such a way that life is transformed to a higher, purified state in which what returns is actually eternity and what occurs is only

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a consequence (or realization) of the will to power. He posits the notion of endless return to dislodge man from clinging to linear time, and ultimately proposes eternity as the solution for monotonous circularity. As in the fragment of Heraclitus, who Nietzsche claims was the only thinker before him who could have taught eternal recurrence, "Upon those who step into the same rivers flow other and yet other waters:"[35] in the incessant change there is a constancy of motion and rhythm, repeating itself again and again. Sameness encompasses eternal difference and eternal identity, each realized in and through the other. The constancy is that there is no constancy; there is no possibility of equilibrium.

The transformation is brought about when the will to power resolves to discard the shackles of "it was" and assert itself: "I will" is a preliminary stage of the path which, while still leaving man a victim of the consequence of time, indicates that he knows "he can". The ultimate victory comes when the creative will eliminates any doubt or confusion by willing backwards, turning in on itself to remedy itself from linear thinking: "I am" is the deliverance of the will from its revulsion when it wills the constant recurrence of the same in the exact detail as it is occurring now. The will to power does not simply say: "Thus I willed it." It also says: "Thus do I will it, thus shall I will it;"[36] and especially: Thus am I willing it now as it has always been and shall be.

At the point of utmost vulnerability, man can elevate himself through the activation and mastery of his strengths. Time is fulfilled in a single, comprehensive, all-inclusive Moment. This does not mean that eternity is reduced to an instantaneous, isolated point in time somehow lifted out of the chain of temporality, but that its structure corresponds to that of a moment. The Moment does not draw all past things after it into the future; it draws all coming things after itself.[37] The Moment draws all the future into the past. It embraces the will to power's only apparently conflicting tendencies of willing more and of self-mastery so that it needs less; preserving itself and yet feeding on its own excrement; intensification and conservation; expansion and contraction; passing away and coming again; overcoming and under-going; commanding and obeying/resisting. The awakened overman is free from time and the staticized "is" to live in an eternal present tense. Each of his thoughts and actions reverberates through temporality with the intensity of eternity. Zarathustra expresses the singularly spontaneous harmony of man and the nature of things, the supreme exaltation of all experience: "The knot of causes in which I am entangled recurs and will create me again. I myself belong to the causes of the eternal recurrence. I come again, with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent—not to a new life or a better life or a similar

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life: I come back eternally to this same, selfsame (*gleichen und selbigen*) life, in what is greatest as in what is smallest"[38] . . . to, Nietzsche adds in *The Will to Power*, "a circular movement of absolutely identical series... at the same time one and many; increasing here and at the same time decreasing there."[39]

IV

Liberation for Buddhism and Nietzsche completes the radical movement away from passive submission to the delusion of a stable world toward a creative acceptance of and unobstructive absorption in the dynamic nature of reality. A common question has arisen in scholarly interpretations of *nibbāna* and eternal recurrence: is the freedom proposed a subjective state or a transcendental truth? Is it to be understood as something psychological or ontological? The implicit assumption is that liberation could be one or the other, or even both. For example, Johannson argues in *The Psychology of Nirvana* that *nibbāna* is subjective. *Citta* or thought, which is to be distinguished from *viññāṇa* or consciousness, he says, is the "core of the personality...which can be made immovable and *viññāṇa* 'stopped'." *Citta* is the organizing factor which produces the continuity in the individual. "*Citta* attains *nibbāna*. *Nibbāna* is also a name for the state attained by *citta*."[40] Murti[41] and Conze,[42] on the other hand, argue that *nibbāna* is a metaphysical realm, an absolute totally transcending mundane existence. Jaspers[43] interprets Nietzsche's eternal recurrence as an existential imperative, the most stimulating encouragement for life-fulfilment, whereas Kaufmann[44] labels will to power an "all-embracing monism." Pfeffer[45] carefully distinguishes the existential/ethical dimension from the metaphysical/cosmological aspect of eternal recurrence, as if they were two separate things.

The dilemma inherent in these accounts is not simply that they are one-sided, but that they are not alive to the central aim of Buddhism and Nietzsche in their complete rooting out and overcoming of the metaphysical disposition. If freedom were subjective, then it would be metaphysical because subjectivity in any form already presupposes an enduring conscious entity which can realize truth—a *citta* which acquires *nibbāna*. Should freedom be ontological, it would necessarily be subjectivistic because all speculative claims arise from the ego's self-defensive predicaments.

The three basic doctrines of both philosophies, however, lead out of the entanglement of speculative-subjective metaphysical views by attacking both empty claims of oneness and illusory bifurcations :

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1. Dependent origination and will to power dislodge one from attachment to uncaused units or entities in favour of shifting constellations of interrelated forces.

2. *Anattā* (no-self) and overman no longer use a unified human subject as a starting point. The question of man is not posed in terms of, concerning, or according to man, but in terms of the in-different nature of reality. Such an emphasis does not avoid the existential issue, which is inseparable from the metaphysical problem, but resolves it at its source.

3. *Anicca* (impermanence) and eternal recurrence disperse any notion of constancy, permanence, or progress in time, either as linear or goal-directed movement (eschatology, teleology, evolution) or as endlessly prolonged duration.

These doctrines point neither to an endless flux nor a fixed permanence over and against the flux but to a uniquely dynamic harmony or non-differentiated integration of realization and reality, man's nature and the nature of things.

In Buddhism, negation re-orients all matters in terms of the middle way (*majjhimā*). The middle way is not one particular route, but a broad, inclusive middle that explores all alternatives while clinging to none. It is not only a means to an end, but it constitutes the processes of liberation itself. In appropriating the middle way through meditation, one mirrors or becomes immersed in things as they are.

The 8-fold middle path, the discipline of cultivating right (*sammā*) attitudes and actions, is fully realized as *citta samatā* (sameness or unification of mind). In his *Philosophy of the Buddha*, Archie Bahm suggests a new translation of the term *sammā* based on its etymological stem *sam* meaning withness, togetherness, conjunction, equipoise, evenness, tranquillity.[46] *Sammā* does not simply mean 'right'. In fact, it is antithetical to right in the sense of right vs. wrong; that is the stance to be eliminated by *paññā*. *Sammā* actually means sameness, a gathering into wholeness and undisturbedness; not a restrictive or narrow identity, but middle way inclusiveness that embraces difference. *Sammā-diṭṭhi*, for example, represents the collecting of all views in the sameness of their partiality, the non-distinctness of their distinctness, as well as the equanimous attitude which can distinguish between and therefore remain detached from them.

Thus, *sammā* means middle way, or right in the sense of thoroughgoing and truly complete. Each step of the path is not the development of an individual subject or the attainment of a transcendent truth, but the unfolding of the middle path characterized by: an acceptance of all things both generally and specifically, and without exception; the unity of means

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and end, theory and practice so that the *dhamma*-as-raft is left behind because as reality it has been incorporated by the enlightened being; ambiguity or confusion in a healthy sense marked not by discrimination and valuation but impartiality, not by one-sidedness but equanimity, not by extreme but composure.

The steps, however, are not linear stages, a kind of climbing the ladder into freedom. Rather, they are transcendental movements ever-enriching and ever-enhancing one's understanding and experience of the middle way, which is fulfilled as *sammā-paññā* (harmony of one's thoughts and the nature of reality), *sammā-sila* (harmony of one's actions and convictions), and *sammā samādhi* (harmony of the aggregates in their possibilities and limitations—form, feeling, preception, will, and awareness are creatively balanced). The steps culminate with *sammā sam-ā-dhi*, fully synthesized equanimity of togetherness, further enhanced by equanimity. Yet they do not reach a final conclusion, but are ever-continuing in a way that reflects reality, and is the antithesis of the vicious cycles of thirst and delusion. As Lama Govinda writes, "...the world exclusively consists in action. Nowhere is stagnation, nowhere limitation. Nothing exists for itself or separately in itself. There is nothing constant; but instead of a world filled with dead things, there is a *living* cosmos which finds its counterpart in the consciousness of each individual and its focus in each atom, just as every moment from the standpoint of infinitesimal divisibility contains the boundlessness of time."[47]

For Nietzsche, the overman is he who experiences eternal recurrence of the same events as his own inner being—the "same", the sameness of man and cosmos, power and bliss in the total character of life. As in Buddhism, there is no 'subject' who is liberated. Nietzsche totally rejects any notion of a substantive self. Freedom is the abandonment of such an attachment, the realization of ego-lessness, and the awareness that will alone is the limit of existence. What returns? The Same, not as a specifiable content or a soul recurring in endless cycles of time—that is the nihilistic stance which Nietzsche deplores—but as the events which perpetuate themselves identically in that they are ever-differentiated. The Same *is* return. How does the Same return? Eternally, not as an infinitely ordered cycle or haphazard chaos; neither as everlasting monotony nor indefinite selfish striving; not as a cause for nausea, the gnashing of teeth, pity, or paralysis. Eternity is not static persistence, endless duration, or timelessness. It is the element of finality in the present, the assimilation of time into the eternal and the reverberation of the eternal in and through the Moment. The Moment, the meeting point of midday and midnight, the highest peak and the abyss, is portrayed by Zarathustra as an

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indifferent gateway (a non-conceptualizable space—like the Buddhist *ākāśa*, a spatial resolution to the problematic of time) where all tenses are bound in a comprehensive web.

At the point of affirmation, there is awareness of neither change nor repetition, finitude nor infinitude, sameness nor difference. The Moment is not an isolated instant, or the willing of a particular event, but the entire matrix of activity as a manifestation, embodiment, and reflection (yet no longer illusory objectification) of the will to power. The eternal hourglass of existence is no longer turned over again and again: the neck is infinitely expanded, and all the particles of time are held by it. The Moment is implicated in every other moment; each half day is an eternity. Every moment is both unique and repetitive as well as uniquely repetitive.

Thus, eternal recurrence is the rhythm of change and becoming, the sameness and repetition of the motion and beat of the waves of Heraclitus' river. Who is engaged in the return? Not a self-constant entity, but over-man portrayed as the waters, the sameness or integration of individual return with the ring of rings: " 'Verily a polluted stream is man' " says Zarathustra, " 'One must be a sea to receive a polluted stream without becoming unclean. Behold, I teach you the overman: he is this sea: in him your great contempt can go under.' " [48]

Two Buddhist parables portray the *arahant* who has extinguished his delusions in terms of a daring, steadfast composure and resolute acceptance which also characterize Nietzsche's Dionysian Yea-sayer. In one parable, he is compared to a deer who could step into a snare and not be caught by it, and who is always able to escape from the hunter.[49] In the other, he is likened to a man who manages to hold a bowl of oil over the head of a beautiful girl while following her intricate steps as she dances before multitudes and a swordsman to his rear threatens death should he spill a drop on her[50]

Although Buddhism and Nietzsche travel comparable paths of negation to freedom, both finally negating the distinction between negation and affirmation, Buddhism assuredly does not conclude with a 'Yes'. It is perhaps understandable that Nietzsche was unable to grasp the profundity of Buddhist negation when the renowned contemporary scholar Edward Conze also misrepresents it. "As a practical term," writes Conze, " 'emptiness' means the complete denial or negation of this world...Meditation on 'emptiness' serves the purpose of helping us to get rid of this world..."[51] The above analysis of *diṭṭhi* and *sammā-diṭṭhi*, however, shows that Buddhism has nothing to do with negating the world or refuting life, but only with denying those relativistic conceptualizations which impede our access to the world.

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Nietzsche seems to be saying to Buddhism, "I know what you are doing, only I can do it better. Why do you not rejoice in an ecstatic affirmation of the groundless nature of things ?" But Buddhism could respond in turn, "Why do you say yes ? Do you really understand the basis of your own affirmation ?" To elaborate on this conflict, it is necessary to outline the structure of negation in Buddhism and Nietzsche :

1. Both philosophies agree that all systems of thought, including their own, are fundamentally nihilistic—that is, in origin and in essence they are without an absolute or transcendental support. The ground on which all views, values, and attitudes are superimposed is itself empty or without ground. A philosophy can respond to the abyss either by covering it up out of ignorance or weakness, or by recognizing it as the source of wisdom and strength; the understanding and acceptance of nihilism is the overcoming of nihilism. Metaphysics is a tendency to hypostatize an 'is' or substratum where none exists in order to disguise the void. It entangles itself in various either/or dilemmas, delineating one alternative as true and real and the other as false and unreal. Invariably, however, the reverse of the metaphysical position is actually the case; what metaphysics presents as real is not at all real.

2. Both philosophies negate the metaphysical abstractions which pollute the world in a more stringent and direct way than skepticism which holds out the possibility that there may be a hidden transcendent truth, just that it is not yet known. Because the delusions have no basis, negation is not so much an active destruction of particular positions as a letting-desist, which by impartially reflecting the fabrications, exposes their flaws and inadequacies. Nietzsche proclaims, for example, that nihilism means, "*the highest values devaluate themselves.*"[52] The values are self-negating in the sense that they self-destruct. As Camus notes, Nietzsche did not form a project to kill God, he found God already dead in the minds of his contemporaries.[53] In Buddhism, *paññā* is the emergence of an illumination which disperses one-sided views and the whole process by which they are generated.

3. a. In negating a position, the negation is not intended to affirm the opposite position, or to infer that there is an acceptable position which cannot be described. The Buddhist *anattā* doctrine does not imply the existence of an entity that is the opposite of a self—namely, a 'non-self.'

b. Nor does negation extinguish reality as such, but in fact it enhances the possibility of a genuine experience of reality.

The final points are the ones contested. Nietzsche's claim that Buddhism does not appreciate the latter point has already been dismissed. But Buddhism is now in a position to challenge Nietzsche's understanding

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of the former aspect of negation, that the denial of *A* is not the support of non-*A* (which in a disguised way becomes a new '*A*'). Nietzsche condemns metaphysics for projecting an 'other-worldly' realm of being, permanence, reality over and against 'this-worldly' becoming, contingency, and appearance, and he cites *nibbāna* as one such example. The history of metaphysics and religion, he maintains, has consisted of false duplications of the empirical world. The question is, does Nietzsche himself fully overcome this dichotomy, or does he merely change the pre-eminent element? Does his transvaluation completely trans-verse the value-creating process, or only re-verse previous values in favour of joy, strength, and the innocence of becoming ? Nietzsche denies that there are two realms, but if he asserts only one, is that not a metaphysical stance ?

The Buddha's silence moves beyond the either/or predicament through the emergence of 'neither/nor' thinking which negates four possibilities: is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not. In the sutta known as "The Summum Bonum",[54] *nibbāna* is described as unbound by the realm of 'nothingness' or the realm of 'neither perception nor non-perception'. Buddhist 'no' as in 'no-self' and 'unborn' indicates neither/nor, a convenient designation for *sammā-diṭṭhi* which rejects even 'neither,/nor' as a satisfactory alternative. Nietzsche, however, seems caught on the third rejected possibility. On the one hand, he negates the concept of being as mere fiction, an evaporating fallacy, yet he also insists, "to impose upon becoming the character of being—that is the supreme will to power."[55] Nietzsche attempts a logical-scientific proof of the doctrine (based on the law of conservation of energy)[56] claiming that it is the "most *scientific* of all possible hypotheses,"[57] yet also maintains the eternal recurrence is a matter of "discipline and breeding (*zucht und züchtung*)." Although eternal recurrence as the sameness of apparent oppositions resembles the middle way, its approach in terms of 'both and' thinking-both being and becoming'—is not in accord with *sammā-diṭṭhi*.

Nietzsche's dilemma is evident, from a Buddhist standpoint, in his concept of will which supposedly represents a trans-subjective and non-metaphysical disclosure of reality, but is actually a kind of subjective projection on the world. If Nietzsche were not ensnared in the subjectivist trap, he would recognize that liberation from either/or and yes/no dichotomies does not lead to Yes (both/and) but to Neither/Nor that is never limited by itself. Nietzsche declares in *Zarathustra*:

> Joy—deeper yet than agony:
> Woe implores: Go!
> But all joy wants eternity—

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Wants deep, wants deep eternity.[58]

Yet eternity cannot be gained by willing, but by insight which is beyond will and not-will as well as the will to not-will. Buddhism recognizes this in its account of emancipation as an effortless natural occurrence: "It is *in the nature of things* (*dhammatā*) that a person in the state of meditative concentration knows and sees what really is. A person who knows and sees what really is does not need to make an effort of will to feel disinterested and renounce. It is *in the nature of things* that a person who knows and sees as it really is, feels disinterested and renounces...(and) realizes the knowledge and insight of emancipation."[59] Is it not Nietzsche then who, through his clinging to will to power, shows a trace of fearfulness and concealed impotence when confronting the void ? The Buddhist reorientation is centered on no-thing, but Nietzsche resorts to will.

Nietzsche can counter on two grounds, however, one theoretical, the other practical. First, he has indicated that his doctrines may be understood as provisional, heuristic devices—and not metaphysical views—which are appropriate for awakening man from the slumber of metaphysics in the destitute modern era:

> A pessimistic teaching and way of thinking, an ecstatic nihilism, can under certain conditions be indispensable precisely to the philosopher—as a mighty pressure and hammer with which he breaks and removes degenerate and decaying races to make way for a new order of life, or to implant into that which is degenerate and desires to die a longing for the end.[60]

Nietzsche calls overman a "metaphor"[61] and eternal recurrence a "prophecy" of which belief there are two consequences: "a. Means of enduring it, b. Means of disposing of it."[62] Perhaps Nietzsche's doctrines, like the Buddha's raft, are to be left behind once their utility has passed.

Secondly, Nietzsche might question whether in practice, the final criterion for any evaluation, early Buddhism was really able to avoid escapism. Did Buddhism, historically, attempt to transform all of society, or was it content with monasticism ? Actually, this issue is inseparable from the theoretical one. To the extent that *nibbāna* was interpreted as the eradication of *saṁsāra* by the Abhidhamma schools, Nietzsche's critique (of certain forms of early Buddhism) is in agreement with the Mādhyamika's refutation of Abhidhamma through Nāgārjuna's identifying as mutually inclusive the unconditioned (*asaṁkhāta*) and conditioned (*saṁkhāta*) realms. Nietzsche's overman, the creator and legislator of new values,

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reflects the bodhisattva's ideal of realizing enlightenment in and through social commitment, rather than by withdrawing from the world.

NOTES

1. See especially *Götzen-Dammerung*, "*Wie Die 'Wahre Welt' Endlich zur Fabel Wurde*" (*Twilight of the Idols*, "How the True World' Finally Became a Fable") in *Werke in Drei Bänden* edited by Karl Schlecta (München, Carl Hanser, 1966), vol. II, p. 963. Hereafter cited as SII.
2. *Der Wille zur Macht* (Stuttgart, Kröner, 1964), hereafter cited as WM, passages 1065-1066. In citing WM, I call attention to the controversy concerning the use of Nietzsche's posthumously edited and published material for study and interpretation. See Walter Kaufmann's discussion of the background of this issue in his translation, *The Will to Power* (New York, Vintage, 1967), p. xiii-xxix. My conclusion is that WM is eminently representative of Nietzsche's thinking and worthy of our most serious attention. I have followed Kaufmann's translation in all Passages from WM.
3. SII, p. 1159; also WM pa. 1052.
4. WM, pa. 154; also in *Der Antichrist* 20-23 in SII, p. 1179-1183.
5. WM, pa. 55. This lengthy passage shows Nietzsche's ambivalence toward Buddhism as he uses the phrase, "the European form of Buddhism" twice, with decidedly different emphases.
6. SII, p. 310, trans. Walter Kaufmann, *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (New York, Viking 1966). p. 4-5.
7. WM, pa. 28. Nietzsche often contrasts complete and incomplete, active and passive, strong and weary nihilism.
8. WM, pa. 462, 1053.
9. See *Die Fröhliche Wissanschaft* (*The Gay Science*), pa. 341-342 in SII for Nietzsche's first expression, characteristically prophetic rather than systematic, of the thought which "invaded" him in 1881 and continued to dominate his thinking throughout. Eternal recurrence is later formulated mainly in *Also Sprach Zarathustra* (*Thus Spake Zarathustra*) in "*Von der Selbst Uberwindung*" ("On Self-Overcoming"), "*Von der Erlosung*" ("On Redemption"), and "*Vom Gesicht und Ratsel*" ("On the Vision and the Riddle") as well as WM, *Viertes Buch* (Fourth Book). Otherwise, the eternal recurrence is rarely mentioned. In an important sense, however, all Nietzsche's later works are concerned with it in that they provide the philosophical and moral foundations for comprehending and accepting it.
10. WM, pa. 617.
11. By 'basic' Buddhism, I refer to Buddhism as expressed in the *Nikāya* literature. Nietzsche, for whatever reason, makes no reference to anything but basic Buddhism, and at times he confuses that with Brahmanism. A full explication of

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his philosophical affinities and conflicts with Buddhism would involve a treatment of the culmination of Buddhist negation in the Mahāyāna notion of *sūnyatā*, or the unimpeded non-distinguishability, but not merely equation, of form and non-form-conditioned and unconditioned, *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. A possible Buddhist critique of Nietzsche should also take into account the Western dismantling of his "ecstatic nihilism"—Heidegger's evaluation of will to power as heir of Cartesian subjectivity and the final convolution of the oblivion or forgetfulness of Being that has plagued Western thinking since the pre-Socratics. See Heidegger's 2-volume *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen, Niske, 1961), *Was Heisst Denken*? (*What is Called Thinking*?) (Tubingen, Niemayer, 1971), and several other essays.

12. 3 marks: *dukkha* (suffering), *annica* (impermanence), *anattā* (no-self). 3 thirsts: *bhava-taṇhā* (thirst for existence), *vibhava-taṇhā* (thirst for non-existence), *kāma-taṇhā* (thirst for sense-pleasures). 4 defilements: *moha* (self-deception), *lobha* (lust), *doṣa* (hatred), *diṭṭhi* (false views). 12 links: *avijja* (ignorance), *saṃkhāra* (volition), *viññāṇā* (consciousness), *nāmh-phen* (mental and physical phenomena), *salāyatana* (six faculties), *phassa* (mental and sensorial contact), *vedanā* (feeling), *taṇhā* (thirst), *upādāna* (clinging), *bhāva* (becoming), *jāti* (birth), *dukkha* (suffering, decay, sorrow, etc.).
13. WM, pa. 768.
14. SII, p 394.
15. SII, p. 395.
16. WM, pa. 765.
17. *Majjhima Nikāya*, trans. I.B. Horner (London, Luzac and Co., 1954), p. 180.
18. WM, pa. 570.
19. WM, pa. 577.
20. 5 *khandhas* (aggregates): *rūpa* (matter) *vedanā* (sensation), *sannā* (perceptions), *samkhara* (volition), *viññaṇā* (consciousness).
21. Walpola Rahula, *What the Buddha Taught* (New York, Grove, 1958), p. 31.
22. *Majjhima Nikāyā*, sutta 62, trans. H.C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (New York, Atheneum, 1973), p. 117-122.
23. *Sāṃyutta Nikāya*, trans. Warren, p. 168.
24. 8-fold path: *sammā diṭṭhi* (right views), *sammā sankappa* (right thought), *sammā vācā* (right speech), *sammā kammanta* (right action), *sammā ajiva* (right livelihood), *sammā vāyamā* (right effort), *sammā sati* (right mindfulness), *sammā samādhi* (right concentration), 4 *Brahma vihāra* states: *metta* (universal love) *karunā* (compassion), *muditā* (sympathetic joy), *upekkhā* (impartiality).
25. See Bhikkhu Nanananda, *Concept and Reality* (Columbo, Buddhist Publication Society, 1971), p. 60.
26. *Aṇguttara Nikāya*, trans. K.N. Jayatilleke in *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 421.
27. WM, p. 516, 520.

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28. WM, pa. 527.
29. WM, pa. 461.
30. WM, pa. 668.
31. SII, p. 371.
32. SII, p. 293-294.
33. See Heidegger, *Was Heisst Denken* ?, p. 33-40.
34. SII, p. 357.
35. J.M. Robinson, trans., *Early Greek Philosophy* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1968), p. 91.
36. SII, p. 395.
37. SII, p. 406-410.
38. SII, p. 466-467, trans. Walter Kaufmann, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, p. 221.
39. WM, pa. 1066-1067.
40. Rune Johannson, *The Psychology of Nirvana* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1968), p. 107.
41. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1960), p. 48.
42. Edward Conze, *Buddhist Thought in India* (Ann Arbor, Univ. of Michigan Press, 1970), p. 76.
43. Karl Jaspers, *Nietzsche : An Introduction to the Understanding of His Philosophical Activity* (Chicago, Regnery-Gateway, 1965).
44. Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche : Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist* (New York, Vintage, 1968), p. 192.
45. Rose Pfeffer. *Nietzsche : Disciple of Dionysus* (Lewisburg, Bucknell University Press, 1971).
46. Archie Bahm, *Philosophy of the Buddha* (New York, Capricorn, 1969), p. 80ff.
47. Lama Anagarika Govinda, *Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (New York, Weiser, 1969), p. 142.
48. SII., p. 280.
49. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, trans. Warren, p. 347.
50. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, trans. F.L. Woodward (London, Luzac and Co., 1956), Vol. V, p. 169.
51. Conze, p. 61.
52. WM, pa. 2.
53. *Majjhimā Nikāya*, sutta 26, trans. Warren, pp. 331-349.
54. Albert Camus, *The Rebel* (New York, Vintage, 1956), p. 68.
55. WM, pa. 617.

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56. WM, pa. 1063. "The law of the conservation of energy demands *eternal recurrence*." Nietzsche's proof is based on the premises that time is infinite, but energy is limited and must "pass through a calculable number of combinations" as in "a great dice game of existence (1066)." See Arthur Danto, *Nietzsche as Philosopher* (New York, MacMillan, 1955), p. 203-207 for an analysis of the logical consistency of the proof.

57. WM, pa. 55.

58. SI1, pp. 472-473.

59. *Aṇguttara Nikāya*, trans. Jayatilleke, pp. 420-421.

60. WM, pa. 1055.

61. WM, pa. 866.

62. WM, pa. 1057.

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12

Problematics of the Buddhist Nature of Self

KENNETH K. INADA

In dealing with the problematics of the Buddhist nature of self, we are treading on old grounds. In this essay, however, I hope to avoid those grounds as much as possible and open up fresh grounds for a meaningful dialogical discourse.

By the Buddhist nature of self we are specifically focusing on that unparalleled doctrine of anātman ("non-self"). Certainly, the doctrine was a rare Copernican turn in philosophic insight in the East, first in India proper, then subsequently outside of India, especially in the Asiatic countries in general which developed unique social and cultural forms that continue to exist today. It has, in short, influenced major changes in the outlook and perspective in man and his livelihood; yet, we scarcely know what it means in its fullness and how it has made the impact on men. For instance, ask any Buddhist, practising or professed, to explain the doctrine or its rudiments and chances are he will not be able to convey to you its full meaning and significance in any satisfactory manner, barring linguistic difficulties naturally. This is as it should be. For any positive or objective accounting of the doctrine would surely be held suspect.

In many respects it is possible to assert that Buddhism is a philosophy of anātman. By saying this, I am not at all denigrating other important doctrines in Buddhism; rather, I am trying to say that we can focus on a single major doctrine, as the anātman, and introduce other relevant doctrines of equal or lesser values as well in ways that are consistent and coherent to the whole system of Buddhist thought. For, it is an important character of Buddhist thought in general that it includes traits of malleability and flexibility, adaptation and absorption, and interrelationship and interpenetration. In this respect, the later T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen doctrines, such as, "all in one, one in all" or "all is one, one is all," are not entirely new to Chinese Buddhist thinking. The roots go back to original Buddhist thought. So a Buddhist, nay even a strict academician, cannot afford to experience clashes of ideas, concepts or doctrines in Buddhism, although clashes are inevitable for many. There is deep concern and uneasiness, to be sure, about the way Buddhists at times set up contrasting doctrines side by side or even on the same level of existence, e.g., the relative (saṃvṛti)

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and absolute (paramārtha) natures of truth, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, relational origination (pratītya-samutpāda) and emptiness (śūnyatā), etc. These only remind us of the subtleties and profundities of the nature of Buddhist doctrines.[1]

I wish to re-examine the doctrine of anātman in such a way that the old problematics will be covered and at the same time new problematics, in the sense of advancing the cause of Buddhist understanding, will emerge. It is not an easy task but well worth the try. In this attempt, I will return to Buddhist thought what many scholars have tried to deny it, i.e., the place and function of metaphysics. It would seem to me that such a denial is ungrounded and greatly restricts or limits Buddhist understanding. It is so in several ways.

a. The denial is prompted by an overly concern for the Buddhist goal, nirvāṇa, and the meditative discipline that leads to it by "transcending" any empirical analysis. Meditation, after all, it is argued, is the key to slough off the elements of the empirical realm and that in this process metaphysics or metaphysical understanding is unnecessary (shades of logical positivism perhaps) and in fact it becomes a burden on the practitioner. We can understand the zeal to rid man of any obstacles in his meditative practice but that is only one aspect of man's quest for the goal. There is another aspect, equally important and perhaps more basic to his attainments, which is the critical understanding of his own intimate empirical realm of existence. In other words, the metaphysics of his own ordinary experiential world is the most important grounds upon which he launches his meditative practice.

b. The famous so-called anti-metaphysical sūtra, Cūḷa-Māluṅkyasutta,[2] is readily invoked to support the denial. The technical term, avyākata (indeterminate or inexpressible nature), for example, is interpreted to signify the inanity or inefficacy of any metaphysical principles or descriptions. For example, the question on whether or not the Tathāgata (Enlightened One) survives death is metaphysical and does not elicit an answer, thus suggesting the Buddha's alleged silence. But it can also be argued that the sūtra is not really pointing at the bankruptcy of metaphysics or metaphysical thinking as such. The Buddha's constant or repeated entreaty to Māluṅkyaputta that the question "does not fit" (the case) can be interpreted to mean (out of several other interpretations naturally) that his so-called metaphysical imputations, e.g., Tathāgata, soul, death, finitude, infinitude, etc., are wrongly constructed or

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presented and therefore wrongly understood. I will treat the nature of metaphysics shortly.

c. Again, by pointing at some of the principal doctrines, such as, śūnyatā, nirvāṇa, dharma, pratītya-samutpāda, anitya and anātman, it is pointed out that these do not have substantial contents and therefore they are metaphysically neutral or indifferent. In this instance, I believe the denial is very much premature. That is, it seems that the doctrines or concepts are not really understood in their true natures before they are cast into the same so-called non-substantial and thus non-metaphysical basket. It is a simplistic device but a wrong one. It is wrong for the reason that none of the doctrines has been given the chance to apply or manifest itself cogently in one's experience. Of course, to demonstrate this is a very difficult task but it still is important to indicate that to the detractors of metaphysics falls the burden of proof on experiential matters. It seems quite ironic, moreover, that such detractors of metaphysics go merrily along to indulge in the doctrines of Buddhism in ways that not only suggest but strongly indicate the place of metaphysics and the function of metaphysical thinking. They reserve the right of course to toss the metaphysical ladder away after using it *á la* Wittgenstein. But can we or do we dispense with the ladder so readily ? This is a question that needs looking into.

To be sure, there is no exact term for metaphysics in Buddhism, nor in Indian philosophy in general for that matter. This may seem to be a shortcoming but for us I would rather like to interpret it as a real challenge, an invitation to explore deeper into the elements of the Buddhist system. On this, it should be noted at the outset that Buddhism is not a well-defined system of thought where there is a clearly defined framework in which or into which all the fillers can be readily thrown in or framed so that both the framework and the fillers can be identified always in no uncertain terms. Such a framework is a fiction, a bad myth, that simply does not stand. It is a rather ungrounded myth or ideal to which we must address ourselves and on which I hope to clarify in the course of this essay.

It seems to me further that the detractors of metaphysics do not distinguish between good and bad metaphysics. They seem to be turned off from the start and quite abruptly, perhaps, by the term itself, i.e., that one could be so bold and presumptuous as to attempt an analysis of man and the world with such categorical verve as seen, for example, in some of the

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idealistic and materialistic systems. Granted that sheer absolutism or sheer relativism or even sheer materialism has no legitimate place in sound metaphysics, as I am willing to admit that the detractors rightly observe in the imputations of eminent realities in these so-called "isms" in both the Western and Eastern traditions, still, it would be folly to be ignorant of or to dismiss outright the quest in man for the relative and the absolute nature of things. My point is that the eminent realities referred to within the context of relative and absolute systems are somehow misplaced or misdirected or misguided. They are so because of the truncated or one-directional way in which they are treated within a seemingly coherent system of metaphysics. The proponents are in such a hurry to construct that system that they either miss or gloss over much of the nature of experiential content that constitutes existence. It is so easy to see and count a few realities (or elements of existence) and to indulge in sweeping generalizations about *the reality* of the nature of things. I call this form of metaphysics deviated. It is bad metaphysics. It is a myopic view, a limited or constricted type of metaphysics.

So, granted that bad metaphysics is prevalent amongst us, even with religious and philosophical thinkers of the first order, there is still a place for good or proper type of metaphysics. In this respect, I cannot help but recall Alfred Whitehead's famous caution :[3]

> Whatever is found in 'practice' must lie within the scope of the metaphysical description. When the description fails to include the 'practice', the metaphysics is inadequate and requires revision. There can be no appeal to practice to supplement metaphysics, so long as we remain contented with our metaphysical doctrines. Metaphysics is nothing but the description of the generalities which apply to all the details of practice.

In Buddhism there is an incredible amount of concern for the mechanics of 'practice', a deep concern for the ingredients that are necessary for the description of a truly great metaphysical system of experience.[4] In many ways, its metaphysical system is unique in that it probes deeper than most Western systems in accounting for the complex mechanics of man's being and this includes certain elements that are only seen in Buddhism. These elements will shortly show up in the discussion.

In the main, then, anti-metaphysicians have been critical of any and all ontological assumptions. With both idealistic and materialistic strains of metaphysics, there is a tendency to indulge in a form of "object" or "objects of discourse", be it the Absolute, God, Brahman, One, Unity, Principle, etc., relative to the macrocosmic realm or the atomic components,

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such as, the self, soul, consciousness, elements of existence, etc. relative to the microcosmic realm. Unless one is wary, these implicit or explicit objectifications have the tendency to result in definitive ontological natures that frame one's life and life perspectives. Even in Buddhism, the svabhāvic (self-nature) ontology of the Abhidharma-Sarvāstivāda tradition was immediately criticized by the Sautrāntika as well as by the Mādhyamika (i.e. Nāgārjuna) and the Mahāyāna tradition in general. But we would certainly be remiss were we to dismiss ontologies solely on the basis of their being bad metaphysics. What is important here is to distinguish the kind of ontology referred to that we should be wary of (i.e. svabhāvic type) from the kind that we should be able to explore and accommodate if proved to be worthy and relevant to our experiences.

Needless to say, the svabhāvic type belongs to bad metaphysics and thus cannot be perpetrated. But what about the other type ? This other type of metaphysics accounts for an ever widening and deepening nature of human experience. It came about in Western philosophy relatively late, picking up momentum, for example, with the ideas of Hegel, Darwin, Bergson, Morgan, 19th century science, Einstein, Heisenberg, Heidegger and showing up clearly in Whitehead's organic philosophy. In the East, the Buddha had already expounded the rudiments of such a thought 2500 years earlier. The detailed comparisons between the East and the West on the matter is unnecessary at this point but suffice it to say that the principle of organic process philosophy was known and lived through by man earlier than usually noted. In the West of course Heraclitus is the shining example of an earlier sage who keyed on the principle of change and process but alas few took him seriously. Plato carried the thought to some extent but he couldn't really accommodate it within his great doctrine on the Idea of the Good. Nor did Aristotle, with his sweeping architectonic view of things, really succeed in accommodating organic philosophy. His thoughts rather fired a concern for the substantial treatment of things. All this is not to fall complacent with a false impression that modern man has understood and accepted process philosophy all along as a way of life. I might add that the situation can also be applied to modern Buddhists, scholars and practitioners alike.

It is my contention that organic process philosophy is marvellously depicted in the Buddhist philosophy of anātman. Let us move into its implications.

Anātman is etymologically, an-ātman, or the negation of the ātman (self); it connotes the exact opposite of ātman. Logically, there is no doubt that this is very clear but the question is, Is that all there is to the concept ? Does it convey to us the full meaning ? To say that there is no soul

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or self, or that the soul or self is negated, does not really advance the true understanding of the concept of anātman, except on the linguistic and logical levels.[5] The antithetic treatment of ātman-anātman doesn't really resolve the question or even come close to clarifying it. As a matter of fact, Buddhist thought, if I am correct in my interpretation, never saw the ātman view as wholly antithetic to its own anātman view. In my understanding, it seems to be a simple case of imposing bad metaphysical elements on the experimental process or confusing bad and good metaphysics.

The problem is much more complicated than we suppose since even on the linguistic and logical levels we go on to accept the ātman concept as if we know all about it and premise it for further manipulation. The ātman and its spiritual cognate, Brahman, are essentially non-cognitive or non-logical entities and yet we do not cease to give them circumscribed epistemological meanings. The ātman concept still remains in the province of the Hindu who has his own metaphysics and the faith and will to pursue it. What the Buddhist or the historical Buddha reacted against was the inadequacy of the Hinduistic metaphysics to account for the so-called worldly empirical nature of things. It was not a simple overturn of the ātman concept into nullity but an unique overhaul of the understanding of human experience. The famous Middle Doctrine in Buddhism specifically cautions us to avoid the extremes of substantialism (sassata-vāda) and non-substantialism (ucchedavāda). I believe the doctrine supports my view that the extremes (anta) refer to the ends or extremes as obviously bad metaphysics, both of which are ill-grounded in experience.

In many respects, however, the Buddhist introduction of the anātman concept was a 180-degree turn from the prevailing ātman concept. Where the latter (i.e., ātman view) attempted to see the whole from the metaphysical totality, illusion notwithstanding, the former (i.e., anātman view) attempted to see the whole as much as possible from the metaphysically fragmentary nature of things. Where the latter presupposed the ātman-brahman identity explicitly or implicitly from the beginning to the end, the former delved into no presuppositions at all and denied any bad metaphysical elements to influence such concepts as jīva (soul) sattva (sentient being) and pudgala (personal identity). Where both invoked the indeterminate principle (avyākṛta), they used it for different purposes, i.e., the latter used it to explain away the barriers relative to the ātman-brahman identity and all things related to it but the former used it to exhibit or expose the limitations or shortcomings of relying solely on the entified empirical concepts (prajñapti). Where the latter was involved in a kind of emanation theory of being in a relatively "steady-state" affair, the former remained true to a

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strictly naturalistic and evolutionary basis for man's being, a process that indeed defies one's imagination—and rightly so—but one that purports to have all the ingredients of a consistent system of process thought. I have elsewhere argued that the latter aims at a metaphysical absolute regarding the nature of being, whereas the former aims at an ontological absolute of being.

In Buddhist metaphysics, we are focusing on the concrete nature of experiential reality. And this reality is nothing but the ontological nature of the individual being, his entire experiential content. The reader will be quick to note that I am already using terms that relate to or depict certain realities or ontological objects, something I had previously criticized. This is an inevitable circumstance and a practical necessity. Even the historical Buddha, it will be recalled, was quite mindful and cautious regarding this matter and yet he had no recourse but to use the prevailing language to convey the intent and purpose of seeking that concrete nature of reality. In essence, then, we are in search of that reality within the matrix of things, however laden it may be with the elements of the provisional and conventional natures.

Reality is like a maze. If one is caught up in the elements of the maze, one is prevented from seeing the passage-way and contrariwise, if one is not, then the passage-way is there without the usual obstructive elements and thus one is able to move freely and easily. In other words, one understands the maze for what it is or sees it at a glance, so to speak. There are no impediments. It is rather a habit of our ordinary epistemological nature that we try to catch everything in one's experience even by imposing on it unsupportable metaphysical elements. A good example is the Cartesian framework that reduces all epistemological entities to clarity and distinctness. It should be noted that it is one thing to say that epistemological entities must be clear and distinct but it is another to say that they relate to reality. And still another to say that reality must be clear and distinct.

So in Buddhism, regardless of the false impositions we make, we are dealing with the metaphysics of being which is in truth a reference to individual ontology. But individual ontology is also process ontology. Therefore, it is not an ontology in the usual sense. The three cardinal characteristics in basic Buddhism, i.e., anicca, dukkha, anattā (impermanence, suffering, and non-self) point up to this unique ontology. The first, impermanent principle, reminds us that everything is a moving phenomenon or a moving ontology. The so-called "great chain of being" is not merely a static linking phenomenon where the nature of being persists in linear fashion; rather, it is a novel creative process based

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on the ever fresh dynamic nature of the links where nothing persists or endures.

Thus we may now be able to assert that there is a stream of reality (bhava) in the general or primal sense, and also a stream of consciousness (bhavanga, saṇtāna) in the finer and more technical sense. The stream cannot be framed, either substantially or in the usual ontological sense, unless we are to speak of it conventionally. Perhaps, I may be permitted to say that the stream of reality has to do with process ontology whereas the stream of consciousness with epistemological process, although the latter process necessarily "rests" upon or functions within the realm of the former.

We might also add that in the strictest sense there is process ontology but no ontological process that refers to static entities in movement. Again, in a different sense it might be asserted that there is ontological understanding on the nature of things but no understanding of ontological (static) elements as such. It is this unique ontological understanding that leads to good or proper metaphysics. In other words, there seems to be a widening receptacle, a field of being, that aids in the understanding of the nature of things. In this, however, the ontological elements do not spell out that receptacle or field of being, for the focus is always on the dynamic field of existence.

All this is indeed paradoxical and puzzling but process philosophies are of this nature. Yet they are not contrary to or contradictory of the facts of experience. Indeed, they are most adaptive and accommodative of the facts. From the Buddhist standpoint, the seeming contradictions occur from several causes or bases. They may occur, for example, from the inability to distinguish between the provisional or conventional and the ontologically absolute natures of being. Or, it may be due to the inability to follow the middle doctrine which eschews us to stay clear from the extremes as discussed earlier.

It goes without saying that in process ontology, we are concerned with the dynamics of the specious present. The present is specious because its locus of reality is never at a standstill or steady and thus unaccountable in any definitive sense, especially in terms of the manipulable data and aspects of things. Moreover, it can now be stated that the locus of anātman is likewise specious and therefore we must concentrate on it.

The problematics of the specious present is somewhat aggravated by the plain fact that we normally assign only an one-dimensional framework to the process of being. That is, we normally understand temporality to be a simple one-directional flow. But it is much more complicated than that. That present, in actuality, is a multi-faceted, multi-directional phenomena

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which the Buddhists early on sensed and captured in their doctrines. How that multi-dimensional nature manifests in our experiences is the crux of the problem in our understanding of the specious present. The difficulty is basically one in which we are asked to be both spectator and participant of the activities, a difficulty as old as Platonism in the West. This spectator-participant view or approach is so basic yet so fraught with difficulties of understanding that the average intellect and even great minds find it totally incomprehensible on the one hand and beyond reach on the other.

Naturally, we refrain from resorting to meditative devices of any form for the understanding since we believe that man must still initially seek a naturalistic understanding, bringing into sharp focus all the canons of logic or the intellect together with the utilization of the empirical data in the most exhaustive sense. And in many ways, we have not really taxed our reason and its power to anything like the optimum degree of usage when it comes to intimating ourselves with the nature of reality. The same can be said about our intimacy with the empirical realm. For the most part, we simply get carried away with the mechanics or the elements thereof and these in turn result in subtle dogmatic stands, be they psychological, social, metaphysical or whatever.

Again, we do not have the time to enter into the reasons for the rise of the dogmatic stands. Rather, it is more important now to focus on one aspect and educe the subtle and unknown ways in which the experiential process is taking place. Moreover, the failure to understand this aspect has resulted in grave misgivings and at times irreparable damage to the person in his pursuit of a proper development of the enlightened way of life.

The aspect in question that I wish to focus on is the ontological grounds and nature of the process. Failure to understand this, in a rather circuitous or circular way, results in the most damaging phenomenon, i.e., the ontological unclarity of existence or one's clouded nature of being (avidyā). Of course, I am not implying at all that one cannot go on living in this clouded nature of being, as there are abundant examples personified by our normal saṃsāric (duḥkha-ridden) pursuits. Yet, the message of Buddhism is that there must be a constant vigil and search for the opposite, i.e., the pursuit for the ontological clarity of existence. This is the search in the right direction of the Buddhist nature of self, the anātman. But this search is futile and unproductive should one adhere to old methods and framework. This is not to say that the old methods and framework are to be junked or abandoned completely; no, that would be a total destruction or negation which no Buddhist would ever sanction.

What is then called for is the "re-organization", or "re-constitution",

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if you will, of the ontological framework that I propose. Moreover, certain scholars have conveniently labelled such re-organization or re-constitution as a systematic de-ontologization. To a large extent, this is true and cogent. However, as I see it, the more important question is, After de-ontologization, what ? True, Nāgārjuna's systematic critique of his opponent's position is an attempt to de-ontologize his realistic tendencies. But Nāgārjuna's critique does not end there. He will not leave his opponent suspended in so-called de-ontologized mid-air. He, like all true Buddhists, will try his best to return the de-ontologized nature back to solid grounds, i.e., in constant contact with true reality, without the traces or vestiges of the mind's imposition on reality as such (tattva). In short, de-ontologization is at best a half-way measure, a conceptual device, that needs to be brought back to the full experiential content in the total process.

Let us proceed to examine the specious present further. As mentioned earlier, the Buddhist will premise two types of continuum, i.e., one is the continuum of being (bhava) and the other the continuum of consciousness (saṇtāna, bhāvanga). Though different in definition and application, they are really indicating certain aspects of the self— same flow of existence. The former refers to the general nature of being and the latter to the subtle links relative to conscious plays. Regardless of the differences then, the specious moment is functional in both. They both exhibit the ways in which the continuum is a fact of existence. The specious moment, as the literal centre of being, is always real. But the question to be posed here is, In what way is it sustaining its reality or its real "contents" in the flow of existence ? Or, How can we speak of it in its speciousness ?

It can be said that the Buddhist came to grips with the concept of passage, nay actual passage itself, in a most profound way. Empirically, he perceived rightly that the rise (utpāda) of a moment is seen and so is its fall or subsidence (bhanga or anityata). And he also perceived that there is a duration (sthita) in which the moment is full blown, so to speak, or attains fruition (vipāka).[7] These three aspects of the moment are incessantly involving themselves in an unique way that even graphs or diagrams fail to describe the full import of the process. Yet, it is highly important now to utilize these devices in order to delineate, if only in a small way, on the peculiarities of the process.

(1) First of all, the flow of existence in the simplest possible manner is illustrated with an arrow thus : →or it may be expanded into a "bloated" arrow thus : ⟹ to depict the content of the flow. In either illustration, it says or describes relatively little, if any, of the full experiential content. At best, it only shows the directional flow of the process. And so

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we move on to the next diagram.

(2) The second diagram can be illustrated thus :  The arrow is quite gratuitous but necessary for conceptual understanding. This diagram is an improvement over the first but it still is inadequate and perhaps is misleading in its simplicity. It gives the false impression that the moments of existence go on in a substantially one=dimensional fashion and in a predictable way. The idea of a causal chain here is too simplistic. Again, it does not really tell us much about the experiential content prior and posterior to the specious moment. Nor does it address itself to the crucial question of the continuity of moments. And finally it suggests a reversion to the normal ontological understanding of process that could only lead to bad metaphysics.

(3) The third diagram does address to the problem of continuity very well. It is depicted as follows: (a) Although it illustrates the interlocking nature of the moments, we can improve on it in the following way : (b)  This diagram shows up the truly interlocking nature of the moments, not only between two moments but a multiple faceted nature of several moments within the flow. In this respect, it is closer to the reality of the process although confusing in its implicated nature of things.

(4) At this point, we need to have a closer microscopic look at the moment in the making. We might then "blow up" *the present specious moment in the making* thus :



The specious present is equivalent to one of the rings in the above interlocking phenomena, either in (a) or (b), and the past and the future could very well correspond to the prior and posterior natures, respectively, in the continuum with the proviso that the future has not yet become but has all the potential of becoming so.

Each specious present is a carving out phenomenon with respect to the continuum of existence. It has a past from which it has basically but not entirely arisen. In other words, the past is necessary to the present

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but not sufficient for its own being. It also has a future in terms of latent potential for being. However, what is unique here is the fact that the specious present can "look" two ways, i.e., to the components (realms) of the past and the future for the constitution or creation of its own being. The interlocking phenomena must be viewed in this sense. That is to say, there is every bit of the past, actually as well as potentially, in the specious present. Or, it can be said that there is a sense of the concept of reverse causality functioning here to check the wholly one-directional causal chain of moments. Perhaps, the Buddhist accounting here is in correspondence with the Whiteheadian concept of asymmetry, i.e., the flow of existence involves a reverse or asymmetric relationship of the specious present to the past and not merely a vice-versa phenomenon, i.e., the past symmetrically relates to the present and the present, in turn, to the future. The minutely circular interpenetrating and interlocking diagram in (b) shows to an extent the symmetric as well as asymmetric dimensions in the continual flow of existence. In order to illustrate this further and to gain some understanding of the subtle movements, we need to proceed to the next diagram.

(5) In order to illustrate the temporal flow with the more subtle features I will diagram as follows:



A glance at the above diagram will show the unique implications of the real temporal characteristics involving the past, present and future. The locus of reality or the flow of reality, to be sure, resides in the specious present, but it is never left alone for it not only creates in cooperation

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with the past and becomes a past as well but it also is intimately related to a potential future in the process. This sounds odd or even absurd on first reading, to be sure, but at least the diagram does sufficiently justify the nature of the profound doctrine of momentary existence in Buddhism (kṣanika-bhaṅga). For, there is undoubtedly the rise of the moment, not *ex nihilo* but in full view or cooperation of the components of the temporal dimensions. The specious present gains something but at the same time loses something in its procession to the next triadic contextual matrix of dynamics. In this way, the continuum is fulfilled content-wise and simultaneously exhibits its open-endedness. The gaining and losing phenomena are dependent largely on the conditions or materials prevailing with respect to the total nature of the relational conditions (pratyaya, paccaya). And in the search for the understanding of these phenomena, we return finally to a few significant Buddhist doctrines that are relevant to the process thus far delineated and which in turn should make us realize that the anātman doctrine is supreme here and that it is infinitely superior to the ātman approach to reality.

In Diagram 5 I have used the phrase, "nisus of being" for the real temporal flow of existence. It is a nisus in that there is a striving, a motive, to perfect one's own being. Life is a creative process in this sense but not always in the best or propitious sense. The Buddhist calls this relational origination (pratītya-samutpāda) which is indeed one of the most difficult concepts to fathom or grasp, much less to feel its functional dimensions in our everyday activities. It depicts the becoming process (bhava) in its most unique form—uniqueness in the sense that the process is another way of delineating on how the ordinary conception of the self becomes or is at once a non-self phenomenon. The dynamic character of this concept, which is so depictive of the subtle movements in the microscopic realm of existence, issues forth the challenge to understand the anātman concept. The two concepts, pratītya-samutpāda and anātman, may seem so distanced yet are so proximate to our nature of being; indeed, in the strictest sense, they are referring to the self-same reality of existence from two novel but technically isomorphic natures. By asserting thus I am not trying to confuse the issue. Rather, I wish to call to attention a desideratum for a closer and critical examination of the ordinary situation in which we continue to exist so that the nature of Buddhist reality could be understood or realized in its own right. Again, all this is cryptic, to be sure, but cryptic only in the hope of showing up the problematics that the becoming process or the nisus of being cannot be reduced to a simple, cut and dried, type of analysis or manipulation of the elements, be they dharmas in the case of Buddhism, in and of themselves as they occur in

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all facets of our experiences.

In the process, the elements (dharmas) have no ontological nature or status, either in an *a priori* or *a posteriori* sense. For, their so-called participation in the process is the fact of the process itself, just as the process itself properly reflects the various elemental presence. I believe that Diagram 5 is conducive to the Sarvāstivādin's (Vaibhāṣika's) choice of the third explanation for the description of the differences in the temporal flow as stated as a change of condition (avasthā-pariṇāma). The relevant passage states thus :[8]

> Thus it is that among all proposed explanations [the remaining one alone], the third in number is right, that which maintains a change of condition [or function]. According thereto the difference in time reposes on the difference in function; at the time when an element does not yet actually perform its function, it is future; when performing it, it becomes present; when, after having performed it, it stops, it becomes past.

We should now have a better picture of the way in which the specious present is flowing as the nisus of being. But I hasten to add here the final diagram to depict the way in which the ātman approach vitiates the nisus.

(6) The specious present relative to the ātman-process is now represented thus :



It will be seen that the linear symmetrical flow has all the trappings of a causal or deterministic system. The temporal flow is firmly set in the sense that the present came from the past and that it will eventually enter into or become a new phenomenon known as the future. But the problematics involved here is that this type of temporal flow does not or is unable to accommodate new or novel contents or elements that are added and at the same time to dispense with the so-called spent contents. This is indeed a disturbing point which reason alone fails to explain the process.

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A deterministic or even semi-deterministic nature would invariably introduce a form of "transmigration" of the elements of being which is so often heard but erroneously attributed to Buddhism.

The Buddhist approach was not only profound but practical. It did not shirk the problem by presenting a mere theoretical accounting of the facts of experience but went deeply into the components of the experiences themselves in order to present a most holistic view that included both the tangible as well as non-tangible contents of the said experiences. It started off naturally with the accepted self-view (ātman process) but quickly indicated that once such a view is set up or the conditions relative to it are perpetuated, there will be no relief from the limiting and restrictive phenomena from occurring. For the Buddhist came to an understanding that if man were left alone he would continue to assert his basic drives, i.e., what is known as the desires or thirst for life (tṛṣṇā). Close examination, however, will reveal the fact that both thirst and the object of thirst are mutually limiting or restrictive in the sense that they isolate themselves from the rest of the run of nature or from the experiential process itself. Yet, nothing in nature or in the experiential process is really independent, isolated or aloof, except perhaps when we deal with them in abstract or speculative terms.

The Buddhist went very deep here to make a significant contribution on the subtleties of the thirst for life. The drive is prominently present as we can easily see but what makes that drive "counter-productive" is the tendency in it to be "over-extending" and thereby "over-productive". In this respect, there is no real appreciation for the drive or thirst itself for the latter is warped or unbalanced. In short, the fulness of the drive or thirst is not realised or implemented. What then is this strange new obstructive element? It is nothing but the clinging or attaching phenomenon present in each thrust of the drive or thirst. The technical term for it is upādāna, a term which is so basic and yet so little understood in the process. Thirst or the drive is ever present, as stated earlier, but it over-extends itself as soon as the upādāna force is present. Upādāna usually go hand in hand with tṛṣṇā but it does not necessarily have to be so.

In many respects, there is a contradiction in the two terms; at least there is an element of incongruency in treating them together. For, on the one hand, tṛṣna (thirst) is a force, an activity that lunges forward in the experiential process and on the other, upādāna is a holding, steadying pattern, that keeps the process from lunging forward in the sense of incorporating new elements. The former is a basic drive while the latter is a subtle aspect of that drive which becomes narrow and specialized by the latter's presence. The latter is always ancillary to the former and in its expended nature counters the flow of the basic flow. So while the

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former thrives on process, the latter thrives on static objectification. Or, it can be said that while the former is a moving ontology, the latter is a static type of ontology, the type that becomes fodder for the conceptual mill and perpetuates bad metaphysics. Yet, despite all, the truth of the whole matter is that both are very much in function in mutual ways in that the function of one invariably entails the function of the other. And that the function of both only obviates the fact of the subject in its elemental perceiving or grasping activities; this is the assertion of the ātman process. Thus the perpetuation of the ātman process theory, although giving way to biological, psychological and phenomenological phenomena, still is a basic ontological phenomenon. And the failure to understand the ontological implications, both in the ordinary sense of static objectification and in the true sense of non-objectifiable process flow, has only, impeded real grasp of the reason for man's suffering (duḥkha). For, indeed, one of the most basic origins of the suffering state is the inability of man to cope with the flow of existence or the plain fact that life and its elements are momentary or transitory.

It is curious to note that the self (ātman) as a subject has really in turn become an objective component in the process of perception. It as well as the object of perception have both become ontological objects and in consequence a mild form of rigidity has set in. And thus the ontological nature and the ontological dimensions seen and employed within the framework of the three temporal dimensions begin to rule the order of the process itself.

The same phenomenon can also be said of the five skandhas (constituents of being) which manifestly show up the way in which the ātman-process is narrow and obstructive. In the famous Burden Sutta,[9] it is repeatedly stated that the skandhas are the burden or the carrying of the burden (bhāra-hāra) of life. In the organic skandhic structure, the mere structuring becomes a burden in the sense that they *in toto* would spell out some form of an objective self. The Sutta goes on to say that the "burden-taking is the individual," and that "the craving which tends to rebirth, accompanied by delight and passion, taking delight here and there, namely the craving for sensual pleasure, for existence, for non-existence."[10] Edward J. Thomas makes a 'telling' point that the term, bhāra-hāra, can be translated either as or "burden-taking" or "burden bearer".[11] He aptly states that in either case, it points out to the concept of an individuality (pudgala) or a self (ātman).

Now, why is it a burden ? With Diagram 6 in view, we can show that the five skandhas have the tendency to construct a steadying ontological entity called a self or a subject that moves through the temporal

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periods, rather than to be the process itself. That is, the skandhic classification, each element or any combination, seems to arrest the flow, whereas in reality there is no arresting possible at all. From rūpa (corporeality) to vijñāna (consciousness), all the skandhas seem to statically structure a self or an image thereof. This fact is also supported by the concept of upādāna where the ātman concept is considered to be one of the four forms of ignorant outflows (āsravas), the others being sensual desire (kāma), false or dogmatic view (dṛṣṭi), and ritualistic following of conduct (śīla). These outflows are the seeming blind irrational forces that seem to dominate the flow by their rigid moorings on life's process. But they as well as other structural entities (e.g., skandhas, āyatanas, dhātus, dhārmas) are the makings of still another rigid process, perhaps the worst form possible, the rebirth process or the relinking of the staticized (upādāna-bound) nature of being.[12]

The rebirth concept is quite problematic in Buddhism. In general, there are two ways to view it. One is that it could be taken to be the phenomenon of an after life in terms of the last so-called clingings remaining in man. This seems to be the accepted religious or moral view. The other more philosophical view is to take rebirth to mean the clingings relative to the moment to moment existence. The latter is preferred since it is the more tangible and plausible of the two views and also for the fact that it can be accommodated very nicely in Diagram 6.

The question of karma is also quite relevant here. Karmic acts are in the main, acts that are determined by one's clinging phenomenon within the process. There is a cessation of that phenomenon should there be a subsidence of the clinging action and which, in turn, immediately exhibits the undefiled nature of being. The early texts speak of different kinds as as well as different forms of karma.[13] Regardless of the kinds or forms, karma is indeed an accounting of the process of being in its exhibitive and sustainable aspects and thus it only promotes the perpetuation of the self. This would have to cease in the on-going process if the aim is the enlightened realm of existence.

In many respects, the karmic act is another form of the relational origination (pratītya-samutpāda) as interpreted as the ordinary conception of the perpetual turning of the wheel of life (saṃsāra). There are both the bad deeds as well as the good ones that motivate the saṃsāric life due to its self-directing carving out process. But self-directing only makes obvious the statical nature of being, whereas the inexorable flow of existence must not be hampered by this nature. There is no time to go into the details of the defiling elements (kleśas) relative to the flow but suffice it to say that the Buddhist always solved the problems within the empirical

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nature of things. In short the relational origination in its empirical nature is another way to look at the saṃsāric nature but it can also be turned around or transformed into a non-empirical and (ontologically) absolute nature which is another perspective of the flow of existence from the supremely free and unhampered nature of things. Needless to say, the Mahāyāna tradition, in general, pursued such a course with respect to the cogency of the concept of relational origination.

In the foregoing discussion, I have attempted to return to man the dynamics of his own process ontology. It is an ontology that should not be confused with ontologies of the usual type. Diagram 6, which depicts the ātman process, exhibits all the signs of constructing or continuing a deterministic system based on the usual concept of ontology i.e., the substantiation and attribution of all the elements of existence. It does this because each element defines its own existence or is definable by relating to other entities with the usual ontological base. But nature is far from a mere collection of independent or interdependent entities.

Diagram 5, on the other hand, depicts an open moving ontology where the three temporal dimensions with respect to the subtle elemental plays are accommodated without the imposition of restrictive conditions. It addresses itself to the crucial question of delineating on the continuity of being. And this continuity of being is also crucial in turn for the fact that it makes it possible to speak of the ever-widening nature of individual process ontology which must be the basis for the compassionate (karuṇā) and enlightened (prajñā) natures in man. Without this widening character of process ontology, man's nature will not be afforded the chance to grow and develop. In this way then, process ontology makes it possible to identify the metaphysics of man and the world in a continuum or in a coterminous sense. For it is essential for man in Buddhism to move out of his restrictive ātman process in order to realize the illimitable nature of the ānatman process ontology.

I have thus expressed the desideratum for a *a unique ontological turn* in understanding the experiential process. The series of diagrams only served to get a handle on the problematics of the Buddhist nature of self (ānatman).

NOTES

1. For example, it is said that Louis de la Vallée Poussin struggled throughout his lifetime on the question of how to accommodate a deed (karman) with the doctrine of non-self (ānātman, nairātmya) as both concepts do not lend them-

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selves readily. Toward the end of his life, he finally moved from Buddhism as a system of contingency to a Buddhism as a system of transcendency. As Maryla Falk put it so well : "The new understanding of Buddhism acquired in three decades of earnest personal investigation had brought home to him that the notion of Nirvāṇa is based, not on the concept, however subtly formulated, of an unconscious and senseless unimaginable condition or of absolute non-existence, but, primarily and throughout the history of Buddhist thought, on the experience of the fulness of salvation. How is this conception possible without the admission of an immortal soul ? This was the problem now unhusking itself to its nakedness before the mind of the thinker who had lovingly devoted his life to the subject of his research and was now preparing to justify it, along with his life, before the Creator." (*Louis De La Vallée Poussin Memorial Volume*, Edited by B.N. Law. Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press, 1940, p. 444). Until his final days, Poussin could not completely divest himself from his Christian orientation. It should also be noted that Mrs Rhys Davids drew somewhat similar conclusions concerning the anātman concept. Her views on the concept of a More, man's transcendent becoming nature, occupies much of her thinking in later years in such works as *Sakya or Buddhist Origins* (London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1931) and *Wayfarer's Words* (London : Luzac & Co., Vol. I, 1940; Vol. II, 1941). Both Poussin and Davids were formidable Buddhist thinkers in the Mahāyāna and Theravāda traditions, respectively. They both struggled with the problematics of the anātman concept, as we all do, but in the final analysis did not succeed.

2. *Majjhima Nikāya*, 63 & 64; Pali Text Society Translation Series, No. 30; The *Collection of the Middle Length Sayings*, Vol. II. (London : Luzac & Co., 1957), pp. 97-107. In the suttas, the Buddha is more interested in the empirical nature of things, i.e., the origin of suffering and the way out of it, rather than pursuing impractical discourse on hypothetical or empirically groundless states of being.
3. Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1929). p. 19.
4. I have previously drawn some parallels and differences in Buddhist and Whiteheadian metaphysical systems in an essay, "The Metaphysics of Buddhist Experience and the Whiteheadian Encounter," in *Philosophy East and West*, XXV, 4 (1975), pp. 465-488.
5. Richard Taylor in a fairly recent essay, "The Anattā Doctrine and Personal Identity,". (*Philosophy East and West*, XIX, 4, 1969; pp 359-366) has argued in an indirect way that the particular person or self is one and the same thing as his body, that there is no personal self as such, and thus everything points to the non-self doctrine. While his analysis has certain linguistic and logical considerations as well as merits, his conclusion on the concept of anātman is still unconvincing from the Buddhist standpoint.
6. In a symposium essay, "Munitz' Concept of the World. . .A Buddhist Response" together with a "Rejoinder to Munitz" (*Philosophy East and West*, XXV, 3, 1975; pp. 309-317, 351-352) I have argued that Buddhism is basically stressing on the ontologically absolute nature of things rather than the epistemological entities as such. Or, in another sense, the epistemological structures and entities are grounded in the ontological nature.

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7. *Aṇguttara-Nikāya*, I, 152, article 47; Pali Text Society Translation Series No. 22; *The Book of the Gradual Saying*, Vol. I (London: Luzac & Co., 1960) p. 135. The gist of the passage states thus : "The arising is apparent, the duration is apparent and the passing away is apparent. These are the three marks relative to the compounded (or conditioned) nature of being." But it also goes on to state contrariwise and very cryptically, in the very next paragraph : "The arising is not apparent, the duration is not apparent, and the passing away is not apparent. These are the three marks of the uncompounded (or unconditioned) nature of being." The key terms here are of course the compounded (sankhata) and the uncompounded (asaṅkhata). Their study is more than this essay could do for now but at least the way is left open for some understanding as the discussion is proceeding in the direction of the ontological absolute nature of things and the problematics thereof.

8. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1956; First Edition printed in London, 1923) pp. 66-67.

9. *Sautta-Nikāya*, III, 25, article 22; Pali Text Society Translation Series. pp. 18; *The Book of the Kindred Sayings*, Vol. III (London: Luzac & Co., 1954) pp. 24-31.

10. *ibid.*, p. 25; I have followed E.J. Thomas' translation (reference follows).

11. Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1953) p. 100.

12. The *Milindapaňha* 32, makes it very clear the "If I should have attachment (*upādāna*), sire, I will reconnect (*paṭisandhi*)." Confer *Milinda's Questions* Vol. I, translated by I.B. Horner (London : Luzac & Co., Ltd., 1963) p. 43; Henry C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations* (New York : Atheneum, 1963) pp. 232-233.

13. For example, there are fruitful as well as barren types of karma (*Aňguttara-Nikāya*, III. 33) or good and bad karma (*Saṃyutta-Nikāya*, III, 2) and that the *Visuddhimagga*, XIX, elaborates on the fourfold nature of karma, i.e. that which bears fruit in the present existence, bears fruit in rebirth, bears fruit at no fixed time and by-gone karma. Confer, Henry C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, pp. 215-221, 226-228, 242-252.

14. The concept of relational origination (pratītya-samutpāda) takes on a different, much more inclusive and intense, meaning in the Mahāyāna tradition. There is no time to go into its complicated nature here but at least it could be said that it has a profound meaning in the saṁsāric-nirvāṅic identity in virtue of the novel understanding of emptiness (sūnyatā) that is germane to the foundational Māhāyana sūtras, including the early Prajñāparamitā texts, and the followers of that tradition. The understanding of emptiness, I believe, can be accommodated in the ontologcial scheme as described in Diagram 5. Naturally, this has to be explored further.

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13

On the Notion of Verification in Buddhism and in Logical Positivism : A brief philosophical study

DR A.D.P. KALANSURIYA

PART I

INTRODUCTION

In the early Buddhist thinking, as revealed in the Nikāya literature, there is a notion known as "ehipassika" (meaning : "that which invites everyman to come to see (something) for himself[1]=verifiable"). For instance, it is stated : "dhammo sandiṭṭhiko akāliko ehipassiko opanayiko paccattaṃ veditabbo viññūhi" (meaning: "bearing fruits in this life before long, an invitation to 'come and see,' leading to the goal and verifiable by the wise").[2] The notion of "verification" which is embodied in this passage needs to be understood purely in a religious context and not in any other one, i.e., scientific or empirico-positivistic or political or poetic or any other. This need is highlighted further by the following passage in the Majjhima Nikāya: ". . . I am one of those recluses who profess the basis of a religion after finding an ultimate insight in this life by gaining a *higher knowledge personally* of a doctrine among doctrines not traditionally heard of before."[3] On another occasion in a discourse to Bhaddiya Licchavi, the Buddha ends on the note that one should accept a proposition as true only when one has "*personal knowledge*" ("atttanā va jāneyyāttha") of it.[4] What emerges explicitly from this for the moment would be the following :

(i) The notion of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammam abhiññāya")
and
(ii) the notion of "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha"),.

It is not possible to surmise that (i) and (ii) above will both make explicit an identical meaning, though some semblance of "verification" seems

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evident in both. How does verification come by way of (i) and (ii) given above ?

PART II

BUDDHISM AND BUDDHISTIC MODERNISTS

To start with, K.N. Jayatilleke, a Buddhistic modernist and one of the protagonists of the Logical positivistic line of interpretation of early Buddhist thought says that the verification of the operation of the Four Noble Truths comes by way of "the knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses," ("āsavānaṃ khayañāṇa").[5] Following this line of argumentation, D.J. Kalupahana, another Buddhistic modernist, says : "The fourth form of knowledge is retrocognition (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa, su ming chih) by which one is able to verify one's own history."[6] What he means by the notion "one's own history," seems most probably, to be one's manifold past world. It appears as if both these scholars use the notion of "verification" context-free with the result that their assertions remain nebulous. But what the Nikāyas emphasize in this connection seems to be not so much any verification of propositions as expounded in modern Logical positivism, but the "verification" of the Four Noble Truths, which essentially consist of *doing* virtuous acts or *practising* the virtuous life.[7] This will be followed by the restraint of the senses (indriya-saṃvara), the development of mindfulness (satisaṃpajaññā) and the elimination of the five impediments (pañcanivarane pahāya).[8] From this results the attainment of the first up to the fourth jhānas, in which there is "a perfection of equanimity and mindfulness" ("uppekkhāsatiparisuddhiṃ"). The sixfold higher knowledge (abhiññā) manifests itself in this state. The āsavānāṃ khayañāṇa by which according to Jayatilleke, one verifies the Four Noble Truths is the third jhāna of the six-fold higher knowledge (abhiññā); and pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa, by which, according to Kalupahana, one verifies one's own history is the fourth jhāna of the sixfold higher knowledge.

So far we have encountered the following new notions : "restraint of the senses", "virtuous life", "mindfulness", "five impediments", "jhāna", and "sixfold higher knowledge" ("abhiññā"). Yet it should be noted that the context that is appropriate to these notions does not appear to be clearly specified and emphasised by the Buddhist modernists. However, it may be possible at this point to argue that the context is clear, that it is the religious one (i.e., an atheistic religious one). If so, the employment of the notion of "verification" needs careful control, exposition and

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explanation. For instance, is it possible to employ the notion of "verification" as understood in modern Logical positivistic circles? Alternatively, is the notion of "verification," applicable if it happens that it implies "restraint of senses" ? These questions call for further analysis of the notions involved.

PART III

LOGICAL POSITIVISTIC "VERIFICATION"

We shall begin our analysis with a brief exposition of the major notions of "verification" in contemporary Logical positivism. This will facilitate our study to some extent. The notion of "verification" introduced by M. Schlick's Vienna Circle was given a significant philosophical usage by A.J. Ayer, the principal protagonist of the Logical positivistic trend in the English-speaking world. In the attempts of M. Schlick, K. Godel, F. Waismann, R. Carnap, etc., to demolish traditional metaphysics, a technique seems to have been evolved for judging the meaningfulness of a statement. This may be observed in M. Schlick's statement that "the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification,"[9] and in Ayer's statement that "a sentence is factually significant to a given person if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express.[10] In both these cases, the "verification" referred to is verification by means of observation (sense-perception). Yet these notions not only remain unclear but are also attended by considerable difficulties, which were clearly stated by Ayer himself.[11] The answers usually suggested to these conceptual problems were firstly that the word "verify" must be taken in a somewhat basic and moderate sense so that it would cover both conclusive proof of the truth of the propositions as well as the production of evidence which is significant to the truth of what is stated; and, secondly, that the dictum "The meaning of a statement is the method of its verification" should not be taken as a definition of meaning. To put the matter thus would be worth the effort since it would help avoid various objections. In this broader sense, to say that "the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification" is not to hold a theory which can be true or false but rather to make a recommendation as to a possible way in which we should deal with certain sentences when they have no conventional meaning. F. Waismann attempts a formulation of it in this way : "If you are not clear what the meaning of a statement is, or whether it has any meaning at all, then consider how it can be verified." He further adds

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that "Once you realise how this can be done, then you will understand what the sentence means."[12]

The Logical positivist's case therefore may be expressed thus: Conventionally speaking, meaningful statements (i.e., propositions) are of two kinds only, namely, statement in mathematics and logic, which are deduced from fixed premises, and statements of fact (propositions), based on empirical investigation; statements of any other kind are meaningless, or, literally speaking, nonsensical. To put the point still more explicitly, empirical (factual) statements and analytic statements are deemed to be meaningful : all other statements are simply meaningless. Amplifying this contention, the logical positivists held that while empirical (factual) statements give us new knowledge, analytic ones do not give such knowledge, as they are simply tautologies. That is to say, they express and make explicit that which is implicitly contained in them already such that their truth arises entirely from the meanings of their symbols or words. To simplify the point we may add that their function is not to state facts but to make explicit what is already contained in the symbols or words, so that they are tautologous. Yet 'tautologous' is not the same as 'meaningless' : for tautologies are meaningful. As Ayer puts it, "they do enlighten us by illustrating the way in which we use certain symbols."[13]

From the above discussion, it is clear that there are two and only two kinds of meaningful statement, empirical (factual) statements about the world and analytic (tautological) statements of mathematics and of logic. The so-called metaphysical statements belong to neither category, and, hence, they are neither empirical (factual) nor analytic (tautological), so that they remain meaningless.[14] In this sense, "verifiability" is the criterion of all meaningful utterance. To put it still more explicitly, it is the model of all meaningful utterance. The principle that has been established above seems to be as follows : All metaphysical statements are meaningless. That is, all statements of traditional philosophy as well as other kinds of statement—religious, ethical, aesthetic, political—which are asserted to be true but which are neither empirical (known from experience) nor tautological, are for this reason meaningless.

PART IV

EARLY BUDDHISM AND VERIFICATION

With this brief exposition of the notion of verification in Logical positivism, which sprang out of theoretical speculations in science and

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mathematics in the Western world, let us turn, as a first step, to the sub-concept, "restraint of the senses" in early Buddhism to see whether it could be explained by the meaning-model adopted by Logical positivism.[15] We noted above that the "verification" referred to by the Logical positivist is "verification" by means of observation or sense-perception; and that it has, primarily to do with the activities of the sense-organs of the human bio-chemical system. In some rather unclear sense, sense-perception or observation may be said to be equivalent to "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha") as noted in the Aṅguttara Nikāya (see Part 1). In this context, it is sense-perception (senses) that matters as against the "restraint of the senses" noted there. For, it follows that sense-perception activities of our sense-organs would not be possible *if the senses are restrained*; and, *ipso facto*, "verification" too would not be possible. Alternatively, the claimed verifiability-basis of early Buddhism may further be questioned when it is taken together with such notions as "the virtuous life", "mindfulness", "jhāna" ("rapture") and "sixfold higher knowledge ("abhiññā"), the reason being that the logical nature of these notions remains unclarified by Buddhistic modernists. However, impressive their claims may seem to be, both Jayatilleke and Kalupahana remain silent on the issues relating to the natural context of Buddhistic religious ideology. For instance, with reference to "Sage's knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses," Jayatilleke says : "With this he verifies the Four Noble Truths" :[16] and then he satisfies himself with a quotation from the Majjihima Nikāya which is expressed thus : "As he thus knows and sees, the mind is emancipated from the inflowing impulses of sensuous gratification, personal immortality and ignorance; along with this emancipation arises the knowledge that emancipation has been attained."[17] Following on the same tracks, Kalupahana says thus about emancipation : "It is an important stage of mental concentration attained by the Yogi whence he is able to develop not only the insight necessary to achieve enlightenment but also the renunciation that leads to freedom. A prerequisite of the state of complete freedom (nirvāṇa) is insight, which is also attained as a result of concentration, which in turn consists of the sixfold higher knowledge."[18] These passages are not only nebulous, they also embody a confusion of contexts. Let me explain.

The case seems to be both religious and scientific at the same time and the words employed by Jayatilleke and Kalupahana, *ipso facto*, fail to get at the valid context. An objector may seek to refute this by drawing attention to the notion of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāṃaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") made explicit in the Nikāyas, and arguing that, the Majjhima Nikāya, as previously noted too, introduces the notion of

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"sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya" and that, *ipso facto*, it is the modern Logical positivistic notion of "verification" that is evident here as well. Is this argument valid ?

In the next few paragraphs, I shall put forward an argument which I believe would rebut the objector's argument. I shall begin my argument by the following question : "What is the logical nature of the notion of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") ? In a genuine attempt to demarcate the logical boundary of the notion, Jayatilleke and Kalupahana enumerate the "sixfold higher knowledge" in this undoubtedly impressive way :[19]

i. iddhividha (psychokinesis[20] or levitation)
ii. dibbasotadhātu (clairaudience)
iii. cetopariyañāṇa (telepathy)
iv. pubbenivāsânussatiñāṇa (retrocognition)
v. dibbacakhu (clairvoyance)[21]
vi. asavakkhayañāṇa (knowledge of the destruction of the defiling impulses).

Elaborating these further, Jayatilleke adds, "These six came to be known as the "six (kinds of) higher knowledge" (chaḷabhiññā") in the Pāli Nikāyas but since the first is a case of 'knowing how' and not of 'knowing that' it came to be dissociated from the rest and these latter were known as the 'five (kinds of) higher knowledge' ('pañchābhiññā')."[22] What is the context of the expressions 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' ? Ryle explains the notion of 'knowing how' in this way :". . . it is proper and normal to speak of a person knowing in part how to do something, i.e., of his having a particular capacity in a limited degree. An ordinary chess player knows the game pretty well but a champion knows it better and even the champion has still much to learn."[23] Elaborating further the notions of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' in relation to 'abhiññā' ('sixfold higher knowledge'), Jayatilleke says somewhere else, "Of these, the first is strictly not a cognitive power in the sense of a 'knowing that.' It consists according to the Vissudhimagga in various manifestations of the 'power of will' (adhiṭṭhānāidhi) in jhāna. . . The sixth too is partly a case of 'knowing that'. . . "[24]

But Jayatilleke does not explain the rest of the sixfold higher knowledge in terms of 'knowing how' and 'knowing that,' thus leaving the reader perplexed. However, if the first is a case of 'knowing how" and the sixth at least partly a case of 'knowing that,' then what follows is simple and obvious : the second (dibbasothadhātu, viz., clairaudience)

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the third (cetopariyañaṇa, viz., telepathy), the fourth (pubbenivāsânusāstiñāṇa, viz., retrocognition) and the fifth (dibbacakku, viz., clairvoyance, also known as cutūpapatañāṇa, knowledge of the decease and survival of beings) must all be clear cases of 'knowing that' ! But these kinds of 'knowing' cannot logically be cases of 'knowing that' because all and only synthetic (empirical) knowledge can be such. This is because telepathy, clairvoyance, clairaudience, retrocognition, etc., seem to be some kinds of presumed mental states such that

(i) they are confined to a privileged few (i.e., Enlightened ones= Transcendent ones) and

(ii) empirically, extrasensory perception (sixfold higher knowledge) remains unexplained by way of a "sense-perceptual model."[25]

Contrariwise, Jayatilleke argues thus : ". . . in the Buddhist account the mental concentration (samādhi) which is a produce of training and effort is a casual factor (upanisā) in the production of this knowledge."[26] Immediately after setting down this contention he adds that "It is a natural and not a supernatural occurrence."[27] This line of argument seems to be strengthened a great deal by Kalupahana's claim to the effect that ". . . Even extrasensory perception and emancipation are not considered supernatural occurrences in Buddhism. They are natural causal occurrences."[28] But this argument is weak because it involves violation of basically different contexts which work at cross-purposes. We shall amplify this point as follows. Kalupahana believes that the Buddha had put forward the idea that inductive inferences about Buddhistic causality (paticcasamuppāda) must come by way of abhiññā (=higher knowledge=extrasensory perception). Admittedly, we have got a meaningful idea of what inductive inferences are; but we have not got a meaningful idea of what abhiññā is all about. Why ? Because, we are not Buddhas or Enlightened Ones or, as Jayatilleke very correctly puts it, *Transcendent Ones*.[29] Is not the Buddha human ? The answer to this is as follows. Jayatilleke says, "It is not possible to measure the enlightenment of the Buddha,"[30] and re-emphasises the point thus : "The idea that the Buddha was a 'mere human being' is also mistaken. For when the Buddha was asked whether he was a human being, a Brahmā (God) or Māra (Satan), he denied that he was any of them and claimed that he was Buddha, i.e., an Enlightened Being who had attained the Transcendent. This does not, however, make the Buddha unique for it is a status that any human being can aspire to attain. The

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significance of this claim is brought out in the Brāhmaṇimantanika Sutta, where it is shown that even a Brahmā eventually passes away while the Buddha, being one with the Transcendent Reality beyond space, time and causation is not subject to such vicissitudes."[31] So, if, on the one hand, there is no criterion by which one can measure the Buddha's enlightenment and, on the other, the Buddha is not subject to the space-time matrix and causality, then we human beings cannot have a meaningful idea as to what abhiññā or higher knowledge is all about; for it is claimed that abhiñña are the higher knowledge by which the Four Noble Truths, the past lives of men and other people's minds are verified. If this is so, then this higher knowledge (=abhiññā) is a state of a few who have attained enlightenment. Although Kalupahana wishes to conclude that early Buddhism as embodied in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Chinese Āgamas represents from the point of view of the primitives that are involved, a kind of empiricism,[32] it appears as if he attempts to run with the hare and also to hunt with the hounds. This follows from one of his own statements. It reads thus : "The silence of the Buddha was thus due to his awareness of the limitation of empiricism, rather than of concepts."[33] But, then, if one accepts that early Buddhism represents a kind of 'empiricism' and also that the same religion accepts "the limitation of empiricism" (meaning : there is no way of knowing (pamāṇa=pramāṇa, a source of knowledge) the state of the Enlightened One after his death, it is simply self-contradictory. For empiricism (sensory) and trans-empiricism (extra-sensory=non-sensory) seems affirmed in one and the same argument. This is a philosophical error, for the latter remains simply unexplained by the former. That is to say, if anything is said of the latter by way of the former, nothing meaningful is said. To put the point yet more explicitly, ontologywise, it does not make sense, empirically, and, therefore, literally also, if one is within the spatio-temporal (space-time) matrix, and at the same time also says that one is *aware* of the "possible limits of empiricism."

In any event, it must now be very clear that empirically speaking, we do not have a meaningful idea of what abhiññā is all about. Therefore, we also do not have a meaningful notion of a possible verification of abhiññā which logically falls outside "the perceptual model." It is the Buddhistic concept of "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha") which appears to bear the closest resemblance to that notion of 'verification' which is expounded in Logical positivism. But without any proviso added, the notion of "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha") seems to have been repl aced by that of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") by the Buddhistic modernists. They confuse their argument further by drawing on the additional notion of the "mind

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becoming supple" noted in the Saṃyutta Nikāya.[34] However, it is 'verification' by means of sense-perception or observation which the positivistic interpretation of 'meaning' notes and makes explicit. And this sort of 'verification' is significantly different from "mind becoming supple," a kind of ethico-religious *doing* or *undoing* which is a major characteristic of Buddhistic religious philosophy. The Buddhistic modernists such as Jayatilleke, Kalupahana and others have failed to emphasise the significance of the difference of conflicting contexts which work at cross-purposes: and this confusion is a central philosophical error rather than a problem. To put it more accurately, when the words used in a religious (an atheistic) context, are employed in another context, i.e., empirical or scientific or mathematical or poetic, what it amounts to simply is a misusing of contexts. This may lead to an odd use of words without a clear meaning; and what happens here is, as Wittgenstein notes, that "language goes on holiday."[35] I think that the conclusion to be drawn is that no argument of the type that the Buddhistic modernists put forward is going to be successful. And, therefore, the logical nature of the notion of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") remains nebulous. The most that this primitive notion would remotely convey is "an unobservable somewhat" or "a ghost in the machine" or "a state of mind" (which is clear and cleansed—citte parisuddhe pariyoddāta[36]) which works behind impenetrable screens. However, if this is the upshot of their argument, then, the Logical positivistic criterion of meaning—verification by sense-perception—seems logically inappropriate. This point can be elaborated thus. The notion of "personal higher knowledge" (sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") is, empirically speaking, simply empty because the notion of "personal higher knowledge" is basically different from that of sense-empiricism. Therefore, the empirico-positivistic meaning criterion—verification—is logically irrelevant in the former context. However, if this point is either ignored or taken no notice of, then, what results is simply emptiness due to confusion of contexts such as the religious context and the sense-empirical context in the interpretation of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya").

Alternatively, it must be emphasised that most philosophers today would reject the view that if a man is certain, he then, *ipso facto*, has knowledge,[37] for one cannot tell by introspection whether a given state of mind is one of knowing. Ryle amplifies this point thus: ". . . it is supposed that my being conscious of my mental states and operations either is my knowing them, or is the necessary and sufficient ground for my doing so. But to say this is to abuse the logic and even the grammar of the verb 'to know'."[38] The Buddhistic modernists confuse the Buddhistic context and

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attempt to accommodate it within empiricism. Therefore, the sacrosanct nature of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") of certain states of mind—such as that possessed by the Buddha and by the arahants—is adversely affected beyond repair.

In sum, it must be evident that the notion of 'verification' in early Buddhism remains nebulous. The Buddhist Nikāyas at times stress "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha") and at some other times "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya"). The Buddhistic modernists manipulate these two notions as if they are context-free, thus isolating them from the logical contexts to which they individually and naturally belong. Though the former notion is remotely analogous to the Logical positivistic notion of 'verification,' the latter fails to suggest even a semblance of verification. This contention is strengthened a great deal by a clarification of the very aim of early Buddhism, which is "the attainment of nibbāna." The attainment at issue is the cessation of conceptuality on the one hand and sense-experience on the other. Expressions to this effect are found in many strata of the Nikāya literature. To illustrate the point we shall quote the following: When the Buddha was charged with being an annihilationist about emancipation from craving—attainment of nibbāna—he counters the argument by saying that this was a misrepresentation by other religious teachers, of the central tenets of his teaching. Then he goes on to clarify his point in this way. When a monk's *mind* becomes finally emancipated (vimutta-cittam), even the most powerful and intelligent Gods of the universe are unable to trace where the consciousness of such an arahant (tathāgata) is located (. . .anvesaṃ nādhigacchanti idaṃ nissitaṃ tathāgatassa viññānaṃ ti).[39] If even Gods cannot tract (detect) the arahant's mind as the Nikāyas claim, the ability of human beings to do so is, evidently, remote also. This point is appreciably strengthened by the notion of "saññāvadayitanirodha" (meaning: "the cessation of sensation, perception and feeling") in the Nikāya literature. For instance, if sensation, perception and feeling are jointly inoperative relative to this *state*, the Logical positivistic *verification* in question, which comes by way of sense-perception, is inoperative also. To put the point yet more explicitly, what is implicative is that with reference to the Buddhistic higher states of meditation of the Buddha and the arahants, the processes of verification are simply inadequate. Conceptually speaking, the notion of verification remains inapplicable in the context of the Buddhistic higher states of knowledge. From the point of attainment of nibbāna, the arahant is free from all dukkha (anguish=suffering) in the sense that even physical pain cannot have an effect on his mental serenity. The Buddha had refused, it is said, to answer questions regarding the nature of the

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person after death, except by such similes as the 'extinction of a flame.' Alternatively, this contention altogether rules out a theory or a principle or a recommendation about any type of verification simply because (as noted above) a possible way by which we should deal with certain sentences when they have no conventional meaning remains logically non-existent. The simple reason according to the Buddha himself is this: "Atthaṃgattassa na pamāṇaṃ atthi, yena naṃ vajju taṃ tassa natthi:" (meaning: "The one who has attained the goal is without measure; he does not have that with which one can speak of him at all").[40] To put it in clear terms, if from a logical point of view there exist no statements or sentences, a question as to their meaningfulness or meaninglessness is logically inappropriate too; and *ipso facto*, verification of them would also be logically inappropriate. How is this the case ? A case about a complex verification may be very helpful here.

Let us take an example from the Nikāya literature itself. Scattered throughout the Nikāyas there are references to clairvoyant visions, clairaudient hearings, retrocognitive visions beyond the ken of normal vision, etc., of the Buddha and other arahants who attained emancipation—nibbāna—and who no longer have their being as persons. Clairvoyance may be elucidated as follows. According to the Majjhima Nikāya, Vol. I., the Buddha had seen the group of five monks dwelling in Benares in the deer-park of Isipatana. This may be restated as follows: "The Buddha saw the group of five monks dwelling in the deer-park of Isipatana which is far away from where the Buddha was at that time" (= "Q") which describes the verification of the statement that "The sage (the Buddha) has clairvoyant vision" (= "P"). What, then, is it I do when I describe the verification of the proposition "P"? I give a second proposition "Q" and emphasise that the second is to follow from the first ("Q" follows from "P"). To put the point in clear terms, this gives only a rule of inference which relates these two propositions. This rule of inference should not be confused with empirical statements which help us to discover the truth of an assertion. The latter does not determine its meaning as this was already established long before a method of checking or verifying its *truth* was even mentioned. What becomes clear is the non-interexchangeability of the 'meaning' of a statement and the 'truth' of a statement as they are significantly different. To put the point still more explicitly, the *truth* of a statement and the *meaning* of a statement are not one and the same thing but two different roles in a wide theory of knowledge.

However, the role of inference emphasised above about 'verification' does not hold in early Buddhism although the Buddhistic modernists describe doctrinal theory as empirical.[41] As an example would clarify the

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point I shall repeat the Suttanipāta statement quoted earlier, namely, "The person who attained the goal is without measure; he does not possess that with which one can speak of him." If so, can I verify statements I make about him or others make about him? The answer is "no". This follows obviously from the above Suttanipāta-assertion simply because one is logically debarred from making any statement about the one who attains the goal. Kalupahana emphasises this point thus: "As for the state of the enlightened one after death, there is no way of knowing."[42] If one must be silent on this issue, as the Nikāya indicates, it is simply inconsistent to make judgments about nature of the sage, the Buddha, the enlightened one, etc. And this in turn indicates that we cannot have a judgment about the clairvoyant vision of the sage, the Buddha, etc. When the Buddhistic religious doctrine is that clear, it is simply poor logic to attempt to read 'empiricism' into it. In this connection it cannot be helped but to quote Kalupahana again. With reference to a discussion which there had been between the Buddha and Jānussoni, Kalupahana says, ". . .it purports to reject all speculative theories which go beyond the data of sensory experience, thus emphasising the empiricist attitude."[43] Kalupahana's stress here is on the notion of 'avisaya' (meaning: transgresses the limits of experience). It appears to be poor logic on the part of Kalupahana to uproot this notion from the natural context in which early Buddhism logically belongs and wherein lies its natural home. As the Majjhima Nikāya makes explicit, the Buddha was essentially a religious teacher who propounded certain moral principles and a way of life designed on an ethical code.[44] It is contextually wrong, therefore, to judge Buddhism as if it is a form of empiricism. The claim that it is a form of empiricism is emotively charged rather than consistently argued. It seems that the problem has not received sufficient attention from Buddhistic modernists against the context in which early Buddhism as an eastern religion naturally belongs. The Buddhist religion is an offshoot of a morality-oriented Indian civilisation while Empirico-positivism, which implicitly contains the criterion of verification, is an offshoot of a conceptually-oriented (hence knowledge-oriented) Western philosophy which logically belongs to Graeco-roman civilisaton.

This clearly points to a basic difference which has remained obscured in the writings of the Buddhistic modernists. Kalupahana believes that the contents of the dialogue between the Buddha and Jānussoni necessitates a rejection of metaphysics on the one hand and an acceptance of empiricism on the other. As a matter of logic, the Buddha's statements here do not, by necessity, indicate an empiricist attitude, not even in a primitive sense. In fact what the Buddha very validly does in the discussion with Jānussoni

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is to advance an alternative argument. From this, as just noted, follows no wholesale rejection of all speculative theories which go beyond the data of sensory experience. Similarly, if the Buddha's statement affirms a possibility concerning the availability of data through sources other than sense-perception (which is the case according to Kalupahana), as a matter of logic or of fact, it cannot be inferred that it purports to reject all speculative theories, simply because the affirmation remains speculative itself! What is remotely evident from the notion of 'aviṣaya', therefore, is a speculative affirmation of something beyond empiricism and sense-perception !! To put the point yet more explicitly, it is not erroneous—and not too harsh either —to conclude that Kalupahana's thesis remains fallacious, for the conclusion which he confidently affirms as following from the Buddha's statements, does not in fact do so.

PART V

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it can now easily be accepted that the rule of inference covering logical positivistic 'verification' is logically inappropriate with reference to the Buddha and the arahants. The reason relates to the notion expressed in the claim that "the one who has attained the goal is without measure : he does not have that with which one can speak of him." What is clear here is that the introduction of the Logical positivistic notion of 'verification' into early Buddhism remains unconvincing.

It is evident now that the objector's objection is simply rebutted. However, the rebuttal here should not be taken as a wholesale rejection of the notion of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya") referred to in the Majjhima Nikāya. The central aim of this paper is to explicate the notion in terms of a wider verifiability-based argument of a kind which (it is implied) is not necessary when dealing with such religious notions as "personal higher knowledge" in early Buddhism, something that is associated with sacrosanct higher mental states of the Buddha (the Transcendent One, according to Jayatilleke) and of the arahants (the enlightened ones).

Therefore, it is a philosophical error to intermix the notion of "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha") and that of "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññaya"). Although in the discourse to Bhaddiya Licchavi, the Buddha ends on the note that one should accept a proposition as true only when one has "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha"), yet this context is basically different from

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that which relates to the notion "personal higher knowledge" ("sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya"). As regards the former, a proposition is possible and, *ipso facto*, verification as well in the Logical positivistic sense envisaged by the thinkers in the Vienna Circle. However, with regard to the latter, such verification is not possible, though the Buddhistic modernists wish to accommodate abhiññā (higher knowledge=extrasensory perception) within the logical boundary of the former. For instance, as already noted, if the mental state of emancipation [=freedom (nibbāna)] consists of the sixfold higher knowledge, and if, *ipso facto*, it is the cessation of sensation, perception and feeling (saññāvedayitanirodha), then it falls outside a model which emphasises verification—that is, a sense perceptual model. And it does not, literally, however, mean that it cannot be spoken of, only that it does not make sense, *empirically*. Therefore, what the Buddhistic modernist Kalupahana says, namely, that "the Buddha confined himself to what is empirically given,"[45] damages the central notion in Buddhistic religion, viz., "abhiññā" ("higher knowledge"), beyond repair. Kalupahana's statement above is, of course consistent with the criterion of meaning he thinks is embedded in Buddhistic religion, something that is similar to or identical with the verifiability criterion expounded by the Logical positivists in the Vienna Circle. But it cannot be logically extended to cover "personal higher knowledge," in Buddhism. Kalupahana implicitly notes the reason for it, in this way : "Nirodhasamāpatti is the same as saññāvedayitanirodha, 'the cessation of perception and feeling,' which is the highest state of meditation attained by the Buddha and the other arahants."[46] If it is the case that "the cessation of perception and feeling" is involved and, further, that 'verifiability' is the meaning-criterion, how does Kalupahana, on the basis of a pure empirical theory of knowledge, arrive at the view that the highest state of meditation attained by the Buddha and the arahants is saññāvedayitanirodha—the cessation of perception and feeling ? To put the point yet more explicitly, the Logical positivistic verifiability-criterion is logically unusable concerning this state, which logically debars verifiability—since it provides no place for perception and feeling. Alternatively speaking, Kalupahana's thesis oscillates between empiricism and transempiricism. His attempt is to explain transempiricism by way of empiricism; but to accept empiricism and transempiricism simultaneously in one and the same argument is self-contradictory.

The Buddhistic modernists (the empirico-Buddhistic thinkers) such as Jayatilleke, Kalupahana and others have attempted to explain and clarify the Buddhistic notions by way of the verifiability-criterion of the Logical positivistic model. This move is good but sufficient respect should have

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been paid to the limitations of the subject-matter at hand, namely, the Buddhistic religion. Religious systems, originating in, at the very least, the desire for theoretical enlightenment and, concerned as they are with practical rules of action designed on an ethical code, are, at the most, primitive. The reason is that the attempts at the solutions of problems are not yet treated as scientific. Contrariwise, every scientific discipline must necessarily develop a special language adapted to its own nature and scope, and the development in that particular area represents as essential part of scientific work. Alternatively, the meaning of a technical term in a scientific language cannot be arrived at from the meaning of the word in ordinary language or religious language or any other language, poetic, political, and so on. Therefore, one has to be extra careful when one borrows a term in a scientific language and uses it elsewhere without intuiting the limitations of the subject-matter at hand. The Buddhistic modernists, however, have dismally failed in this endeavour, something that is clearly evidenced in their attempt to explain Buddhistic (religious) notions by way of the verifiability-criterion of the modern positivistic thinkers of the Vienna Circle. In this connection, it is not too harsh to conclude that the Buddhistic modernists commit a significant philosophical error by borrowing technical such terms as 'verifiability', 'causality', etc., from modern science, which is an offshoot of Graeco-roman civilisation, and using them as models to demythologize religious theoretical constructions in early Buddhism, which is embedded in Indian civilisation. However, the attempt to explain or probe early Buddhism to be true by way of modern science is analogous to an attempt to measure cloth by the gallon. When the question arose, at a particular juncture in the development of Science and Philosophy in the Western world, as to how sentences, to which the truth-value 'true' or 'not-true' ('false') is applicable, can be properly characterised, early Wittgenstein and the Logical positivists insisted upon the criterion of verifiability. Accordingly, all statements (other than the analytic ones) that do not conform to this *model* came to be rejected as *meaningless*.

The Buddhistic modernists try to establish a parallel between the Logical positivistic *verifiability* and the Buddhistic *ehipassika* (invitation to come and see) together with "personal knowledge" ("attanā va jāneyyātha"). But this attempt is erroneous because the model embedded in the verifiability-criterion is concerned with how sentences to which the truth-value 'true' or 'not-true' ('false') is applicable can be properly characterised. But this model is logically inapplicable in connection with sentences to which the truth-value 'true' or 'not-true' ('false') is inapplicable. Buddhistic religious sentences fall into the latter category because

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they are neither true nor false *empirically*. The reason is that the conceptual structure of Buddhism is such that there are no true or false (*empirical*) sentences in it.[47] The concept of *ehipassika* has to be understood in strict relation to the conceptual structure of the said religion. As an amplification of this point is essential at this particular juncture, it shall be made explicit thus. Early Buddhism, which is an atheistic religion, by necessity depicts a soteriology; and its central theme is embedded in the prescriptive way (patipāda) which is designed on an ethical code. In this connection, the Buddha says : "And, again, Udāyin, a course (patipāda) has been pointed out by me for disciples, practising which disciples of mine develop the ariyan eightfold way,"[48] The notion of ehipassika, viz., the invitation 'to come and see,' has to be understood strictly in the context of the course (patipāda) prescribed by the Buddha and not in the context of what the Logical positivists say. To put the point yet more explicitly, it is an invitation to practise the course (patipāda) and *not* to verify a sentence or a statement which is characterized as *empirically* 'true' or 'not-true' ('false'). The following words are very appropriate in this connection: "The Buddha sought truth in the practice of ethics and prescribed it as the way leading to emancipation from rebirth. He sought complete spiritual emancipation through ethical conduct or in the observance of rules of conduct; and the Buddha considered this spiritual way of life or the majjhima patipāda or the Golden mean to be the *truth*. Very consistently the Buddha asserted 'There is only one truth : there cannot be a second.' "[49]

In sum, it can be said that the notions of "ehipassika", (an invitation to 'come and see'), "attanā va jāneyyātha" (personal knowledge) and "sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya" (personal higher knowledge) cannot be understood outside the natural context that is their natural home. What the Buddhistic modernists have attempted in their treatises in connection with the above notions may be stated as follows : A sloughing off of conceptual connections is evident in their attempt, and this is a philosophical error. And this error results from the attempt of Buddhistic modernists to understand early Buddhism by way of the Logical positivistic notion of verifiability. Hamlyn throws light on this error in this way : "You could not be said to understand scientific discourse if you thought of it as some sort of magic incantation, nor could you be said to understand religious discourse if you thought of it as a form of scientific discourse."[50] Now we can easily intuit the philosophical error of the Buddhistic modernists—Jayatilleke and Kalupahana—who attempt to explain early Buddhism, which is essentially a religious ideology, by way of the verifiability-criterion of the Vienna Cricle positivists. The error in question seems to be compounded by their simply ignoring the conceptual family of the religious

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ideology, thus attempting to apply the notion of "ehipassika" (an invitation to 'come and see') without reference to other central notions that form its normal background, namely, "the noble truths," ("ariya saccāni"), "the middle path" ("majjhima patipāda"), "causality" ("paticcasamuppāda"), "emancipation" ("nibbāna"), etc. This is what later Wittgenstein calls "the engine idling."[51] When one tries to apply a notion by sloughing off its conceptual connections, in this case, the conceptual family, nonsense or meaninglessness is produced for the use of the notion remains empty.

Conceptually speaking, the notions of "ehipassika", "attanā va jāneyyātta" and "sāmaṃ yeva dhammaṃ abhiññāya" need to be understood from the natural context to which they belong, namely, an ethico-religious context which is characterised as atheistic. In any event, it must be remembered that the kind of atheism just mentioned is not going to bestow even a semblance of *empirical* verifiability on the notions simply because this is logically impossible. In an ethico-religious ideology such as Buddhism there are no statements which can be assigned the truth value 'true' or 'not-true' ('false'), *empirically*. The reason is that the statements of this religion, or of any other religion for that matter are ethical ones and not factual ones which are *empirically* 'true' or 'not-true' ('false'). All attempts at constructing a system of religious ethics upon modern science shall fail as the propositions of modern science are factual statements and not moral ones. And, therefore, the attempt of the Buddhistic modernists must fail too.

NOTES

1. *Pāli Text Society Dictionary* (London : 1959), p. 162.
2. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. I, ed. V. Trenkner and R. Chalmers, (London : P.T.S., 1948-51); tr. I.B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings*, (London : P.T.S., 1954-9), Vol. I, p. 37.
3. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. II, p. 211.
4. *Aṅguttara Nikāya*, Vol. II, ed. R. Morris and E. Hardy, (London : P.T.S., 1885-1900); tr. F.L. Woodward and E.M. Hare, *The Book of Gradual Sayings*, Vol. II, (London . P.T.S., 1932-6), p. 191.
5. Jayatilleke, K.N., *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, (London : Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 466.
6. Kalupahana, D.J., *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, (Honolulu : The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), p. 106.

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7. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 346 : "ariyena silakkhandhena samannāgato".
8. *ibid.*, p. 547.
9. Feigel, H., and Sellers, W., eds., *Readings in Philosophical Analysis*, (New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949). See M. Schlick's paper entitled "Meaning and Verification", p. 148.
10. Ayer, A.J., *Language, Truth and Logic*, (London : Victor Gollancz, 1936), p. 35.
11. *ibid.*, p. 37; and also see p. 95.
12. Waismann, F., *The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy*, (London : 1971, paperback edition), p. 329.
13. *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 79.
14. Ayer, A.J., ed., *Logical Positivism*, (Free Press of Glencoe, 1959). See "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language", by R. Carnap.
15. Kalansuriya, A.D.P., "Wittgenstein, Meaning-Model and Buddhism", *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 3, April 1977, pp. 381-91.
16. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 466.
17. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vo . I, p. 348.
18. *Causality : The Central Philosophy af Buddhism*, p. 181.
19. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 438. See also *Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 104.
20. Haynes, Renée, the Editor of the *British Journal of Psychical Research*, says : " 'Poltergeist haunting' now believed to be the effect of profound chaotic human misery expressing itself in some psychokinetic mode not yet understood." See Koestler, Arthur, *The Roots of Coincidence*, (London : Hutchinson & Co., 1972), p. 147.
21. Murray, Gilbert, a celebrated parapsychologist and a chairman of the British Association for Parapsychological Research in 1915 and 1952 has rejected the possibility of *clairvoyance*, *ibid.*, p. 39.
22. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 423.
23. Ryle, Gilbert, *The Concept of Mind*, (reprint Penguin, 1966), p. 58.
24. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 438.
25. Kalansuriya, A.D.P., "Buddhism, Empiricism and Transempiricism", forthcoming. See also Kalansuriya, A.D.P., "Empirical Buddhism and Philosophy", Jaffna : *The Sri Lanka Journal of South Asian Studies*. Vol. I, No. 1, June, 1976, pp. 33-50.
26. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 420.
27. *ibid.*
28. *Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 42.

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29. Jayatilleke, K.N., *Message of the Buddha*, ed. by Ninian Smart, (London : Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975), p. 202.
30. *ibid.*, p. 32.
31. *ibid.*, p. 59. See also Kalansuriya, A.D.P., "Philosophical Reflections on Empirico-Buddhistic Claims", Colombo : *Dialogue*, Vol. III, No. 1, April 1976, pp. 6-11.
32. *Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 185.
33. *ibid*, p. 180. See also Kalansuriya, A.D.P., "Buddhism, Empiricism and Transempiricism", forthcoming.
34. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*. Vol. III, p. 232.
35. Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophical Investigations*, (Oxford : Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 19e.
36. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, p. 437.
37. Aaron, R.I., *Knowing and the Function of Reason*, (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 3.
38. *The Concept of Mind*, p. 155.
39. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. I, p. 140.
40. *Suttanipāta*, ed. by D. Anderson and H. Smith, (London : P.T.S., 1913), verse 1076.
41. *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 463-4. See also *Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, p. 42.
42. *ibid.*,pp. 181-3.
43. *The Ceylon Journal of the Humanities*, Vol. I, No. 1, January 1970, p. 98.
44. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol. II, p. 211. See also Kalansuriya, A.D.P., "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of Buddhism", Colombo : *Dialogue* Vol. IV, Nos. 1 & 2, January-August, 1977, pp. 51-60.
45. *Causality : The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*. p. 185.
46. *ibid.*, p. 181.
47. See my paper entitled "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of Buddhism", op. cit.
48. *Majjhima Nikāya*, Vol, II, p. 213.
49. See my paper entitled "The Ethico-religious Nature of the Conceptual Framework of Buddhism".
50. Hamlyn, D.W., *The Theory of Knowledge*, (London : Macmillan, 1971), p. 68.
51. *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 51e.

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14

Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein on Error[1]

NATHAN KATZ

I

It seems to us that one of the most important points Ludwig Wittgenstein is making repeatedly and throughout his *Philosophical Investigations* is that a word is not necessarily the name of a thing, and that philosophic problems arise when one abstracts a word from its context—that is, from the everyday workings of language—and tries to understand that word apart from its functional matrix.[2] Nāgārjuna, in his more dialectical writings, seems to be telling us that our words and concepts neither adequately explain nor describe reality.

There are similarities and differences in just these two statements. Both would imply that the proper business of philosophy would be a criticism of language, which is what both in fact do. But Wittgenstein maintains that language describes reality just fine—it *works* in our business of conducting life. We get into difficulties only when we abstract words from this working language and try to do philosophy. It is not so much the case that words are *inadequate*; rather, philosophers tend to make nonsense out of perfectly good words. Nāgārjuna would agree with this much at least : that philosophers do indeed make nonsense.

In this essay we shall concern ourselves primarily with what Wittgenstein and Nāgārjuna, and some of their commentators, have to say about what constitutes a philosophic mistake, an error. However, we must be cautioned that both philosophers are tricky fellows. In a very important sense, neither are philosophers—if we take 'philosopher' to mean one who goes about developing philosophic systems. Rather, both Wittgenstein and Nāgārjuna are critics of philosophy; both would want to render philosophy, in the sense just indicated, an impossibility.

As critics, neither Wittgenstein nor Nāgārjuna are concerned with

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maintaining consistent positions—unless one would call the very methodology of criticism a 'position'. Wittgenstein writes :[3] "My aim is : to teach you to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense", a statement which would serve as very fine characterization of Nāgārjuna's *prasaṅga* methodology of refutation as well. Yet one can find by careful readings some more or less consistent pictures of what might constitute an error. In order to proceed to this point, we shall build our case slowly by means of specific examples of what each of them think to be errors in particular cases. By this method we hope to get a picture of their notions of error. Along the way we shall discover some interesting and parallel philosophic meanderings.

II

One error which Wittgenstein considers at length in *Philosophical Investigations*, from the first to 137th sections more or less, is the belief that a word has a 'meaning', a referent, that words 'stand for' things. He demonstrates the absurdity of this notion by several critical methods :

(1) He analyzes how language *works* by imagining a very simple language indeed : that of a builder and his assistant who get along very well by pointing and saying "Slab", "Pillar" and "Block" and specifying numbers.[4] This system of language ('language-game') is offered as an alternative to our more common belief that we learn the word 'slab' by *ostensive definition*, by pointing to the 'meaning' of the word. What Wittgenstein is telling us is that when the builder says "Slab", he is not conveying information or 'communicating' with his assistant : rather, he wants him to bring the slab!

The idea that words have meanings and that language is the communication of these meanings is shown to be absurd. Consider as an example the case of a person in a burning house who telephones the fire department, saying "There is a fire at 135 Main Street." What could we say is being *communicated* here ? What if the fire chief were to reply, "Yes, I understand what you are saying", and hung up, taking no further action ? While it could be granted that 'information' was being 'communicated', would we want to say that language had fulfilled its purpose here ? If we start from the premise that words have meanings and that the purpose of language is the communication of these meanings, then we'd be forced to admit that the exchange had been successful. On the other hand, if we see what Wittgenstein is showing us—that the belief in meanings of words and language as communication is not a useful model—then we would come

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to realize that our call to the fire department, like the builder's "Slab", were not aimed at communicating anything at all. Rather, they were used to tell us to do something. Thus Wittgenstein's rule :[5] "For a *large* class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus : the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

(2) We may make the same point by following Wittgenstein's method along these lines : Let us, for the sake of the argument, accept as true the following assertions. Whether or not these facts are true does not affect the argument; Wittgenstein holds his method to be grammatical, not empirical.

1. The French language has a larger vocabulary dealing with wine tasting than does English.

2. The Pāli language has more words to talk about the mind and its functions than does English.

3. The Eskimo language has 37 words to talk about snow, whereas English has only four or five.

If words have meanings, if words refer, if we learn language by ostensive definition, then it would seem to follow that there really are 37 kinds of snow, or x qualities inherent in wine, or x types of 'mental states' of which we poor English speakers are woefully ignorant. If you believe this to be a fair representation of the case, then I would like to ask you what would happen if we today came to an agreement that there were a type of sensation in our necks (or quality of the air, or type of airplane) which we should call 'barg' and that 'barg' entered into common usage. Then would you say 'barg' was a real object ? If so, where were 'bargs' before today ?

I think Wittgenstein is offering us a more coherent analysis of what might be going on in these cases : the Eskimo has mastered a technique called 'talking about snow'; the Frenchman his technique for social intercourse about wines; and the Abhidharmika wants to say some things about what goes on in his, and presumably our, head. Language is a learned, public behaviour which we use to go about the business of life; it is not a representational scheme referring to objects existing 'out there'.

(3) Wittgenstein employs another type of argument against this view, and this one, as we shall see, is very similar to some dialectical methods of Nāgārjuna. It is to bring questions of time and duration into the model of an objectively referring language. He argues :[6]

The word 'Excalibur', say, is a proper name in the ordinary sense. The

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> sword Excalibur consists of parts combined in a particular way. If they are combined differently Excalibur does not exist. But it is clear that the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' makes *sense* whether Excalibur is still whole or broken up. But if 'Excalibur' is the name of an object, this object no longer exists when Excalibur is broken up into pieces; and as no object would then correspond to the name it would have no meaning. But then the sentence 'Excalibur has a sharp blade' would contain a word that has no meaning, and hence the sentence would be nonsense. But it does still make sense. . .

To restate Wittgenstein's point : the absurdity of holding that words, even simple names, refer to objects becomes clear in the case of a meaningful sentence said of a no-longer-existing object. Since the subject is non-existent and the sentence still works, then we may see that coherent speech need not be referring speech.

(4) It is just this mistaken assumption about language that leads us into philosophical dilemmas. Wittgenstein, following St. Augustine's lead, considers the word 'time', a word we all know and use more or less successfully when we ask each other the time, when we're on time for a seminar, when we time our three-minute eggs, and when we keep time to the music by tapping our feet. Wittgenstein observes Augustine's comment in the *Confessions* :[7] "Quid est ergo tempus ? Si nemo me quaerat scio; si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio." ("What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know; but if someone asks me to explain, I don't know.")

The question—"What is time ?"—has led philosophers in Europe and India to some of the most remarkable conclusions. For Zeno it is unreal. For some Kālacakra-tāntrikas it seems like an absolute. Yet we have no reason to doubt, just as Hume could play billiards after 'disproving' causality, that both Zeno and the Tantrika could answer the question, "What time is it ?" or, if trained musically, "What is the time signature of this piece ?" with no difficulty. The word 'time' is a technique we learn for quite a variety of purposes : so as not to be late for dinner, so as to keep rhythm with our fellow musicians, and so our eggs won't be too runny. But it is this assumption of a referrential model of language, the dogma that a word has a meaning, which leads us astray. Some of us have gotten into similar problems with words like 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I', 'proposition' and 'name'—to follow Wittgenstein's examples in section 116. He cautions us that when we try to deal with such words :[8] "One must always ask oneself : is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home ? What *we* do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use."

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III

Buddhism is also highly critical of the assumption that a word has a meaning and refers to a thing. Of course, given the central position of Buddhism as *anātmavāda*, this becomes manifestly clear in the discussions of the word 'I' (*ahaṃkāra*), as we find in early Buddhism. It is also a chief concern of later Buddhism, especially Dignāga's Sautrāntika school and Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamaka school, in their encounters with the Nyāya realists (*bāhyārthavāda*). We shall look at some of the arguments given at different stages in the history of Buddhist thought, and we shall be commenting on some similarities and divergences from Wittgenstein's position.

In the oldest Buddhist texts, the Nikāyas, we find the Buddha himself arguing against a naively-understood language. In the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta we hear him saying :[9]

> Evam eva kho Citta yasmiṃ oḷāriko atta-paṭilābho hoti. . .pe. . .Tasmiṃ Citta samaye manomayo atta-paṭilābho hoti. .pe...Yasmiṁ Citta samaye arūpo atta-paṭilābho, n' eva tasmiṃ samaye oḷāriko atta-paṭilābho te saṅkham gacchati, na manomayo atta-paṭilābho ti saṅkham gacchati, arūpo atta-paṭilābho tveva tasmiṃ samaye saṅkham gacchati. Itimä kho Citta loka samaññā loka-niruttiyo, loka-vohārā loka-paññattiyo yāhi Tathāgato voharati aparāmasan.

which Rhys-Davids translates as :[10]

> Just so, Citta, when any of the three modes of personality (i.e., past, present or future) is going on, it is not called by the name of the other. For these, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech, designations in the common use of the world. And of these a Tathāgata makes use indeed, but is not led astray by them.

The question of personal identity was a crucial one at the time of the Buddha, and different systems of thought had covered it from every possible angle. Here the Buddha is telling his interlocutor that terms thought to be referring to a self are merely turns of speech, useful in the business of everyday life, but not referring to an entity, not mysteriously carrying a 'meaning' beyond these everyday usages. The wisdom of a Tathāgata (Buddha) consists, in part, in that he doesn't make the type of grammatical mistake that the *ātmavāda* philosophers make.

The Buddha's position here must be carefully distinguished from that of other heterodox teachers of his day. He does not, as the Cārvāka, merely

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negate the view of the *ātmavādins* and claim that the self is identical with the body and does not exist beyond the body after death. He also does not, as Sañjāya, opt for a sceptical position, which merely refuses to affirm or deny any thesis about the self. The Buddha rather skilfully examines the language of talking about the self and finds that the mistake is grammatical : that learning to use the word 'I' does not entail an entity corresponding to it. Of course the Buddha goes on to psycho-analyze the conditions given which one claims there to be an 'I' in terms of *paṭicca-samuppāda*, and goes on to teach a therapy (*magga*) for quieting these psychoses—which is far more than Wittgenstein would care to attempt. The point to note, however, is the nature of the Buddha's analysis of the language of talking about 'I' and its similarity to Wittgenstein's.[11]

A bit later in the history of Buddhist literature, in the *Milindapāñha*, we find perhaps the most famous example of the Buddhist critique of 'I'-language.[12] King Milinda is discussing with the monk, Nāgasena, the Buddhist teaching of no-self (*anattā*). He is confused, as many of us are, by the apparent contradiction based on a naive understanding of the workings of language : If there is no self, to what does the term 'Nāgasena' refer? Nāgasena answers in two ways, by grammatical and analogical methods. He first replies :[13]

> I am known as Nāgasena, O king, and it is by that name that my brethren in the faith address me. But although parents, O king, give such names as Nāgasena, or Sūrasena, or Vīrasena, or Sīhasena, yet this, Sire—Nāgasena and so on—is only a generally understood term, a designation in the common use. For there is no permanent individuality involved in the matter (na puggalo upalabbhati).

Then Nāgasena offers the famous analogy of the chariot[14] wherein the term 'chariot' is found to be a convention for speaking about a functioning of certain parts, but not the name of an entity ('essence'). As Wittgenstein has shown us with the case of Excalibur, language is not necessarily referential, but it is useful. Milinda thanks Nāgasena and goes on his way muttering to himself.[15]

The parallel between the Buddhist notion of 'convenient designation' and Wittgenstein's 'everyday language' is clear. Both are saying that because a word may be *used*, we should not get carried away with philosophies about essences and the like. The method of the early Buddhist and th at of Wittgenstein is also similar : Wittgenstein wants to return a word from its metaphysical to its everyday use. In the instance just cited, Nāgasena' de-metaphysicalizes the terms 'chariot' and 'Nāgasena, and

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shows us that a convenient designation does not imply a metaphysical entity. One of the powers (*balāni*) of the perfect human (*arahant*) of early Buddhism is this grammatical skilfulness (*loke samaññaṃ kusalo*). He is praised for this ability in the Saṁyutta Nikāya : [16]

> He among the monks who is an arahant, slayer of the cankers, doer of what was to be done, can say "I say" or "It is mine", skilfully employing worldly language-games and aware of their value, yet would speak only in conformity with these usages.

So important was this point that the Buddha himself declared that all grief, woe, lamentation and despair could be traced to a naively-understood grammar of 'I'.[17]

The type of position which Wittgenstein has been criticizing, called 'logical atomism' by Strawson,[18] has as its counterpart in India the Nyāya school. Fundamentally the Nyāya holds that that which could be meaningfully asserted in terms of 'is' and 'is not' (*asti* and *nasti*) alone is real; that which could not be so asserted is nonsense.[19] Religiously this could be expressed as : the sickness of life (*duḥkha*) is due to a sick understanding of life, and this sickness could be remedied by appropriate referential language. It is precisely against the school that the later Buddhists, most notable Nāgārjuna and Dignāga, launch their most telling arguments.

Nāgārjuna,'s *Vigrahavyāvartanī*[20] devotes its first twenty verses to a restatement of the Nyāya notion *svabhāva*, a difficult Indian concept used to denote the reality, literally 'self-existence', of an object. The remaining fifty verses comprise Nāgārjuna's attack on this notion. In verses 42 to 56, Nāgārjuna makes a case similar to Wittgenstein's Excalibur when he argues that the notion of *svabhāva* is incompatible with temporality. He is objecting to the ontologization of the verb 'to be' (*bhāva*).

A similar argument is found in his most famous work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*,[21] in Chapter V which deals with the notion of an element (*dhātu*). The *dhātus* are earth, water, fire, wind, space and consciousness, and in this argument he takes space (*ākāśa*) as a paradigm. He argues that space cannot be separated from the characteristic of space (*ākāśalakṣaṇa*). He then employs a temporal argument : if space is said to precede its characteristics, then we would be left with a characteristicless element—an impossibility according to Nyāya epistemology; also if the characteristic preceded the element, then there would be no place for the characteristic to reside—this point also contradicts the Nyāya position that "So long as the properties exist, they can only exist as residing in their substance"[22] and if the element and its characteristic are said to be

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simultaneous, then we are at a loss to explain from where the characteristic has come. What is behind this argument is the invitation for the Naiyayika to see that simply because one may *speak* of elements and characteristics does not give one the right to speak about them *metaphysically*. While the surface grammar of 'element' and 'characteristic' may look as if they were two separate reals, which is what the Nyāya doggedly affirms, a closer analysis of our language will reveal that these two are dependently co-originated, that is, these concepts take on meaning only when used in counterposition to each other. The error of Nyāya is to attribute to each *svabhāva*—here the antithesis of 'dependently co-originated'—and to speak of them abstractly as reals.

Two other arguments of Nāgārjuna are worthy of our attention in the context of Wittgenstein's comments about time. In one[23] we are reminded that speech about time independent of a particular thing in time is incoherent. From this point, Nāgārjuna goes on to attack the notion of a 'thing',[24] but the point of interest to us is Nāgārjuna's refusal to allow his opponent to speak of time in the abstract, that is, in metaphysical rather than everyday language.

A similar argument is found in Nāgārjuna's examination of the cardinal Buddhist notions of 'birth' and 'old age-death'.[25] To those who would speak about birth and old age-death apart from *somebody's* being born, ageing and dying, Nāgārjuna launches another temporal argument, similar to the one regarding 'element' and 'characteristic' : if birth is prior to, implying separate from, old age-death, then we are left with a deathless being, a contradiction in Buddhist terms. If death is prior to birth, again implying separation, then we are left with something dying which is unborn; and if they are simultaneous, this would be tantamount to saying that they are uncaused, that is, having no antecedent condition. Unlike the person who loves humanity in general but is repelled by individual people, the Buddha's horror at the chain of suffering, as expressed by birth and old age-death, was not an abstract horror. It is lived, not theoretical, suffering that is Buddhism's point, and to theorize about these vital matters is to kill them. For those who do theorize, Nāgārjuna is willing to use their own presuppositions to demonstrate the incoherence of their claims.

Wittgenstein writes:[26] "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness." This would also hold for Nāgārjuna, but he would be a homoeopathic physician : the principle of like healing like is shown in Nāgārjuna's use of logic to cure us of our metaphysical insistence that the world conform to our logic. Nāgārjuna wants to show us that the world is indeed older than our logic; that our logic is a malignancy rooted in our being so fascinated with language that our

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conventions become convictions. He wishes, along with Wittgenstein, that language could be returned to its everyday, conventional home; but as we shall see below, it may be that Nāgārjuna finds that home far removed from us indeed.

IV

Wittgenstein contends that:[27] "Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday," and it is this view that comes through in his treatment of words like 'to know', 'to understand', 'to intend', etc.—words which have caused great philosophic confusions. Such words give the appearance of something mysterious, something beyond the investigator's empirical ken. As Paul M. vanBuren observes:[28]

> Surely, it might be thought, understanding and knowing are strange, hidden, inner processes that go on in our head. But that is just a jumble of confusions. No doubt if my head is cut off, I shall be in such a condition that I could not be said to understand. Nor do I deny that when I understand what is said, interesting neurological processes go on in my brain. What I am saying, however, is that when you say that I understand, the word 'understand' neither refers to, nor depends for its correct use on any knowledge about, those inner processes. As far as getting clear about the rules for the use of 'understanding', 'knowing' and 'thinking', information about brain cells is of no use whatever. Understanding algebra, for example, is a condition, a state, perhaps, but it is a state of affairs, not an inner, hidden condition. A person can be tested to find out if he understands algebra, and we say he understands when he is able to pass the test. Understanding is a state of having mastered a technique, activity, or material. Whether I have that mastery is decided by what I am able to do and is therefore as open to your judgment as it is to mine.

According to Wittgenstein, words like 'to understand', 'to know', et cetera, are in the public arena, not something hidden, some mysterious process'. He writes:[29] "Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process, at all. For *that* is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of cases, in what kind of circumstances do we say 'Now I know how to go on. . .'?" An example of this circumstance[30] would be when one is presented with a series of numbers : 3, 6, 9, 12. . ., and one thinks, 'Now I know how to go on,' or perhaps, 'I know that series'. If

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one 'knows' that series, does he at the same time 'know' that the 87th member of that series is 261? Yet if we think of 'knowing' as a state of mind, or as something appearing mentally in a flash, then we might be puzzled to answer. It's quite likely that when one comes to the 87th member, one would say '261'. But the grammar of 'to know' is public, and one only knows the 87th member when one comes to it.

Similarly: Perhaps when one is writing an essay, one 'knows' what one is going to say. But are there not invariably new twists that come up as we actually write it? Doesn't it often come out rather differently than we'd thought? The mystery of 'knowing' is dissolved when we realize that our knowing is bound up with our language, and that our language is a public enterprise. I did not know that I would write this sentence when I began this paper; yet I knew what I was going to say. Need we bring into the picture philosophic bugaboo like 'paradox' and 'mental state'? Or need we look into the grammar of 'to know'?

The Mādhyamikas, too, had a great deal to say about how metaphysics, which they characterize as a 'dispositional disease', evolves out of sloppy grammar. For one example, let us consider how modern scholarship on the Mādhyamaka has neglected the grammar of the term '*prajñā* and has consequently concluded that Nāgārjuna is an absolutist.

The grammar of '*prajñā*', is closely connected with terms like '*yathābhūtadarśana*' and '*dharma-cakṣus*,' Wittgenstein would call them grammatical cousins. We are not concerned here with its etymology or translation : we shall accept Murti's 'intuition'. But because '*prajñā*' looks like, in terms of surface grammar, works like '*jñāna*', *vijñāna*', et cetera, scholars like Murti,[31] Stcherbatsky,[32] and Schayer[33] have thought it to work in the same way. Since *jñāna* cannot be thought of without *jñāpti*, since the abhidharma always speaks about the object-of-vision co-arising with the consciousness-of-object-of-vision, then one might be misled into thinking that there could be no intuition apart from 'intuition-into-something'—in this case, an absolute. *Prajñā* no more implies an absolute than 'to understand' implies a 'mental event'; yet it is precisely this type of reasoning, based on superficial grammatical considerations, that has lead to Nāgārjuna's being thought of as an absolutist. (There is also a great deal of confusion between Nāgārjuna and Śaṁkarācārya; their agreement on many issues does not force Nāgārjuna into Śaṁkarācārya's monistic camp.) However, were one to consider the deeper grammar of '*prajñā*', then the case for Nāgārjuna as absolutist would collapse. There are strong family resemblances between '*prajñā*', '*yathābhūtadarśana*', and '*dharma-cakṣus*', as we have already indicated. Yet no one would think that the 'eye of *dharma*' sees objectively in the same way as the 'eye of flesh'. Why, then, need *prajñā* be directed

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towards any object, absolute or otherwise?

According to Nāgārjuna, the Buddha is a being free from metaphysics. In the *dPe. med. par. bstod. ba.*[34] he writes:

> 10. Thy mind, O Lord, is not attached to the multifarious opinions as regards pleasure and pain, existence of an ego, non-existence of an ego, affirmation of some eternal being, negation of some eternal being.
>
> 11. Thy belief is that things do not go [changing into some other condition], nor do they come [into existence by agency of some force]; nor dost Thou admit that there is a whole as the conglomeration of many parts. Therefore Thou knowest absolute truth.
>
> 13. Thou, the Irreproachable One, didst understand that this world is neither unity nor multiplicity; it is like an echo, it is neither subject to changing [into other forms] nor to destruction.
>
> 14. Thou, my Lord, didst know that the cycle of existence is neither eternal nor impermanent, that in it there is no predicable nor predicate, [since it is] similar to a dream or to a magic play.

An analysis of these devotional verses will yield an insight into Nāgārjuna's position regarding the arising of metaphysical opinions (*dṛṣṭi prapañca*) and will show how an absolutist reading of his works is an instance of sloppy grammar.

Verse 10 is rather straightforward: we have already discussed Chapter XI of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*—and a similar point is made in Chapter XII—wherein talk about birth and death apart from somebody's being born and dying is incoherent. *Duḥkha* is not a proposition; it is an invitation to see clearly our human condition. To treat *duḥkha* as propositional is to engage in worthless disputation, as the Buddha taught in the parable of the arrow.[35] When the Buddha's invitational language about *duḥkha* is taken as propositional, philosophic problems arise—problems which Nāgārjuna is trying to dis-solve by returning birth/old age/death talk to its original language game. The Buddha is: (1) a being free from suffering ; and (2) a being free from metaphysics. These two statements are innately bound up.

In the *Ātma parikṣā* (Chapter XVIII), Nāgārjuna tells us that the teaching of *anātman* is not a metaphysical position in contradistinction to the *ātmavāda.* He writes:[36]

> ātmetyapi prajñāpitamanātmetyapi deśitam/buddhanairātmā na cānatmā kaścidityapi deśitaṃ.

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> The Buddhas have provisionally employed the term *ātman* and instructed on the true idea of *anātman.* They have also taught that any (abstract) entity as *ātman* or *anātman* does not exist.

Thus Nāgārjuna's understanding of the Buddha's teaching of *anātman* is structurally similar to his own teaching of śūnyatā. Both *anātman* and *śūnaytā* are correctives and neither can be understood apart from this corrective language game. Seeing either term as other than dependently co-originated, that is, other than as having 'meaning' only in relation to the view (*dṛṣṭi*) for which they were offered as correctives—in these cases the views of *ātmavāda* and *bāhyārthavāda* ('substantialism' and 'realism')—is to treat them away from their original homes. Neither *anātman* nor *śūnyatā* are the bases for any metaphysics. It is not for nothing that Nāgārjuna's school is called the 'Mādhyamaka' ('middle position') as it steers a middle course between all extremes, and any metaphysical position whatsoever is considered an extremity. Candrakīrti[37] compares *śūnyatā* with a snake: if wrongly grasped, the snake can be extremely dangerous, just as a metaphysically-understood *śūnyatā* is dangerous. He writes:[38] "It is true that a useful thing when wrongly seized does not give service, but how could it be injurious ? The seed, sown in contempt of nature, does not destroy the sower. Thus the Master gives an example to clarify this regard : (It is) just like a serpent clumsily grasped, like the magical sciences wrongly applied." Thus *śūnyatā* has as its use (read 'meaning') the negation without counter-position of extreme (read 'metaphysical,') views. Other interpretations of *śūnyatā* as absolutism, according to Candrakīrti, are instances of faulty grammar.[39]

V

As both Wittgenstein and Nāgārjuna are critics (Nāgārjuna has been called *vaitaṇḍika*, 'one without any position')[40] one might expect them to have some interesting thoughts on negation, since it would be the business of a critic to negate what he considers to be errors. And here we find strong parallels. The question of negation has been of major concern to philosophers east and west. All sorts of questions, such as the status of the negated, which was a key issue in the Nyāya-Sautrāntika debates,[41] and the absolute or relative quality of the negation itself, which was a focus of the Prasaṅgika-Svātantrika debates,[42] have been raised.

Wittgenstein notices that there is something curious about the grammar of negation. He writes: [43] "The feeling is as if the negation of a proposition had to make it true in a certain sense, in order to negate it," which

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is precisely the point Nyāya was making in their arguments with the Sautrāntikas. A meaningful negation, according to Nyāya, is possible only if its opposite, which they called *pratiyogin* or counter-positive, is a real. Remember that it is a basic tenet of Nyāya that anything which could meaningfully be asserted is real, and it will not be difficult to see their consistency in insisting that in the case of 'the pot is not on the ground', the 'absence of pot' is said to be a real, albeit a negative real, *abhāva*. For both the Buddhists and Wittgenstein, this position is absurd. Speaking for Buddhism, a Sautrāntika would say that the perception 'the pot is not on the ground' is not a true perception at all, but a 'determinate perception', *savikalpa*, which is a mental and not sensory object, *vikalpa*. What is being cognized, he would argue, is the 'empty ground' (*kaivalya*) in the context of one's expecting pot to be there. Again the Buddhist is asking the Naiyayika to see that the speaking of x does not entail the being of x.[44]

Wittgenstein gives a similar analysis, but along more explicitly linguistic lines. He writes:[45] "It would be odd to say: 'A process looks different when it happens from when it doesn't happen.' Or 'A red patch looks different when it is there from when it isn't there'—but language abstracts from this difference, for it speaks of a red patch whether it is there or not." It is a peculiarity of our language, and not of reality as Nyāya would have us believe, that "The assertion of a negative proposition contains the proposition which is negated, but not the assertion of it."[46] To take our mode of speaking for what is given is one of the fundamental types of error for both Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein, as we shall see below. In this instance, taking our language of negation and abstracting it into untenable theses such as the existence of absence (*abhāvaḥ-vastu*) is a fine example of such nonsense for which Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein are offering remedies.

Both Wittgenstein and Nāgārjuna are explicit in stating that in their negations they are not negating anything real—which is consistent with our characterization of them as both being positionless. Wittgenstein says: [47] "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." When we say 'there is no red patch', it is only by convention that we may say 'red patch' when it is not there. When Wittgenstein refutes metaphysical talk about 'Being' he is doing just that—refuting *talk about* 'Being'. Since name does not imply thing, as we have discussed, then the negation involved is grammatical and not ontological. And 'grammar' is certainly not a thing'.

Nāgārjuna recapitulates the Nyāya position in the *Vigrahavyāvartani*[48] He says :

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> Negation is seen to be only of an existent (sata eva pratiṣedho . . . dṛṣṭaḥ), as in the following: 'There is no pot in the house' (nasti ghato geha ity ayam). Consequently, this negation is that of an existent intrinsic nature (pratiṣedho' yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāt).
>
> It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one. For instance, when it is said: 'There is no pot in the house,' it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one (sato gahaṭaya pratiṣedaḥ kriyate nāsātaḥ).
>
> In like manner it follows that the negation 'The things have no intrinsic nature' (nāsti svabhāvo dharmāṇaṃ) is a negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not a non-existent one. In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated.

As we have seen, the claim of Nāgārjuna that things have no intrinsic nature', *svabhāva*, is a grammatical rather than an ontological statement. To say that things have *svabhāva* is to say that one can coherently speak of them apart from their everyday language, that a word has a referent, which is to say that a word is more than a convenient designation. It is precisely this naive conception of language that Nāgārjuna is negating when he says that things have no *svabhāva*. Candrakīrti[49] says that the objection of the Naiyayika is meaningless, that it amounts to saying as little as 'the son of the barren woman is handsome', since it wants to treat as established an unestablished term, *svabhāva*. Their argument is not well-founded because it wants to admit, by virtue of its negation, the existence of *svabhāva*, when the Mādhyamaka does not accept it because of grammatical considerations.

It has not been unusual for the Mādhyamaka to be misunderstood as nihilism.[50] This misunderstanding is precisely because their negations are taken as ontological rather than grammatical, leading to the false idea that Nāgārjuna negates reals. One argument given by Candrakīrti[51] is analogical: Imagine that a theft has been committed. One man, who has not witnessed the theft but, out of malice for the accused, testifies against him. Another man, having seen the accused commit the crime, also testifies against him. While both are making the same claim—that the accused did commit the crime—in one case we have untruth and in the other, truth. The nihilist who negates is like the first witness; Nāgārjuna is like the second. There are two reasons for this : (1) Nāgārjuna's negation is a corrective, an enquiry into the grammar of talking about the

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world, while the nihilist's negation is, according to the Mādhyamaka, just another view (*dṛṣṭi*); and (2) Nāgārjuna's negation is absolute in the sense that it offers no counter-thesis, not even a negative counter-thesis, whereas the nihilist's negation is relative to a particular view which is being negated, which is tantamount to saying that he is indulging in mere play of concepts (*prapañca*). Compare Candrakīrti's analogy with the method employed by the Buddha to examine claims about the self, as discussed above. The Buddha does not negate self, as does the Cārvāka, nor does he assume a sceptical stance, as does Sañjāya. Rather, the Buddha analyzes our talking about the self and makes some grammatical observations. Of course, for Buddhism grammar is rooted in psychology, not ontology, which is to say that grammatical confusions involved in talk about the self require a psychotherapy rather than mere philosophizing. This matter is considered further below.

Wittgenstein is also explicit on this point, that the negation he employs is grammatical and not ontological. He writes:[52]

> And we may not advance any kind of theory. There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. We must do away with all *explanation*, and description alone must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognize those workings : *in despite of* an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.

VI

Editions of the *Oxford English Dictionary* have a Wittgensteinian flavour. Rather than 'defining' a word, the *O.E.D.* prefers to list some uses before getting into definitions. It is as if it wanted to *show* us how English works. If we remember that the term meaning (read 'definition') most often refers to *use*, we may see the connections.

So has been our treatment of the notions of 'error' in the thought of Nāgārjuna, and Wittgenstein. We have not as yet, nor shall we, offer any definition. For a metaphysical thinker, it would be quite proper to define his meaning of 'error'; for example, this would be a relatively simple task in the case of Śaṁkarācārya. But both Wittgenstein and Nāgārjuna

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eschew easy definitions precisely because it is an important theme in their writings that definitions do not adequately reflect the workings of our language.

The dominant theme in Wittgenstein's notion of error could be stated as:[53] "A main cause of philosophic disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example." An example of this type of one-sided diet[54] would be the claim that all talking is logical talking. Behind this claim are certain beliefs about the structure of our language and the binary workings of the human brain. Our thinking and talking are innately bound up with each other, and the brain 'thinks' in terms of binary opposed pairs. Therefore, what we say is expressed in terms of opposites; the structure of our talking is the structure of logic. Those who hold this type of view extend it to go about analyzing myths by means of a computer. This type of view is nourished by a certain model of the word 'to talk'. But a Wittgensteinian might also point out that we have other uses, 'baby talk', 'jive talk', 'pillow talk', et cetera. The problem involved with this claim is that it considers only certain uses of the word. One may "Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts. And when you see them, there is a good deal that you will not say."[55] We tend to look at only one type of use of a word, and to hypothesize a meaning from this diet of one-sided examples.

Wittgenstein's philosophy neither negates anything real nor proposes to modify our everyday language. [56] "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give any foundation either. It leaves everything as it is." And as for those who would do philosophy in a metaphysical sense ?[57]: "When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it."

The question of Wittgenstein's diet becomes, in Buddhist parlance, the well-known question of the relationship of the two truths: *paramārtha-satya* and *saṃvṛtti-satya*. Nāgārjuna's famous verse on this subject is:[58]

ye 'nayorne vijānanti vibhāgaṃ satyaordvayoḥ/
te tattvaṃ na vijānanti gambhīraṃ buddhaśasane/
Those who do not know the distinction between the two truths
cannot understand the profound nature of the Buddha's teaching.

Many scholars, both western and Buddhist, have been confused by statements like that one and :[59]

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na kva citkasya citkaściddharmo buddhena deśitaḥ/
No *dharma* relating to any person or any place has ever been taught by the Buddha.

It does seem unusual to claim that the Buddha, whose teachings have been compiled into five full nikāyas, never taught anything. What is involved with this statement is an invitation to see that when the Buddha does teach, he does so in a very different way from our mundane methods. Much has been said about how the Buddha's teaching is really silence, et certera; the point to consider in the context of our discussion is that the Buddha never confused the relative discourse (*samvṛtti-satya*) with the ultimate (*paramārtha-satya*), which is beyond any specification whatsoever (*āparyāya*). To take the *words* of the Buddha as ultimate as, did the Lokattaravādins and, to a lesser extent, as do the Theravādins,[60] is to involve oneself in a one-sided diet—from the Mādhyamaka standpoint. Their distinction (*vibhāṣa*) of *samvṛtti* and *paramārtha* is a caution to us to see *any* statement (including the Buddha's) as a convenient designation, as an exercise in skilful means (*upāya-kauśala*), as heuristic and pedagogical, as everyday language—but never as referring or absolute. Thus to take the Four Noble Truths, much less any other statement, as ultimate, to treat them as propositional, is to refuse to see that when the Buddha preached, he preached contextually.[61] This is not to deny the *value* of the Buddha's teaching; it is to remove it from the realm of metaphysical discoursing.[62]

If for Wittgenstein the philosopher is a savage, for Nāgārjuna he is a very sick man. His problem, like that of the metaphysician who would predicate the Tathāgata in terms of fourfold logical alternatives (*catuhṣkoṭa*)[63] is the desire to make cognitive claims where the grounds for such claims are lacking. He is like the man who loves 'the most beautiful woman in the world' without even knowing who she is.[64] His one-sided diet is likened by the Buddha to the case of six blind men touching different parts of an elephant and fighting over their claims: 'This is tree', 'This is horse,' et cetera.[65] It has been said that Nāgārjuna wrote the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as a commentary on the Buddha's silence when asked about the predication of the Tathāgata by the members of the *catuhṣkoṭa*[66] and that he is showing how all philosophic claiming follows the same model wheret in one claims despite lack of grounds to do so. The Buddha even rebuked his beloved disciple, Sāriputta, for hailing the Buddha as omniscient, since Sāriputta is speaking beyond what he can know. [67] Speaking despite a lack of grounds for so speaking, which is found at the basis of Nāgārjuna's examination of errors—as is the one-sided diet at the basis of Wittgenstein's analysis—is found to be rooted in psychology.

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The Indian paradigm for our dis-ease in the world is that of the rope and the snake.[68] The rope/snake metaphor goes like this : A person at twilight sees a coiled rope near a tree, but he sees the rope as a snake and responds in terms of snake. Later, when the light is clearer, he sees that the supposed snake is a rope. In Vedāntic parlance, the snake is no longer superimposed on the rope when the rope sublates the experience of snake. Our life, so the analogy goes, in terms of self and other is a case of seeing snake, with all the fear-responses appropriate for that situation, instead of a rope. By intuition (*prajñā*) we come to know that what we'd thought was a snake was a rope all along. So it goes with *saṁsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, both interpretive experiences of the given. There are other similar paradigms: the case of a man with jaundiced eyes seeing the world as yellow, et cetera. The point to note is that, in the Indian *Weltanschauung*, our daily cognizing of the world is faulty.

Wittgenstein considers unusual perceptual instances, such as Jastrow's duck/rabbit,[69] which is a figure that can be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. Wittgenstein comments :[70] " 'Seeing as . . .' is not a part of perception. And for this reason it is like seeing and again not like." The Buddhist, following his paradigm, would offer that, in the world of self and other (*saṃsāra*) there is no 'seeing' apart from 'seeing as'. Wittgenstein might reply that the Buddhist is unhealthy because of a one-sided diet: he is taking as a paradigm an unusual case and then forcing our experience to conform to this unjustified paradigm. Wittgenstein has a lot at stake on this point, because if the Buddhist can convince him that our everyday perceptions are defective, then Wittgenstein's crucial stance about everyday language might be in jeopardy.

The Buddhist might then ask Wittgenstein not to miss the context of his paradigm. The philosophical, for Buddhism, is rooted in the psychological. The belief in self, which Buddhism also holds to be a grammatical mistake, is deeply rooted in our desire that there be a self (*diṭṭhi-taṇhā* is rooted in *bhava-taṇhā*).[71] Philosophic problems are a disease to be cured because life is a disease to be cured. If philosopheres are savages, it is due to the savagery of our being born to be re-born. Having done this linguistic therapy, Buddhism would invite us to do some psychotherapy. Nāgārjuna writes *Ratnvālī* after completing *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*; the Buddha, having quieted Māluṅkyaputta's philosophic outburst, invites him to do some quiet meditation.[72] Philosophical problems do indeed arise when language goes on holiday, but this holiday is not only a problem for the philosopher. It is a disease with which we are all afflicted.

We are not concluding that Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein, should they meet, would end up at the loggerheads just described. What we are saying

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is that the philosophic methodologies, and many of the points made, of Nāgārjuna and Wittgenstein are, at times, strikingly similar; however, Nāgārjuna's concern, like that of all Buddhists, is not primarily philosophic but religious. Therefore, for him analytic philosophy is analagous to sweeping the floor before one sits down to meditate. The *jñeyavaraṇa* ('congnitive defilements') are resolved in Buddhism only as a preliminary to the quieting of the *kleśāvaraṇa* 'emotive defilements'. In fact, the two cannot be separated.

NOTES

1. This essay is a revised form of a paper read at the International Seminar on Buddhism, sponsored by the Maha Bodhi Society and the Government of India, held in March, 1977, in New Delhi. The research for this essay was supported by a Fulbright-Hays research fellowship in Sri Lanka, 1976-77.
2. While the responsibility for all opinions expressed in this essay rests with the author, he wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor Paul M. vanBuren for stimulating his interest in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Many of the issues taken up in this essay were first raised during a seminar on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* conducted at Temple University in 1975. The author is grateful to Professor vanBuren for reading over an earlier manuscript and making some suggestions.
3. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd edition, tr. by G.E.M. Anscombe, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953, section 464. (Hereinafter *P.I.* . . .)
4. *P.I.*, sections 6-10.
5. *P.I.*, section 43.
6. *P.I.*, section 39.
7. *P.I.*, section 89.
8. *P.I.*, section 116.
9. *Dīgha Nikāya*, P.T.S. edition, ix, 53.
10. *Dialogues of the Buddha*, London: Oxford University Press, P.T.S., 1899, p. I: 265.
11. One possible Wittgensteinian critique of the notion of 'I' has been worked out by Peter Geach in "The Fallacy of 'Cogito Ergo Sum' ", in Harold Morick, ed., *Wittgenstein and the Problem of other Minds*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967, pp. 211-214.
12. *Milindapañha*, P.T.S. edition, II, 1, 1.
13. T.W. Rhys-Davids, tr., *The Questions of King Milinda*, 2 vols., Sacred Books of the East Series, F. Max Muller, ed., reprinted Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975, (1890), p. I: 40.

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14. *Milindapāñha*, II, 1, 1; *The Questions of King Milinda*, p. I: 43-44.

15. *Milindapāñha*, II, 1, 3.

16. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, P.T.S. edition, p. I: 14-15. This is my own rather unorthodox translation of: Yo hoti bhikkhu araham katāvī, khīṇāsāvo antimadehadhārī ahaṁ vadāmīti pi so vadeyya, mamaṁ vadantīti pi so vadeyya, loke samaññaṁ kusalo viditvā, vohāramattena so vohareyyāti.

17. *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, p. III: 18. . . . tassa rūpapariṇāmañňathābhāva uppajjanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassassupāyāsā.

18. P.F. Strawson, "Critical Notice of Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*", reprinted in H. Morick, ed., op. cit., pp. 3-81, especially p. 9.

19. A masterful discussion of these and other tenets of the Nyāya system is found in Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *A Critique of Indian Realism: A Study of the Conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignāga School*, Agra: Agra University Press, 1964.

20. Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Tibetan text and English translation in Giuseppe Tucci, ed. and tr., *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XLIX, Baroda: The Oriental Institute, 1929.

21. Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, Sanskrit text and English translation in Kenneth K. Inada, ed. and tr., *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamākākārikā with an Introductory Essay*, Tokyo: Hokuseido, 1970. In this discussion we shall be concentrating on Chapter V, verses 1-4.

22. D.N. Shastri. op. cit., p. 139,

23. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 19, 6.

24. For a Wittgensteinian criticism of the notion of 'fact', analogous to the Nyāya notion of a 'thing', see Paul M. vanBuren, *The Edges of Language: An Essay in the Logic of a Religion*, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972, pp 58-59.

25. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 11, 1-7.

26. *P.I.*, section 225.

27. *P.I.*, section 38.

28. Paul M. vanBuren, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

29. *P.I.*, section 156.

30. *P.I.*, section 151. My example is not identical to Wittgenstein's, but the point is the same.

31. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Mādhyamika System*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1974 (1955). Compare Jacques May's review, "Kant et le Mādhyamaka: ā propos d'une livre récent," *Indo-Iranian Journal*, III, No. 2, 1959, pp. 102-111. For a restatement of his position by new arguments, see his "Samvṛtti and Paramārtha in Buddhism and Vedānta", in Mervyn Sprung, ed., *The Problem of Two Truths in Buddhism and Vedānta*, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1973, pp. 9-26.

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32. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of the Buddhist Nirvana*, Leningrad: Academy of the U.S.S.R., 1927, *passim*. and a whole series of articles which formed an exciting debate between himself and Louis de la Vallée Poussin.

33. Stanislav Schayer holds Nāgārjuna to be an absolutist in two articles: "Notes and Queries on Buddhism", *Rocznik Orjentalistyczny*, Xi, 1935, pp. 206-213; and "Das Mahāyānistische Absolutum nach der Lehre der Mādhyamikas", *Orientalistische Literaturseitung*, XXXVIII, 1935. pp. 401-415.

34. Tibetan and Sanskrit texts with English translation in Giuseppe Tucci, "Two Hyms of the Catuḥ-stava of Nāgārjuna", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1932, pp. 309-325, p. 317.

35. Cūla-Māluṅkya Sutta, *Majjhima Nikāya*, P.T.S. edition, 63.

36. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 18, 6.

37. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā Mādhyamakavṛtti*, XXIV, 11. Tibetan text and French translation in Jacques May, *Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Mādhyamakavṛtti: Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain en français, et accompagnés d'uen introduction, du notes et d'une edition critique de la versionne tibétaine*, Paris Libraire d' Amérique et d' Orient, 1959,

38. *ibid.*, p. 232.

39. Louis de la Vallée Poussin supports the same conclusion by a different method. See "Réflexions sur le Mādhyamaka", *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, II, 1933, pp. 4-50, especially pp. 38-47.

40. Just as Nāgārjuna is 'positionless' so the Buddha, characterises himself as 'contentionless'. See *Saṁyutta Nikāya*, p. III: 138: Nāham bhikkhave lokena vividāmi loko ca mayā vivadati. Na bhikkhave dhammavādī kenaci lokasmiṃ vivadati.

41. D.N. Shastri, op. cit., gives a very lucid blow-by-blow account of the issues raised in the course of these debates, pp. 395-487.

42. For a thorough treatment of these issues, see Nathan Katz, "An Appraisal of the Svātantrika—Prasaṅgika Debates", *Philosophy East and West*, 26, 3, July, 1976, pp. 253-267.

43. *P.I.*, section 447.

44. A masterful discussion of these issues is found in Bibhuti S. Yadav, "Negation, Nirvāṇa and Nonsense", *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, XLV, 4, 1977, pp. 451-471.

45. *P.I.*, section 446.

46. *P.I.*, section 447.

47. *P.I.*, section 118.

48. Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavayāvartanī*, XI. This time we are following the translation of Kameleswar Bhattacharyya in "The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna: Translation of the 'Vigrahavyāvartanī, from the Original Sanskrit with Introduction and Notes", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, I, 1971, pp. 217-261. Compare Giuseppe Tucci, ed. and tr., *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, pp. 18-19.

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49. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, XVIII, 8, Tibetan text and French translation in Jan Willem de Jong, *Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1949, pp. 11-12.

50. Sea, for example, Harsh Narain, "Śūnyāvāda : A Reinterpretation", *Philosophy East and West*, 13, 4, January, 1964, pp. 311-318.

51. Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, XVIII, 13, in de Jong, op. cit. p. 26.

52. *P.I.*, section 109.

53. *P.I.*, section 593.

54. This case was suggested to me by Paul M. vanBuren during a discussion of Chomsky, Lévi-Strauss, and those who would speak about underlying structures of language.

55. *P.I.*, section 79.

56. *P.I.* section 124.

57. *P.I.*, section 194.

58. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 249.

59. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 25, 24, line 2. (My translation.)

60. André Bareau, *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule*, Paris : École française d'Extrême Orient, 1955, p. 70. The Lokattaravāda holds that *all* words of the Buddha are ultimately true. The Theravāda holds that *some* words of the Buddha are ultimately true.

61. *Mūlamadhyakakārikā*, chapter 24, *passim*.

62. It seems that Bhāvaviveka and his Svātantrikas better understood this point than did Buddhapālita and the Prasaṅgikas. See Nathan Katz, "An Appraisal of the Svātantrika—Prasaṅgika Dabates", op. cit.

63. See *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 22.

64. Poṭṭhapada Sutta, *Dīgha Nikāya*, ix, 36-37.

65. *Udāna*, P.T.S. edition, VI, 4.

66. Pāsādika Suttanta, *Dīgha Nikāya*, xxix, 31.

67. Sampasādaniya Suttanta, *Dīgha Nikāya*, xxviii, 1; repeated in Mahā-Parinibbāna Suttanta, *Dīgha Nikāya*, xvi, 1, 16.

68. For a commentatorial discussion of 'illusion' (*mig. yor.*) in Buddhist thought, see kLong. chen. rab. 'byams. pa., *Ngal. gso. skor. gsum.*, part III, *sGyu. ma. ngal. so*, tr. by Herbert V. Guenther as *Kindly Bent to Ease Us*, part III : *Wonderment*, Emeryville, Ca. : Dharma Publishing, 1976, pp. 63-69 and p. 128, fn. 1.

69. *P.I.*, page 194e.

70. *P.I.*, page 197e.

71. Padmasiri de Silva makes this type of case convincingly in *Buddhist and Freudian Psychology*, Colombo : Lake House, 1973.

72. Cūla-Māluṅkya Sutta, *Majjhima Nikāya*, 63.

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15

Buddhism and Modern Philosophies of Existence

BHIKKHU ÑĀṆAJĪVAKO

Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā ti-
sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā ti-
sabbe dhammā anattā ti-
yadā paññāya passati
atha nibbindati dukkhe,
esa maggo visuddhiyā.
(All factors of existence are transient—
all factors of existence are painful—
all phenomena are without a self [-noumenon]
He who wisely realises this
becomes disgusted with suffering.
This is the path to purity.

Dhamma-padaṁ, 277-279

TRANSIENCY, suffering and non-existence of a permanent self are three essential characteristics (*ti-lakkhanam*) of the *Buddha-dhammo*. The essential marks characteristic of all trends of existentialist philosophies—from the Catholic to the Marxist extremes—can also be summarised in three fundamental conceptions : a barely 'humanistic' approach, the situation of 'anguish' as its central problem, and the doctrine of nothingness or 'nihilation' of the world. This last feature, most specific and also most comprehensive within the scope of our comparative study, should not be understood in the sense of idealist, prevalently Kantian theories of knowledge, but primarily as an *a*-cosmic attitude to the human 'being-in-the-world' or existence, as a specific determination of the rather equivocal first principle of 'humanism'.[1]

Should we look for a complete formal analogy at first sight between the characteristic features of the original Buddhist statement and the tentative existentialist counterpart as stated above, then the principle of *aniccaṁ* (transiency) could easily be adequated to the existentialist idea of 'temporality' as the basic constituent factor of the 'human reality' (according to Sartre's free translation of Heidegger's German term *Dasein*,

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'here-being' or simply existence) as I shall try to show in a later section. The Pāli term *dukkhaṁ* has recently been translated preferably as 'anguish' or even 'unsatisfactoriness'[2] *Anattā*, the negation of an 'in-it-self', or *noumenon* in the back-stage of phenomena, is a structure dependent on 'temporality' (*aniccaṁ*); it will be explained in the part of the present essay dealing with the theory of nothingness (*suññatā-vādo*).[3]

Since all philosophies of existence broadly agree in their basic assessment of these aspects of the actual human situation, they have been able, in the 20th century, to make also a good deal of their analyses on a common ground by adapting prevalently the principles of the same method conducive to their ends, viz. the phenomenological method as laid down by Edmund Husserl in his transcendental logic. The wide area of their common endeavours, despite irreconcilable ideological differences, could, however, be constituted only due to a fact of much deeper existential importance and urgency—the fact that the philosophies of existence are first of all concerned with the precarious human condition in the world. Having in view this urgency, true philosophers, perhaps for the first time in history, have been able to abstract to a considerable extent from the formulation of their specific *views* and ultimate metaphysical ends, by giving priority to a concise formulation of the actual *problems* and to an unbiased analysis of the immediately given ('pre-reflective') phenomenon of human experience. Husserl's method of transcendental analysis, though not arising from the same considerations, had the advantage of an emphasis on refraining from propounding theories but serving "purely descriptive" purpose.[4]

From a Buddhist approach, the first important constatation should be just the coincidence in this capacity of abstracting from ideological 'views' or biases (*diṭṭhi* in the teaching of the Buddho, Greek *doxa* in Husserl's phenomenology) in approaching phenomena (*dhammā*) *yathā bhūta*, "as they have come to exist". This preliminary noetical condition, consisting in the critique of the purport of speculative world-views, has been very explicitly elicited by the Buddho in the *Brahma-jāla-suttam* (D. 1)[5], whose specific analysis from a modern standpoint cannot be undertaken in this place. The only point that has to be singled out in this connection is that any such coincidence of an archaic logical method with a modern one would be of no avail for us if there were not at the same time a coincidence also in the subject of its application, for the sake of which the principal criteria of the method have been formulated. This coincidence is given above all in the stress on the *exclusively* humanistic interest in philosophical problems. The meaning of 'existential humanism' has therefore to be explained in the first place.

The 'right views', the first step on the 'eight fold path leading to the

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cessation of suffering', are determined by the *exclusive* interest in the "teaching specific to the buddhas" (*yā buddhānam samukkaṁsikā dhammadesanā*), concentrated on the problem of suffering :

> Whether the dogma prevails that the world is eternal, or that the world is not eternal..., there still remains birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, misery, grief, and despair, for the extinction of which *in the present life* I am prescribing. (*M. 63*)
> I teach only what is suffering and the liberation from suffering. (*passim*)

The formulation of the humanist principle in *Aṅguttara-nikāyo*, IV, 5,5, has become one of the most often quoted in modern contexts :

> ...I do proclaim that in this very fathom-long body, with its feelings and mind, is the world, the world's arising, the world's ceasing, and the path leading to the world's ceasing,...

which is the Eightfold Path of the Buddho. Here the cycle of the worldliness and of world-views comes to the closure of its round.

This text could easily be supported by extensive corroboration from the the stand-point of any modern philosophy of existence. In another context[6] I have compared, rather as a matter of curiosity, the quoted *suttam* with a statement by Schopenhauer, who, from an Asian point of approach, should be considered as the most significant among the precursors of the contemporary existential thinking in Europe. The following pointers are characteristic of Heidegger's and Sartre's interpretations of the *co-extension of the world with the human-reality* (*Dasein* in Heidegger's terminology).[7] According to *Heidegger :*

> The fallenness of Dasein must not be taken...as a 'fall' from a purer and higher 'primal status'. Not only do we lack any experience of this ontically, ontologically we lack any possibilities or clues for interpreting it.—('Falling' in this world a human being) has not fallen into some entity which it comes upon in the course of its being...; it has fallen into the world, which itself *belongs to its being*. (p. 176)
>
> *Dasein is* its world existingly. We have defined Dasein's being as 'worry'. The ontological meaning of 'worry' is temporality. We have shown that temporality constitutes the disclosedness of the 'there', and we have shown how it does so...*The unity of significance...is* the ontological constitution of *the world*, [and only] in so far as Dasein Temporalizes itself, a world *is* too...If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there' either. (pp. 364 f.)

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The 'world' itself is something constitutive for Dasein. (p. 52)

Sartre :

> Thus it is the upsurge of the for-itself (i.e., personal consciousness) in the world which by *the same stroke causes the world to exist* as a totality of things, and *causes senses to exist* as the objective mode in which the qualities of things are presented. What is *fundamental is my relation to the world. ...My body is co-existence with the world.* (pp. 294 f., 382 f.)
>
> If there is a world, it is because we rise up into the world suddenly and in totality...But *our upsurge is a passion* in this sense that *we lose ourselves in nihilation in order that a world may exist.* (p. 437, 538)
>
> There is no absolute beginning which without ever having a past would become past. Since the For-itself, qua For-itself, has to be a past, it comes into the world *with* a past. These few remarks may permit us to view in somewhat different light the *problem of birth* . . . There is a metaphysical problem concerning birth in that I can be anxious to know how I happen to have been born from that *particular* embryo; and this problem is perhaps insoluble. (p. 114 f., 184 f.)

One Indian term used by Sartre very often and considered untranslatable is *'avatar'*. The idea of 'rebirth' (*punar-bhavaḥ*), tacitly alluded to between lines, could be understood and explained best in connection with the wider meaning of Sartre's 'avatar', if it had to be explicitly defined or asserted from a similar viewpoint today.

Such modern coincidences shed simultaneously a proper light on an old misunderstanding created by superficial and tendentious readers of the basic discourses of the Buddho not only in the western world but also, and much earlier, in Indian traditions alien to Buddhism, to whom *sammā-diṭṭhi*, the 'right views' in the Eightfold Path seem to restrict, if not to contradict, the rejection by the Buddho of *diṭṭhis* or *world*-views in the widest meaning of this term, not only in his critique of the antinomies of the speculative Reason in the *Brahma-jāla-suttaṁ*, but also in other statements on "the thicket of views, the wilderness of the contortion of views, the vacillation of views, the fetter of views", where "no untaught ordinary man bound by the fetter of views is freed by birth, aging and death, by sorrow and lamentation, from pains, griefs and despair; he is not freed from suffering, I say." (M. 2, 7)

What is pointed out very clearly by the Buddho as wrong in *all world*-views without exception is the *direction of the view* and its intention, the delimitation of the subject of philosophical interest and discussion, the ultimate misunderstanding on the nature of *problems* to be discussed from

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a standpoint more than merely 'analogous' to that of the contemporary philosophies of existence. Throughout a series of texts the humanistic standpoint of the Buddho denotes an essential and very explicit *a*-cosmic intention. May it suffice here to add his first utterance after the awakening :

> Through many births I wandered in the stream of existence seeking but not finding the builder of this house (the world). Sorrowful is it to be born again and again. But now, o house-builder, you have been seen. You will not build the house any more. All your rafters are broken, your ridge-pole is shattered. The mind is beyond doubt, attained is the end of craving. (*Dhamma-padaṁ, 153-4*)

On this point, in one specific respect at least, the Buddho is still in advance of most contemporary philosophers of existence. According to him, an acosmic philosophy has necessarily to be also anti-ontological, i.e., it cannot be construed as a philosophy of Being. The ultimate aim, *nibbānaṁ*, or "extinction without remainder" (*nir-upadhisesa-nibbānaṁ*) is formulated by the Buddho (with particular reference to the Self-principle, *attā*) in terms of a rational principle of extreme precision attainable to a scholastic system of formal logics—his *cātu-koṭikam* (tetra-lemma) :

> Neither being, nor non-being, nor both being-and-non-being, nor neither-being-nor-non-being—

can express the existential purport and content of our human reality. The word 'being' (lat. *esse*) or any other derivate from the verb 'to be' cannot adequately enough express the immediate insight (*vipassanā*, cf. Sartre's "pre-reflexive Cogito") of existence, or the essence of actuality (as *paramāttho* or ultimate aim).[8]

Analogous anti-ontological tendencies have been expressed by Jaspers, Berdyaev, and several French philosophers (G. Marcel was the first to point out the problem), mainly against Heidegger and Sartre.

According to Jaspers, his philosophical "elucidation of existence is not ontology."[9] This means that the problem of human existence can be reduced to that of being or not-being in it-self or as a transcendence. Berdyaev gives a short explanation of the same thought in its historical aspect as follows[10] :

> The construction of an ontology has been philosophy's highest claim [since its origins] ...At times it has appeared as though human thought was in this respect pursuing a phantom. The transition from the many to the one, and from one to the many was a fundamental theme in Greek philosophy. In a different way the same topic has been fundamental in Indian philosophy also. Indian thought has been disquieted by

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the question : how does being arise out of non-being ? It has to a large extent been focused upon the problem of nothingness, non-being and illusion.

Here again it seems to be much more than a matter of curiosity to compare such reflections on the history of philosophy with the judgment of the Buddho on both the vedantic monism (in the early upaniṣads) and the sāṁkhyaḥ dualism in two identically formulated suttas of the *Saṁyutta-nikāyo* (XXXV, 23-26) :

> Bhikkhus, I will teach you *the all* [...*the duality*, in the second version]. Listen to it. And what, bhikkhus, is the all [...the duality] ? It is eye and object, ear and sound, nose and scent, tongue and savour, body and tangible things, mind and mind-states. That is called the all [...the duality]. Whoso, bhikkhus, should say : 'Reject this all, [...duality], I will proclaim another all [...duality]'—it would be a mere talk on his part, and when questioned he could not make good his boast, and further would come to an ill pass. Why so ? Because it is beyond his scope to do so. I will show you a teaching, bhikkhus, for the abandonment of the all [. . . of the duality] . . . The eye must be abandoned, objects must be abandoned, eye-consciousness must be abandoned, eye contact must be abandoned. That enjoyment or suffering or neutral state experienced which arises owing to eye contact—that also must be abandoned,. . .Mind must be abandoned, mind-states, mind-consciousness, mind-contact must be abandoned . . . This, bhikkhus, is the teaching for the abandonment of all [. . . of the duality]. . . by fully knowing, by comprehending it . . . Without fully knowing, without comprehending, without detaching himself from, without abandoning the all [. . . the duality], one is incapable of extinguishing suffering.

On another occasion[11] Berdyaev discusses the question: "Why is ontology impossible?" His answer is:

> Because it is always a knowledge objectifying existence. In an ontology the idea of being is objectified, and an objectification is already an existence which is alienated in the objectification. So that in ontology—in every ontology—existence vanishes. There is no more existence because existence cannot be objectified. It is precisely in this respect that I feel myself rather close to Kierkegaard...It is only in subjectivity that one may know existence, not in objectivity. In my opinion the central idea has vanished in the ontology of Heidegger and Sartre...I believe that Jaspers is more nearly right than Heidegger...
>
> In the same sense Jaspers speaks of the ontologisation of existence as

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a "degradation to object". Both Jaspers and Berdyaev use in this connection the metaphor of "congealing" genuine being into a knowledge-of-being. The metaphor was coined earlier by Bergson in his vision of the "*élan vital*" in the descending "precipitation". The following reflections of Jaspers on the controversial subject of ontologism in contemporary philosophies of existence summarize at the same time his basic assessment of the existential danger, or the essential *dukkha*-factor (to express it in brief in terms of our comparative context) of the contemporary technical civilization (problem elaborated extensively in his book *Man in the Modern Age*):

> The ideal followed by ontologies is the perfectioning of the rational structure of the objectified world. Technical sciences have to help us to bring about engineered existence. Whenever I grasp Being, it becomes affected by a relativisation due to another Being which I have not grasped. However, as potential existence, *I am able to lift myself up from bondage.* My chains will thus become the material of Being... Ontology deceives us by its attempt to absolutize something wherefrom the other ought to be deduced. As an attempt to bind us to objectified Being, *ontology sublates freedom.*[12]

Berdyaev recognized in his critique of Heidegger's philosophy that "as a man Heidegger is deeply troubled by this *world of care, fear, death and daily dullness*". Yet, beyond that sincerity, "the depth of existence does not make itself felt" in his philosophy.[13] Kierkegaard, on the contrary, "did not wish to create an ontology or metaphysics, and he did not believe in the possibility of an ideational philosophy; he believed in an expression of existence...Kierkegaard's philosophy of existence is an *expressionist philosophy*—one might say: it is the expression of the existence of Kierkegaard. Here the knowing subject is existential."[14]

It should be noted, however, that neither Jaspers' nor Berdyaev's critique of ontologism can any longer be considered, without considerable misunderstandings, as adequately referring to Heidegger's phenomenological conception of Being (*Esse, Sein*). Especially in his later critical and polemic writings, Heidegger rejects emphatically the traditional understanding of ontology as "degradation" of Being to object, for reasons similar to those adduced by Jaspers and the Kierkegaardian trend of Christian existentialism, whose "subjectivism" is, however, refuted by Heidegger with good reasons in his arguments *against irrationalism*, or rather against the falsified positivist conception of rationality.

In *Being and Time* (p. 106) Heidegger speaks of "a 'subjectivity' which perhaps uncovers the 'reality' of the world at its most real; it has nothing to do with 'subjective' arbitrariness or subjectivistic 'ways of taking' an entity

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which 'in itself' is otherwise." In his later, shorter and polemical, writings he uses the word 'subjectity' (*Subjektität*) for the first meaning, adequate to his own understanding, against 'subjectivity' in the second meaning typical for idealist and pseudo-dealist, positivist 'objectifying' philosophies. Thus in his letter to Ernst Jünger (*Zur Seinsfrage*[15]) Heidegger emphasises "the subjectity (not subjectivity) of the human being" and rejects the idea of a "subjectivistic subjectity of the human being" (p. 224). His critique of the "subjectifying (*Subjektivierung*) of entities into mere objects" (p. 180) presupposes, on the other hand, that both "subjectivity and objectivity are based on a specific disclosure of 'being' and of 'human being' " (p. 236). The whole argument is based on the idea of a "totality (*Inbegriff*) . . . encompassing the subject-object-relation" (p. 239). The conception of 'the encompassing' (*das Umgreifende*) is still more characteristic for Jaspers' approach to the same problem.

The rejection of the reproach of irrationalism (directly dealt with in *Nachwort zu*: "*Was ist Metaphysik?*" op. cit., p. 101 ff.) follows the line of the same ontological argument applied to the misconception of the idea of *Logos* and logics: "A reflection following this course is not directed against logic but aims at a sufficient determination of the *Logos*" (p. 306). In the *Letter on 'Humanism'* (to Sartre; pp. 146-7) Heidegger formulates the problem of essential thinking as follows: "Can the endeavour to bring thinking back to its (proper) element be called 'irrationalism'?" The proper primeval "element of thinking is Being" (*Esse*, not *ens*; *Sein*, not *Seiendes*). "In simple terms, thinking is the thinking of the Being." "In the technical interpretation of thinking, Being as its /proper/ element has been sacrificed." Such technical transformation has been "sanctioned by 'logics' since the times of the Sophist and of Plato." The Greeks, in their high times, have thought without such titles as 'logics', 'ethics', 'physics'. Their thinking was not even called 'philosophy'. "These names appear only when the primordial thinking has come to its end...Since these times 'philosophy' has been in a permanent need of justifying its existence in confrontation with the 'sciences'". To that end the safest means seemed to be for philosophy "to raise itself to the rank of a science. But just this effort was the sacrifice of the essence of thinking. Thinking is thus judged by an inadequate standard...The strictness of thinking, unlike the strictness of the sciences, does not consist only in the artificial, i.e., technical-theoretical exactitude of concepts..."

In this light Heidegger's critique of the traditional understanding of 'ontology', since Aristotle, can be summed up in his argument that the rejected type of ontology (though until now the only one historically extant) mistakes 'entities' (*Ens, Seiendes*) for 'Being' (*Esse, Sein*), and thus already at the primeval source of knowledge (Sartre would call it "the

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pre-reflexive Cogito") abandons truth as "transparence of Being" (Greek *aletheia* in Heidegger's interpretation) for mere 'idea' (already in its Platonic meaning.[16]

Emmanuel Mounier has defined Existentialism as "a reaction of the philosophy of man against the excess of the philosophy of ideas and the philosophy of things."[17] This definition sums up Mounier's criticism of Kantian philosophy. It was the aim of Kant's philosophy, too, to determine the transcendental limits of the possible human knowledge. Yet it seems to Mounier that philosophers of the Kantian trend, "in league with scientists, are bent on ridding the world of man's presence," in order to make it "a world composed purely of matter, i.e., of pure hypotheses...Thus the concept of existence was seen to be being drained, little by little, of its substance, and, if one may say so, to be being steadily filled with *nothingness*...Worldly concern has destroyed man, and man in his turn is frittering away the world."

Berdyaev, on the contrary, was very much interested to defend and not to abandon the importance of Kant's outset at those problems. From the beginning to the end of his book *The Beginning and the End* he endeavours to elicit an existentialist interpretation of Kant's philosophy as a whole. Its historical import is expressed in the first chapter in statements as the following few:[18]

> When Kant appeared the tragic side of the act of knowing came to light...It is not true to say that Kant makes an end of all metaphysics; he merely makes an end of metaphysics of the naturalistic rationalist type, metaphysics which are derived from the object, from the world, and he reveals the possibility of metaphysics based on the subject, of a metaphysics of freedom . . . The scientifically knowable world also is itself an illusory world as the philosophy of the Upanishads recognizes . . . Kant recognizes that there is a metaphysical need implanted in our nature; it is deeply inherent in reason.

Agreeing with Berdyaev I would venture to extend the essential meaning of his statement also to the *Buddho's attitude to metaphysical questions* of existential, viz. a-cosmical, import, especially against all those who seem to believe that even a religion is *possible* on purely 'pragmatic' and 'practical' grounds, ignoring the metaphysical depth of all the statements quoted here until now from his discourses in Pāli suttas.

The whole problem of Kantian criticism as rediscussed in this new light can be very adequately compared, on the other hand, with the results of the analysis of the *same* basic antinomies of Pure Reason as elicited in an archaic context by the Buddho in the *Brahma-jāla-suttaṁ*. Without returning to this argument at present,[19] I wish to quote only its conclusion in

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view of two particular references to the subject under discussion:

> Whosoever *samaṇā* and *brāhmanā*... put forward various propositions with regard to the past and to the future, they all of them, are entrapped in the net of these 62 modes of speculation; this way or that they may flounder, but they are included in it, caught in it.

1. Kantian philosophy, too, one might say today, though seeing its own being caught in the "net of Brahma", or in categorial structures of the scientifically objectified world, is still determined to remain in it. For this reason it has been criticized already by Schopenhauer, while Bergson, in the same sense, used the simile of a fisherman's net for the leaky logical structure of our intellect.

2. Buddho's exclusive reference "to the past and to the future not to the "being in itself" in the back-stage of phenomena (*dhammā*) which he denies, points at another motive characteristic for the exclusively humanistic interest of modern existential thinking. It is the tremendous emphasis, on both sides, on the importance of the present moment, on "getting rid of (morally) unskilled states of mind (*akusala-dhammā*), *here and now*, the uprising of skilled states":

> Let not a man trace back a past or wonder what the future holds... Instead, with insight let him see each thing presently arisen. (M.10)

No existentialist philosopher of today could lay more emphasis on the terrifying feeling of man's "thrownness" in his actual world-situation, on his "being abandoned by gods" (Heidegger), on his restless and presentless "being catapulted from the past into the future" (Ortega y Gasset), than did the Buddho in the often repeated "simile of the burning turban", or in the condensed expression of his famous "fire sermon" in a verse of *Dhamma-padaṁ*, 146:

> —Bhikkhus, when one's turban or head is ablaze, what is to be done ? ...
> —Why laughter ? What pleasure can there be where all is ever burning ?[20]

II. SUFFERING (DUKKHAṂ)

In his first discourse (*Dhamma-cakka-ppavattana-suttaṁ*) the Buddho defined *suffering* (*dukkhaṁ*), the fundamental subject of his entire teaching, in these simple terms:

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This, bhikkhus, is the noble truth of suffering: Birth is suffering, old age is suffering, death is suffering, separation from the loved is suffering, not to get what one wants is suffering, in short the five constituents of grasping are suffering.

The five constituents of grasping and of existence in general are defined by the Buddho in another connection as follows:

Hence the annihilation, cessation and overcoming of *corporeality, feeling, perception, mental formations and consciousness*, this is the cessation of suffering, the end of disease, the overcoming of old age and death.

(*S. XXII, 30*)

Schopenhauer, in connection with his own constatation of the same facts, quotes an analogous statement by St. Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*, XIV, 6):

For what are desire and joy but the will to consent to what we want? And what are fear and sadness but the will not to consent to what we do not want?

Schopenhauer's conclusion[21]:

However varied the forms in which man's happiness and unhappiness appear and impel him to pursuit or escape, the material basis of all this is nevertheless physical pleasure or pain. This basis is very restricted, namely health, nourishment, protection from wet and cold, and sexual satisfaction, or else the want of these things. Consequently, in real physical pleasure man has no more than the animal.

For *Kierkegaard* the "sickness unto death" (compare Sartre's *Nausea*) arises from his realization that "the objective situation is repellent, and the expression for the objective repulsion constitutes the tension and the measure of the corresponding inwardness". In such existential situation "truth will confront the individual as a paradox. Gripped in anguish and pain of sin, facing the tremendous risk of the objective insecurity, the individual believes".[22] This is the existential foundation of the want for religion.

The comparison with the Buddho on this point is probably the most striking:

...He then hears a Perfect One expounding the teaching for the removal of all grounds for 'views', of all prejudices, obsessions, dogmas and biases; for the stilling of all processes, for the relinquishing of all substrata

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> of existence, for the extirpation of craving, for dispassion, cessation, extinction (*nibbānaṁ*). He then thinks: "I shall be annihilated, I shall be destroyed! No longer shall I exist!" Hence he grieves, is depressed and laments; beating his breast he weeps and dejection befalls him. Thus, bhikkhus, is there *anxiety about realities* in the internal. (M.22)

In this connection it seems to me very important from the Buddhist standpoint not to slight or to disregard as a mere historical incident the fact that the first introduction and subject of 'meditation' taught by the Buddho was "on the loathsome (*asubha-kammaṭṭhānaṁ*).[23] The first effect of this instruction was so strong that it caused a wave of suicides in the early community. Only after such negative consequences the Buddho was induced by his disciples to elaborate a wider range of subjects and methods of practising concentration (*samādhi*) as ultimately formulated *in his sati-paṭṭhāna-suttas* (cf. D. 22, M.10). Yet, he never renounced the basic importance of the loathsome subjects. Out of 40 subjects (*kammaṭṭhānaṁ*) classified in the *Visuddhi-maggo* by Buddhaghoso in seven sections, 11 subjects, in two sections, pertain exclusively to this group, while in the section of "ten recollection", the "mindfulness of death" and the "mindfulness occupied with the body" can equally be considered as loathsome. The subject of the "mindfulness of death" has been raised to the central problem of existential philosophy by Heidegger. Sartre, in criticizing Heidegger's metaphysical conception on this point does not at all attempt to tone down the emphasis on its importance.

The follower of the Buddhist method of purification (*visuddhi-maggo*) has to undergo a transformation of his animal or biological *genus* (*gotraṁ*) as a consequence of his choice of liberation from *āsavā*, or ignorance-born passions of our animal nature. This process of vital transformation is called by the Buddho *gortra-bhū*. In Buddhaghoso's *Visuddhi-maggo* (XXI, 95 ff), "the ordinary man" is characterized as he who "takes the five constituents of existence as 'I and mine'." "After entering upon the right way and seeing the three characteristics" (of impermanence, suffering and non-being of a permanent self-principle or 'soul'), the "apparent" or "illusory" nature of these constituents is necessarily intuited "as terror... like the time when a man is frightened on waking up and seeing the fire. Knowledge of desire for deliverance is like that man's looking for a way out". Ultimately "change-of-lineage is like the man's getting out...Fruition-knowledge is like his staying in a safe place". In *Paṭisambhidā-maggo* (I, 66) the question is discussed: How is it that *understanding of emergency* and turning away from the external is change-of-lineage knowledge?" The

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series of arguments in the answer to this question culminates in the last one[24] :

> It enters into non-despair, thus it is change-of-lineage. It enters into cessation, *nibbānaṁ*, thus it is change-of-lineage.

In a poetical section of the Visuddhi-maggo (XXIII, 15) on the "asceticism's fruit", Buddhaghoso derives "its calm from lack of worldliness".

This dimension of freedom, conceived just as a biological fact of *gotrabhū* (Nietzsche was right in emphasizing the difference of Buddhism from Christianity just on such biological and "hygienic" functions, cf. *Ecce Homo* and *The Antichrist*, sect. 20) is confirmed also by Sartre (though in a footnote) in a statement which, besides that, seems to be his epitome of the central conception of Schopenhauer's philosophy[25] :

> These considerations do not exclude the possibility of an ethics of deliverance and salvation. But this can be achieved only after a radical conversion which we can not discuss here.

Yet, the importance of this subject, even for the interior necessity of Sartre's dialectical logic, could neither remain concealed nor be denied. It results most clearly from the concluding definition of the human being at the end of *Being and Nothingness*[26]: Man, who "is not what he is, but is what he is not," because he is only a "pro-ject" propelled from the past into the future, or an "ek-static being" and therefore a being continually "missing" not only his own essence, but even his own present—"man is a useless passion".

The central chapters in Heidegger's main work, *Being and Time*, are the chapters on *Conscience*. Even Sartre points out that Heidegger's main concern was to produce a treatise on ethics. In the concluding sentence of *Being and Nothingness* Sartre commits himself to "devote a future work" to ethics, though such a work by him has not appeared later.

In the second chapter of the second half of *Being and Time*, Heidegger discusses the problem of "conscience as the call of care" (Section 57). The first half of the book was concluded with an ontological analysis of the central conception of the whole treatise, the *existentiale*, or 'Dasein's character'[27] of Care.' The basic 'ontical' meaning of this term is interpreted (in sec. 42) as 'worry' or 'grief'. As it can be seen from the continuation, there is no doubt that this primary meaning of Heidegger's central conception is essentially the same as the meaning of *dukkhaṁ* in Buddhist interpretation. In the same central paragraph (42) of his treatise Heidegger reveals the historical, almost accidental, provenience and inspiration of

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this fundamental conception. The aim of the first part of the book was to "exhibit Care as the Being of Dasein," of "that entity which in each case we ourselves are, and which we call 'man'." "There is an ancient fable," continues Heidegger, "in which Dasein's interpretation of itself as 'care' has been embodied." Heidegger considers it as a "pre-ontological illustration" of his own "existential-ontological interpretation of Dasein as care." This Latin fable of *Cura* "has come to us as No. 220 of the Fables of Hyginus" and was rediscovered by Herder, from whom "Goethe took it over and worked up for the second part of his Faust":[28]

> Once when Care was crossing a river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was meditating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. Care asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While Care and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of her body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: "Since you, Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth, have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since Care first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called *homo*, for it is made out of *humus* (earth).

In Heidegger's interpretation :

> This pre-ontological document becomes especially significant not only because 'care' is here seen as that to which human Dasein belongs 'for its lifetime', but also because this priority of 'care' emerges in connection with the familiar way of taking man as compounded of body [earth] and spirit...In care this entity has the 'source' of its being...The entity is not released from this source but is held fast, dominated by it through and through as long as this entity 'is in the world'. 'Being-in-the-world' has the stamp of 'care' which accords with its being. It gets the name '*homo*' not in consideration of its being but in relation to that of which it consists [*humus*]. The decision as to wherein the 'primordial' being of this creature is to be seen, is left to Saturn, 'Time' ...The very 'emptiness' and 'generality' which obtrude themselves ontically in existential structures, have an ontological definiteness and fulness of their *own*. Thus Dasein's whole constitution itself is not simple in its unity, but shows a structural articulation; in the existential conception of care this articulation becomes expressed.

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Thus in this 'pre-ontological' *nucleus* of Heidegger's philosophical inspiration ultimately also the problem of nothingness (at the end of the sec. 42), the last and most important aspect of our analogy, appears in connection with the 'structural articulation' of the human self-being in and as 'temporality'.

When reading the ancient and forgotten *Cura* fable and Heidegger's footnote information on his painstaking research of its historical provenience, one almost might exclaim (as in several other instances of Heidegger's philological research-work in forgotten archives) with astonishment: *Cur tanta cura*?—Why so much trouble? Has not, e.g., Schopenhauer, nearly one hundred years earlier, in elaborating his philosophy of care, anxiety and unalienable suffering as the core of man's being in the world, indicated with no less painstaking but much more voluminous bibliographical documentation a considerable share of Buddhist source-material in his life-long study of the same basic problem (notably in the interval between the first and the second volume of his main work, *The World as Will and Representation*)?[29] In the meantime these sources have become not only easier of access in reliable translation and scholarly interpretation, but also very popular, particularly in Germany. As a matter of fact, Heidegger, in his advanced age, when made aware of such analogies (also by some Japanese research fellows among his own students), read D.T. Suzuki's *Essays on Zen Buddhism*, and said that this was exactly what he has endeavoured to say all his life long.[30] Heidegger's predilection for Taoism was well known much earlier. Yet, had he followed this cultural influence deeper and earlier in his career, would it still have been possible for him to qualify it merely as "pre-ontological Dasein's interpretation of itself"?

In the philosophy of *Karl Jaspers* a stronger emphasis is laid on man's capacity of reasoning than on his primordial existential 'moods'. A continuous effort is dedicated to the sublimation of such moods as care, anguish and suffering by "the philosophical faith" (*der pailosophische Glaube*), or rational justification or reasonable belief in the possibility of transcending. I shall quote only one symptomatic passage from his *Existenz-philosophie* :[31]

In as far as human reality, on its lowest existential level, has to be considered merely as a "determined being", it finds its expression in "an interested life, having its aim in itself, limited, subordinating everything to the condition of its own well-being, and only to that extent endowed with feelings of sympathy and antipathy in establishing communications with others, exclusively for the sake of a determined interest." In such a determined being", there is "exhilaration in life's self-accomplishment, and suffering for what gets lost thereby. From a confrontation of both, however, there results the shortcoming of merely determined being, there results the

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boredom of repetition, and the dread of facing the extreme situation of shipwreck. Every determined being bears in itself destruction. No idea, no thought can ever enable us to clearly envisage the happiness of existence as an unobstructed possibility. There is no lasting and permanent happiness, no happiness that once fully comprehended would remain self-sufficient." On a higher spiritual level "there is deep contentment in the totality, but also the torment of irreducible uncompleteness. From a confrontation of both there arises the disharmony and perplexity in view of the disintegration of each totality... In existence there is *faith and despair*. From a confrontation of both there arises the desire of eternal peace where despair has become impossible and faith transformed into contemplation." This is the ideal of "the perfect reality".

To a Buddhist reader, already the style of these statements may suggest the reminiscence of a *suttaṁ* on the same subject :

> ...What is the cause, what is the reason of the defilement of beings ?
> Indeed, Mahāli, if body were entirely painful, affected by pain, disposed to pain, and not to pleasure, beings would not get attached to body. But, Mahāli, it is because body is also pleasant, affected by pleasure, disposed to pleasure and not to pain, that beings get attached to body. Due to attachment they are bound and due to that bondage they are defiled ...[The same is repeated for feeling, perception, formations and consciousness.]
> But what, lord, is the cause, what is the reason for the purification of beings ?
> Indeed, Mahāli, if body were entirely pleasant, affected by pleasure, disposed to pleasure, and not to pain, beings would not get disgusted with body. But, Mahāli, it is because body is also painful, affected by pain, disposed to pain and not to pleasure, that beings get disgusted with body. Being disgusted they become detached and due to detachment they are purified... [The same is repeated for feeling, perception, formations and consciousness.]
>
> (*Mahāli Suttaṁ, S. XXII, 60*)

In the last of his voluminous works, *The Great Philosophers*,[32] Jaspers dedicated, also in this connection, particular attention to the problem of "the philosophical faith" in the chapters on St. Augustine and Kant. Yet, before entering in the analysis of Christian and modern European traditions, in the first part, on "paradigmatic individuals," Jaspers tries to approach the teachings of the Buddho and of Confucius on the same level with Socrates and Jesus, with the intention to find out "what they have in

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common and how on this common ground they characteristically differ."

It is characteristic for Jaspers, in comparison with Heidegger, that he ranks Confucius higher than Lao-tzu. According to Jaspers, "the essential difference between Lao-tzu and Confucius is that Lao-tzu follows a direct way to the *tao*... while Confucius takes a detour by way of the human order" to reach the same end (p. 70). As for the Buddho, his doctrine "is represented in the texts as a body of knowledge, expressed in propositions and rational sequence to normal consciousness" (p. 38). In the "Concluding Considerations regarding Paradigmatic Individuals" (Socrates, Buddha, Confucius and Jesus) the following common features are singled out among other :

> They do not conform to the prophet type characterised by vision and ecstasis...They speak in parables, dialectical contradictions, conversational replies; [*they do not fixate* ...In them a chasm has opened. The world is not in order ...In each case we find a characteristic relation to these basic elements of human existence, death, and suffering...None of them is interested in metaphysical speculation on the science of nature. There are large realms that they have no desire to know. (pp. 100, 101, 104)

At the end of the same volume Jaspers found his most congenial approach to Buddhist and Asian thought in a lengthy chapter on Nāgārjuna, the founder of Buddhist metaphysics.[33]

At this last stage of his life and work Jaspers underwent also a characteristic reorientation from a notoriously Europo-centrist position towards Asian tradition. In his endeavours to establish a religiously informed philosophy of culture adequated to the critical position of "man in the modern age",[34] and especially at the time when he wished to give a conclusive expression to his idea of the "philosophical faith", in his lectures at the end of the second world war,[35] Jaspers was visibly oppressed by the heavy burden of Biblical tradition to which he felt himself still committed, realising not less clearly than Kierkegaard, how tragically "absurd" and untractable it was for any reasonable modern approach. The turning point toward a more adequate appreciation of Asian perspectives in spiritual culture must have followed shortly after the *Philosophical Faith*, and is felt, at least by a Buddhist reader, in the chapter on Nāgārjuna's metaphysics of nothingness as a positive relief.

III NOTHINGNESS (*Suaññtā*)

The problem of nothingness, or nullity (Pāli *suññtā*, Sansk. *śūnyatā*;

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cf. Sartre's term 'nihilation')[36] is the deepest metaphysical point reached by both the ancient Buddhist and the modern existential philosophies. Nonetheless it had become the main stumbling-block already for traditional commentarial interpretations of the teaching of Buddho (in the Pāli Canon), while in the case of modern philosophies of existence it can be considered as the boundary-stone wherefrom paths and trends diverge, aiming at different metaphysical solutions. Speaking of rare predecessors in European philosophy, it is just their exceptional character which makes the unmistakable impression that even so distant thinkers as Meister Eckhart (13-14 century) and Sartre discuss the same problem of ineluctable 'nihilation' of human existence.

A comparative eliciting of this subject should proceed by distinguishing and comparing three different aspects and historical strata of its formulation :

A—the standpoint of European philosophies of existence;

B—the aspects of the *suñña-vādo* and *ākhiñcaññāyatanaṁ* (theory of nullity and sphere of no-thing-ness) in the Pāli *suttas*;

C—the development of the *śūnya-vādaḥ* in the mahāyānaṁ philosophy.

An adequate differential presentation of these facets cannot be undertaken within the limits of the present survey. The aspects B and C will therefore be dealt with explicitly in a subsequent essay. The following approach from the standpoint A will contain only implicit references to the extensive Buddhist literature on topics relevant for further comparative studies.

For the preliminary orientation of the reader it may suffice to add the following short and often quoted text from *Saṁyutta-nikāyo*, XXXV, 85, which can be reliably considered also as the canonical basis of the later teaching in the philosophical literature of the *mahāyānaṁ* on the "double nihilation", since Nāgārjuna's time :

...The Venerable Ānando said thus to the Exalted One :
'The world is nothing' is the saying, lord. Pray, lord, how far does this saying go ?

Because the world is nothing in itself and for itself [*suññam attena vā attaniyena vā*], Ānando, therefore it is said that the world is nothing. And what, Ānando, is nothing in itself and for itself ? [The organs of] sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching, and the mind; their objects and the [corresponding types of intentional] consciousness, are nothing in themselves and for themselves. That is why, Ānando, it is said that the world is nothing...

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As for the doctrine of "double nihilation" in the later *mahāyānaṁ* philosophy, here are a few characteristic explanations from a treatise of Nāgārjuna's school: [37]

> The two aspects of nihilation [*śūnyatā*] are : (1) nihilation of being [*sattva-śūnyatā*], (2) nihilation of phenomenon [*dharma-śūnyatā*]. To say that there is no *ātmā* [self] is a statement of *sattva-śūnyatā*; to say that there is no phenomenon is *dharma-śūnyatā*.
>
> In what concerns oneself [*adhyātma*], the Buddha always applies his knowledge that there is no 'self ' [*anātma-jñānaṁ*], and in what concerns the outward world [*bahirdhā*], he always contemplates the nullity of phenomena [*dharma-śūnyatā*]. He sees the true character of the phenomena [*bhūta-lakṣaṇa- dharmaṁ*]—he realises that there is no self *ātmā* a nd no being [*sattvaṁ*].

1. MEISTER ECKHART

For the initial formulation of the problem of nothingness or nullity in European philosophy we may refer to Meister Eckhart: [38]

> The disciple inquired : "What is the soul made of ?"—"She is made out of nothing."—"Where did God get the nothing he made the soul out of ?"—"Some say he got it in himself. That is not the case for in God is not nothing...There is getting nothing from inside or out...So runs the argument that the nothing is gotten from nowhere...And this soul has by rights absolute *freedom from herself and things...She sinks eternally, but never touches bottom*...God with his uncreatedness supports her nothing-at-all...The soul has dared to come to naught and, failing by herself, to reach herself, she swoons away ere God comes to her rescue... What does emptiness mean ? It means a turning from creatures... Creatures enclose a mere nothing of God wherefrom they cannot disclose him... Holy Scripture cries aloud *freedom from self*."

(a) In the analysis of Pāli texts an essential difference will be singled out between the *idea* of nothingness as "nullity" (*suññatā*) and the transcendental *experience* of the "sphere of nothingness" (*ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ*) realised as a noematic region by the contemplative mind (*arūpa-jhānaṁ*). Meister Eckhart's statements, quoted above, include characteristic pointers for his use of both terms, as 'nothingness' and 'voidness'.

(b) A modern Japanese philosopher of particular interest for our survey, Nishida Kitarô who "thought it was his mission to make Zen Buddhism intelligible to the West,"[39] condensed the basic idea of his best known work, *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*, in a *tanka*

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poem based on the same simile of bottomless sinking as underlined above in Meister Eckhart's version :

> There is something bottomless
> Within me, I feel,
> However disturbing are the waves
> of joy and sorrow,
> They fail to reach it.

Not less striking at first glance appears the similarity of Meister Eckhart's statement "God never spoke but one word, and that is still unspoken,"[40] to some of the best known Zen *koans* on the paradox character of silence.

2. SÖREN KIERKEGAARD

Existentialist philosophers of the 20th century agree almost without exception in acknowledging Kierkegaard as the 'father' of modern existentialism. From my standpoint, whose initial orientation is not Europocentric, the position of the most prominent precursor should rather pertain to Arthur Schopenhauer as the first modern philosopher who recognised his indebtedness to Indian and particularly to Buddhist precedents in dealing with basic existential problems specified as the *tertium comparationis* in the present essay. As for Kierkegaard, in his insistence on the "absurdity" of basic existential problems there appears at the first sight an obviously prevalent influence of Christian theology on the formations of his thought. In some of his historical considerations he even admits the possibility of rational solutions of such *paradoxical* problems without their exaggeration *ad absurdum*. The best known is his analysis of the case of Socrates.

In his *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*,[41] Kierkegaard distinguishes the alternative approach of Socrates from his own Christian attitude to the apparent absurdity of existence and thus comes closest to what I would term the rational solution of a logical paradox as propounded by Nāgārjuna in the early Buddhist philosophy :

(a) The "Socratic principle" according to Kierkegaard :

> In the principle that subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, there is comprehended the Socratic wisdom, whose everlasting merit it wa to have become aware of the essential significance of existence, of the fact that the knower is an existing individual. For this reason Socrates was in truth by virtue of his ignorance, in the highest sense in which this was possible within paganism.

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(b) Interpretation in analogy to Nāgārjuna :

> The *paradox* emerges when the eternal truth and existence are placed in juxtaposition with one another; each time the fact of existence is realised, the paradox becomes more clearly evident.

(c) The "absurd" of the Christian position :
What now is the *absurd*? The absurd is—that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth...

A Buddhist's Postscript ; *Quo usque tandem credere quia absurdum* ?!

At the beginning of the II Chapter above, on Buddha's Noble Truth of Suffering, the analogy of Schopenhauer was quoted with referenee to the "restricted basis" on which "man's happiness and unhappiness appear". On this subject Kierkegaard seems to come closer to the Buddhist analogy in its later philosophical development than Schopenhauer to whom the basic Pāli formulation was well known.[42] Kierkegaard tries to reduce the "restrictedness" of this "basis" further, to the purely negative value of nothingness :

> Life is a masquerade...Your occupation consists in preserving your hiding place... In fact *you are nothing*; *you are merely a relation to others*, and what you are, you are by virtue of this relation...When the enchantment of illusion is broken, when existence begins to totter, then too does despair manifest itself as that which was at the bottom. Despair is a negativity, unconsciousness of it is a new negativity.

This is Kierkegaard's "sickness unto death".

The Buddho often compared the seeking of a permanent self (or 'soul') behind and beyond ("apart from") the "five constituents of grasping" to the attempt of a foolish man to find a core of hard wood by removing one after another the leaves of a banana plant. Thus in *Saṁyuttaṁ XXII, 53*, he teaches :

> Bhikkhus, should one say : "Apart from body, from feeling, from perception, from the activities, I shall explain how consciousness comes and goes, or how it disappears and emerges, or how it increases, unfolds and attains its full expansion"—he would not be able to do so.

3. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

In Schopenhauer's philosophy of nothingness, the motive of the 'groundlessness' of both man's 'self' and the 'things', constitutive for his 'being-*in*-the-world' and consequently, for the fundamental problem of the

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metaphysics of conscience—the problem of freedom as liberation *from* the world, re-emerges in its full strength :[43]

> The groundlessness of the will has actually been recognised where it manifests itself most distinctly, that is, as the will of man; and this has been called free and independent... As soon as we enter into ourselves ...and wish for once to know ourselves fully by directing our knowledge inwards, we lose ourselves in a bottomless void... Therefore, if anyone ventures to raise *the question why there is not nothing at all rather than this world*, then the world cannot be justified from itself; no ground, no final cause of its existence can be found in itself; it cannot be demonstrated that it exists for its own sake, in other words, for its own advantage. In pursuance of my teaching, this can, of course, be explained from the fact that the principle of the world's existence is expressly a groundless one, namely a blind will-to-live, which, as thing-in-itself cannot be the principle of sufficient reason or ground...

This sounds almost as an explicit modern interpretation of the basic teaching of all *mahāyānaṁ* philosophies on the "double nullity" (*śūnyatā*) of the self and of the world, a teaching to whose Buddhist origins Schopenhauer refers also explicitly.[44]

The question underlined in the quoted text, "Why is there not nothing at all rather than this world ?", alludes to the historical link of Schopenhauer's philosophy of nothingness with its European antecedents. This question is raised characteristically, in the last part of the second volume of the *The World as Will and Representation*, written at a later stage of the philosopher's life. The same question was formulated, or rather reformulated, by Schopenhauer's elder contemporary, Schelling (whom Schopenhauer disliked almost as much as he disliked Hegel), in his *Philosophy of Revelation*. In the 20th century, most existentialist philosophers have returned to the same question and re-examined it, often without quoting its source. Yet, going to the bottom of this romanticist precedent would bring us straight to Schopenhauer's antipode in metaphysics, Leibniz. Heidegger, in his letter to Ernst Jünger on the problem of nihilism,[45] mentions that his own famous lecture, *What is Metaphysics* ?, ended with the question : "Why is there not nothing at all rather than being ?... a question put in this wording by Leibniz and taken over by Schelling."

4. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE

After Schopenhauer and immediately under his influence the increasing interest in Buddhism specifically finds its strongest affirmation in the philosophy of Nietzsche. His influence on later philosophers of existence is

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best confirmed by voluminous studies dedicated to him by Jaspers and Heidegger.

Nietzsche dedicated the first part of his last and most important work, *The Will to Power*, to the problem of *European nihilism*.[46] What does he mean by 'nihilism' in this context ? How far does his problem coincide with the problem of nothingness compared in our context with the Buddhist *śūnyatā-vadaḥ* ?

With reference to the first question, similarities with the Russian nihilism in the 19th century (Herzen, Pisarev, Bakunin) are obvious, though Nietzsche never referred explicitly to these thinkers.[47]

Explicitly Nietzsche recognises only Schopenhauer as his "precursor". An enthusiastic acknowledgement of Schopenhauer's influence on the formation of Nietzsche's thought is contained in his early essay on *Schopenhauer as Educator*.[48] The problem of nihilism in Nietzsche's philosophy of culture arises from his attempt of critical transvaluation and "overcoming" of Schopenhauer's pessimism :

"With Schopenhauer the philosopher's mission dawns; it is felt that the object is to determine *values*" (W.P.- Sec. 422). Thus "pessimism is a preparatory state to nihilism" (Sec. 9). "Nihilism is the absolute repudiation of worth, purpose, desirability" of values on which a specific culture is based ("Plan" for book I. on nihilism). In the subtitle of the first book on nihilism Sec. (1) "nihilism" is defined "as an outcome of the valuations and interpretations of existence which prevailed heretofore." "The consequence of nihilism (disbelief in all values) is a result of moral valuation" (Sec. 8).

The limit of Nietzsche's agreement with Schopenhauer's and Buddhist pessimism is emphasised in statements as the following :

> Under certain circumstances, the appearance of the extremist form of pessimism and actual nihilism might be the sign of a process of incisive and most essential growth, and of mankind's new conditions of existence. (Sec. 112).
>
> Dissatisfaction, nihilism, might be a good sign...Suffering and the symptoms of decline belong to ages of enormous progress. (Sec. 111-112).
>
> Schopenhauer declared high intellectuality to be the emancipation from the will : he did not wish to recognise the freedom from moral prejudices which is coincident with the emancipation of a great mind; he refuses to see what is the typical immorality of genius; he artfully contrived to set up the only moral value he honoured—self-effacement, as the one condition of highest intellectual activity : "objective" contemplation. (Sec. 382).

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The analysis of Nietzsche's numerous references to Buddhism would leave little doubt about his explicit knowledge of the Buddhist origin of the expression "beyond good and evil". In his *Beyond Good and Evil* (3rd Ch., "The Religious Mood", section 56) he claims to have looked "with an Asiatic and super-Asiatic eye, inside and into the most world-renouncing of all possible modes of thought—beyond good and evil, and no longer like Buddha and Schopenhauer, under the delusion of morality."

Here are a few statements from *The Will to Power* referring directly to India and Buddhism :

> European pessimism is still in its infancy...it has not yet attained that prodigious and yearning fixity of sight to which it attained in India once upon a time, and in which nonentity is reflected...(Sec. 31)
>
> The level of these nihilists is by no means a low one. Only think of the conditions in which Buddha appeared ! (Sec. 55)[49]
>
> Our age, in a certain sense is mature (that is to say decadent) just as Buddha's was. (Sec. 239)
>
> A European Buddhism might perhaps be indispensable (Sec. 132)
>
> Even purely *moral* valuation [as, for instance, the Buddhistic] terms in nihilism : Europe must expect the same thing ! (Sec. 19)
>
> ...This is the European form of Buddhism, that *active negation*, after all existence has lost its meaning. (Sec. 55)

Nietzsche comes closest to the basic ontological meaning of the Buddhist *śūnya-vādaḥ* in such statements as : "Mankind does not advance, it does not even exist" (Sec. 90).

It is not possible here to go any farther into his direct and positive interpretations of Buddhism, based in the first place on his often repeated quotation of *Dhamma-padaṁ*, 5 :

> Enmities are never appeased by enmity, but they are appeased by non-enmity. This is the eternal law.

According to Nietzsche "this is not a moral advice, this is an advice of physiology", or of "hygiene".[50]

5. HEIDEGGER AND SARTRE

About the middle of the twentieth century the problem of nothingness in the 'phenomenological ontology'[51] has been determined by the dialectical opposition of two ontological standpoints. The antithetical situation was

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created by Sartre's criticism of *Heidegger's thesis* :[52]

The Being of entities is founded in the nihilation of Nothing; or

Dasein is the null basis of its own nullity;

against which Sartre opposes his colourful affirmation of an anti-Husserlian realism :[53]

Nothingness lies coiled in the heart of Being—like a worm.

The anti-ontological trend, as we have seen in Ch. I, has singled out other possibilities of discussing the problem in different dimensions even before the dialectical antinomy was formulated in ontological terms.

While for Sartre "nothingness can nihilate only on the foundation of being", so that no idea of nothingness is conceivable which would not be "supported by being",[54] at the outset of Heidegger's ontology there appears to be a conception which comes closest to the 'double nihilation' postulated by Nāgārjuna's interpretation of *śūnya-vādaḥ* as both a nihilation *of* the world and of the human 'being-*in*-the-world'. In terms taken over and adapted by Sartre from Kant and Hegel we can speak both of the nullity (*śūnyatā*) of the world's being 'in itself' and of the nullity of man's being 'for himself'. Sartre also recognized in explicit terms that for Heidegger there was no 'negative absolute', an insinuation against which especially Buddhist philosophers were always particularly sensitive in order to exclude attempts of reducing their thesis by indirect arguments to the absolutist metaphysics of their Vedāntic opponents :[55]

> Heidegger, while establishing the possibilities of a concrete apprehension of nothingness, never falls into the error which Hegel made; he does not preserve a being for Non-Being, not even an abstract being.

In order to show that Heidegger's coincidence with the Buddhist philosophy here is not merely a speculative figment constructed on an occasional intersection of metaphysical theories, it may suffice to refer again to the chapter of central importance in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, on "Conscience as the Call of Care", in which we find the deduction of the thesis on the "nullity of the world" from the basic truth of suffering ('anxiety') :

> Uncanniness reveals itself authentically in the basic state-of-mind of anxiety; and, as the most elemental way in which thrown Dasein is disclosed, it puts Dasein's being-in-the-world face to face with the nothing of the world; in the face of this nothing, Dasein is anxious with anxiety about its ownmost potentiality-for-being...Anxiety is anxious in the face of the nothing of the world...[To the man who thus realizes that] the world has the character of completely lacking significance [anxi-

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> ety reveals then his own] nothing and nowhere within-the-world...on the basis of this *insignificance* of what is within-the-world.

That is why man can be defined as "the substitute of Nothing."[56]

The analogy with Buddhism in Heidegger's approach to the problem of nothingness can be extended still farther in the direction of the 'no-self' (*an-attā*) thesis. I do not intend here to discuss Heidegger's important analysis of the "inauthentic self" imposed by social pressure of the impersonal "they" (*das Man*), which could very adequately be explained also in analogy with the *māyā-vādaḥ* of the Advaita Vedāntaḥ. Although Heidegger will not pursue the problem of nihilation of the world or of the self's constitutive "subjectity" beyond the already traced limits of his phenomenological investigation as far as Nāgārjuna, his contribution to the transcendental analysis of the self-problem, contemplated in the light of insights essential to Buddhist philosophy, has disclosed still deeper aspects on different levels. Sartre, on the other hand, while abandoning from the very outset the thesis of the *world's* nihilation, tries to strengthen the thesis of the nullity of the selfhood of "human reality".

(*a*) *The range of the Self-problem*

At the beginning of the quoted chapter on "Conscience as the Call of Care", Heidegger formulates the problem of man's "authentic self" in contrast with the "inauthentic they-self" (*das Man*):

> The self, however, is proximally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self...Conscience summons Dasein's self from its lostness in the 'they'. The self to which the appeal is made remains indefinite and empty in its 'what'.

Thus, at its outset, the call of conscience, originating from anxiety, is a call to..., directed toward an inner emptiness (*śūnyatā*). Its intentional object is a *surmised entity of faith and hope*, or a postulate of belief :[57]

> What if this kind of 'giving-itself' on the part of Dasein should lead our existential analytic astray and do so, indeed, in a manner grounded in the Being of Dasein itself ? Perhaps when Dasein addresses itself in the way which is closest to itself, it always says "I am this entity," and in the long run says this loudest when it is "not" this entity. Dasein is in each case mine, and this is its constitution; but what if this should be the very reason why, proximally and for the most part, Dasein *is not itself*?... Not-being-it-self functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential character, is absorbed in a world. This kind of *not*-Being has to be conceived as that kind of Being which is

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closest to Dasein and in which Dasein maintains itself for the most part...[In anxiety] Dasein finds itself face to face with the "nothing" of the possible impossibility of its existence...The idea of "transcendence" —that man is something that reaches beyond himself—is rooted in Christian dogmatics, which can hardly be said to have made an ontological problem of man's Being.

In what does consist the relation of interdependence between "human reality" as Dasein and the postulated "Self-subsistence" ?

Ontologically, Dasein is in principle different from everything that is present-at-hand or real. Its "subsistence" is not based on the substantiality of a substance but on "the *Self-subsistence*" of the existing self whose being has been conceived as care. The phenomenon of the *Self—a phenomenon which is included in care*—needs to be defined existentially in a way which is primordial and authentic, in contrast to our preparatory exhibition of the inauthentic they-self. Along with this, we must establish what possible ontological questions are to be directed toward the "self", if indeed it is *neither substance nor subject*.[58]

On this point Heidegger's theses on the character of the Self, relevant to our comparative study, can be summed up as follows :

1. Selfhood pertains "*explicitly* to the structure of care" or "anxiety" (*dukkhaṁ*)

2. "and therefore of temporality". Temporality (*aniccaṁ*) constitutes "the meaning of the being of that entity which we call Dasein". As such "temporality reveals itself as the meaning of authentic care". Thus it is the character of temporality and historicality (*aniccaṁ*) which imparts to care or worry (*dukkhaṁ*) its ontological meaning.[59] The ultimate reason of this existential interdependence (*paṭica-samuppādo*) is disclosed by the temporal interpretation of "non-self-constancy" (*anattā*).[60]

3. "Thrown" into its own precarious structure of "temporality" and "historicality", the self realizes its existential situation in the challenge to the authenticity of its "primordial Being" as "potentiality-for-being-a-whole."[61]

Is man then "a useless passion", "sufficient to prove that human reality is a lack", "a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not", as Sartre ultimately defined it ?[62] Was the Buddho right in rejecting Uddālaka Āruṇi's thesis "*tat tvam asi*" by his statement "*na me so attā*" and by negating the "potentiality-for-being-a-whole" ?[63]

As for Sartre, his conclusion, quoted above, is based on his adaptation of Heidegger's analysis of "man's ecstatical being", and we can sum it up now in Heidegger's original version.

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(*b*) *Man's ecstatical being* (*aniccaṁ*)

> What makes the authentic being-a-whole of Dasein possible with regard to the unity of its articulated structural whole ? [It is the] anticipatory resoluteness [which is] *being towards* one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-being [B.T., p. 325][64]...The totality of the structure [is thus constituted] on the existential ground of temporality, i.e. on the same ground on which] care has been traced back and defined ontologically (p. 351) ..Temporality constitutes primordially the totality of the structure of care [by making possible] the unity of existence, facticity and falling [p. 328].

Thus it is care and preoccupation that drives Dasein ultimately "towards itself from that which it concerns itself," or from the "inauthentic future" (p.337), where "it entangles itself in itself, so that its distracted non-tarrying becomes *never-dwelling-anywhere*" (p. 347),[65] due to "the craving for the new" (p. 346). This is called "the temporality of falling" as mentioned above in the basic ecstatic structure of Dasein's temporality.

"As care, Dasein is essentially ahead of itself" (p. 337). Therefore, "the primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future" (p. 329). "The ecstatical unity" of the three temporal ecstases through which the "human reality" is permanently "thrown", or "catapulted" (Ortega y Gasset) towards a future, from a past, through the momentariness of the present, forms its existential "horizon" or "horizontal scheme". The whole possibility of "being-in-the-world" "lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon" (p. 365). "We therefore call the phenomena of the future the character of having been, and the present, the *ecstases* of temporality" (*ecstasis* in its original Greek meaning of 'standing outside'). "Temporality is not, prior to this, an entity which first emerges from *itself*; its essence is a process of temporalizing in the unity of the ecstases" (p. 329). With reference to Heidegger's "temporal interpretation of understanding and state-of-mind," the three "primary ecstases" are interpreted in short as follows :

> Just as understanding is made possible primarily by the future, and moods are made possible by having been, the third constitutive item in the structure of care—namely, *falling*—has its existential meaning in the *present*" (p. 346).
>
> The phenomena of the 'towards...', the 'to...', and the 'alongside...', make temporality manifest as the *ek-statikon* pure and simple. *Temporality is the primordial* 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself. (p. 329) The world is transcendent (because it has) its ground in the horizontal unity of ecstatical temporality. (p. 366).

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The analogy with the general Buddhist theory of momentariness, *kṣaṇika-vādaḥ*, resolving substance into process, is too obvious here to require any explicit comment. "Man's position in the universe" (Scheler) converges here toward the realization of the 'double nullity' as elicited in Nāgārjuna's existential dialectic : In the 'world' process of *saṁsāro* and in the momentariness of his "own" present, man's desperate situation ultimately results in his attempt to look for his own "entangled" self "in a way of finding which arises not so much from a direct seeking as rather from a fleeing" (B.T., p. 135). *Ek-stasis is escape.* What is man then trying to escape from in his ecstatical transcendence ?—The fear of death; the ultimate *nidānam* in the eternal circle of *paṭica-samuppādo* (dependent origination of existence). In its structure man's being is a "being-towards-death".

> Thrownness into death reveals itself to Dasein in a more primordial and impressive manner in that state of mind which we have called "anxiety". Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety "in the face of" that potentiality-for-being which is one's ownmost, not-relational, and not to be outstripped. That in face of which one has anxiety is being-in-the-world itself. That about which one has this anxiety is simply Dasein's potentiality-for-being. (p. 251)

(c) *The problem of freedom*

Has then the 'philosophical belief' in transcendence no other, deeper meaning ? What would be the repercussion of the negative answer on the problem of freedom ? For *Sartre* this aspect of the problem of 'nihilation' has become the central issue and motive of existential thinking. Dostoievsky made him aware of the deepest dilemma concerning religion from this bias :[66]

> The existentialist thinks it very distressing that God does not exist, because all possibility of finding values in a heaven of ideas disappears along with him...Dostoievsky said, "If God didn't exist, everything would be permissible." That is the very starting point of existentialism. Indeed, everything is permissible if God does not exist, and as a result man is forlorn, because *neither within him nor without does he find anything to cling to.*

The underlined statement sounds too much as a stray quotation from the Buddho's "sayings". In Sartre's famous interpretation :

> *Man is condemned to freedom*...His existence precedes his essence...Thus *there is no human nature*, since there is no God to conceive it...Such is the first principle of existentialism.

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Sartre could perhaps have found a more adequate and straightforward parallel for these thoughts in a less theistic formulation of the Buddhist *śūnya-vādaḥ* by Nāgārjuna :

> For him who admits nihilation (*śūnyatā*) all appears to be possible. For him who does not admit nihilation, nothing appears to be possible. (*Madhyamaka-kārikā, XXIV, 14*).

Since Scheler, at least, modern European philosophy is fully aware of the fact that the problem of freedom cannot any longer be adequately formulated as a question of will's practical or pragmatical activity. 'Activistic' solutions are no more sufficient. The problem of freedom has become the ultimate ontological problem of man's Being. Not the possibility of action but the possibility of being is now at stake.

What can *freedom as transcendence* mean ? It obviously can mean—and that is the critical minimum of any possible meaning of freedom—'liberation' (*mokṣaḥ*) *from* 'being' and 'Being' (empirical and ontolog ical). Restrained to this minimum of strictly rational requirement remains—asfar as I know—only the most rigorous attitude of the Buddhist *śūnya-vādaḥ* in its interpretation of *an-ātmā* and *nirvāṇam*. In Nāgārjuna's words :

> The thought, "I am not and I shall not be; nothing is mine and nothing will be mine," has a horrifying meaning for the fool; for the wise it means the end of horror.
>
> (*Ratnāvalī, I, 26*)

(*d*) *The problem of nihilism*

Heidegger's basic formulation of the problem of nothingness is contained in his inaugural speech at the University of Freiburg, *What is Metaphysics* ? (1929). In his much later Post-Script to the same text (*Nachwort*, 1943), and in some other still later references, especially in the letter to Ernst Jünger, *Zur Seinsfrage* (On the Question of Being, 1955), Heidegger took a defensive position against critics who had misunderstood his "philosophy of nothingness" as a "perfect nihilism". His principal intention was to show in what sense "the nothing had to be understood as the subject-matter (*Gegenstand*) of metaphysics in general."[67]

In his letter to E. Jünger, Heidegger points out again that his conception of "the nothing as subject of metaphysics" results from his criticism of the scientifically oriented classical ontology where entities (*Seiendes*) have been constantly mistaken for Being (*des Sein*). The intentional regions of sciences can consist only of entities. The primordial ontological question, concerning the "crossing over" from entities to "the Being of entities" remains necessarily excluded from the scientific intention, and therefore

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also neglected and repressed by scientifically oriented 'ideational' philosophies.[68] It remains "forgotten" and waiting to be rediscovered by pure metaphysical reflection in renewed efforts to attain *aletheia* (the primeval clearness of insight, Heidegger's analogue to Buddhist *vipassanā*) by "destroying the history of ontology". This was the task, undertaken by Heidegger at the beignning of *Being and Time* (sec. 6).

A scientifically oriented philosophy, limited to the exclusive knowledge of entities, can conceive of "that which is no entity at all (i.e. the Being) only as 'nothing'. "That was the reason why Heidegger's basic lecture on metaphysics initiated an inquiry into "*this* Nothing" specifically, and not into any fortuitous or indetermined meaning of "the" Nothing. This inquiry revealed first the insight in the condition of human existence as Dasein ("being-there") suspended (hineingehalten) in "this" Nothing, into a situation completely different from being-an-entity. Questions concerning the .primordial relatedness of entities to the Being as a whole (we might add : in its Vedāntic meaning and purport) "must be answered before the problem of Dasein's totality can be dismissed as nugatory", or better to say, as mere 'nihilation' (*als nichtiges*).[69] This statement, earlier than Heidegger's specific discussion of the ontological deficiency of scientific philosophies, seems to me to contain the *criterion* by which he will later approach the problem of 'nihilism', particularly in discussing it with E. Jünger, whereby his intention was not to reject its deeper meaning and justification but rather to determine its proper and essential metaphysical limits. Therefore he insists, also against Jünger, to remain in this discussion "on the line" of nihilism itself rather than to "cross the line" in order to refute the nihilist argument. To translate it in terms of our comparative study of the problem, I would not agree that Heidegger, at least at this stage, adopted a Vedāntic solution of the problem of the Being as a whole, but rather that he endeavoured to realize and recognize its importance as one of the alternative possibilities of explicit metaphysical insight. It should appear obvious, not only for historical reasons, that the *śūnya-vādaḥ* alternative, as authentic Buddhists understand it, could by no stretch of imagination be construed to an analogon of modern scientifically minded 'positivism', and still less reduced to any form of the early Indian *lokāyataḥ* proto-scientific trend.[70]

The same consideration regarding the inner development of Heidegger's metaphysical thought may at the same time help us to explain and justify Sartre's explicit endeavour, at the beginning of *Being and Nothingness*, to lay a stronger emphasis than Heidegger on the basic affirmation of the primacy of the Being.

In this equivocal situation between Being and Nothing, Heidegger's initial attitude is rather that before taking either an affirmative or a negative

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stance, the metaphysician should first try to learn how to attain a state of "mindfulness" and to listen to "the voice of silence", which alone may "teach him how to experience the Being in the Nothing".[71]

Here, however, the required quality of mindfulness of the "meditating philosopher" (as Husserl in his *Cartesian Meditations* designated the master of phenomenological reduction—*epohé*) presupposes again—just as in Buddhist texts on existential dread, quoted above[72]—the utmost existential courage to face and to endure (*auszuhalten*) the realization of the Nothing in its full purport, which means to look "into the chasm of horror" for the last "recess of Being, hardly ever entered upon," through whose "clearing (*Lichtung*) alone any whatsoever entity has to return to what it is and what it might be."[73]

This is how "the Being of entities is grounded in the Nothing of nihilation" (*Im Nichten des Nichts is das Sein des Seienden begründet*)—according to the initial thesis of Heidegger's lecture on the subject of metaphysics.

(*e*) *Karma, "the ripening fruit"*

Ultimately the problem of nihilism in Heidegger's interpretation appears to converge upon a metaphysical position analogous to that of *avidyā*, or metaphysical 'nescience', in Indian philosophies. The discussion of the specifically Buddhist aspects of these problems has to be left for a forthcoming paper on the same subject.[71] In the present survey I wish to single out, with reference to Heidegger, one more similarity resulting, on the Buddhist side, from the basic conception of *avijjā* as the outset of *paṭicca-samuppādo* (the vicious circle of 'dependent origination' of the 'being-in-the-world'). Based on this metaphysical 'nescience' (or lack of *aletheia*, "undisclosedness" in Heidegger's meaning of the Greek term) between Being and Nothing, the integrity of our human-reality depends on the *circulus vitiosus* of 'interdependent origination' or 'double nihilation' of both our 'self' and its 'being-in-the-world'. In Nāgārjuna's formulation :

> Dependent origination is what we call nihilation (*śūnyatā*)...because anything whose origin is dependent is no-self.
>
> (*Madhyamak-kārika, XXIV, 18, 22*)

In being that what it appears to be, this ~~Being~~ (as Heidegger tries to express it in writing[75]) in its nihilation is an effect of *karma* or purposive activity. *Paṭicca-samuppādo* is thus an early attempt of critical analysis of the essentially activistic structure of the human entity (since, as Heidegger

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would say, the world has not its origin in anybody's "gaping at" but in the effort of "procurement").

A comparative analysis of the Buddhist approach cannot be undertaken here. It is only with reference to Heidegger's approach to the entire complex of existential values that I wish to point out the emergence of a new *vitalistic theory of causality* in modern philosophy. Its first formulation, identical not only in its significance but even in its wording with the Indian theory of *karma*, was propounded by *Bergson* : The self (*le moi*) "lives and develops itself as an effect of its own hesitations until a free action is detached from it *as if it were an overripe fruit*."[76]

The same expression, already familiar to European philosophy at the time of *Being and Time*, is used by Heidegger, and explained as follows :[77]

> When, for instance, a fruit is unripe, it 'goes towards' its ripeness. In this process of ripening, that which the fruit is not yet is by no means pieced on as something not yet present-at-hand. The fruit brings itself to ripeness, and such bringing of itself is a characteristic of its being as a fruit. Nothing imaginable which one might contribute to it would eliminate the unripeness of the fruit, if this entity did not come to ripeness *of its own accord.* When we speak of the 'not yet' of the unripeness, we do not have in view something else which stands outside, and which—with utter indifference to the fruit—might be present-at-hand in it and with it. What we have in view is the fruit itself in its specific kind of being...The ripening fruit, however, not only is not indifferent to its unripeness as something other than itself, but it is that unripeness as it ripens. The 'not-yet' has already been included in the very being of the fruit, not as some random characteristic, but as something constitutive. Correspondingly, as long as any Dasein is, it too *is already* its 'not-yet'.

The implicit emphasis laid on the difference from the 'classical' European mechanicist theory of causality is obvious enough. On the same page Heidegger brings his conception of *karma* immediately into relation with the last *nidānam* in the chain of the Buddhist *paṭica-samuppādo* :

> With ripeness the fruit *fulfills* itself. But is the death at which Dasein arrives, a fulfilment in this sense ? With its death Dasein has indeed 'fulfilled its course'. But in doing so, has it necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities ?...For the most part, Dasein ends in unfulfilment, or else by having disintegrated and been used up. Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. It thus becomes more urgent to ask *in what sense, if any, death must be conceived as the ending of Dasein.*

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Arising out of this situation, the problem of *karma*, implicitly felt as an "anticipatory resoluteness" in "concrete working out of temporality" aiming at "an authentic historizing of Dasein" (p. 382), is further discussed as the existential problem of "Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole" (p. 309).

Since "those possibilities of existence which have been factically disclosed are not to be gathered from death," "we must ask whence, in general, Dasein can draw those possibilities upon which it factically projects itself." The answer is :

> The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses current factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them *in terms of the heritage* which that resoluteness, *as thrown, takes over*. In one's coming back resolutely to one's thrownness, there is hidden a *handing down to oneself* of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as *having thus come down*. (p. 383)

In other words, the 'heritage' of a '*tathāgato*'[78] has not to be understood here as a passive facticity of historically 'objectified' social tradition and behaviour, which in Heidegger's terms should be called '*unauthentic* heritage'. Unlike the social study of external history, Dasein, in its intimate 'ripening', "never comes back behind its thrownness" (*ib.*). The critical term 'thrownness', whose meaning should be better determined on this point, is an obvious Christian 'cypher' for a karmically determined situation. This historical connotation of the term could possibly reveal an apparent deficiency of our analogy, had not Heidegger, fortunately for us and more explicitly that any other existentialist philosopher, explained it, in the same context, by an "attribute" synonymous with the basic First Noble Truth of the Buddho—*dukkhaṁ* :

> Before we decide too quickly whether Dasein draws its authentic possibilities of existence from thrownness or not, we must assure ourselves that we have a full conception of *thrownness as a basic attribute of care*. (*Ib.*)

This inquiry will show how the karmic phenomenon has to be comprised within the scope of the central theme of Heidegger's philosophy as a whole, in response to the "call of conscience". It will disclose itself as the awakening call which alone may liberate us from our lost condition (*Verlorenheit*) and thrownness in *avijjā*, or metaphysical 'nescience'. Only in giving heed to it "Dasein understands itself with regard to its potentiality-for-being" in its mindfulness and resoluteness "to take over in its thrownness—right under the eyes of Death—that entity which it is itself, and to take it over

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wholly." Here "resoluteness is defined as a projecting oneself upon one's own being-guilty—a projecting which is reticent and ready for anxiety" (p. 382).

A few recapitulations, recurring as basic themes throughout Heidegger's book, could, in my understanding, be taken as direct definitions of the Indian notion of *karma*. (They will be underlined by me in the following quotations.)[79]

> The call is the call of care. Being-guilty constitutes the being to which we give the name of 'care'. In uncanniness Dasein stands together with itself primordially. Uncanniness brings this entity face to face with its undisguised nullity, which belongs to the possibility of its ownmost potentiality-for-being...*The appeal calls back by calling forth* [*Der Anruf ist vorrufender Rückruf*] : it calls Dasein *forth* to the possibility of taking over, in existence, even that thrown entity which it is. (p. 286-7)
>
> We have seen that care is the basic state of Dasein. The ontological signification of the expression 'care' has been expressed in *the definition*: *ahead-of-itself-being-already-in* [*the world*] as being-alongside entities which we encounter [within-the-world]. (p. 249)
>
> If the term 'understanding' is taken in a way which is primordially existential, *it means to be projecting towards a potentiality-for-being for the sake of which any Dasein exists.* In understanding, one's own potentiality-for-being is disclosed in such a way that one's Dasein always knows understandingly what it is capable of. It 'knows' this, however, not by having discovered some fact, but by maintaining itself in an existential possibility. The kind of *ignorance* which corresponds to this, does not consist in an absence or cessation of understanding, but must be regarded as a deficient mode of the projectedness of one's potentiality-for-being. Existence can be questionable...When one understands oneself projectively in an existential possibility, *the future underlies this understanding*, and it does so as a coming-towards-oneslf out of that current possibility as which one's Dasein exists...Temporality does not temporalize itself constantly out of the authentic future. This inconstancy, however, does not mean that temporality sometimes lacks a future, but rather that the temporalizing of the future takes various forms. (p. 336)

This seems to explain one step further the "hesitation" of the self "until a free action is detached...as an overripe fruit," as Bergson expressed the limits of freedom as release (*mokṣaḥ*) within the scope of a karmical determination. Just as Schopenhauer did in his direct interpretation of Buddhism, Heidegger too cannot avoid using the term 'destiny', or 'fate',

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for the lack of a better equivalent in European terminology.

Heidegger insists on an implicit consciousness of *karma* in the experience of 'care' as Dasein's "understanding of itself in being-guilty" (p. 292). He equally insists on the fact that even "phenomena with which the vulgar interpretation has any familiarity point back to the primordial meaning of the call of conscience when they are understood in a way that is ontologically appropriate" and that "this interpretation, in spite of all its obviousness, is *by no means accidental*" (p. 294).

And yet, the call of conscience is "a *keeping silent*...Only in keeping silent does the conscience call; that is to say, the call comes from the soundlessness of uncanniness, and the Dasein which it summons is called back into the stillness of itself, and called back as something that is to become still." (p. 296). A Japanese student in Heidegger's seminar has interpreted once this course of thoughts in terms of a few Zen *kôans*[80]. A follower of Ramana Maharshi could do it just as well to Heidegger's full satisfaction. In a Buddhist interpretation, however, the implicit reference to 'nihilation' in *avidyā* ('nescience') on this turning point would bring us immediately to the acosmic 'ground' (*bhūmi*) of contemplative introversion (*dhyānam*) where the whole problem of nothingness originates and finds its ultimate solution in a dimension which cannot be pursued any further in the present context. At the other end, from his European bias, Sartre will try later to explain the "reticence" of the "silent call of conscience" in terms of his "existential psychoanalysis", but also in occasional allusions to problems that could be termed parapsychological, as in statements quoted at the beginning of our Ch. I, above, and in a few works of fiction (e.g. a short story from the Spanish civil war, "The Wall", in which a case of clairvoyance is acknowledged).

For Heidegger's understanding of 'destiny' (*Schicksal*) its necessary connection with the feeling of *guilt* (*karmic disbalance*) is essential, though the problem of a possible balance or of an ultimate settlement and release from suffering (*vimutti*) is not raised. All that he can do on this point is to insist on caution against "overhasty" solutions of *the ultimate existential question*:

> But it remains all the more enigmatic in what way this event as destiny is to constitute the whole 'connectedness' of Dasein from its birth to its death. How can recourse to resoluteness bring us any enlightenment? Is not each resolution just *one* more single 'experience' in the sequence of the whole connectedness of experiences?...Why is that the question of how the '*connectedness of life*' is constituted finds no adequate and satisfying answer? Is our investigation overhasty? Does it not, in the end, hang too much on the answer, without first having tested the

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legitimacy of the *question* ? (p. 387)

Speaking of the problem of re-emergence or "recurrence" of existential situations in their essential dependence on destiny in Dasein's "historizing" course, Heidegger does not even indirectly attempt to formulate an idea analogous to 'rebirth' (*punarbhavaḥ*) in Indian religious thought, though his sensitivity for the "enigmatic" remainder of the problem traced above is able of a still closer approach to this complex issue :

> Dasein can be reached by the blows of destiny only because in the depths of its own being *Dasein is destiny*. (p. 384)

Therefore, when its "historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence' of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefully, in a moment of vision (*schicksal-halft-augenblicklich*), in resolute repetition" (p. 391-392).

6. KARL JASPERS

In connection with the problem of nothingness two structures essential to Buddhist philosophy are discussed also by Jaspers, though without direct reference to the Buddhist *alternative* and the difference of its ultimate solution :

(1) *the middle way* "between the nothing and the all, existing always *only as a passage*" to the level of a higher moral and spiritual attitude, and not the Buddhist *puthujjano's* ('worldling') being satisfied with mediocrity;

(2) *the sphere of nothingness* (Buddhist *ākiñcaññāyatanam*) within the structure of the "comprehensive infinity" of contemplative stages corresponding to the *arūpa-jhānam*.[81]

It can be safely taken for granted that Jaspers, while dealing with these problems in his earlier works, as quoted in the following interpretation, had no adequate and explicit knowledge of their analogous formulation in Buddhist philosophy. Only much later, in his last work (as mentioned in Chapter II, above), he must have realized the astonishing similarity of his approach to the problem of nothingness with Nāgārjuna's formulation of the 'middle way' (*madhyamā pratipat*). As for the *arūpa-jhānam* structure, it seems most improbable that Jaspers ever became explicitly aware of this analogy. Otherwise his interpretation of the "stages of meditation" in the chapter on the Buddha in *The Great Philosophers* would have been more accurate.[82]

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The advantage of Jaspers, in comparison with Heidegger, has been soon felt and attributed to his anti-ontological attitude by religiously minded thinkers sensitive to the turning of the whole problem of Being and Nothingness into an essentially 'meditative' dimension of introvert consciousness. This turning was carefully avoided by Heidegger, from whose ontological philosophy the term 'consciousness' was explicitly eliminated.

N. Berdyaev had in view the advantage of the same antiontological attitude, at least for his strictly Christian position, in the following critical remarks :[83]

> Without nothingness there would be neither personal existence nor freedom...But Heidegger is perhaps the most extreme pessimist in the history of the philosophical thought in the West. He is entirely concerned with the fact that human existence is *cast out* into the world. This being cast out...is the fall. But from what elevation can all this be seen? *Heidegger does not explain whence the power of getting to know things is acquired.* He looks upon man and the world exclusively from below, and sees nothing but the lowest part of them.

Jaspers, in the *Existenz Philosophie*, formulates the problem of nothingness as an explicit antinomy to the ontological thesis of the speculative Reason :

Reason feels attracted by elements absolutely extraneous to its own nature. In the effort to prevent its own failure as a nothing, it strives to make plain, and to find a tenable expression for, all that "occult passions" may produce by "nullifying the law of illumination" in the event of their own self-destruction. Reason insinuates itself wherever unity is being destroyed, in order to extract one more truth to prevent that "metaphysical break-down" in which Being itself would be disarrayed. Actually, a feeling of nothingness assails us in the very moment when we believe to have succeeded in "transforming the whole reality into thinkability." In this moment there emerges the thought that there is no need of any whatsoever reality, and that "the nothing of the thinkability is self-sufficient." Thus "immanence imposes itself as authentic Being, because *immanence alone is knowable.*"

All this seems to be a strictly sufficient explanation of the thesis (not adopted by Jaspers) of the Buddhist *vijñāna-vādaḥ* school as formulated in the titles of several philosophical treatises dealing with *vijñaptimātratā-siddhiḥ*, or the idealist "thesis that there is only cognition."

In his effort to reject this conviction existentially, Jaspers considers it as the last entrenchment in the "desperate battle" for a life ending in nothing;

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as the ultimate "hardly concealed" residue of that existential dread whose most dramatic descriptions can be found in Buddhist texts (quoted in preceding sections) on the subject of "the change of lineage" (*gotra-bhū*).

Out of this classical "cleavage",[84] unavoidable to any historical form of 'first philosophy', the question about the possibility of a 'middle way' arises with logical necessity. And Jaspers cannot formulate it better than the Buddho did :

THE MIDDLE WAY

"Between the nothing and the all, existing always only as a transition," unable to attain his self-perfection in an "all-encompassing totality", man, in any whatsoever mode of human reality, exists only as a "historical entity"—or as a phenomenon of 'temporality'—*aniccaṁ*.

As a "being-determined-in-categories" human reality (Dasein) is located "between nothingness and being-too-much (*Uebersein*)," i.e., the all-encompassing "fullness" of Being. Therefore in Dasein 'everything is ambiguous."[85]

Nothingness itself—as one of the two 'poles' of Dasein's transcendental constitution (to express it rather in terms of Husserl's transcendental logics) —has a double meaning : The first is "actual nothingness (*in der Tat*)" : "I go out of the world, I instantly lose the 'air' of the 'here-being' Dasein, I fall to nothing"—for lack of *prāṇaḥ* as we might add from the standpoint that will be discussed in the following section. In—its second meaning, "nothingness is the authentic being, since it is the non-being of any determined something. Being and Nothing become identic. Nothing is the indetermined fullness." This double meaning of nothingness as identity of Being and Nothing, on the one hand, and the absolute Nothing, on the other, is expressed as the contrast between "being-too-much" the *Uebersein* unattainable to our merely "historical" Dasein,[86] and its being-not-at-all. While nothingness remains indetermined, "fullness" appears to Jaspers as a reliable "*signum*" or index of infinite experience. Should we take the other alternative in this ancient dispute between Vedānta and Buddhism, Jaspers, obviously siding with the Vedāntins,[87] cautions us that in facing the nothing as absolute non-being, there is "the horror from possible transcendent chasm." What should we answer ? Perhaps that the obvious advantage of his choice is existential but not necessarily logical to the same extent.

THE SPHERE OF NOTHINGNESS (*ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ*)

Jaspers started his career as professor of psychology in Heidelberg. He is also well known as the author of a voluminous treatise on psychiatrics.

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In connection with this it seems to me that his anti-ontological approach to the problem of nothingness has penetrated into some deeper aspects of subjective experience, just because he refused to limit his investigation to the ontological constitution of the world, as did Heidegger, and thus necessarily turned in the direction of the ancient Buddhist alternative where nothingness is the ultimate subject of spiritual contemplation (*jhānaṁ*). (Whether his alternative theory of explaining the world by a method of "cypher-reading" can be accepted as adequate, or not, is a different question.)

His initial question (in *Philosophie*)[88] was : How is the nothing as transcendent voidness, or absolute nothingness, *thinkable* ? There is a tendency to limit his first conclusions to such statements as : The absolute non-being can only be conceived through the possibility of being; and this possibility is already Being (cf. Sartre !). In the next statement Jaspers seems to reveal Ramana Maharshi's method of spiritual self-contemplation within the void : In my *being silent* there is for me the certainty of a unique manner in which absolute non-being is impossible. In thinking the Being as Nothing, the thought-dialectic is developed to the point of the impossibility of thinking. There dialectical thought reaches its own impossibility, which, however, is illuminating.

In *Existenz Philosophie*, a deeper layer of contemplative consciousness seems to be reached in earnest consequent proceeding with the same method. There can be no doubt that at least the structure described by Jaspers in one place corresponds exactly to the stage of transition from the first and second *arūpa-jhānam* to the third, i.e., the attainment of the "sphere of no-thing" (*ākiñcaññāyatanaṁ*) upon abandoning the spheres of the "infinity of space" and of its conscious "comprehension" : Upon having entered the "space of infinite comprehensiveness" we have to face a double possibility : (a) From one side I can submerge in the immensity of the infinite and be absorbed in the nothing. (b) Instead of this it may occur that, in a state of terror and excitement, I may be "saved" by an ecstatic uplift to something specifically determined...Ultimately, disclosing its "infinite comprehensiveness" the Being will "stream toward me from all its primeval sources."

In a concluding, typically Christian turning towards the redeeming power of love, Jaspers discards the alternative of equanimity (*upekhā*), the highest term in the Buddhist conception of "immeasurable" (*aatmaññā*) attainments in *sammā samādhi*. Like the brāhman Dhānañjāni (in *Majjh. 97*) he choses to remain in "the low world of god Brahmā" attainable "in "a state of mind endued with loving-kindness (*mettā*), pervading...the whole world everywhere in every way..."

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Nevertheless, in such statements European philosophy of the twentieth century has regained a clear understanding of the basic principle of "perennial philosophy" (*sanātana dharmaḥ*) that there are philosophies which cannot even be thought if "the meditating philosopher" does not live in accordance with them. Or, as the French Christian philosopher Jean Wahl (author of a well-known book on Kierkegaard) has put it in a lecture: "We are concerned with questions which, strictly speaking, belong to solitary meditation and cannot be subjects of discourses."[89]

7. NISHIDA KITARÔ

Nishida's philosophy of nothingness is an interpretation of the *śunyatā-vādaḥ* for the explicit purpose "to make Zen-Buddhism intelligible to the West."[90] The understanding of *śūnyatā* (nullity) in the basic Pāli *suttas* (*suññatā*, cf. especially the *Cūla suññatā-suttam*, 121, in the *Suññata-vaggo* of the *Majjhima-nikāyo*), in keeping with the acosmic attitude of the Buddho) against all world-views (*diṭṭhi*), pertains to the highest levels (*āyatanam* of purely contemplative introversion (*arūpa-jhānam*). In later Mahāyānam philosophy, since Nāgārjuna, the idea of *śūnyatā* was expanded, as a principle of dialectical reasoning, to satisfy (the requirements of a renewed metaphysical interest in cosmological problems, and thus developed to a theory of knowledge. The idealist character of this gnoseology can easily be explicated also from the primordial structure of phenomenological reduction of mind's states (noesis) and contents (noema) in the meditative proceeding according to the *jhānam* method. In a forthcoming essay, dedicated to the original Buddhist approach to this problem, I propose to specify how far the title 'meditation', even in this context, can be interpreted in terms of Husserl's transcendental reduction—*epohé*. In the same context it will be necessary to distinguish the said two aspects of the *śunya-vādaḥ*, strictly acosmic meditative dimension from the dialectical one, as to their intrinsic intentionalities, and to correlate them critically as aspects of transcendental constitution of their respective categorial regions.

Nishida was not unaware of such comparativistic possibilities. On various occasions he discussed problems of Kant's, Hegel's and Husserl's philosophies as topics of fundamental importance for the structure of his own system. In the conclusion of our present attempt to approach such common problems from the western direction, Nishida's comparativistic endeavours can be pointed out only in a few fragmentary indications.

In his *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*,[91] the idea of the world as "intelligible universal" is elicited from the lowest level of the "universal of judgment" to the universal of the "intelligible self", and to the ultimate "location" of even that universal in the "place of absolute nothingness":

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> With regard to the Universal, three stages or layers can be discerned by which three worlds are defined. First, there is the universal of judgment...Second, there is the Universal of self-consciousness...Third, there is the Universal which contains something that transcends the depth of our conscious self. Everything that has its place in this last enveloping universal, and is determined by it, belongs to the intelligible world. (p. 69).

On the second, middle and intermediate level of self-consciousness, pure logical intentionality transforms itself into *will* :

> Will forms the basis of self-consciousness, and self-consciousness forms the very basis of judgment...The physical natural world becomes the teleological world (p. 79)...
>
> Transcending the basis of the will, one reaches the standpoint of the self, which has transcended the so-called conscious self. It goes without saying that the intelligible self in this sense can neither be determined as objective 'being' within the Universal of judgment, nor as psychological 'being' within the Universal of self-consciousness. *It can no longer be determined at all as 'being'*, like an object of knowledge (p. 100)...The more the Universal returns to itself, the more the 'place' approaches to nothingness (p. 104)...That which envelopes even the intelligible universal, and which serves as 'place' for our true self, may be called the 'place of absolute nothingness' (p. 134)...The deeper one sees into one's own self, the more one is suffering; the suffering soul is the deepest reality in the intelligible world (p. 128).

Therefore the urge to transcend it, the idea of liberation, even of 'nihilation', has been haunting human mind since its first awakening to "intelligibility".

Before going over to Nishida's explication of the essentially religious nature of this urge towards freedom, a few points of comparison with European philosophies of existence may find here their proper place :

(1) Here, in Nishida's words, the same way is traced in broad lines along which Schopenhauer had found his approach to Buddhism : Will was identified by Schopenhauer with "thirst" for life, a basic Buddhist term (*taṇhā, tṛṣṇā*). The negation of the will-to-live brought him to the acceptance of the ideal of *nibbānam* (*nirvāṇam*) as "extinction", and ultimately to the idea of nothingness as he found it expounded in the *"prajñā-pāramitā* of the Buddhists."[92]

(2) With reference to our earlier discussion of Heidegger's understanding of nothingness as Dasein's being "suspended" in the specific ("(hist"

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nothing of its existential situation, it is interesting to note how close Nishida's "placing" of the "intelligible self" into "no place" and "enveloping" it there by nothingness, comes to the same image of the precarious condition of our human reality.

(3) We need not presume a direct influence of Schopenhauer upon Nishida's interpretation of the intrinsic "will character of the self" in terms of Buddhist doctrine of existential "thirst" (*tṛṣṇā*). On the other hand, the basic doctrine of all later philosophies of existence, as formulated by Kierkegaard, is restated almost verbally by Nishida too :

> In this sense, our acting, first, determines the 'being' in the intelligible world (p. 110).

"Acting" here stands for existence, while "intelligible being" in this context comes closest to Heidegger's understanding of Being (*Sein-esse*, not entity) as essence. Though this principle of existence determining essence is deduced by Nishida only as a corollary of the fundamental Buddhist theory of will as existential "thirst", it would be difficult to exclude the probability of Nishida's direct or indirect acquaintance with Kierkegaard's dialectical deduction of the same principle under the influence of Hegelian dialectics. Unlike Kierkegaard, Nishida recognized his positive indebtedness to Hegel above all other western influences.

From this point of agreement with Kierkegaard's central thesis, a short and straight way brought both thinkers—the Christian and the Buddhist—to the ultimate solution of the problem of freedom in the sphere of the religious consciousness. Here only Nishida's version can be singled out in a few pointers :

> Therefore, similar to the contradiction in the will, one must suffer from *the contradiction in oneself*, the more the deeper one is and the deeper one sees one's self. To free oneself of this contradiction, and to see the last basis of one's own self, is the religious consciousnes (p. 129).

As mentioned above, Nishida's *śūnya-vādaḥ* consists in his insistence that "the intelligible universal" (whose noematic content consists of the idea of truth, the idea of beauty, and the idea of good) "can not be the last universal; there must be a universal which envelopes even the intelligible universal; it may be called the place of *absolute nothingness*. That is the *religious consciousness*. In the religious consciousness, body and soul disappear, and we unite ourselves with the absolute nothingness...There is neither 'true' nor 'false', neither 'good' nor 'evil'. The religious value is the value of negation of value" (p. 130).

> *Conscience*, seeing the free self itself, is self-contradicting...As determined by the universal of absolute nothingness...the act of religious

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'experience'...is a determination without mediation by concept...It is only through absolute negation of the self that it becomes possible 'to live in God'...(Such a proposition) is however, in my opinion, not deep enough (either). If one is really overwhelmed by the consciousness of absolute nothingness, there is neither 'me' nor 'God'; but just because there is absolute nothingness, the mountain is mountain, and the water is water, and the being is as it is. (pp. 130, 135, 137)

Ultimately, it is "from the standpoint of the universal of absolute nothingness that philosophy tries to clarify the specific 'determination' of each enveloped universal." Such determination of the universal "may be called 'reason' in the widest sense of the word." Though, however wide this sense may be in its extension, the philosopher should always bear in mind that "since philosophy has transcended the standpoint of the intelligible self, it has already transcended art and ethics, and even the religious aspect of life" (p. 139), and this appears to be its ultimate acosmic attainment.

ANNEXE 1

Russian Nihilism in the 19th Century

Thomas G. Masaryk in *The Spirit of Russia—Studies in History, Literature and Philosophy* (English transl., New York 1919) compared some aspects of Nietzsche's nihilism with precedents in the Russian nihilist and anarchist revolutionary movement about the middle of the 19th century. The following few pointers from V.V. Zenkovsky's *A History of Russian Philosophy* (London 1953), may be of interest also for analogies with some of the later authors included in our survey, who either referred directly to the political aspect of modern nihilism (Heidegger in his correspondence with E. Jünger) or to its reflection in the classical Russian literature of the same epoch (Heidegger's references to Tolstoy, and Sartre's to Dostoevski) :

In *Herzen's* philosophy of despair, hopelessness, and disbelief, "nihilism" meant "the most complete freedom...science without dogma, unconditional submission to experience and unmurmuring acceptance of the consequences" (Zenkovsky, p. 296).

Pisarev insisted on the restriction of "the work of the mind to problems which are evoked by the immediate demands of life" and denied significance to scientific researches which are not related to "living needs". While Masaryk compared him to Nietzsche, Zenkovsky considered that "no one else is as close intellectually as he is to that other nihilistic genius, *Leo Tolstoy*" (*ibid.*, p. 337 ff)

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Reading *Bakunin's* dialectical defence of nihilism and anarchism, we are often lively reminded of basic existential issues on which Sartre tries to revolutionize Heidegger's views. In his endeavour to "formulate a mysticism of negation and conflict", Bakunin attributes to Death an existential importance which reminds us of Heidegger's viewpoint: "Death, the complete destruction of individuality, is the highest fulfilment of personality..., that is why death occurs in the supreme moments of life." On the question of atheism the depth of Bakunin's insight might have influenced Sartre (who avows the influence of Dostoevski in his criticism of French rationalist and later positivist superficiality in dealing with this question). In 1849, Bakunin wrote: "You are mistaken if you think that I do not believe in God; but I have wholly given up comprehending Him through science and theory...I seek God in men, in human freedom, and now I seek God in revolution." And later: "If God exists man has no freedom, he is a slave. But man can and must be free, therefore God does not exist." (Compare Sartre's conclusion: "Man is condemned to freedom.") (Cf. Zenkovski, op. cit., pp. 245-256.)

On the opposite pole of the later religious thinkers, who affirmed themselves in emigration, in the generation of N. Berdyaev, Leo Isakovich Shestov was the first and most enthusiastic Russian supporter of the existentialist movement in Western Europe. It may suffice to mention the titles of some of his works on this subject:

Dostojewski und Nietzsche—Philosophie der Tragödie.
(Köln 1924).

L'Idée de bien chez Tolstoi et Nietzsche
(Paris 1949, posthumous).

All Things Are Possible (London 1921, with a Foreword by D.H. Lawrence).

Kierkegaard et la philosophie existentielle (Paris 1936).

One of his earlier writings, published still in Russia (1905), mentioned by Zenkovsky, had the title *The Apotheosis of Groundlessness.*

In a wider context special attention should be paid to the influence of the same ideas, under direct influence of Nietzsche, on the formation of Aurobindo Ghose's revolutionary ideology at the earlier stage of his political activity, but also in his later reflections, especially in *The Human Cycle* (written in 1916-1918) and in some other writings of the same epoch. Remarkable are his positive appreciations of "anarchism as a rational principle of society", whose "realisation in spiritual society" will remain

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an essential "ideal of intellectual" endeavours towards this ultimate aim. In one of his minor studies (*Heraclitus*, 1916-17) he criticizes Nietzsche because "he affirms Becoming only and excludes Being from his view of things ..like the Buddhists". (Cf. the note on Sri Aurobindo in my essay "The Philosophy of Disgust—Buddho and Nietzsche", in *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch 1977*.)

ANNEXE 2

Max Scheler on the "soul-substance"

Max Scheler remained a staunch defender of a strictly Roman Catholic position of personalist monotheism until the last short period of his philosophical activity (1921-1927), when he renegated his "theist" standpoint "in some *highest* questions of metaphysics and philosophy of religion" (as he formulated this change in the Foreword to the third edition of his main work, *Formalism in Ethics and the Ethics of Material Values*). Yet, still in the earlier period, and notably since the first edition of the same work (in 1913-1916), he had clearly recognized from the very beginning of his phenomenological investigations the necessity to reject the idea of a *soul as ontical entity*, or "soul substance" as an inadequate hypothesis.

In Scheler's basic personalistic conception the substantialist idea of soul is resolved in the higher constitutional structure of Personality. In this first version he insists on the necessity of conceiving God as the highest "idea of person", in which "there is no more 'I' and no more having-a-soul (*Beseeltheit*)," since we cannot confront God "either with an outward world of with a You." (*Formalismus...*, 4th ed., *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 2, Bern Francke, 1954, p. 487.)

Apart from such speculations it is characteristic for Scheler's penetrating insight in the essential evidentness of psychical phenomena that he did not hesitate from the very beginning to fully agree even with Kant's "Refutation of the Argument for the Substantiality of the Soul" as maintained by "the rationalism of his time" (Mendelssohn; cf. *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Scheler, op. cit., p. 387), though in other respects Scheler's book was in the first place meant to be a criticism of Kant's Philosophy.

Here are a few pointers from *Formalisums...*, characteristic for Scheler's position in this question :

"Against erroneous attempts of a certain kind of philosophy to consider man as a *species of nature* endowed with specific 'faculties' of speech, of morality, of reasoning, and even with a so-called immortal soul-substance", Scheler denies "explicitly any whatsoever significance of such attempts" in discussing the problem of "man's position in the All" (pp. 304, 303).

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"Since the concept of soul and the concept of body do not represent classes of absolute objects, the question about their possible interaction is also meaningless." The whole problem appears to arise arbitrarily "out of its own...as it was very correctly observed already by Kant." Connections between psychical and physical events can be properly explained only as being effected by the integrating activity of a person. Even the acts of another person are never disclosed to our understanding in the form of "causal deduction" from given movement (or 'behaviour') to the acting soul. A person " 'is' only as the concrete unity of acts accomplished by that person, and only *in* their actual accomplishment."

Thus "the idea of person" has to be "sharply distinguished" from such "concepts of the real or of thing" as the presumed "soul-substance". 'Person' "does not mean anything psychical at all." The phenomenology of inner experience should not any longer (at least since Kant) be misunderstood as "psychology".

In order to reconcile the results of his actual phenomenological analyses with his Christian beliefs, Scheler had, at that time, to restrict the still valid meaning of his concepts of both "soul" and "self" in explicit distinction from the meaning of "person" in the central conception of his personalist philosophy. (Cf. pp. 487-9 and 512.)

NOTES

1. Heidegger's rejection of the *term* 'humanism' in his discussion with Sartre (cf. *Brief über den "Humanismu"*, 1946) is based on his objections against equivocal and misleading connotations a by which the meaning of this *term* has been overloaded throughout centuries, and particularly in modern history of ideas, since the Renaissance. There is no disagreement about the fundamental principle of existential ontology that 'being' has to be understood as "*man's* being-in-the-world".

2. See I.B. Horner's translation of *The Middle Length Sayings* of the Buddha (*Majjhima-nikāyo*) in the Pali Text Society Translation Series (London). I found the interpretation of *dukkaṁ* as "unsatisfactoriness" first in Nyanatiloka's *Guide through the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*, section on Yamaka V, p. 140 (Ed. Lake House Bookshop, Colombo 1957).

3. For basic Pāli texts on *anattā* see my paper "Why is Buddhism a Religion ?" in *Indian Philosophical Annual* Vol. VI, 1970. In *Mahāyānam* texts the *tri-lakaṇaṃṣ* formula is extended to four or five propositions, interpolating the statement *śūnyāh sarva-dharmāh* between the statements on *dukkhāḥ* and *anātmanāḥ*. See for these variations the synopsis in E.Lamotte, *LeTraité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna*, Tome III, pp. 1369-1370. Ed. Institut Orientaliste, Louvain 1970.

4. Max Scheler was, however, the first of Husserl's followers who explicitly dismissed the limitation to a "picture-book phenomenology", in the Preface to the first edition of his main work, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* (1916). Heidegger, instead of formulating theories, prefers to propound his ideas as "theses" e.g. : "The substance of man is existence", "Primordial time is finite" ; on *Dasein* : "The Being of this entity is constituted by historicality", etc. (cf. *Being and Time*, original German ed., pp. 314, 331, 382.)

5. Cf. "My Approach to Indian Philosophy", section on Buddhism, in *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. II (1966). The discourses of the Buddho are quoted in the

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sequel mainly from the Pali Text Society editions, London, with necessary adaptation. References are to the serial numbers of the *suttas*, preceded by the initial letter of the collection (*nikāyo*): M.-Majjhima—, D.-Dīgha, S.-Saṁyutta, A.-Aṅguttara-nikāyo.

6. Cf. *Schopenhauer and Buddhism*, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1970, pp. 86-7.
7. *M. Heidegger, Being and Time* (in the sequel B.T., page numbers follow the German ed., text adapted from the English translation by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Harper and Row Ed., 1962). *J.P. Sartre, Being and Nothingness* (in the sequel B.N.; first page no. follows the English translation by H.E. Barnes, The Citadel Press New York, 1966; second page no. follows the original French edition, Paris, Gallimard, NRF, 1943). Italics are partly mine.
8. On this principle of the Buddho and its analogies in anti-ontological trends in modern philosophies of existence, see also my paper, "Aniccam, the Buddhist Theory of Impermanence", in *The Basic Facts of Existence I, Impermanence*, Kandy, Buddhist Publication Society, 1973.
9. Cf. K. Jaspers, *Philosophie*, 2nd ed., Berlin 1948, p. 662.
10. Cf. N. Berdyaev, *The Beginning and the End*, New York, Harper, 1957, p. 91
11. Discussion following Jean Whal's lecture, *A Short History of Existentialism* Engl. transl., New York, 1949.
12. *Philosophie*, p. 814.
13. op. cit., p. 117.
14. Discussion with Jean Wahl, op. cit.
15. This and the following quotations from Heidegger's minor writings are from his *Wegmarken*, ed. Klostermann, Frankfurt/M. 1967.
16. Cf. "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit", in *Wegmarken* p. 124 ff.
17. *Existentialist Philosophies—An Introduction* by Emmanuel Mounier. Engl. transl., London, 1948, pp. 2, 8, 11.
18. op. cit., pp. 8, 9, 14.
19. See on this subject my paper quoted in footnote 5 above, and also "Dependence of punar-bhava on karma in Buhdhist Philosophy" (under my lay-name Cedomil Veljačić) in *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. I, 1965.
20. Since T.S. Eliot, in his *Waste Land*, referred to "the Buddha's Fire Sermon (which corresponds in importance to the Sermon on the Mount)," reference to this specific text (cf. *Vinaya-piṭakam, Mahā-vaggo I, 21*) has been made also by several other poets, as I shall try to show in a forthcoming essay on Eliot's and later poetry.
21. *The World as Will and Representation* (in the sequel quoted as WWR from E.F.J. Payne's translation, Dover Publications, New York, 1958). Vol II, Sec. 153. Cf. my *Schopenhauer and Buddhism*, p. 42 f.
22. *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, edited by R. Bretall, Princeton, 1951, p. 219.
23. Cf. *Saṁyutta-nikāyo, LIV, 9*, and a more extensive documentation on this subject in my essay "The Philosophy of Disgust—Buddho and Nietzsche", in *Schopenhauer-Jahrbuch 1977*.
24. Quotations from *Visuddhi-maggo* are from the English transl. by Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli *The Path of Purification*, Colombo, 1956.
25. *Being and Nothingness*, p. 388 (484) n.
26. P. 708 (in the original French ed.)
27. "Because Dasein's characters of being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them '*existentialia*'." They have to be clearly distinguished from what we call '*categories*'—characteristics of being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein. (B.T., p. 44).
28. B.T., 42, pp. 196-200.
29. The chapter on "Sinology" in *On the Will in Nature* (2nd German ed. 1854, pp. 119-120) contains a list of 23 books on Buddhism recommended by Schopenhauer. See my *Schopenhauer and Buddhism*, pp. 23-24, section 0.9.

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30. Cf. Introduction to Suzuki's *Zen Buddhism*, Doubleday Anchor Books ed., New York, 1956.
31. Berlin, 1938 (free translation from my notes).
32. *Die grossen Philosophen I*, ed. Piper, München, 1957. English transl. ed. R. Hart-Davis, London 1962.
33. This chapter is unfortunately not included in the English translation of selected chapters from *The Great Philosophers*.
34. Title of the English transl. (London 1959) of Jaspers' book *Die geistige Situation dee Zeit* (1931).
35. *Der Philosophische Glaube*, radio talks 1947, published by Piper, München.
36. The inadequacy of the translation of the Buddhist term *śūnyatā* (Pāli *suññatā*) by 'emptiness', adopted by most western interpreters, has been pointed out only recently in some critical works. Thus H.V. Guenther in his *Buddhist Philosophy in Theory and Practice* (Penguin ed, 1972. p. 224) explains his rejection "on the following consideration : *śūnyatā* is not a container that can be emptied nor is there anything that could be taken out of *śūnyatā*. The choice of the term 'emptiness' dates back to the time when under the influence of idealism mind was conceived as a container of ideas, and when the ideal seemed to be to leave an empty blankness." As we shall see in the last section of this chapter, the first original Japanese philosopher in the 20th century who dedicated one of his basic works to this problem, Nishida Kitaro in his *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*, did not hesitate to use the philosophically correct term for *śūnyatā* Among his followers on this line Prof. Shienichi Hisamatsu (Kyoto) has written. an interesting paper on "The Characteristics of Oriental Nothingness", in *Philosophical Studies of Japan*, Vol. II, 1960 (pp. 65-97).
37. *Mahā-prājñā-pāramitā-śāstraṁ*, quoted from E. Lamotte's French translation, referred to in footnote 3, above. Ch. XLI 9, XLI 4, XL 2.
38. The following quotations are from *Meister Eckhart* by Franz Pfeiffer, Leipzig 1857. Translation with some omissions and additions by C. de B. Evans, London, J.M. Watkins, 1924. Titles and pages : *Liber positionum*, 2-3, p. 445. *Sermons and Collations*, 6, p, 30. *Sayings*, p. 418. I have underlined the statements of particular interest for references in the sequel.
39. D.T. Suzuki's Introduction to Nishida's book, *A Study of Good*, ed. Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, 1960. See also K. Nishida, *Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness*, ed. Maruzen, Tokyo 1958.
40. op. cit. *Sermons and Collations*, 17. p. 57.
41. *A Kierkegaard Anthology* (op. cit., V.n. 22 above), pp. 215, 218, 220.
42. In WWR, Vol. II, (Payne p. 623), Ch. XLVIII, Schopenhauer quotes "The Four Noble Truths" from Fausbōll's Latin translation of the *Dhammapadaṁ*. The following quotation is from *A Kierkegaard Anthology*, pp. 99, 346.
43. *WWR*, Vol. I : sec. 23, p. 113; sec. 54, p. 278 n.; Vol. II, Ch XLVI, p. 579.
44. In the concluding sec. 71 of *WWR*, I, the last sentence, in which the meaning of *nirvāṇaṁ* is discussed, ends with the word "nothing" and a footnote according to which "this is also the *prājñā-pāramitā* of the Buddhists, the 'beyond all knowledge', in other words, the point where subject and object no longer exist". In Ch. XLVIII of Vol. II. p. 608, Schopenhauer explains "the teaching of the Veda" on "rebirths that are the consequence of the works in each case, until right knowledge appears and with it salvation (final emancipation), *mokṣa*, i.e., reunion with Brahma. But the Buddhists with complete frankness describe the matter only negatively as *nirvāṇa...*"
45. *Wegmarken*, p. 248.
46. Quotations in the sequel are from *The Will to Power, An Attempted Transvaluation of all Values*, transl. by A.M. Ludovici, London, Allen and Unwin, 1924 (3rd ed.)
47. See *Annexure* 1 on this subject.
48. On Nietzsche's attitude to Schopenhauer, see my essay "The Philosophy of Disgust —Buddha and Nietzsche", in *Schopenhauer Jahrbuch 1977*. The following quotations are from the *Will to Power*.
49. Max Weber, who had a strong influence both on the formation of the philosophical

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thought of Max Scheler and of Karl Jaspers (cf. the Introduction to *Existenz-Philosophie*), considered the place of early Jainism and Buddhism in his interpretation of the Indian classical intellectualism as typical "drawing room" "intellectualistically heterodox" ideologies, particularly in view of their atheism and disrespect for the caste system. Weber's *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie*, II, Bd. *Hinduismus und Buddhismus* (Tübingen 1921), appeard in English translation in 1958 (Glencoe, Ill. Free Press) : *The Religion of India* : *The Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism*. See also Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion* (London, Methuen, 1963) Ch. XVI, pp. 266-8, on Buddhism.

50. Cf. *The Antichrist*, section 20, and *Ecce Home*, "Why I Am so Wise ?", section 6.
51. The sub-title of Sartre's book *Being and Nothingness*, that might be criticized perhaps also as a contradiction *in adjecto*.
52. *Was ist Metaphysik*? (early editions), and *Sein und Zeit*, pp. 305-6.
53. *Being and Nothingness*, p. 21 (57).
54. B.N., p. 21 (57).
55. B.N., p. 17 (53). See E. Lamotte, op. cit. (note 3 above) for arguments against "les élucubrations modernes concernant la présence dans le Madhyamaka d'un Absolu négatif" (p. 1227), in recent literature on this subject. Prof. Lamotte has summed up the arguments against such unwarranted assumptions of a "negative absolute" in Buddhist philosophy in the heading "Vacuity is not an entity" in the Introduction to his study on Vimalakīrti (*L' enseignement de Vimalakīrti*, Bibliothéque du Muséon, Louvain, 1962).
56. B.T., pp. 276, 343, 186, 187. *Wegmarken*, p. 247.
57. For the preceding quotations see B.T., pp. 181, 274, for the following B.T., pp. 115 f., 176, 266, 49.
58. B.T., p. 49. See also *Annexe 2*, on Scheler's formulation of the same phenomenological thesis.
59. B.T., pp. 332, 17, 326, 301.
60. It would be interesting to compare in a wider connection Nāgārjuna's arguments on the same subject—his deduction of *duhkham* (suffering) from the lack of self-constancy (*an-ātmā or nih-svabhāvatā*) in the universal process of interdependent propagation, or rather 'nullification', of existence. Here are a few pointers in free translation from my notes : "The dependent origination of things is called nullity, because there is no selfhood in anything of dependent origin." (Vigrahavyāvartani, 22)—"How should there be suffering if its origin would not be dependent, since it is the transient that is called suffering, and it cannot exist if (self-) being is autonomous." (Madhyamaka-kārikā, XXIV, 21) "He who has attained the insight in the dependent origination has attained the insight into suffering, its arising, its cessation, and the way thereto." (*ib.* 40).
61. B.T., p. 234.
62. B.N. (French original, 1943) pp. 708, 130, 722, 183.
63. Compare the text on *The All* from Saṁyutta-nikāyo, XXXV, 23-26, quoted in Ch. I, above.
64. In the following sequence of quotations from Heidegger's *Being and Time*, page numbers of the German edition will be quoted in brackets.
65. Buddhaghosa conceived the entire plan of his *Visuddhi-maggo* as an answer to the question formulated in *Saṁyutta-nikāyo, I*, 13, to which he reverts at the beginning of each of the three parts of his book :

    The inner tangle and the outer tangle,
    mankind is entangled in a tangle.
    And so I ask of Gotamo this question :
    Who succeeds in disentangling this tangle ?

66. *L'Existentialisme est un humanisme*, Paris 1945. English transl. *Existentialism*, Philosophical Library, New York 1947, pp. 15-27.
67. *Wegmarken*, p. 101.
68. *ibid.*, p. 246.

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69. B.T., p. 237.
70. Vasubandhu (4th c.A.D.) in his *Viṃśatikā vijñaptimātratā siddhih* asks the representative of an atomistic school: "Why do you not recognize that the change of the cognitive consciousness is due to the change of activities alone? Why do you construe 'elements'?" (I, 6). It is not possible to show that an object is "either a mass of atoms or an atomic construction, because the existence of a single atom cannot be demonstrated" (III, 11), and since this cannot be demonstrated, "it is not possible to prove either that form is object of the eye" (and other material elements objects of other senses, including mind). It follows that all "is cognitive consciousness alone" (III, 15. Free translations from my notes).
71. *Wegmarken*, pp. 174, 102 f.
72. *Majjh.* 22. See Ch. II, above.
73. *Wegmarken*, pp. 102 f.
74. See my paper on "Karma—the ripening fruit" in *Kamma and its Fruit*, Wheel Publication No. 221-223, Buddhist Publication Soc., Kandy 1975.
75. Cf. *Zur Seinsfrage*, *Wegmarken*, p. 239 ff.
76. H. Bergson, *Essai sur les Donnèes Immèdiates de la Conscience*, Presses Universitaires de France, 68th ed., p.132.
77. B.T., p. 343 f. The following quotations from *Being and Time* will be referred to by page numbers in brackets. Italics are in part mine.
78. The literal meaning of *tathāgato* ("having thus come") in its widest sense is often used in *suttas* and interpreted in commentarial Pāli literature as a designation of 'human being' in general, and not only as an epithet of the Buddho.
79. Underlined by me in the following quotations from *Being and Time*.
80. Tsujimura Koichi (University of Kyoto) in 1957. I have published the translation of his seminar paper, on "The Nothing in Zen", in my Yugoslav book on Oriental Philosophy (C. Veljačić, *Filozofija istocnih naroda*, vol. II, Zagreb 1958).
81. Where not indicated otherwise, quotations are free translations based on my notes from *Existenz Philosophie* by K. Jaspers, Berlin 1938.
82. Cf. the section on this subject in my paper "Why is Buddhism a Religion?" in *Indian Philosophical Annual*, Vol. VI, 1970.
83. *The Beginning and the End* (op. cit.), p. 116 f.
84. Term used by Jaspers to indicate the subject-object "split" (*Spaltung*) in the primordial "all-encompassing" pre-reflective awareness.
85. This and the following quotations are my free translations from *Philosophie* by K. Jaspers, Berlin 1948, 2nd ed., p. 712 ff.
86. Cf. T.S. Eliot: "Human kind cannot bear very much reality" (Th. Becket in *Murder in the Cathedral*).
87. A chapter on Śaṁkara was foreseen in the plan of *The Great Philosophers*, but the author did not live long enough to write it, at a time when explicit problems of Indian philosophies flared up again in the awareness of European thought.
88. Cf. *Philosophie*, p. 712 f.
89. J. Whal, *A Short History of Existentialism*. The Philosophical Library, New York 1949.
90. See note 39 in Ch. III, 1, above.
91. Translated by R. Schinzinger, Tokyo, Maruzen, 1958,
92. WWR I, 71 (Payne's transl. p. 412).

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16

Nihilism and Sūnyatā

KEIJI NISHITANI

I

ONE of the greatest and most fundamental problems all religions are now confronted with is their relation to science. The world-view prevalent in science, the scientific way of thinking in general, shows itself as absolutely incompatible with the world-view or ontology which the traditional religions have, by and large, regarded as their basis. The objection might here be raised, that such a world-view or ontology is a so-called metaphysics or philosophy, but is not a religion, nor has it anything to do with the essential life of religion. An objection of this sort has a half-truth, to be sure. But it cannot be said to be the whole truth.

When a religion comes into being concretely, that is, as a historical fact, it always has as its basis a world-view or ontology of one sort or another, even though it may be in a form in which it is not yet fully conscious of itself. For a religion, such a "philosophy" is not like clothes that one can change whenever he pleases. It is to religion just what water is to fish. It is the indispensable condition by virtue of which religion can actually come into existence. Water is neither the life of the fish as such nor its body, yet it is fundamentally linked with them. A change of the world-view or ontology is a matter no less fatal to religion than a change of salt water to fresh is to a fish.

Hence, the view that religion and science never come into conflict with each other if they remain confined within their proper limits, because each has its own proper realm and task, is not adequate for the purpose of solving the problem. A limit between two realms, a borderline, separates them from each other. But at the same time, it belongs to both of them. The crux of the problem we are now confronted with lies precisely in this borderline. In fact, it can be said that metaphysics and philosophy have

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been since ancient times a research of this borderline between science and religion. No neutral zone can exist between them, standing detached from them.

Moreover, it has now come to pass that the question has become one of whether a borderline, in fact, exists. For at present, science does not feel it necessary to take up the question of its own limits. In other words, the standpoint of science perhaps essentially has a tendency to overlook religion as well as philosophy—except perhaps the "scientific" philosophy which translates without ado the philosophical standpoint into the scientific one. This amounts to saying that science appears as something which regards as its own a standpoint of unquestionable truth that can assert itself over all. Hence, again, the character of absoluteness that always accompanies scientific knowledge.

For this reason, we can now no longer content ourselves with setting respective limits to science and religion, as we have become accustomed to do. The problem is more critical than the so-called theology of crisis thought it to be.

We can say that the reason science is able to conceive its own standpoint as that of unquestionable truth lies in the pure objectivity of the laws of nature, which are the presupposition and the content of scientific knowledge. No one is allowed to interfere with a scientific explanation of the laws of nature except scientifically. Science always requires that the criticism and correction of this explanation should be made only from its own standpoint. Because of this, although a scientific explanation has, properly speaking, a hypothetical character, its contents are, nevertheless, each time presented as objective facts. In the fact that science renders this possible is found the power unique to science, the authority inherent in science.

If this is true, does it follow that the contents of religion, philosophy, and art, if compared with the absolute character of scientifically objective knowledge, are nothing but mere productions of subjective conception or imagination? Is the scientific truth the whole truth due to its absoluteness? Or, is it not possible to think that, besides the absoluteness of scientific truth, in other realms truths would also exist, which are absolute in their respective spheres?

At first glance, it does not seem possible that a variety of absolute truth obtains. The general opinion is that "two absolute truths" is a contradiction in terms and that only one or the other can be true. But is this opinion after all self-evident? Is it not rather based upon a certain fixed and merely particular idea of the absolute or of the relative? Is the

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possibility of some new way of thinking about the absolute and the relative according to which two absolutes obtain entirely out of question? In attempting to think about the relative, is there no other alternative for us but to set a limit in the manner of dividing a sheet of paper by drawing a line across it? Would it not be incorrect for us to put aside the possibility of an entirely new mode of thinking about the absolute and the relative, according to which, as with a single sheet of paper seen from both front and back, two things, in spite of, or rather by reason of, their both being absolute, turn out to be all the more relative?

In order to account for these problems, I would like to approach the question of the relationship between science and philosophy from a little different angle from that hitherto ordinarily employed.

If the aforementioned objectivity of the laws of nature is taken for granted, the first question to be here posed is: in what horizon or on what level are the laws encountered and accepted? For instance, when a dog jumps at a piece of bread thrown by a man and catches it in the air, such "beings" as a piece of bread, a man, a dog, as well as their respective movements, are all subject to physico-chemical laws. Seen from this point of view, these "beings" and their respective movements, deprived of their particular concreteness, will be reduced to the homogeneous relationship of atoms and particles. It is in this relationship and the various laws holding sway over it that the true and real aspect of the concrete things and their movements I have just spoken of is thought to consist.

Of course, on top of the physico-chemical realm, there are supposed to exist the biological, the psychological, and eventually the realm of "spirit" or "personality". But various phenomena in these realms will all be regarded as capable of reduction in one way or another to the physico-chemical relations or laws and capable of being explained from them.

However, looking at it from another angle, it is undeniable that such "beings" as a piece of bread, a dog, and a human being exist each with its proper mode of being and with its proper "*eidos*". What is more, these "beings" make together a particular connection : for the dog, for example, the piece of bread and the man are in its "environment"; the same can be said for the man in his relationship to the piece of bread and the dog. The respective properties, manners of movement, and bodily structures inherent in the human being and the dog cannot be comprehended apart from the special characteristic of the environment each of them possesses.

Moreover, in this relation of "beings" to their environments, the way whereby the laws of nature are "accepted" varies according to the different levels on which they are accepted. As for the case I have just mentioned,

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the dog and the human being *live*, so to speak, the laws of nature in their respective behaviours. Here, the laws of nature are the laws which are lived. They appear in all living "beings" as the laws which are lived in their respective lives.

Moreover, when, in the case of a dog and a human being, the laws are lived in their respective lives—for instance, in the behaviours of man's throwing a piece of bread and of the dog's jumping at it—these behaviours involve at the same time a sort of bodily realization of the laws of nature; an understanding which is generally denoted by the vague term "instinct", or, to put it inversely, an understanding anterior to the understanding proper.

We cannot here embark upon detailed consideration of the "instinct" Bergson and other thinkers pursued very deeply. All that we can say is that "instinct" is based, on the one hand, on a particular relation of individuals and their environments--this relation is particular, because it determines the properties, movements, bodily structures, and so forth of living beings—and on the other, upon the "specific" mode of being which is inherited as the "*eidos*" of individuals from the parent individual to the child individual. "Instinct" can rather be said to come into play at the dynamic intersection of these two directions. Of course, such a general argument regarding instinct is not adequate even for making a basic distinction between plants and animals. But, for the time being, I will set aside further discussion of this problem.

From the standpoint of natural science, the laws of nature must be "at work" as dominant forces also in the aforementioned behaviours of living beings. But the point here is that these dominant laws reveal themselves in living beings as the laws lived and acted out with a sort of "instinctive" bodily realization. Here, the laws of nature reveal themselves only when living beings live and act them and thus embody and bodily understand them. In the world of concrete "being", the laws manifest their dominance only when the beings actualize them. This means that the domination of the laws is, in the case of living beings, encountered on the instinct level. Or, it can be said that the very way whereby the laws are encountered in living beings, the way through which the laws are established in the aforementioned fashion, that is, the fact itself that the laws become the laws which are lived and acted, is none other than what is termed "instinct". Instinctive behaviours are the actualization of the laws of nature. That living beings' acts occur only in accordance with these laws means that the laws are "at work", so to speak, in and as these acts. The rational law of being (*ratio essendi*), on the level of living

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"beings", comes into its own reality as the law which is embodied and bodily realized.

Generally speaking, such a way of actualization of the rational law has a "purposive" (teleological) character. The field wherein living beings arise and instinct comes into play is the field wherein the rational law of being acquires a teleological character. Here, physico-chemical laws are brought into synthesis in a purposive construction, supplying the material for this construction.

Let us look now at man. What characterizes man is technique. In his comprehension of the relation between a definite purpose aimed at and definite means required for its actualization is involved a knowledge of the laws of nature.

In contrast with mere instinct, technique involves some sort of intellectual comprehension of these laws. When primitive men made an instrument and learned how to make fire by its use, this understanding may be said to have implied the knowledge, even if in an embryonic form, of the laws of nature as laws. To use instruments and act technically comes about only through the knowledge thus implied.

To put it the other way round, knowledge advances only through man acting technically, and the advancement of knowledge, in its turn, develops technique. Here the laws become the known laws; the laws which, while being known, are lived and acted in instrumental techniques.

In this case, too, man's working in accordance with the laws of nature in technical actions means that the laws are "at work" in and as his working, and that, in this way, they become manifest and come to be realized as laws.

The only thing that differs in this case from the case of instinct is that the laws are actualized into actions through being reflected upon knowledge. And that knowing actualization is nothing else than the technique. Here, the laws appear and come into their own reality on the field wherein knowledge advances parallel to action. The dominance of the laws is accepted and encountered on such a field.

The same can be said of the case in which knowledge becomes scientific and technique also becomes scientific in its train. In the natural sciences, laws are known purely as laws in their abstractedness and universality. Technique also becomes mechanical, which implies such a knowledge of the laws. In this case also, the development of technique advances the apparatus of observation and experiment so that it gives impetus to the progress of scientific knowledge. And the progress of knowledge, in its turn, promotes the development of technique. Since the mechanization of

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technique the tempo of this reciprocal development of knowledge and technique has accelerated rapidly.

The meaning of man's always acting in accordance with the laws of nature is disclosed most thoroughly in mechanical technique. At the same time, that the laws of nature are actualized in and as man's actions reveal its meaning most radically in the same mechanical technique. It is in precisely this area of mechanical technique, wherein knowledge and purposive action go their way to a further development in ever-increasing reciprocal acceleration, that the laws of nature come to appear in their character as law. The laws are encountered most intimately in this area. Mechanical technique and machines are the ultimate embodiment and bodily understanding in man of the laws of nature.

In this way, the laws of nature appear and come into their own reality on various levels and various fields, and we encounter them on all these levels. We encounter them no less on the field of instinct, where we are on the same level as a dog, and on that of material inertia where we are on a par with a piece of bread, than on that of technical activity where we make use of instruments and machines.

Besides, it has generally been held that the developments of distinctions of these various levels sums up concisely the history of human "progress". In other words, the tendency in which, with insistent rationalization of man's knowledge of nature through science and technology, his intellect itself and even the whole of his everyday life are rationalized, has been given enthusiastic glorification.

Now, in the context of what I have just spoken of, we find two things being united into one. One is that the laws of nature hold sway over all things, ranging from inanimate things to human beings, according to different modes of being on their respective levels. We can here recognize that the dominating power of laws over beings has come to extend its domain by permeating the various levels of things. While inanimate things are merely made up of matter, living beings are composed of matter and, at the same time, provided with life, and human beings are endowed with intellect in addition to their being composed of matter and provided with life. That the laws of nature rule, to the very end, throughout the various levels which unfold themselves one after another within the domain of beingness reveals a gradual increase of the rule of laws over the things.

The rational law of being exhibits a perspective with multiple levels. Its "teleological" (purposive) character ascends accordingly as the level of being is elevated and eventually comes to its complete realization in the machine, in which man's purposive actions are put in motion in a purely

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"mechanical" manner. There is here, we can say, the rule of the laws of nature carried to its extremity.

Now, the other thing to be noticed here is that, in proportion to such an ascent of the ruling power of the laws, there appears a gradual penetration of the power of beings over the laws as they use them. This second aspect shows that the release of "beings" from the laws of nature through their use of them, their emancipation from the bondage of laws, and hence their freedom, is manifested in beings more and more deeply.

It is a matter of course that these two aspects connect into one. The higher the level of being ascends, the deeper the rule of laws reaches out into beingness. But, at the same time, the freedom of beings in using them comes to be realized all the more.

As for inanimate things, since they are wholly passive toward the rule of laws, the rule is to that extent direct, but to the same extent shallow and superficial. In the instinctive behaviours of living things, however, the laws appear as laws which are lived and acted. This signifies that the rule of laws here makes its appearance in a more intimately intensified and internalized form than in inanimate things. Even the life and behaviour of living things cannot stray a step from the laws of nature. On the other side, however, in that they live them they already take a step forward in the direction of the riddance of laws.

In short, already in their mode of being (as "living" beings) we can get a glimpse, however vague, of the fact that subordination to the laws is at once emancipation from their bondage. In the "instinctive" life and behaviour, the actualization of the laws of nature and the use which is made of them are directly united. It is only to be noted here that, in so far as this connection is direct, the world of living things is still tied down to the laws.

When man acts technically with instruments, however, the rule of nature's laws comes to light in a still more internalized form, and at the same time, the fact that the laws are made use of manifests itself all the more lucidly. This is because the laws come to realize themselves in man's actions through intellect. It is only in man's actions that we are able clearly to recognize that the subordination to laws means at once freedom from their bondage. And the most radical manifestation of this relation can be seen on the level wherein technique becomes mechanized.

Looking at it from one side, the appearance of machines implies the laws of nature appearing and coming into their own reality in and through man's actions in the most penetrating and most apparent form. In machines, man's action, we can say, has objectified itself even beyond the mode of being man's action and taken on the character of being the direct

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operation of the laws of nature themselves.

Machines are pure products of human intellect. Man constructed them for his own purposes. They can be found nowhere in the world of nature, as the products of nature. In spite of this, they give expression to the operation of natural laws most purely—more purely than any of the products of nature themselves do. The laws of nature directly operate in machines with a directness indiscernible in any of the products of nature. We can say that in machines, nature was brought back to itself in a more purified (or abstracted) form than is possible in nature itself.

As such, the operation of the machine has become an expression of man's action. The expression of the laws of nature in a form so purely abstract that it is to be found in none of nature's products and is in fact impossible as a natural occurrence, has become in the machine an expression of man's action.

This indicates the profundity of the rule of the laws of nature. They have come to reveal the working of their rule most deeply by permeating man's action and life—so deeply that nature again goes back to nature itself (brought to its abstract form) beyond the pale of the "human". There is here the aspect of the laws of nature making the most of their rule over beings in general.

Looking at it from another side, however, the coming into being of machines was an epoch-making emancipation of man from the rule of the laws of nature, the greatest embodiment of his freedom in using the laws. In machines, man's activity is wholly objectified and human artifice with certain purposes is inserted, so to speak, into natureas a part of natural things. In this way, man's rule over nature is radicalized. This is a rule over nature more radical than nature rules itself.

Thus, the relation in which subordination to the rule of laws is at once emancipation from them here comes to light most clearly. The field of this relation as such finds expression in machines and appears in the form of machines.

II

Of utmost significance for us, however, is that there has arisen a great problematic ever since the aforementioned relation of the laws of nature and "beings" reached the last stage of its development, the stage of the appearance of machines. The new problem lies in the fact that the very reversal of the relation is now in process, a reversal in which the ruling becomes itself the ruled.

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In what I have said above, the fact that the laws of nature gradually intensify their rule over the being as the level of beingness ascends, means precisely that the being at the same time frees itself gradually from the rule of laws, rather making use of them for its own "purpose". In this sense, we here find the rule-relationship on both sides; the law ruling over "beings" and the "beings" ruling over the laws. With the appearance of machines, the extreme point of this relationship was reached. But now there arises a new situation.

On the one hand, man's activity and life itself is becoming, as a whole, gradually mechanized and impersonalized on the field where the machine came into being, the field wherein the rule of the laws of nature came to establish itself deeply in man's activity and life. The field in which man found himself when he had produced the machine and which has ever since come to the fore, intensifying in strength, was one in which two things—one of which is, on man's side, abstract intellect looking after scientific rationality, and the other is, on the side of nature, "de-naturalized" nature, so to speak, which I have above described in terms of "purer than nature itself"—stood in correspondence to one another. But this same field is now gradually emerging as something which deprives man of his own human nature.

The relation I have mentioned above, where the rule of natural laws over beings gives way to beings ruling over the laws, brought to a peak with the debut of the machine, has turned out to be a relation lying beyond the authentic and natural connection between man and the world of nature; a field which transcends the limits of man's human nature and of nature's natural character. Herein the relation attains its most thorough radicalization. But, at the same time, we see here a profound reversal of such a relation now emerging in this limit-situation. It can be described as a relation wherein the rule of natural laws over man's action and life that directly engendered man's rule over the laws of nature is reversed from a more fundamental position to a relation in which the laws of nature once more come to rule man who hitherto has held sway over them. This is none other than what is called the tendency towards man's mechanization, towards the loss of human nature; the situation, needless to say, now constituting one of the basic features of the "culture crisis".

On the other hand, there appears in this reversed relation another issue in connection with man's mechanization. Just as man's mechanization is a reversal of his rule over the laws of nature, a reversal likewise arises in the rule of natural laws over man. The rule of natural laws, pushed to the limit-situation in their profound internal rule over man, opens up a mode

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of being in which man behaves as if he stood entirely outside the laws of nature.

Such is, briefly speaking, man's mode of being, at the bottom of which *nihilum* opens up. Eventually, the place where the machine comes into being—the field in which, as I said before, the correspondence of abstract intellect demanding scientific rationality with denaturalized nature obtains —opens up *nihilum* at the bottom both of man who relies on that intellect and of the world of nature as well.

It is now only in standing on this *nihilum* that man is able to find himself detached and completely free from the radical and thoroughgoing rule of the laws of nature. This is a standpoint in which man looks at the laws of nature as if they were entirely external to him. Here, the mode of man's being whereby he lives in keeping with the natural order or natural laws, as has been advocated from ancient times, is completely broken through. In place of it, there comes into view a mode of being wherein man behaves as if he, while standing on the freedom of *nihilum*, makes use of the laws of nature entirely from without. This mode of being is characteristic of man as a subject that adapts itself to impulsive and desire-driven life; that means, in other words, man's subjectivity establishing itself on the plane of life in its natural and raw state, of life's own naked vitality. In this sense, it appears to show similarities to "instinct". But the fact is that it is a mode of being diametrically opposite to "instinct", as a mode of being of a subject standing steadfastly on *nihilum*.

This mode of being of a subject that, grounded on *nihilum*, adapts itself to raw life, exhibits its images according to the depth or shallowness of its adaptation. For instance, *nihilum* lies hidden even behind the tendency in which the average person in the contemporary world passionately devotes himself to sports, cycling races, or other amusements. Here *nihilum* is only floating in the atmosphere of man's life without clearly coming to his consciousness. Yet there is at work a masked nihilism. On the other hand, there is a nihilism which, wholly antagonistic to the condition of the average person in mass society, assumes the form of existential solitude, in which *nihilum* is chosen as the ground of one's own being with clear consciousness and decision. Between these two, there are nihilisms of all shades. These various kinds of nihilism have something in common in a mode of being, a nakedly-living subjectivity which stands steadfast on *nihilum*. It is a mode of man's being wherein he uses the laws of nature by behaving as if he stood entirely outside them. The rule of natural laws over man was reversed at its ultimate extremity into such a mode of man's being.

That the laws of nature, while coming into their own reality through

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man's acts, rule over man, implies the rationalization of human life and thought. This rationalization has from the eighteenth-century Age of Enlightenment even up to the present been conceived as man's progress. But, in fact, from the ground of that rationalized life is gradually emerging a naked life entirely anterior to rationalization—the naked life of a man whose being is grounded on *nihilum* which opens up in a place inaccessible to any kind of rationalization.

Behind and in parallel with the advancement of the rationalization of life, man's affirmation of his own entirely irrational, un-spiritual—or rather entirely "pre-reflective"—mode of being, that is, the status of a subject that, while standing steadfast on *nihilum*, pursues its desire unrestrictedly, is increasing in potency. This circumstance also constitutes one of the basic aspects of what is usually called the contemporary culture crisis.

Thus, from whichever side one looks at it, there comes into view a reversal in which the ruling becomes itself the ruled. At the extremity of his freedom in ruling over the laws of nature, man shows a tendency to be deprived of his human nature and be mechanized. At the extremity of their permeating and totally ruling man's life, the laws of nature come to be ruled by man who, as a subject of desire-driven freedom, behaves as if he stood outside all the laws and their controls. The mechanization of man's life and his change into a completely irrational subject arise as a fundamental whole. As I said before, it is in the mechanical technique, in the fact that the realm in which the machine comes into existence is opened up within man's life, that the situation in which the subordination to the laws is at once emancipation from them assumes its most radical form. But at the same time, the real aspect of this situation now appears as an inverted image that hides most secretly its real form. The authentic relation that naturally ought to be between man and the world of nature even in the situation of technology shows an image in actuality of human life as if it were fallen into a state of perversion. This is what we usually mean by saying that man is dragged along by the machines he himself constructs. This is also the matter underlying the problem of imbalance between the progress of science and the progress of man's morality. The crux of the matter is not so much their imbalance as their movement in contrary directions. It goes without saying that this problematic pointedly takes one shape in the problem of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, if we extend our argument from man's mechanization and his change into a desire-driven subject to historical and social problems, the various forms of political institutions in the contemporary world, for instance, will also fall under this same problematic. In the communist

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countries, the political institution exhibits a tendency towards totalitarianism which implies direction to the mechanization of institutions as well as of man. In the liberalistic countries, the freedom of individuals in democracy is apt to change into that of the merely desire-driven subject. These two different directions are derived then from the same root and converge into the same problematic. Lastly, viewed as a whole, the problem of mechanical civilization and of political institution reverts to one and the same ultimate root, which is the site whence the contemporary version of nihilism is emerging, either in a camouflaged form or in a form brought to consciousness of itself.

Nihilism in the present world begins, as was said before, with the sense of meaninglessness that has come to be perceived from the depths of both man himself and the world, in parallel with the appearance of the mechanistic world-image of modern science and in parallel with an increasing tendency man's mechanization which has gradually permeated not only the social structures in the modern world but also man's inner life.

In the midst of the tendency of human life to be in fact mechanized socially as well as psychologically and taken itself for a kind of mechanism, man has rendered himself capable of escaping from being dissolved into a mechanism, inner or outer, only as a desire-driven subject that places itself (with or without towards self-consciousness) on the *nihilum* that opens up at the ground of that mechanism.

As was noted before, the reversal which occurred between the authentic relation of natural laws and man has taken the shape of a basic intertwining of man's mechanization and his change into a desire-driven subject. At the bottom of this intertwining, *nihilum* has opened up as a sense of the meaninglessness of the whole affair. This *nihilum* has come to reveal itself precisely as what ought to have emerged from the basic situation in which man finds himself in the contemporary world. Hence, it is something which cannot remain unperceived. It eventually has to come to man's self-awareness, if he but fixes his sight upon his own existence without delusions of any kind.

This is why many contemporary existentialists, by virtue of honesty to their own existence, have decided of themselves to stand steadfastly on *nihilum*. Such a positive nihilism in existentialism reveals an intent to steps outside man's mechanization as well as his degeneration to a desire-driven mode of being, both inherent in the nihilism which is not yet brought to consciousness of itself. In other words, it shows an effort to avoid the pitfall of the perversion into which man falls victim at present.

But at the same time, man cannot manage to escape the perversion as

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long as he places himself on *nihilum*, because the *nihilum* opened up precisely through that perversion, and the pitfall which opened up at the bottom of that perversion is none other than *nihilum*. *Nihilum* cannot escape *nihilum* by itself. Nihilism is prevented from actualizing its aforementioned intention through the very *nihilum* on which it stands so steadfastly. Nihilism and the consciousness of *nihilum* therein involves such a dilemma.

Moreover, if this nihilism can be said to have arisen from the rule of natural laws, from the influential role played by science and technique in the manner in which man is concerned with the world and with himself, we can say also that in this nihilism and in the dilemma involved therein, the problem of science and religion comes into question in its most concentrated and fundamental form.

III

In the preceding paragraph, I spoke of the rule of science and scientific technique, or more fundamentally, of the field wherein they arise : the opening up of the sphere in which abstract, impersonal intellect and the mechanistic world-image correspond with each other. I also spoke of the emergence, owing to this new situation, of a two-sided tendency towards the mechanization of man's inner life and social relations on the one hand and man's transformation into a desire-driven subject on the other : in a word, a tendency towards the loss of humanity. As for these problems in our contemporary world, the traditional religions which, in favour of the concept of God and man as personal, have based themselves on the personal relation between them, find themselves confronted with one fundamental and difficult question.

To emphasize the meaning of man's personality or spirit is, of course, indispensable for man's right mode of being, which goes in the direction diametrically opposed to the loss of humanity. This is also why ethics, art, and philosophy are of great significance. From the realm of these realities, it is even possible for us to draw a definite line of demarcation, in one way or another, against the domination of science.

What is more, at the base of that personal-spiritual realm, the relation to God as absolute personality (or absolute spirit) was speculated and man's personality or spirit was thought to be firmly grounded only on this religious relation. The direction opposite to the rule of science has drawn, in most cases, its motive power from this realm of religion. Hence, resistance against a tendency towards loss of humanity has, till now, assumed the form of setting limits to the standpoint of science from a basic religious

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realm. Also we can trace the ever recurring mark of such repeated efforts of resistance in the history of philosophy since Descartes. These efforts were made with good reason, because personality or spirit constitutes the core of genuine humanity.

As was noted before, however, due to natural science the image of the natural world has undergone a complete change since the Renaissance. The world has emerged as entirely inhuman and wholly indifferent to human affairs. It has severed the personal relation of God and man horizontally. As a result, the ordering the world through God, the divine providence in history, and even the existence of God have become notions alien to the human mind. Man has become gradually indifferent to these notions and eventually to his own human nature. Man's dehumanization and mechanization is in progress.

Face to face with such a situation, we cannot help but think that there has appeared something that is absolutely beyond our solution, in so far as we keep our footing only on the idea of personality or spirit, or on the idea of the personal relation of God and man. Here arises the claim, as I referred to before,[1] that a transpersonal field should be opened up beyond the domain of so-called personality or spirit—the precise and the only field, however, in which personality and spirit come into their own reality and appear in their true figure as personality and spirit.

Before,[2] I thought it possible to recognize a "personal-impersonal" character in so-called God's omnipresence, in non-differentiating divine "Love", or "God's perfection", which causes the sun to rise equally on both the good and the evil. The reason thereof is that I recognize in the Christian concept of "God" a facet of trans-personality. Eckhart indicates the same thing when he speaks of absolute nothingness as the "ground" of the personal God. He conceives it as the plane of absolute negativity, in which subjectivity as "personality" is broken through directly underfoot of itself. At the same time, he conceives it as the absolute affirmation on which our personality reappears and comes into its own reality; in a word, the plane of absolute death-*sive*-life.

Such a plane must not be on the yonder-side of "*this* world", of "*this* earthly life", etc. It must not be merely "transcendent". On the contrary, it must be, in truth, *radically* on this-side, be even more this-sided than our lives and ourselves here and now are ordinarily supposed to be. Eckhart's "detachment", that is to say, transcendence not only from the self and the world but also even from God—as he says, he flees from God for God's sake—must be, so to speak, the absolutely transcendent this-side. He himself says that the ground of God is, within the self, more intimately near the self than the self itself.

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that our own selfhood in its true self-awareness and the suchness of things come into being as *one*, self-identically, this is not the same as the standpoint of the "unity" of subject and object that appears in various guises in the history of philosophic thought both East and West, whose basic characteristic lies in starting from the presupposed dualism of subject and object so as to induce them to a subsequent unification where they will vanish. The absolute this-side, contrarily, is not some unification brought forth as a result, but the originally selfsame place of absolute openness or emptiness which nevertheless is at once our own home-ground, each of us being here in his true selfhood and self-awareness, as well as things' own home-ground, each thing being here truly in and as itself. This standpoint is neither monism or dualism of any kind. It is the absolute self-identical One which is, as it is, the absolute Two.

But the question will inevitably arise whether this is possible, and if so, how. What is the mode of being of things, when we say that it is only in emptiness that they are on their own home-ground ? To put it the other way around : what does "in emptiness" mean, when we say it is only in emptiness that things are disclosed in their own reality ? After all, when we say "form is emptiness, emptiness is form," what is the mode of being of "form" (existing things), and the meaning of emptiness ? In emptiness, moreover, that things are really on their own home-ground in their suchness and beyond all representation or conception, that they are there in themselves, means precisely that there our individual selfhood opens up on and as the absolute this-side, that our selfhood is realized in its true self-awareness. How can this be possible ?

The problem is revealed, for example, in words from Dōgen's *Genjō-kōan* : "That one's self conveys itself to and practices and confirms all things, is illusion. That all things advance forward and practice and confirm the self, is enlightenment." And, from the same work : "To learn the way of the Buddha is to learn one's self. To learn one's self is to forget one's self. To forget one's self is to be confirmed by all things. To be confirmed by all things is to make the mind and body of one's own self as well as the body and mind of other selves drop away."

What mode of being of things renders it possible for them to come and practice and confirm one's self, or for one's self to be confirmed by them ? Why is this at once the dropping away of the body and mind of one's own self and the body and mind of other selves ?

To give another example. Musō Kokushi says in his *Muchū Mondō* ("Questions and Answers in a Dream") : "Hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all of these are the self's own original part." Again : "It is not that the field of that original part lies in body

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and mind, or that it lies outside body and mind, or that body and mind are precisely the place of the original part, or that the original part is sentient or non-sentient, or that it is the wisdom of Buddhas and saints. Out of the realm of the original part have arisen all things : from the wisdom of Buddhas and saints, to the body and mind of every sentient being, and all lands and worlds."

What does this "original part of the self" indicate ? What does it mean, that hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all constitute the original part of the self, that they all have arisen out of the realm of that original part ?

VIII

In the field of consciousness things are posited as objective beings, with a self-conscious ego being set up opposite them as a subjective being. Things are then "reality" in the sense of entities external to us, although the very fact that they are external is owing to the standpoint of man's consciousness. Things said to exist outside the subject are fundamentally (that is, epistemologically) still inside the compass of subjectivity. That something is an "object" means simply that it is objectivized, that it is represented as an object. That a thing exists objectively and lies beyond all conscious representation is only possible by its being represented as something beyond representation. It is a paradox essentially involved in representation (and hence in the "object" as well), and the *aporia* inherent in the very field of consciousness.

When the field of consciousness is broken through so as to open up *nihilum* at its base, and all things are so to speak "nihilized" and deprived of their "reality," the subjective being makes this *nihilum* the field of self-emancipation and through this subjectivized *nihilum* becomes more authentically subjective. Also, by saying that things are divested of the character of external reality, I do not mean they simply turn out to be illusions, rather that in their being divested of the character of external reality they simultaneously escape from the subjective, representative character that lies hidden behind what is called external reality. They move a step further outside the paradox of representation just mentioned.

In the field of *nihilum* things cease to be objects and as a result disclose themselves as the reality wholly beyond representation. "Wholly beyond representation" here is diametrically opposed to the "objective" existence of things that are hiddenly represented so as to appear external and beyond representation. While in the field of consciousness, reality that is "external"

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and independent of representation arises only by way of representation, in the field of *nihilum* , where things are deprived of external reality as objects, they escape this representative character and reveal themselves in their own reality.

When the field of *nihilum* is opened up at the ground of both subject and object at once, when it appears from behind the relationship of subject and object, it always presents itself as a field that has been from the first there at the ground of that relationship.

What seems to make things and ourselves unreal in fact makes them more really emerge; as Heidegger says "The being of beings reveals itself in the nihilization of *nihilum*". The field of *nihilum* is thus the field where the subject becomes more authentically subjective, and at the same time things reveal themselves more in reality.

Then, if we advance further and turn away even from that field of emptiness (if we, as was said before, go from a right-angle turn to a one hundred and eighty or even a complete three hundred and sixty degree turn), in what mode of being do things disclose themselves on the field of emptiness ? This is the question I have raised in the above.

Of course, in the field of emptiness, things are not merely subjective representations as idealism asserts, nor are they merely objective beings or external realities independent of consciousness as realism and materialism insist. However independent things may be of consciousness—although this already, as I pointed out before, is not so simple as one might suppose—they cannot be independent of *nihilum*. No thing whatsoever can be freed from *nihilum*. They return sooner or later to nothing, so that they only exist as essentially non-existent and unreal, and yet they exist really and authentically precisely because of their being unreal. It is, moreover, in *nihilum* that the being of existing things can be revealed, questioned, and comprehended. The being of things is comprehended by the subject that has become authentically subjectivized in *nihilum*, at one with the being of the subject itself. For this reason, no thing whatsoever can be independent of *nihilum*. The field of *nihilum* far transcends the field of consciousness in which the opposition between materialism and idealism obtains, much more so the field of emptiness, in which alone the abyss of *nihilum* can arise.

Neither the sphere of consciousness nor that of *nihilum* can exist apart from the field of emptiness. Prior to the aspect of things objectivized as external reality in the field of consciousness and prior to their more authentic aspect of being nihilized in the field of *nihilum*, all things are in the field of emptiness in their truly authentic and original aspect. In emptiness, things truly and ultimately abide at their own home. At the same

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time, prior to objective consciousness grounded upon representation and prior to the perception of being in *nihilum*, the truly authentic and original knowing establishes itself in emptiness as the absolute this-side. It is the knowing that arises at the very place where it can be said that "all things advance forward and practise and confirm the self," or that "hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all of these are the self's own original part" : it can perhaps be called a kind of "knowing of unknowing." Here the self is truly on its own home-ground. Where plants and trees are radically and simply plants and trees, where tiles and stones are tiles and stones through and through, and self-identically with this fact, the self is radically the self. This is the knowing of unknowing, a self-awareness which is none other than the field of emptiness. Let us consider this in a little more detail.

From ancient Greece to the present day, in the history of Western thought being or existence can be said to have been dealt with in most cases in terms of the category of substance or the category of (personal) subject. Whether inanimate or animate thing, human being or even God, when one takes something as a being-in-itself, its beingness is considered usually as substance. The concept of substance indicates in something that which makes it be itself, that which makes it preserve its self-identity in spite of the incessant changes that occur in its more or less "accidental" properties. We must say, however, that we come to the concept of substance regarding something only because we view it from the outset as an "object" or (from the opposite side) as a thing posited in front of, viewed from, and represented by the subject. This involves the paradox of representation spoken of before. It is the same in the case of "life" or "soul" being considered in terms of substantiality. Once the circumstance that lies behind the forming of the concept of substance is brought to light, it is natural to propose, as Kant did, the basic position that all objects are representations, and therefore "appearances", and to interpret substance as one of the *a priori* pure concepts of understanding, as something which the thinking activity "thinks into" (*hineindenken*) objects. (In spite of this, the paradox of representation remains unsolved. Kant tries to avoid it by means of the distinction between "appearances" and things-in-themselves", or *phenomena* and *noumena*).

Such a state of affairs lurking behind the forming of the concept of substance gives rise to the idea of a "subject" as something that rejects any objective comprehension whatsoever. Although Kant, of course, marks an epoch in the awakening of the subject in that sense, the same awakening has made a remarkable advancement after him, and continued all the way to the existential subjectivity, that is, to the existence "ecstatically"

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thrust into *nihilum*. The subject now comes to find itself in *nihilum* "essentially". It exists in such a way as to disclose there its own beingness. Generally, that *nihilum* opens up at the base of a being, means that the field is opened up where its beingness, its essential mode of being, is disclosed. Thus in *nihilum* both things and subject return to their essential mode of being, to their ground where they are from the first in and of themselves.

But at the same time, their beingness itself becomes totally a question-mark. It becomes something of which we know neither whence it comes or whither it goes, something essentially incomprehensible and unnameable. Each and every thing, no matter how familiar and acquainted it may be to the self, is originally a thing unknown in that basic sense. The self as a subject also in regard to its own origin, that is, in its "beingness" as such, is something unnamed that refuses to be determined in any way. It is what I meant when, speaking of the "Great Doubt," I said that the self becomes a realization of the Doubt.[6] When the being of things is disclosed on the plane of *nihilum*, it is disclosed as a real "doubt," and the being of the self also appears in its original aspect, the aspect of an enigma to the self. There, in the so-called Great Doubt, things and the self revert to their essential mode of being in which they have been from the beginning.

The traditional ontology cannot be said to have pursued the issue of being to such depths. The field wherein the being itself of the questioner about being becomes a question-mark has never been disclosed. Traditional ontology has never stepped outside the merely "theoretical" standpoint that only asks about "being", a standpoint in which the questioner and the questioned are set apart from each other. It could not reach the place of the manifestation of the Great Doubt, the field where the questioner and the questioned simultaneously manifest themselves as a question-mark, and where there is only present the one great Doubt. Ontology must move through nihilism to a new, entirely different plane.

But if in *nihilum* being itself is disclosed and becomes directly a question mark, the standpoint of *nihilum* cannot be the standpoint able to solve the question. It is a standpoint that merely declares the need of an inevitable turnabout. If in *nihilum* every thing reveals its original enigmatic aspect at one with the subject, the standpoint of *nihilum* must itself be transcended. It is in this, as I have repeatedly pointed out above, that the standpoint of emptiness reveals itself.

It should be obvious that in the standpoint of emptiness the being itself of something can no longer be said to consist in "substance" or "subject", for in *nihilum* both become the question. But can we conceive

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of a mode of being that is neither subjective or substantial ? No matter how difficult it may be to imagine this, the need for such a new perspective in regard to the approach to beingness, is not to be denied. The concept of substance as well as that of subject is established after all on the field of subject-object duality; the former is concerned with the "object" and presupposes the "subject", and it is the same with the latter, *mutatis mutandis*. This field of duality is broken through by *nihilum* in which, as I said above, things and the self are brought back to their ground; where however, the concepts of substance and subject must lose their ground that is no other than the subject-object duality itself. Thus, in the field of *nihilum* the being of things as well as of the self becomes thoroughly questionable by being transported to a region beyond the reach of "logical" thinking. It follows as a necessary consequence that with the further turning away from *nihilum*, that is, within emptiness, the mode of being of things as well as of the self can be neither subjective nor substantial. The mode of being of things when they are truly on their own home-ground in their ultimate being-in-themselves, or in their selfness wholly beyond all modes of being in which they are reflected upon the subject-object relation, cannot be substantial, much less subjective. Equally, the mode of being of the self, when it is ultimately on its own home-ground and in its true selfness, cannot be subjective, much less substantial. If so, what mode of being is being-in-itself in the ultimate sense—more simply, "selfness"—which is neither substance nor subject ?

IX

Both the concepts of substance and of subject provide each in its own way the mode of being in which something is and remains what it is within constantly changing, transitory conditions. So far, we can say that substance and subject each refer to the mode of being-in-itself. But do they truly render the reality of that mode of being ?

A child is making a fire in the garden. There *is* a fire. "Substance" indicates in the fire that which determines it as fire. It signifies the self-identity, the is-ness of the fire. What distinguishes it from the earth, the yard tools and the firewood stacked nearby, the essential property of fire, the power and activity of burning fire, may be said to constitute fire's substance. In it, one can possibly see fire's mode of being-in-itself, its selfness.

But in this case the mode of being of fire as fire is clearly grasped in the aspect in which it appears to us, and hence to the extent we recognize it. Fire's substance is the "form" (*eidos*) of fire. Here fire manifests its

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selfness to *us*. This way of manifestation of a thing is its "form" and the field of "form" is the place where we can distinguish fire from anything else and recognize in combustion its essential property. Here moreover we can discern intellectually or analyze scientifically the process which is called combustion, and thereby express what fire is, that is, its substance. If this expression is the "definition" of fire, then combustion may be said to have the role of moment that constitutes the main content of the definition (the so-called specific difference). That its substance is thus set forth as a "logical" structure and rendered capable of being explained theoretically, means that it can be seen from the standpoint of reason. That is, although "substance" indicates fire's selfness, it is so only in so far as it can be recognized through reason, in the aspect in which it appears to and is conceived by us.

To sum up, the field in which we comprehend a thing's mode of being-in-itself as its form, the field in which the concept of substance arises, has a twofold character : on the one hand it is the field wherein a thing discloses *its own* selfness, and on the other it is the field where *we* comprehend the thing's selfness. This is a characteristic feature of the field of *logos* or reason. Here, we must say the thing is still grasped as an object (and hence, from the opposite side, from the point of view of the subject). No matter how rigorously the grasping of a thing as "substance" insists on viewing things in their selfness, or speaks of viewing them from within themselves, it is still a grasping on a field that unfolds so as to have reason inserted within things.

From ancient times, reason has been called the standpoint of accordance or identification of subject and object. The field of reason is one in which the seer and the seen are found basically to make a unity. This means the field of reason is one in which things disclose themselves in their mode of being-in-itself. It also means that, different from merely subjective passions and imagination, reason's cognition possesses objectivity. On the other hand, however, in spite of reason consisting of the accordance or even identification of seer and seen, it has time and again been observed that in this rational contemplation or intellectual intuition there still remains traces of the "two" of seer and seen. In other words, the objectivity of reason's cognition implies the selfness of a thing is grasped, but at the same time, traces remain of its being viewed externally as an objective being. Such is the standpoint of reason, in which the selfness of a thing is apprehended as substance.

Because of this, the field of reason is not one where a thing can be on the home-ground of its being-in-itself. It is not the proper place in which the true mode of being of a thing's selfness is established.

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In order to approach the fact "*that* fire is", reason always goes through the process of asking "*what* fire is". Its approach is from essential being to actual being. I think we find in Aristotle the most outstanding example of such a way of thinking. That fire actually burns is due to something burnable (for example, firewood) being burned. The actual existence of fire is supported by the firewood. He holds that fire's burnability is due to the fact that the nature (*physis*) of fire is latent in the firewood. Burning, to use Aristotle's terminology, is something that develops from latent possibility (or *dynamis*) to real actuality (or *energeia*).

But firewood cannot catch fire by itself. It is always in need of actual fire. In the same way, a child's learning the alphabet and learning to read is the actualization of an ability (possibility) latent in him. Indispensable for developing the child's reading activity from potentiality to actuality, however, is a teacher who already knows how to read. A pine tree is a development of the nature (*physis*) latent in its seed, yet this seed in its turn is generated by a parent tree possessed of the same nature. Everything exists in this circular development between possibility and actuality. And this circular development is ruled throughout by the essential being, the *physis* of the fire or the pine tree.

Considering essential being as the *physis* (natural essence) of a thing, Aristotle proceeded from essential being to actual being. Here the structure of being—he thought to consist in "form" and "matter". In the actuality of the fire, in its activity of combustion, the being itself of fire manifests itself as "form". And that manifestation occurs as an emergence out of the potentiality latent in combustible "matter". To think of a development from potentiality to actuality is an attempt to connect "form" to "matter" and to look for the substrate of the former in the direction of the latter. The endeavour to grasp the being of things as objective beings from the standpoint of reason stands out in bold relief. Seen from the opposite side, the being of things is still grasped from the point of view of the subject. This is the same characteristic I pointed out before in the position that conceives of the *logos*-structure of being. In fact, the dynamic view of the developmental relation of possibility and actuality as well as the static view of the structural relation of matter and form are conceived—roughly speaking, as I cannot enter into a detailed discussion of this problem—in accordance with the "logical" relation in a "theoretical" definition, that is, the relation of the concept of genus and the concept of species with its specific difference.

In short, it is characteristic of the standpoint of reason that ontological structure-coherence in the being-in-themselves of things is perceived in the thinking of the subject concerned with it as a necessary connection of

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its thought content. Therefore, we can say the standpoint of reason is an attempt to approach the actual being of something (*that it is*) through the medium of its essential being (*what it is*). This means that it is not a standpoint capable of directly penetrating to the precise point where something *is*. It is not capable of placing itself directly in the very place of a thing's selfness, where it originally is and stands in itself, or where it stays at home, in its selfness. But is it after all possible to place oneself in such a standpoint ? If it is possible, then what mode of being is this in a thing? What is our own mode of being when we take ourselves there ?

X

Substance is that in which a thing preserves its self-identity; it denotes the selfness of a thing in the form in which its selfness is revealed to us. If so, what is a thing's mode of being completely apart from its manifestation to us ? What is its genuine mode of selfness ? As was stated before, Eckhart describes Godhead or God's "essence" in terms of an entirely formless, absolute "nothingness"; the place where God is in his own home-ground is beyond all forms whatsoever, in which He reveals Himself to his creatures; in particular, beyond the "personal" forms through which He reveals Himself to man. We are here, with respect to all that exists, including even "plants and trees, tiles and stones", concerned with a similar meaning of "essence." We are concerned with a mode of being in which a thing originally *is*, standing on its own home-ground of being and preserving its own self-identity as selfness.

In my view, the key to this problem is contained within a matter that has been given attention in the East from ancient times, and given expression in such phrases as : "Fire does not burn fire," "Water does not wash water," "The eye does not see the eye." The expression that fire does not burn fire refers of course to the self-identity of fire. This, however, is not the self-identity of fire as a "substance" on a standpoint from which we view it as an object. It is rather the self-identity of fire as "selfness" on its own home-ground of being, that is, it is the self-identity of fire itself.

In the sense that fire is something that is unable to burn fire, the phrase "Fire does not burn fire" speaks of the *essential* being of fire. Yet it also means that there is a fire *actually* burning, that here there is actually fire. That there is actually a fire burning vigorously means that the fire does not burn itself; that it is insisting on being in itself and is existing in its selfness. In the mode of being of fire-not-burning-itself, therefore, the fire's essential being and actual being are one. That

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expression indicates directly the self-identity of fire on its own home-ground of being.

This is fundamentally different from the case in which "substance" is conceived of as denoting the selfness of fire. What is described here by the word "self-identical" could never be "substance." "Substance" denotes the self-identity of a fire as recognized in its *energeia* (the being-at-work) of combustion, that is, in the mode of being in which it is acting as fire, in which fire is actually fire. On the contrary, when we assert that fire does not burn fire, what is indicated is the act of fire's not-burning, act as not-acting.

If we make a distinction for a moment between the fact that fire burns firewood, and the fact that it does not burn itself, then the burning that occurs when the fire burns firewood shows the selfness of fire, and fire being unable to burn itself likewise shows its selfness. These two circumstances are here one and the same. As something that burns firewood, fire does not burn itself, as something that does not burn itself, it burns firewood. This is the true mode of being of fire as fire, the true self-identity of fire. Only where it does not burn itself is fire truly on its own home-ground. This is not only the selfness of fire with regard to us, it is also fire's selfness with regard to itself. That means this is completely different from a "substance" that denotes the self-identity of fire only in its *energeia* of combustion. If the substance of fire is recognized in the *energeia* of combustion, then the fact that fire is burning only as something not burning itself can be truly said to show directly the selfness of fire. That fire does not burn itself means that fire is. at the base of its mode of being in suchness, not simply *substantia* and that its selfness differs from something described by the concept of substance.

As I have repeatedly said, the view has been generally held that the fact that a thing is itself and self-identical can be adequately described with the concept of substance; the view from the standpoint of reason, based upon the field of *logos*. Here the self-identity of a thing, *substantia*, is grasped logically as a "category" in the logic of being. Or rather, it is grasped from the first so as to be made susceptible of being logically grasped. It is in this way—the way basically of the traditional ontology as metaphysics—that we usually think of a thing's self-identity, of the fact that something is itself..

But the true mode of a thing-in-itself, its self-identity in the sense of "selfness" described above, differs so radically from self-identity in the sense of substance, that it implies a thorough negation of the latter conception and with it a turnabout of the standpoint of reason and all its logical thinking. For instance, against the view which in a fire takes notice

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solely of the aspect of its work of combustion (its *energeia*) and recognizes in it the self-identity of fire, whereby it *is* actually fire and whereby *there is* actually fire, the selfness of fire, as was expressed by "fire does not burn fire," must demand a totally different view that can also connote that aspect in which the complete negation of the substantial self-identity manifests itself. If we suppose within the potency and activity of burning the *physis* (natural essence), or in Buddhist terminology the so-called *jishō* (self-nature), of fire, the selfness of fire must be said to lie in its so-called *mu-jishō* (no-self-nature). While the concept of substance grasps the selfness of a fire merely in its own fire-nature (hence as *being*), its true selfness is "no fire-nature." The selfness of fire lies in non-burning. Of course, this non-burning cannot exist apart from burning. Fire is non-burning right in its burning. The point is, however, that the burning cannot in fact be conceived of without its non-burning, i.e. as long as the perspective of fire's not burning itself remains unopened. That a fire is sustaining itself in burning proves that it does not burn itself. Essentially non-combustion is the ground of combustion. Because of non-combustion, combustion is combustion. The *mu jishō* of a fire is its home-ground of being. So also with water. Water washes something because it does not wash itself.

For this reason, we must say that the self-identity of a fire being a fire cannot be conceived of apart from its non-burning. "Fire-nature" is real as such only as the fire-nature of no fire-nature. Fire's genuine self-identity lies not in a *substantia* or *jishō* conceptualized from its aspect of combustion, but rather arises only in the turnabout of that viewpoint, in the appearance of the aspect of non-combustion. Stated more concretely, genuine self-identity consists in the self-identity between that substantial self-identity (as being) and its absolute negation. Our usual utterance at the sight of a fire, that "this is fire" is mostly not true : that is, so long as the utterance is made from the position which recognizes the fire only in the aspect of burning. Since the real truth begins from negating such a position, we can even say that the utterance, "this is not fire," is nearer the truth. Only on the plane where this becomes possible is "this is fire" established as truth. "This is not fire, therefore it is fire"—to use the formula set forth in the *Diamond Sutra*—is the truth of "this is fire," the authentic way of directly denoting fire's selfness and of expressing the true reality of fire.

If all this sounds strange, it is only because we ordinarily place ourselves on the position of reason, in the word's broad sense, not merely in our everyday life but also in science and even in philosophy, and judge and view things (though on each field in a different way) from there where

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we do not touch the reality of things. We can touch their reality only on a field absolutely different and absolutely transcendent from judgements and views based upon reason. It is the field of a thing's selfness described above, the field of a thing's self-identity *pro seipsum* and not *pro nobis*. And since this field is absolutely different from the standpoint of everyday life, of science, or philosophical thinking, the self-identity of a thing on this field—for instance, the stubborn fact that this is fire—can be truly expressed paradoxically as, "this is not fire, therefore it is fire."

This absolutely transcendent field is none other than the field of "emptiness" which, as described previously, opens itself ultimately at this-side, and is the absolute this-side.

However, an adequate explication of the position of emptiness is possible when we take into consideration not only the concept of substance but also that of personal subject. Only then will we be able to pursue radically the problems I have brought up in the above; the problem of personality and materiality, and also the problem of the modes of being of a thing and of a self, when it is said that "all things advance forward and practice and confirm the self," or that "hills and rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones all are the self's own original part."[7]

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NOTES

1. "The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion", Kyoto : *Eastern Buddhist*, vol. iii, nos. 1 and 2.
2. *ibid.*
3. In Chapter I of "What is Religion?" *Philosophical Studies of Japan*, II.
4. *Eastern Buddhist*, vol. iii, no. 1, pp. 6-8.
5. "The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion", op. cit., pp. 71-88.
6. *Eastern Buddhist*, vol. v, no. 1, p 64.
7. *ibid.*, p. 69.

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17

*On the Supramundane and the Divine in Buddhism**

D. SEYFORT RUEGG

THE question whether Buddhism is to be regarded as a religion has often puzzled writers on the subject. This perplexity has arisen in large part from the fact that the Buddhism of India and Tibet can, in most cases, be described from a comparative point of view as non-theistic. It is of course easy enough to define religion in terms of theism and to link it inseparably with theology in the strictest etymological sense (i.e., the knowledge of God), and thus to exclude Buddhism from the outset; this solution to the problem has indeed been adopted by some writers. But such an approach can hardly commend itself to the student of Buddhism; not only does it beg the question of the basic and necessary features constitutive of religion, but it would exclude from the study of religion the Buddhist Dharma which is certainly very much concerned with the sacred and the spirituality of man as well as with reality. To call Buddhism simply non-theistic and to leave it at that is something of a half-truth imposing on it an alien (and somewhat ethnocentric) category that is neither inherent to Buddhism as a way of spiritual culture nor even particularly useful in understanding it in its most important dimensions.

It has also been claimed that 'early' Buddhism was non-theistic and that the Mahāyāna was, on the contrary, theistic. This view, accordingly, supposes that the Mahāyāna differs from 'early' Buddhism in at least one very important respect by admitting a divine and supernatural being who intervenes to save men and is the object of a theistic devotional cult. (To support this view, reference is made both to the Indian sources of the Mahāyāna and to certain currents in Tibetan and Sino-Japanese Buddhism.)

However, there appears to exist no adequate ground for postulating such a radical break between 'early' Buddhism and the Mahāyāna on the

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question of God (īśvara), any more than on that of an immutable individual (pudgala) or self (ātman). Shifts of emphasis there no doubt were, and the Mahāyāna perhaps has more nuances than the early Buddhism known to us. But the view that the Mahāyāna is theistic in any standard sense of the term is arbitrary and idiosyncratic in view of the testimony of the bulk of its main scriptures (sūtra) and exegetical treatises (śāstra). The Mahāyāna does indeed possess a clear notion of the supramundane and the divine. But 'supramundane' and 'divine' have here to be understood not according to some pre-established scheme borrowed from other religions and cultures, but in terms of the structure of Buddhist thought itself.

It is a well-known fact that for Buddhism, both 'early' and Mahāyānist, gods (deva, Tib. lha), like all other beings (sattva, Tib. sem-chen, *sems-can*), are subject to Karma and its ripening and they accordingly also belong to one of the five (or six) forms of transient existence in Buddhist cosmology. In Buddhism there is no supernatural and supreme God who creates the world and beings and no God who presides over or modifies Karma in favour of beings.

In Buddhist thought, furthermore, the gods are classified as either mundane (laukika, Tib. jig-ten-pa, '*jig-rten-pa*) or supramundane (lokottara, jig-ten lä dä-pa, '*jig-rten las' das-pa*), a division that closely follows a more general classification. In the first case they are minor deities, genii or local gods; and in this category are included deities of what may be termed the (pan-Indian or Tibetan) religious substratum capable of granting earthly boons or assisting in mundane matters, as well as genii who have to be propitiated. The supramundane ones are thought of on the contrary as beings far advanced on the path of spiritual perfection and as protectors of the Dharma, possessing great psychological and spiritual significance for the Sādhaka or practiser. (The possibility moreover exists for a laukika divinity to become a lokottara one in certain circumstances.)

For the meditating practiser, the Sādhaka, a tutelary divinity, emerging from Ultimate Reality designated as Emptiness (Śūnyatā), is a kind of exemplar or model of the supramundane level of spiritual perfection. The meditator measures himself up to and becomes undifferentiated from this divinity, not in an act of gratuitous and hybristic self-divinisation but rather in the understanding that there is a certain homology, always founded on the basic principle of Śūnyatā, between his own spirit and the supramundane and divine. The relation is therefore one of non-differentiation or non-duality, a most fundamental category in Mahāyānist thought.

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The supramundane or divine exemplar is often structured according to two further basic Mahāyānist categories, namely, compassionate means (karuṇā, Tib. yig-je, *sñiṅ-rje*; and upāya, Tib. thab, *thabs*) and discriminative understanding (prajñā, Tib. she-rab, *shes-rab*), so that the divinity emerges, out of Śūnyatā, paired with his prajñā or vidyā in the so-called yab-yum form, i.e., as the pair or syzygy of ('male') compassionate means and ('female') prajñā (sophia).

The yab-yum type of image has given rise to a great deal of speculation, not to say misunderstanding, owing to the fact that it is seen as depicting the union of male and female. That is, through an interpretation of the image as iconic rather than as symbolic it has been thought to have a sexual referent. (Here the terms iconic and symbolic are being used in the technical senses they have in the theory of signs, semiology.) Yet nothing could be more irrelevant to the comprehensive content of the image in question, where the yab-yum pair stands for the syzygy of karuṇā/upāya and prajñā; whereas the sexual interpretation results from the material form of the image. In other words, what is semiotically primary here is the symbolisation of two fundamental categories in Mahāyānist and Vajrayānist thought emerging so to speak in a polarised form from the Ultimate Reality of Śūnyatā; and the iconic (sexual) value of the paired figures is a mode in which this primary significance is specified without in any way exhausting the comprehensive symbolic intention or content of the image. (It might of course be that the morphology of the yab-yum type of image in Indian, Nepalese and Tibetan iconography is derived historically from pre-Buddhist, or non-Buddhist images, the intention of which was exhausted within the terms of their iconic reference. But once we come to the images in question in the Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna this is not the case; and the comprehensive symbolically determined intention has become primary, any iconically determined reference linked with the material form of the image being one particularised specification of the emergent polarity in the phenomenal world of samsāra). A failure to take due account of the distinction between an iconic sign and a symbolic or conventional sign, and between form and content, inevitably leads to confusion and to missing the dimensions, philosophical as well as psychological etc., in the culture in which it was created and used. This culture is inseparably bound up with the Dharma or Chö (*Chos*) of the Mahāyāna, as conveyed in the traditional civilisations of Buddhist India and Tibet.

To return now to the point raised at the beginning, Sanskrit Dharma and Tibetan Chö are, in the structure of these civilisations, no doubt more all-embracing terms than is the word 'religion' in much of modern usage.

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They cover not only what moderns are in the habit of regarding as religion and religious but also an entire cultural matrix. But this circumstance does not render the English word 'religion' unusable as a conventional translation-equivalent of Dharma and Chö; for semantic fields in different civilisation do not necessarily, and should not be expected to, coincide completely, and it is often impossible to find translation-equivalents in the target language that are precisely synonymous with terms of the source language. In the case of the terms Dharma and Chö this fact shows that the concept they express belongs to more levels than the word 'religion' in much of modern usage; it does not imply that what they express has nothing to do with what may properly be termed religious in the science of religions. Thus 'religion' may serve as nothing more nor less than a convenient, but of course approximative, translation of the words Dharma and Chö in Buddhist usage in India and Tibet. To avoid confusion, it may sometimes be advisable to retain the Sanskrit or Tibetan terms as is in fact often done at present.

Buddhism has its own concept of the sacred, though certainly not a sacred that is more or less co-ordinate with—and conveniently and tidily demarcated from—the profane. On the one hand there is the above-mentioned lokottara or 'supramundane' level, which is superordinate to the laukika or 'mundane'; and the divine, which has exemplary value for the Sādhaka in the world and provides a means of communication with the supramundane level. And on the other hand there is perfect Awakening (anuttarasamyaksambodhi) and Nirvāṇa transcending any and all polarities, binary oppositions and dichotomising conceptualisation (vikalpa, Tib. nam-par tog-pa, *rnam-par rtog-pa*), including of course even the binary opposition sacred/profane.

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It is in the Buddhist standpoint of śūnyatā (emptiness) that such a point comes to light more clearly. Sunyata is the place where each of us realizes himself in his own true reality (suchness)—himself taken as a concrete and whole man involving not only his personality but also his body—and is at the same time the place where all things around us present themselves in their own true reality (suchness). As we said before,[3] it can also be said to be the place where the words, "once the Great Death, then heaven and earth become new," can at once signify the resurrection of one's self.

"Resurrection" here means that the original face of one's self comes to appear as such; that one goes back to his authentic self as it really is.

Would it miss the mark to say that it is only when one returns to such a standpoint that the aforementioned relation—in which subordination to the rule of law is at once emancipation from it—can truly be established; that moreover, it is with the real possibility of that relation that the possibility of man's existence can also truly be established ? Would it be too much to say that only there can we find a standpoint that can truly overcome the situation wherein, as a result of the rule of science, that relation has undergone reversal and wherein the loss of humanity is in rapid progress; that is, the standpoint which can truly overcome the nihilism which that reversal has caused ? In the following, I would like to discuss how these problems can be approached.

IV

In the preceding paragraph, I argued that sunyata is the absolutely transcendent plane which is opened up not on the yonder-side of us, but on the genuine this-side which is more this-side than we to ourselves, and that this opening-up means a turnabout that should be described in terms of absolute death-*sive*-life. And it belongs to the nature of this death-*sive*-life that it must be taken up seriously and honestly, and that means, as radically as possible.

Up to the present, "to die and be reborn" has been spoken of in various religions. For instance, the admonition that one must die to finite life and be reborn to eternal life, that one must die to the world and to oneself and be reborn in God. In these cases emphasis is laid upon the life side. "Soul," "spirit", and "personality" have in most cases been treated from the viewpoint of life. (Even in the case of the dead; the soul or spirit as a ghost.) In this life direction, with one step beyond the level of inanimate things, the level of living things was seen, and from there an ascending direction to the stories of soul and spirit (or personality) was considered,

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and finally on top of this, in a kind of leap, the field of religion was conceived of as the personal relation of God and man. But, on the other hand, the death direction goes back through personality, spirit, soul, and life, and eventually arrives at inanimate things. Here, all things are conceived as based upon and reducible to materiality. The scientific way of thinking is fundamentally established in this direction. And again, in a kind of leap, at the limit of this direction, *nihilum* and meaninglessness is opened up at the base of all things and of life itself. Consciousness of this *nihilum* and meaninglessness gives rise to nihilism, as mentioned above.

It goes without saying that such a simple diagram as just described is, in fact, inadequate to fully express the matter involved here. For instance, in so far as all things are thought, as in the case of Christianity, to have been created out of *nihilum*, the so-called personal relation of God and man occurs as the grace of salvation through which eternal life is granted from beyond by breaking through that *nihilum*. Since a salvation of this sort has the implication of "to die and be reborn", it contains something which cannot simply be disposed of as belonging to the life direction.

Besides, if a man, without God and without ceasing to be a finite being, intends uncompromisingly to be himself, *nihilum* or death that absolutely separates him from God comes to his self-consciousness as a sin that makes him revolt against God. Sin is, as it were, *nihilum* or death in a sublimated form, which has come in sight on the scene of self-conscious existence. The root of this "original sin" spreads out even into the soul or the animal life of "natural" man, not to speak of his spirit or personality. Hence salvation as the forgiveness of that sin consists in overcoming the *nihilum* or death in its basic, sublimated and comprehensive form. "To die and be reborn" can also be spoken of in such a more fundamental sense. The life direction, of which I spoke above, can open up the realm of religion only by profoundly overcoming death; as I said before, here there is a leap.

Conversely, when it is said that in the death direction meaninglessness and *nihilum* is opened up at the base of all things and at the base of life itself, it does not simply mean that God is lost sight of, that only *nihilum* in the so-called *creatio ex nihilo* is left behind, or that *nihilum* is perceived behind the beingness of finite being. If so, the nihilism we are here concerned with could not be distinguished from the old, ordinary type of nihilism.

In the modern version of nihilism, however, *nihilum* extends, as I said before,[4] even into the place of God's existence and thus becomes an abyss. On that abysmal, Godless *nihilum*, all life whatsoever, that is, even spiritual

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personal life, not to speak of animal life and the soul, reveals the feature of meaninglessness at its base.

But at the same time, according to a nihilist way of thinking, man attains his true subjectivity and becomes truly free and independent only when he decides of himself to stand steadfastly on the abysmal *nihilum*. *Nihilum* is here conceived as the field of ecstatic transcendence of man's self-being, i.e., the field wherein the human "existence" is established. The existence placing itself on this field, from the point at which the meaninglessness and *nihilum* of life and being is radicalized, tries to make its own responsibility to re-create their meaning; or, from the unreservedly passionate desire to take its ground in the absurdity of life, it tries to draw a force able to affirm an absurd life as it is. In place of the "image of God", the image of "super-man" or the image of really human "man" is here set forth as an intentional objective inherent in man.

However this may be, in nihilism as existence there is something we cannot describe only in terms of death direction. There is the point where *nihilum* becomes the basis of a new, real mode of being, where death becomes the basis of a new, different way of living. This is why I stated before that nihilism appears as a leap on top of the death direction in which the scientific point of view originates. No less in the life direction than in the death direction, the real situation is never pure and simple.

In spite of all this, however, I think it possible to conclude that the traditional religions have come into being, by and large, with the life direction as their axis, and that the line connecting the scientific viewpoint and nihilism has originated with the death direction as its axis. This can be made clearer if compared with the standpoint of sunyata mentioned before.

As was once mentioned, we can see everything as established in its true-reality as the point of intersection between the direction of life and the direction of death. Everything can be seen as a kind of "double exposure" of life and death, of being and *nihilum*. With this, however, I do not advance a way of viewing things similar to that Plato inaugurated : that the things in the sensible world are transient beings undergoing a constant change because of their being a "mixture" of being and non-being. I do not also mean that being and non-being mingle together in something as if they were its quantitative parts, or, needless to say, that death arises where life comes to exhaustion, or that *nihilum* appears when being disappears. My point is, that life remains life to the end, and death always death, but that they together constitute a "thing" in its reality, bringing it to appearance as a certain thing, and that the life aspect and the death aspect of a thing can be superposed upon each other and things can be seen in both aspects

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at once. In this sense, such a mode of being can be called life-*sive*-death, death-*sive*-life. Thus a way is possible, I think, of viewing things directly in their own reality which is their mode of being life-*sive*-death or death-*sive*-life, therefore with no need for us to look away from the actual appearance of things.

Of the two directions of viewing things I spoke of before, the one tried to grasp the actual appearance of things with the life direction as its axis, and the other with the death direction as its axis. Thus there arises, on the one hand, an upward-moving viewpoint ascending from life and soul to spirit or personality. In the extremity of this movement the "death", which is implied throughout spirit, personality, soul, and life, comes to awareness as sin (in Christianity, as "original sin") in the sense of disobedience or rebellion against God as absolute life. And at the same time, by passing through the bottom of that death, as a religious conquest of death, the standpoint of a personal communion with God appears as a leap.

On the other, there arises an opposite direction of reducing everything to material relationships. In the extremity of this movement the "life" which is implied throughout life, soul, personality and spirit, comes to awareness as meaninglessness. And in this case, as a conquest of this meaninglessness by passing through its bottom, the standpoint of ecstatic existence in the midst of nihilism appears as a leap. However, what becomes of the matter when we proceed to see things directly as they are in accordance with their mode of being life-*sive*-death, death-*sive*-life ?

Possibly, a sort of leap may be even found here, yet it would not be by ascending along the line of development towards personality or by descending along the line of reduction towards materiality. Rather, it must be a leap which takes place in the direction of its own ground, directly underfoot that mode of being called life-*sive*-death, death-*sive*-life. There should arise a new viewpoint with a completely different perspective from the ones whereby we make various distinctions or levels in between materiality and personality and hence wherein we speak of "ascending" to a higher stage or of "reducing" to a lower. One could conceive of a standpoint in which personality and materiality, usually considered as wholly exclusive of each other, can be seen in a sort of "double exposure," apart from the fixed notions attached to them. This could be described as the standpoint of absolute "equality" in which personality, while retaining its suchness, is nevertheless seen as equal to material things, and in which material things, without ceasing to present themselves as such, are nevertheless seen as equal to personality. It is precisely the standpoint of sunyata that makes possible the arising of such a viewpoint.

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But what does this view mean ? Why should it be the standpoint of śūnyatā ? In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to give attention above all to the difference between the idea of *nihilum* upon which nihilism is based and the idea of sunyata.

V

As stated before, in the traditional view personality has been seen from the point of view of personality itself, or rather, personality has grasped itself from itself. Hitherto, the view of personality is thus established with a self-centred grasp of personality as its nucleus. This way of grasping personality, personality's own self-capture of itself, can also be said to be already a state of captivity, a kind of self-attachment.

This is why in the preceding section I spoke of the standpoint of absolute nothingness or emptiness which breaks through this self-attachment, which negates the self-centred grasp of personality, and also why I spoke of personality manifesting itself in its true Reality only when it appears in being one with, or self-identical with, absolute nothingness, which is its original mode of being. This standpoint of absolute nothingness is not, however, on the yonder side of what we are accustomed to calling our personality or self; rather it opens up this side of it, as the absolute this-side, so to speak. This emptiness (śūnyatā) is not the same as *nihilum* in nihilism.

I said before that *nihilum* has become abysmal in modern nihilism. This means the *nihilum* realized at the base of the world as well as of the self has extended even into the place of God. Nihilism asserts that man can be genuinely free and independent only by grounding his subjectivity on that *nihilum*. With this subjectivization of the abyss of *nihilum*, there has opened at the base of man's self-being a plane beyond the pale of the divine order hitherto considered essentially ruling the self, a plane which does not allow anything, even God, to be above it. It is only here, according to modern nihilism, that man's independence can be established in the true sense.

The anxiety of having nothing to rely upon, the sense of instability at being deprived of all basis for settling down and dwelling peacefully, has become at once, just as it is, a standpoint of creative freedom which does not fasten on any existing thing. For man's self-existence, *nihilum* has become a realm of "ecstatic" self-detachment. Nihilism has become existential.

In spite of this, however, there still remains in that nihilistic way of

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understanding nothingness a characteristic not wholly free from the bias of objectification, of taking nothingness as a "thing" which is nothingness. Of course, this comment does not amount to a denial of modern nihilism being an existential standpoint wherein the *nihilum* is essentially subjectivized. This nihilism founds itself unalterably upon the real experience of the *nihilum* which is realized at the base of all things, our own existence as well. It is a standpoint in which we ourselves become the *nihilum*, a standpoint which can itself be called the realization of *nihilum*. It has nothing to do with the concept of nothingness or the representation of nothingness.

Nevertheless, here the *nihilum* is seen at the ground of one's own self-being as the groundlessness of that being; that is seen from the side of the self-being. Therefore, it is seen outside one's "being". is found lying at the other side of, as an entity other than, the "being". For instance, even in Heidegger's statement that self-being is "held suspended out into nothingness"—although his standpoint is fundamentally different from contemporary types of existentialism or nihilism—traces of such a viewpoint still remain. Already the fact that he speaks of the "abyss" of nothingness can be said to indicate this viewpoint. Here vestiges, however faint, still remain of nothingness being represented as an entity which is nothingness.

As I said, this does not mean that here the representation of nothingness is being called in question. Rather, when standing on self-being we come into contact with *nihilum* opening up at its ground, *nihilum* comes to appear, in fact, as an abyss into which, as Heidegger points out, our self-being is held suspended out. But the point here is that the *nihilum* in this case is always a *nihilum*-for-us, that is, a *nihilum* encountered by us, we ourselves standing on the side of "being". From this it follows that the *nihilum* is seen outside "being" of all things as well as of ourselves (outside beingness, so to speak), as something which is nothingness, as an entity absolutely other than beingness. It is the same with the common view that simply sets nothingness against beingness as its mere negation. The idea of nothingness in the West traditionally has never been freed from such a view. But as for the śūnyatā (emptiness) we spoke of, there is a fundamental difference.

Emptiness in the sense of sunyata is emptiness only where it empties even the standpoint that represents it as something which is emptiness. It is originally self-emptying. This meaning of true emptiness signifies that true emptiness is not to be posited as an entity outside of and other than "being"; that rather it is to be realized at one with and as self-identical with "being".

When it is said that "being is nothingness" or that "form is emptiness",

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that does not mean that "being" and nothingness, taken first separately as two entities, are subsequently brought to connection. Viewed in the context of Mahayana thought, the primary principle of which is to transcend all duality emerging from logical analysis, the phrase "being *sive* nothingness" implies the demand that, in order to realize truly its meaning, one should place himself initially on the basis of this *sive* and see from there being as being and nothingness as nothingness. Of course, in our daily life we live in a situation in which being is viewed solely as being, a situation shackled by being. Once such a standpoint is broken through and negated, *nihilum* arises. The standpoint of *nihilum* is, in its turn, a standpoint of viewing nothingness solely as nothingness, a standpoint which is shackled by nothingness; it is a position to be negated in its turn. It is then that emptiness, as a standpoint of absolute non-attachment free of this twofold attachment, makes its appearance.

Seen through such a process, emptiness is the completion in the direction of negation and can be called the absolute negativity, for it is a standpoint which has negated and thereby transcended *nihilum*, which was itself the negating transcendence of all being. It can also be called an absolute transcendence of being, the transcendence here meaning the negation of, and emancipation from, a standpoint shackled in any way by being. And whenever a spotlight is thrown upon this aspect of negativity or trancendence alone, emptiness can always be described as outside of and absolutely other than the standpoint tied to being, although this should not mislead us into the aforementioned conception that emptiness is an entity subsisting outside of and different from being.

In spite of its transcendence of the standpoint entrapped by being, or rather for this very reason, emptiness can reveal itself only under the character of self-identity with being, both presenting themselves originally together, and as structurally inseparable from each other, in the *sive*. Therefore, transcendence just spoken of does not entail going away to something transcendentally subsisting, called emptiness or nothingness. This is the reason as well I said before that emptiness is absolutely this-side, more this-side than what each person usually regards as his own "self". Emptiness or nothingness is not something we can proceed to; not something we can find existing in front of us; it cannot, generally speaking, be represented objectively. No sooner have we assumed such an attitude than it withdraws.

It has often been pointed out about the ego-self that its subjectivity entirely refuses to be viewed objectively. Nevertheless, the self has a constant tendency to grasp itself emblematically as "something" which is called the ego. This tendency is inherent in the very making of the ego-self, which

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consists of self-consciousness. It was therefore a great progress when the standpoint of "existence", with its mode of being "ecstatic", that is, of being held suspended out into nothingness, appeared. It meant the opening up of a stance appropriate to self-being in its true subjectivity. But, then, we must also recall what we said before : that there are still even in this standpoint traces of nothingness represented or posited as an entity which is nothingness. The standpoint of emptiness is one which transcends this subjectivistic *nihilum*, transcends it to the plane which is more this-side than the subjectivity of existential nihilism. Emptiness is the very standpoint which is unable to be objectified in any way whatsoever.

For this reason, what is called the abyss of *nihilum* originates, in fact, only in emptiness. For it to be represented as such an abyss is possible only in emptiness. In this sense, just as *nihilum* is an abyss to anything that exists, so emptiness may be said to be an abyss to the abyss of *nihilum*. Just as a chasm on the earth, no matter how unfathomably deep it may be, can be said to lie in fact in the boundlessly vast sky, so it is with *nihilum* and emptiness. Only by sky is not meant merely that which spreads out vastly over the chasm, rather that cosmic sky in which the earth, we human beings on it, and countless stars and planets exist and move; that which also underlies every place we tread, and lies at the bottom beyond the chasm's bottom. If the place wherein omnipresent God resides is called Heaven, Heaven would also be found open at the bottom of bottomless Hell, and that Heaven would be an abyss in the same sense that emptiness is an abyss to the abyss of *nihilum*.

Moreover, it is something which opens up more intimately this-side, something more directly and immediately here-and-how than we usually deem our ego-self or subjectivity to be. But just as while moving in the sky in the above sense, we usually forget this fact and look up at the sky only over our heads, we also fail to realize that we are, in fact, moving in emptiness, are, in fact, where we are more nearly this-side ourselves than we are in self-consciousness.

From the basic difference discussed hitherto between the standpoint of emptiness and modern nihilism, the former is not an antheism in the same sense in which the latter is. Still less is it akin to the atheism of positivism or materialism, which are oriented altogether differently from nihilism. The standpoint of emptiness, expressed in such phrases as "being *sive* emptiness," or "form is emptiness; emptiness is form," transcends negatively nihilism on the one hand and materialism and positivism on the other. But, at the same time, this standpoint seems to imply a possibility of bringing into some higher synthesis the truthful factors that are contained in the basic intentions and motives of these two opposite stand-

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points. This problem will be touched upon later. Furthermore, if it is not an atheism in the word's usual sense, it goes without saying that the standpoint of emptiness is not a type of so-called theism.

In the preceding chapter,[5] Eckhart was given as an example in the West of a standpoint which does not belong to the sphere of the either-or of theism and atheism. Grasping the personal relation of God and man as a living relation between *imago Dei* in the soul and its archetype, Eckhart at last dares to call "nothingness" the entirely "formless" (*bildlos*) Godhead, a plane that transcends all forms, and considers the soul to return to itself and acquire absolute freedom only when it absolutely becomes one with the nothingness of Godhead. This is not mere theism, and of course neither is it mere atheism. (For this reason, it was often mistakenly called pantheism.) This nothingness as the "ground" of personal God, while constituting the yonder-side background of God, is realized by man immediately as his "soul's ground," on the this-side foreground of his own self. We are able to perceive in this that the conversion to the standpoint I have described as absolute this-side is also comprised in Eckhart. Then, however, the standpoint of emptiness is one which appears when such a conversion has been achieved with definite clarity.

Of course, even in Buddhism, which expounds the standpoint of emptiness, a transcendence to the yonder-side, or "other-shore", is spoken of. But in this case the transcendence is realized as a disclosure of a horizon which may be called absolute this-side in the sense that it has transcended the opposition between yonder-side and this-side. The essential characteristic of Buddhism can be said to consist in its being the religion of the absolute this-side.

In Eckhart's case it is nothingness, in which, as he says, God's ground is the soul's ground and the soul's ground is God's ground, that holds the plane where arises the personal relation of God and man. It is on the basis of nothingness that the actual form of being of all entities including God comes to appear as such. It is also only on the basis of nothingness that entities being represented as God, soul, and their relation is made possible.

It is the same with the standpoint of emptiness. As I said before, only in emptiness does the abyss of *nihilum* come to appear, and only in emptiness is it represented as an abyss. And this same emptiness is the only area where God and man in their personal form of being and their relation to each other, respectively, come into being; the only field where their representations are made possible. And yet, this field of emptiness opens up on the absolute this-side of what is deemed our ego-self or subjectivity.

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VI

It may perhaps sound highly curious, almost fantastically absurd, to say that emptiness is the only field upon which such things as what modern nihilism calls the abyss of nothingness, and what older religions have called the personal relation of God and man, come to be present and represented; that, moreover, this emptiness is absolute this-side. This is no doubt true according to ordinary reasoning or to current philosophical or theological ways of thinking.

But is it really so strange ? Is it not rather the opposite, that a character of "fantasy" in the original sense of the word, that is, the image-drawing and representative character, still lingers in what is termed the abyss of nothingness and the personal relation of God and man ? Of course, though I say the image-construing and representative character remains, I do not mean that they are solely mental images, mere products of imagination in the sense in which Feuerbach and other critics of religion would hold them to be. The *nihil* or nihility is not a merely subjective feeling, fantasy, or idea. It is a reality as real as the fact that we really exist. It is not, moreover, something remote from our everyday life. It is that in which we constantly live and move. It is just because our everyday-ness is so much everyday, because we are so much wedded to everydayness, that we fail to perceive the reality of *nihilum*.

For instance, we like to think that we feel close familiarity with our family or friends, that we are intimately acquainted with them. But after all, do we really know essentially even those with whom we are most intimately acquainted ? The usage here of the word "essentially" should not be thought to connote the idea, for example, of our not knowing another's inmost thoughts, regardless of his closeness to us, or the idea of there being always something inaccessible between even the closest of friends. Were the word used in this sense, we would have to say that neither the secrets of our own heart nor our own personal character is adequately known even to ourselves. Rather, I used the word "essentially" in connection with the immediately present home-ground on which a person with whom we are familiar appears directly before us. We no more know whence comes and whither goes our most intimate friend than we know whence we ourselves come and whither we go. We do not know the home-ground of this person's existence who is actually standing face to face with us. He is, originally and essentially, a stranger to us.

Of course, my friend is not a stranger in the sense of a person I happen to encounter by the roadside on a trip; in that sense he is one with whom I am most intimately acquainted. Nevertheless, this sort of familiarity is in

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truth a familiarity with the absolute abyss in between. Compared to this essential distance in between, even a stranger in the street is infinitely more familiar. Essentially, all men, whether close to us or remote from us, are "strangers" to us in absolutely the same degree.

This does not hold true only of human beings. For example, the small flowers that bloom before me in my garden grow from seeds, will return to the earth before long and never reappear as long as this world exists. Again, man does not know whence these small blooming faces come and whither they go. Behind them there lies absolute *nihilum*, which lies equally behind us and between these flowers and me. Separated from me by the abyss of that *nihilum*, the flowers in front of me remain unknown to me.

Yet man gives names to persons and things, and then believes that if he knows their names he knows the things themselves; that because he has once seen something somewhere, he therefore is aquainted with it. The more intimately we associate with them, talk with them, and have contact with them, the more they become known to us and the closer we are to them. They become *our* acquaintances, *our* family members, *our* primroses.

Seen essentially, that is, there where they originate as they are in *nihilum*, all things are nameless, unnameable, and unknowable. But in the everyday world, whose element is no other than names, the reality of *nihilum* is covered and hidden; the ground of being, the home-ground of the existence of all things, is thoroughly buried and forgotten. The world around us thus becomes a world which consists only of things already known or able to become known to us : that is to say, it becomes an all too "everyday" world, in which we forget the essence of things even while concerning o urselves with them.

But then what is it like, the aforesaid "abyss of *nihilum*" which separates us even from those most familiar to us ? It lies behind everything in the world. Even the Milky Way, the galaxies and nebulas, cannot be apart from it. And this cosmically omnipresent *nihilum* is the same *nihilum* that separates us by making us essentially unknown to each other. We can say that the Milky Way's planets spread out and the galaxies and nebulas whirl about in that bottomless rupture between us even as we are engaged in friendly conversation. This means that we who are sitting face to face in the same room are both standing outside the whole universe; that we are sitting face to face as bodies and minds immediately manifesting themselves on *nihilum*, wholly unknowable of whence or whither. This is the abyss of *nihilum*.

If emptiness is an abyss even to that abyss of *nihilum*, then what has just been said of the latter can apply equally to the former, now in a truly

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absolute sense. In the mode of being where form is emptiness and emptiness is form, the "forms" (i.e., all things) are each absolutely nameless, unknown, unknowable, and separated from each other by an absolute rupture. However, in contrast with the field of *nihilum* in which the desolate and bottomless abyss opens up the essential distance even between us and those who are most familiar to us, the field of emptiness is one in which the absolute severance signifies in turn the most intimate encounter with all beings. Emptiness is where we are originally in the same essential contact with what ordinarily is to be called totally unrelated to us, even with our enemies, as we are with what is closest to us.

As used here, "essential encounter" means an encounter taking place on the ground where originates both our own being and that of what we encounter, where self and other are, in togetherness, each truly their own respective selves. And here, all things can encounter one another within the equality beyond distinctions of gratitude and revenge, hatred and love. Even the word encounter is already inadequate here. For just as a ray of light that manifests various distinct colours in a prism is a beam of white light, so where self and other are each truly in and by themselves, they are at once absolutely separated and absolutely united, or rather, absolutely self-identical. They are an absolute *two*, and at the same time, an absolute *one*. The Zen master Daitō Kokushi once said: "Separated from one another by 100 million kalpas, yet not apart a single moment: sitting face to face all day long, yet not opposed for an instant." I would like later to enter into more detailed discussion regarding such a mode of being in emptiness.

VII

The absolute this-side referred to above is entirely at one and self-identical with our self as body and mind. I tried earlier to give expression to this by quoting a poem by Gasan Jōseki:

The conscious mind of this shadowy man
At all occasions is to me most familiar—
From long ago mysteriously wondrous,
It is neither I nor other.

This has also been given frequent expression in the illustration of waves and water. The incessantly rising and falling waves revert to water as a whole, and the water in turn enters into the waves. Therefore, authentically, both must be negated: "the waves" apart from water and "the

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water" apart from waves. And yet just where the water and the waves are self-identical (as water-waves), is the place where the very thing (that is, this fluid with its wetness) is presenting itself in its own reality, water being truly water and waves truly waves. This may serve to illustrate the place of sunyata as the absolute this-side.

However, in so far as we ourselves do not turn to and enter into this-side, in so far as we remain simply as beings of body and mind or even as rational or personal beings, the absolute this-side is for us always the absolute yonder-side. This is just the situation that basically determines our ordinary mode of being.

In our ordinary mode of being, that is, in so far as we simply remain as beings of body and mind, rational or personal beings, our body-mind with its self-centred consciousness grasps itself from itself; our reason grasps itself by being based upon reason, and our personality grasps itself from within the personality. Each of these (i.e., the body-mind, reason, personality) is established with an inherent self-grasp as its core and is thereby established as something confined within itself and complete, as something well-defined which is called the self with body and mind (or body and soul), reason, or personality. Moreover, the self-grasp which constitutes their core is always, as was stated before, a state of captivity, including basically a sort of narcissism. It entails self-captivation; it is the essential self-attachment. Even reason and personality do not arise without being accompanied by self-attachment in this essential (that is, ontological) sense.

The self-grasping in this sense is ever an act we ourselves perform. As beings with body and mind, we grasp ourselves and are captured by ourselves in our own body-mind. As rational or personal beings, we grasp ourselves and are captured by ourselves in our own reason or personality. Here, however, our own act does not mean an act we perform by our wanting to do it. It is not an act which depends on our arbitrary will that we might stop any time we wanted to. It is an act we are performing long before we intend to do it.

We can possibly say that a kind of destiny is here at work, a force causing us to act and be this way. All possible rational, personal beings, beings of body and mind, that appear in this world appear as beings with such a mode of existence, performing in such a way. It seems as if when life, consciousness, personality, or reason, each as a whole, appears from the depths of the world so as to become individualized and immanent in each individual being, they betray an essential characteristic of falling into a sort of narcissistic self-attachment. Here we see a kind of necessity, very much like the force of destiny. But it is not destiny in the ordinary

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sense in which it simply rules over us and moves us from without. It is not merely blind will. It is a destiny which appears only under the guise of our own acts, and only at one with our own acts.

And yet in so far as we remain simply as beings of body and mind, rational or personal beings, we are in confinement. And to the extent, we are essentially attached to self. In other words, we ourselves shut out the standpoint of emptiness which is our absolute this-side. Again, to that extent, the absolute this-side must forever remain for us the absolute yonder-side. This essential self-attachment and self-confinement, however, is none other than the situation that basically determines our ordinary mode of being.

It is, in my opinion, in the abovementioned case that the yonder-side truly comes to possess its absoluteness for us. In comparison, in other cases the yonder-side is not yet absolute. For example, when Plato conceives of a world of Ideas as the yonder-side of the sensory world, its beyondness is so only in its being similar to that of a celestial world "high above" and beyond the terrestrial world. It is a yonder-side that is looked up to perpendicularly from the "earth". It arises solely with a ninety-degree turn from the ordinary, everyday life in which men are absorbed. This would be yonder-side for those located on the "earth" as set forth in a Ptolemaic point of view. But for those located on a field analogous to cosmic space, the field of emptiness in which "heaven" and "earth" are established on the same level, it would be no longer the yonder-side.

When, as in the common representation of Christianity, a personal God is considered to reveal Himself vertically from Heaven to earth, God's place is also conceived as the yonder-side. Since here it is revelation from beyond, the yonder-side is much more genuinely yonder-side than in the case of Plato. It is a yonder-side vertically revealed from Heaven to earth. Still, even this must be said to be fundamentally the same as the former. The same nature of "yonder-side" obtains : heaven standing against the earth. The only difference is that in Plato the direction from earth to heaven (the direction of *eros*) predominates, while in Christianity it is, conversely, from Heaven to earth (the direction of *agape*). They tally exactly in the respect that in both cases the yonder-side arises in making a ninety-degree turn.

Even though an absolute break is posited between God and man in Christianity, it still allows room for God, man, and the break between them to be represented within the same scenery, so to speak. In fact, from long ago in Western *Geistesgeschichte* we see that philosophy, in its competency of metaphysics, has incessantly presented the domain of reason or *logos* as the stage for their ontological representation. Reason develops a

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horizon of "thought", in which yonder-side and this-side, God and man, which are usually held not to belong to the same level, can be represented side by side. Even when an absolute break or unrelatedness is supposed to exist between them, philosophical reason unfolds the horizontal of "dialectical" thought, in which such an unrelatedness can also be conceived of as a sort of relation in the form of unrelatedness, that is, as a dialectical relationship.

If we turn next to the "abyss" of *nihilum*, we can say that here the yonder-side in its original sense is not present as it is in the aforementioned two cases, for this abyss belongs to this-side. But in so far as the abyss is represented as something coming in sight right at the ground of our own existence, a yonder-side character still clings to it. It is also a yonder-side that appears at the right angle turn, although in this case, contrary to the former, the turn is directed from the earth into its own depths. Therefore, the depth of the earth is still something that can be represented within the same scenery as the earth; that is, the "nothingness" of the nihilism can be represented philosophically on the same level as "being".

The standpoint of emptiness is completely different : here what I mean by emptiness is absolute openness in the sense that, while presenting itself as the field in which the yonder-side in the direction of heaven as well as the beyond in the direction of the depths of the earth can both be established and representatively conceived, it is in itself sheerly unable to be represented in any way whatsoever and so is always present as the absolute this-side. This is why I said before that both the abyss of *nihilum* and the personal relation of God and man can arise and be represented in emptiness.

Thus we may say the standpoint of emptiness is manifested in a one hundred and eighty degree turn, as the field in which two ninety degree turns are involved, one taking place in a heavenward direction and the other earthward to the earth's depths. It is comparable to passing from the front to the back of a canvas depicting various scenes of heaven and earth. In other cases, e.g., in the relation of Ideas and sense objects, God and man, being and *nihilum*, the yonder-side appears as something drawn on the surface of a canvas, no matter how resolute a separation is supposed to exist between them.

Further, when the standpoint of emptiness is thoroughly penetrated—and the direction of this penetration is, as was said before, one in which "emptiness" itself is also emptied—then the standpoint of emptiness appears in a three hundred and sixty degree about-face : that means in a manifestation of the self-identity of the front and the reverse. The field wherein emptiness is emptied to become true emptiness is none other than

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the place where each and every thing appears in its own reality, in its true suchness. It is the field wherein the zero degree means at once three hundred and sixty degrees. Therefore in spite of, or rather because of it being essentially absolute this-side, it can also be absolute yonder-side. This is because only zero degree can also be three hundred and sixty degrees.

That is, this absolute this-side is on the one hand a place where beings, rational, personal, or with body and mind, essentially die to themselves, a place where man extricates himself from the essential self-attachment mentioned before; in brief, the place of emancipation in the Buddhist sense, or what Eckhart calls *Abgeschiedenheit* (detachment). On the other hand, the same absolute this-side is the place of the essential life of beings that are rational, personal, or with body and mind; the place where beings absolutely unnameable have their names and live in the everyday world whose element is names. In short, it means the place of man's death *sive* life and life-*sive*-death, man here being taken as a whole, including his body and mind, his rational and personal modes of being.

Emptiness as the absolute this-side cannot, of course, be said to be something that exists somewhere. Something represented as emptiness, or posited as emptiness, is not genuine emptiness. What is genuine emptiness is none other than what comes to man's self-awareness as his own absolute selfhood. This emptiness at the same time is the field wherein each and every being comes into its own reality and appears truly as and in itself. It is the field wherein the awakening of our true selfhood—or, what is the same, our selfhood as true self-awareness—and the suchness of each and every thing as it is arise simultaneously, as one or self-identically.

In this case, however, the term self-awareness does not simply mean self-consciousness, nor the term selfhood the ego or the subjectivity of an ego-self. Neither is reality or real "suchness" used here in the sense it is in ordinary realism or materialism. In that interpretation, things are already objectified and represented in opposition to and outside of the ego. No matter how emphatically they are said to be "outside" of consciousness, they cannot escape the implication that in so far as they are conceived as being "outside" they are still seen from the field of consciousness.

Reality as suchness means the manner of something's being beyond all representation or thought, of its being inaccessible to the ego's grasping : and therefore, its manner of being "ungettable" in the specifically Buddhist sense. This is the mode of being of something when, on its own home-ground, it is as it really is. For this reason, even though the term thing as and in itself is here applied to such a mode of being, it has nothing to do with Kant's concept of "thing in itself". Also, even if it is here said

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18

Temporality and Consciousness in Ābhidharmika Buddhism: A Phenomenological Approach

BRAJ M. SINHA

Introduction

In this paper the expression Ābhidharikma Buddhism is employed to connote the "school" of Buddhist thought whose ideas are systematically expounded in the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu and commentaries thereon. The use of the expression is preferred for various reasons including the absence of a more adequate label indicative of the scope of this study. Vasubandhu himself uses the term in *Abhidharmakośa* as a proper name to refer to the philosophical standpoint which is the subject matter of the *Abhidharmakośa*. Moreover, both Vasubandhu and his commentator Yaśomitra seem to be in complete agreement in maintaining that the *Abhidharmakośa* presents in a concise and systematic manner the central ideas of the primary Abhidharma texts which are now lost to the Sanskrit tradition. The allegiance of Vasubandhu, the author of *Abhidharmakośa*, within Buddhist tradition, is a controversial issue. However, it is now widely recognized, on account of the valuable researches of Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Takakusu and Schayer that the *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu offers a valuable index to the philosophical postulates of the school of thought under investigation. And in identifying this segment of Buddhist thought as that of Ābhidharmika Buddhism we are in good company of Buddhist scholars like Murti,[1] Conze,[2] and Keith.[3] The present work assumes the validity of the historical researches in Buddhist study on this specific issue.

For the purposes of this study, it is crucial that we make a conceptual distinction between the categories of time and temporality. The category of time is used for reification of time as an absolute category with independent ontological status. Time is conceived independent of entities and

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somehow influencing and conditioning the mode of being of all entities. Temporality, on the other hand, is the expression used to indicate the fact of change which characterizes entities as their mode. It is not what stands independent of them claiming a coordinate status in relation to them, but is constitutive of their very mode of existing. Abhidharma Buddhism does not look at temporality as a feature or function of time conceived as reified category. Temporality is not the adjectival synonym of time understood as the transcendent condition of our being and cognition. More specifically, temporality may be defined in terms of the changefulness and becomingness characteristic of the phenomena as such and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. Thus, in this study, the term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and the finitude of the phenomenal existence as well as its subjective experience.

A NOTE ON THE METHOD

The problem of method in investigating a theme pertaining to Indian philosophy is a subject of considerable obscurity. Without being unduly d ogmatic one can formulate the requirement in this context as under : the method of approach or investigation must be adequate to the nature of the content. In the classical writings of Indian Philosophy this question has received very careful consideration. The metaphysical differences between the rival philosophical points of view are foreshadowed in the context of a discussion of the problem of methods and criteria. Without going into these issues, and in the present case our task being interpreting the Ābhidharmika philosophical themes in contemporary context, we may conceptualize the method that is adopted in the present study as the method of critical reconstruction.

In stating that the method is primarily critical we do not intend to emphasize polemics or set an undue premium on arguments and counter arguments. The latter could by themselves be themes for investigation as part of the study of the logical structure of statements and their refutations as understood by the Indian thinkers. But this is not our concern. Critical method is employed with a view to locate, isolate and situate a particular concept or body of concepts or ideas in the context of the basic ontological perspective of the systems under investigation. As part of this enterprise surely it will be attempted to delineate the major argument of each system in an expository way by situating it against the major objections and challenges to which they are susceptible. Attention will be paid both to the structure and the language of the argument but always in terms of its basic ontological orientation *vis-a-vis* the ontological positions pitted against it. Critical reconstruction is conceived to involve the imaginative

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task of letting the system speak for itself by weighing other positions at variance with it.

A critical investigation surely does not have to be an expression of one's own philosophical preferences or biases. But it is not also bias free and completely objective. In the present case it is intended expressly to bring out the bias of the systems under investigation. Our exposition of the problem in the specific context will be an attempt to indicate the basic ontological "bias" of the systems that are taken up for consideration in terms or by means of an analysis of the directly relevant texts. It is our hope that it is only in that way that we will let the meaning of the system's argument emerge on its own.

To that extent the method of approach may be described as descriptive and non-judgmental, a method which has come to be identified in recent times as phenomenological. We are not confining ourselves to any specific form of the development of this method. We employ this method in its most generalized form whereby critical reflection, by enabling specific meaning structures to disclose themselves in the light of their intentionality, also enters into a specific kind of relationship with them. It becomes more acutely aware of the meaning structures which it intends to grasp, and by the same token, it becomes part and parcel of that. We can thus call our critical reflection phenomenological if we keep in mind that the phenomenological method is:

> a method for changing our relation to the world, for becoming more acutely aware of it. But at the same time and by that very fact, it is already a certain attitude vis-a-vis the world, or more exactly a certain attitude *vis-a-vis* our relation to the world. Phenomenology combines the most radical break without ordinary and natural attitudes *vis-a-vis* the world (in this sense it is an ascesis of the mind) with the deepening or the consecration of this original attitude (in this sense, it is respect for the real and engagement in the world). Consciousness takes its distance with regard to things: it gives itself complete freedom in respect to them, but one realizes at once that this is in order to be more faithful to our essential insertion in the world . . .The phenomenological method thus permits pushing on simultaneously and with one movement towards the roots of subjectivity and the foundation of the objective world.[4]

What is attempted in the following sections may be described as exemplifying a phenomenological approach in a more limited sense of a reflection on the meaning structures with the express object of becoming more acutely aware of them.

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THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

The central issue for the present work is the possibility of interrogating the issues of temporality in terms of its givenness as an objective fact and its relationship to the cognizing consciousness. The term temporality is used to connote both the fact of change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its "subjective" experience. It is our assumption that neither of the two can be conceived in isolation from the other. Temporality is a feature of existence as a structure of world involvement. Thus articulated, the problem of temporality then turns out to be the problem of subjectivity as what is implied in the structure of world involvement. It may then be asked : is not temporality a feature of existence conceived in terms of the relation of subjectivity to time ? What is the relationship of time to the cognizing subject ? or, How is time related to the subject ? But then, is time anything other than the relation itself, or to be more precise, the structure of relation of the things to things and things to subject. This aspect of time as the structure of relatedness of things and beings of the empiric world, is an undeniable fact. The Abhidharma Buddhism would not deny the empiric reality of time conceived as the structure of temporal relatedness.

The basic issue, however, still evades us. Granting that the empiric time is the structure of the relatedness of things and beings which are perceived as constantly changing and in a relationship of priority and posteriority, we still have to ask the question of the relation of this structure to the subject as world-involved. Denial of the substantive reality of time as transcendental principle in favour of a conception of structure of temporal relationship does not exonerate us from seeking the answer to the question of the relationship of this structure to the subject which is i ntricably enmeshed in the structure.

Now the question of the relationship of the subjectivity to temporal structure can be approached in a variety of ways : The structure itself may be conceived in terms of a receptum in which the subject is situated; or the structure may be conceived as a function of a synthetic activity of the subject which is transcendent to it and constitutes the structure; or finally, that the structure of temporality is identified with the structure of subjectivity. In other words the alternatives open to us are either that the subject is contained in the time, or that the time is in the subject, or that the subject is time, i.e., subjectivity is the temporal structure.[5] The Ābhidharmika Buddhism would contribute to the third alternative on grounds which will become obvious in the sequel during the course of the treatment of the subject. But the following may be said by way of a critique of the

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other alternatives. Any attempt to grasp the essence of temporality as a phenomenologically given fact in terms of these two alternatives would lead to some inexorable difficulties and implications for the subject as the structure of world involvement. The first alternative has to be excluded as a philosophically viable alternative perhaps for the very reason that the position makes a philosophical questioning of the problem of temporality impossible. A subject which is essentially in time and is encased in it cannot, by the nature of case, reflect upon the structure of which it is an element. A subject which is contained in time, must of necessity be contained in the movement of present; while time is the structure of the relationship in which stand things and beings in the relationship of priority and posteriority, the subject which is exhausted in this relationship in the moment of present cannot comprehend past and future. If it necessarily and totally is contained in the moment of present, then it cannot contemplate on temporality as exemplifying the relationship of priority and posteriority of past and future. "Subject, then, must not be conceived as that which is contained in time; it is necessary for the subject not to be himself situated in it, in order to be able to be present in intention to the past as to the future."[6]

The other alternative looks at temporal structure as a function of synthetic activity of the a-temporal subject. This alternative suggests that temporality is a constitutive activity of the subject which somehow "unfolds or constitutes time."[7] Now, the difficulty inherent in this position must be clear. A subject which is the transcendent condition of temporal constitution must of necessity remain external to the temporal structure. Total externality of the subject is an ideal condition of the subject that the Sāṁkhya-Yoga proposes. The subject as transcendence must be free from all the vicissitudes of the temporal structure. But the subject which is totally external to the temporal structure cannot be the constitutive subject. In other words the constituting subject and the subject which is the transcendent condition of all constitution and reflection must be placed in two different realms.

However, the subjects cannot be totally separated and be independent if the possibility of the transcendence of temporality as a function of reflective activity is to be retained. If the problem of transcendence is to be explained, instead of being explained away by declaring the realm of temporality as illusory, there is only one option open, namely to admit a dialectical contact between the two realms. The point of that contact for the Ābhidharmika Buddhism, as we shall show, is the structure of reflection as an act of consciousness. This subject as the structure of temporal constitution must also retain a dialectical contact with the realm of

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transcendence which in the case of Ābhidharmika-Buddhism is Nirvāṇa.

The problematic of the relationship of the subject and the temporal structure can only be resolved if and only if we can show that subject as the structure of world constitution must be identical with the structuring of temporality. This is the intermediary position, a philosophical alternative which seeks to avoid the two extremes of situating subject in time or placing subject totally transcendent to time. The two alternatives, in a sense exemplify the two approaches to time which may be described in conventional terms, that of realism and idealism respectively. The first position is prepared to grant temporal structure an independent reality of its own, with the capacity of complete subsumption of the subject. The second alternative makes temporal structure a mere synthetic act of consciousness, denying the objectivity of temporal becomingness any reality status. In either case, consciousness of temporality becomes problematic: in the first case because time is transcendent to consciousness, and in the second case because consciousness is transcendent to time. The philosophical position that we argue for takes its point of departure, not merely from the failings of these two positions, but also from the more positive ground of the possibility of dialectical interplay between the two.

The intermediary position operates with the datum of the temporal process as the datum for a cognizing consciousness. In that sense, it partakes the character both of realism and idealism. It seeks to retain the significant element of the first alternative which in effect situates the subject in the present. This situating of the world involved subject in the present is a necessary condition for the temporal experience that the subject will have. It seems to be in answer specifically to the requirement underscored in the following statement:

> The subject must in a genuine sense be in the present. Time exists for me because I have a present. If I am able to have access to a past or a future, such access must be gained not by abandoning my present but rather from out of my present.[8]

However, this situating of the subject in the present must be combined with an insight into the possibility of the subject performing the synthetic activity in the present. Only then the present can become the meeting ground of past and future. Only then temporal structure can truly be grasped as the structure of the manifestation of the becomingness of being. If subject is unable to perform this synthetic activity in the present then the subject will remain encased in a block universe with no experience of change and becomingness. Thus the third alternative seeks to identify the structure of subjectivity with the structure of temporality.

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This position is considered extremely significant from the point of view of the present study. It seeks to retain the autonomy of the subject as consciousness. Without this autonomy the possibility of reflection or contemplation as structure of world transcendence will have to be ruled out. On the other hand, temporal process itself is not dismissed as a fictitious construction of consciousness. It is an objective fact. Reality of the "moment" is an objective reality which cannot be reduced to mere projections of consciousness. However, the subject through its synthetic activity enters into an intricate relationship with the world of change and becomingness. In this act of relating the subject assumes the character of temporality. Since this relatedness is intrinsic to the structure of world participation the empiric subject is essentially and intrinsically temporal. At the same time, through this very character of relating to the object the subject also exemplifies transcendence.

The Category of Time and the Theory of Dharma as Temporal

It is in early Ābhidharmika literature that we find the first attempt to understand temporality in a non-substantive term. The Ābhidharmika tradition disregarded the question of the substantive reality of time as a factor in temporal determination. The basic issue for them was not whether Time exists as an independent reality which in conjunction with other realities or events constitute temporal determinations. Their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of things as temporally determined and that they could do by acknowledging the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* on *Jñānaprasthāna* declared that everything is real, the past (*atīta*) and the future (*anāgata*) are as much real as the present (*prattyutpanna*).[9] The theory proposed here does not make any distinction between things in themselves such as past and future matter, and the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism of Ābhidharmikas present in its most pronounced form. It is not the reality of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited by *Mahāvibhāṣā*; rather, it is the reality of things or *dharmas* as past, present and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the determination of things or *dharmas* as past, present or future. In early Ābhidharmik literature we come across an alternative to *Kālavādins*, when Ābhidharmikas point out that the temporal determinations of things are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a being. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* points out :

> If all the three samskṛtalakṣaṇas have not yet been active, the *dharma* is called future. If one of them has already finished its activity and

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thus are just active, then the *dharma* is called present. If they have already finished their activity, the *dharma* is called past.[10]

It is important to note that early Ābhidharmika literature never considered the determination of *dharma's* temporal quality to be a function of transcendental eternal Time which somehow contains things in three receptacles of time and is responsible for temporal designations of past, present and future. Thus *Mahāvibhāṣā* clearly rejected the option which would seem to suggest that

> the svabhāva of Time is *nitya*, but the svabhāva of the *saṁskṛtadharmas* is *anitya*. The *saṁskṛtadharmas* wander across the times just as a fruit from one pot to another or as man from one house into another. This is also the case with the *saṁskṛtadharmas* : going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past.[11]

In this rejection of the receptum notion of Time is implicit the basic Buddhist denial of the substantiality and permanence, a model set by *Mahāvibhāṣā* which is consistently adhered to by Ābhidharmikas. All Ābhidharmika statements about the reality of past, present and future must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of temporal determinations. It is true that in *Ābhidharmika* literature we come across statements which state that "*dharmas* wander across the three Times, that *nirvāṇa* lies beyond the three Times; that there exists a Future, a Past, etc . . . " But all these statements, as Schayer has already noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement "each *dharma* exists in the three Times as future, present and past" the term "three times" is "consequently only a synonymous denomination (*adhivacana*) for Saṁskṛtadharma."[12]

Early *Ābhidharmika* literature clearly rejected any distinction between a *dharma* and its temporal determination. Temporal determinations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent Time, are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a *dharma*. Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the temporality of a *dharma* and its conditioned-ness (*saṁskṛta*). What is given as temporal flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned *dharmas*, apart from which time does not have an independent reality. In other words, time consists of conditional *dharmas* and conditional *dharmas* are time, and that the time is that the growth of which consists of the manifestation of *saṁskṛta dharmas*. The theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned *dharmas*, apart from which it does not have any reality.

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In view of the above articulation of the Ābhidharmika understanding of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency among some modern scholars to suggest that the Ābhidharmika contributed to a view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing change. Drawing upon Pāli sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains that "the Sarvāstivāda represented a school of realism and . . they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time."[13] John M. Koller agrees with Kalupahana's interpretation of the Sarvāstivāda and maintains that Nāgārjuna's critique of Time[14] is "directed primarily at the Sarvāstivādin, who took time to be an ontological container of change and divided the container into three segments : past, present and future."[15]

In the first place, both Koller and Kalupahana are mistaken in assuming that Nāgārjuna's critique of time is directed against the Sarvāstivāda. There is nothing in Nāgārjuna's *kāla parikṣā* to substantiate their contention that the view of time criticized by Nāgārjuna is in fact the one held by the Sarvāstivādins.[16] As a matter of fact, it may be gathered from the Candrakīrti's Vṛtti on *Mulamadhyamakārikā* that the target of Nāgārjuna's attack is a certain Kālavādin who does not subscribe to the views of Buddha. The Kālavādin (the upholder of the reality of Time) under attack of Nāgārjuna's relentless dialectic refers to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents.[17] It is equally interesting to note that while Nāgārjuna specifically rejects the reality of Time, his critique never mentions the concept of *dharma* that is so central to Sarvāstivāda articulation of the problem.[18]

In arguing that the Ābhidharmika believed in the reality of time both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusion between a view which takes the reality of things or *dharmas* as past, present and future as the ontological givens and a view which accords Time a primary ontological status as the container of things or *dharmas*. That the Ābhidharmika position is not the latter will be set forth in the body of the thesis. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the Ābhidharmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvāstivādins believed in the reality of Time. Time as a category is conspicuously absent from the Sarvāstivāda scheme of things. Secondly, as we will show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of *dharmas* or elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of *dharmas* as past, present and future rather than the reality of *dharmas* in past, present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow contain these *dharmas*.

The Ābhidharmikas is an attempt to provide a coherent picture of reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, and at the same time

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retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (*sarvam asti*), Ābhidharmikas insisted that *dharma* is the ultimate constituent of all phenomena, meaning by *dharma* what is discerned to be existent and real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglomeration of these *dharmas* is specifically denied. The basis of this denial is our experience which consists only of a succession of *dharmas*. There is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a thing as a continuing "being" or "self", the ultimate reference point being only the discrete *dharmas* which constitute as such the nature (*svabhāva*) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of *dharmas* (*svabhāva*) in the three temporal phases. The existence of reality of *dharmas* as past, present and future is present to cognitional experience without any mutual contradiction, experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is significant that the Ābhidharmikas do not recognize the existence of *dharmas* in past, present and future moments of time, but recognizes their existence as past, present and future. There is no transcendental or empirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or reside. Time is not an empty mould in which *dharmas* are deposited as they arise, stay and pass away. Time conceived as a transcendental background of our cognition or as an over-arching receptum of entities is totally unacceptable to any school of Buddhist thought, Ābhidharmikas being no exception in this regard. The Ābhidharmika discussions are conducted on the level where the concern is with lived time. The *dharmas* are temporal in the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their own intrinsic nature in the three modes of temporal existence.

The Cognitive Consciousness and Temporality

The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present and future mode of being are to be discerned within the framework of the empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvāstivāda. A careful review of the arguments offered by the Ābhidharmika support of this assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their orientation to knowledge. The empiricistic-realistic approach to cognitional experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of realizing freedom (*nirvāṇa*) are reflected in these arguments. The role of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor of Indian Philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology, and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them.[19]

According to Ābhidharmikas all cognitions are contingent on two

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factors :[20] (a) the objective correlate (*viṣaya, ālambana*) and the (b) cognizing consciousness (*citta, vijñāna*). While sense experience relates to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition refers to the past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (*viṣaya*) were denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Ābhidharmika, there could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the *viṣaya* and the *citta*.

The Ābhidharmika seeks support for this common sense theory from the "scripture" by referring to the unequivocal statement of Buddha to such effect.[21] The postulation of the existence of real in all the three modes is implicit in this contention of the Master, and a denial of it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture (*agamaviruddha*). The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic conviction that whatever causes mental cognition has an objective existence or be objectively real.[22] There is mental cognition of past and future *dharmas*. The crucial datum, here, on which the Ābhidharmika builds or constructs his theory is the fact of the givenness of past and future *dharmas* to mental cognition. If they (past and future *dharmas*) are not objectively real how could there be mental cognition of them. Were they not real "knowledge" of them will not be different from phantasy : their cognition will transpire to be non-cognition. A cognition by definition must have a specific real as its object.[23]

Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the objective correlate, which is the point of view of Sautrantika, the Ābhidharmika argues : a consciousness (*vijñāna*) can only be defined qua "what cognizes" (*vijanati vijñānam*); if there is no object to be cognized (*vijñeya*), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as cognition can exist.

The Sautrantika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition may be defined just by the mere fact of its being the "illuminating accompaniment" (*bodhānugama*) of all cognitions.[24] There is no warrant, according to them, for envoking the object of cognition as part of the definition. To this the Ābhidharmika answers in the following way : the "illumination" itself constitutes the objective correlate of consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming together of consciousness (*vijñāna*) and its objective correlate (*rūpa vedanā*, etc.). But the two factors (the subjective *vijñāna* and objective *rūpa, vedanā* etc.), according to the Ābhidharmikas, stand on the same ontological footing in the sense that they are *dharmas*. As *dharmas* they carry their "own nature" (*svabhāva*). "Illuminating" element in the cognition is the "own nature" (*svabhāva*) consciousness (*vijñāna*) which consists of the *dharma* being objectively real. Thus, illuminating accompaniment (*bodhānugama*) in cognition too is an objective element which has

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an independent reality as the *svabhāva* of *vijñāna* in the three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Ābhidharmika.

Consciousness and Transcendence of Temporality

The Ābhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of consciousness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness (*Vijnāna*) as a dharma is continually on the go, is never self-identical; and as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially temporal.[25] Change, differentiation and fissuration are built into the mode of being of consciousness as a *dharma*.[26] Temporality, therefore cannot be overcome by consciousness as long as it is consciousness. Overcoming of temporality, i.e., transcendence of the realm of temporal existence would imply the overcoming of the fissuration, change and becomingness of consciousness. But since these are structural to consciousness it follows that its transcendence would mean its dissolution. *Nirvāṇa* or freedom is not the recovery of an original mode of being of consciousness; it is the dissolution of any mode of being of consciousness. It is extinction of the very structure of the consciousness as flow.

Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction. Losing sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of the basic orientation of the Ābhidharmikas. For the Ābhidharmikas temporality is essentially an imperfection[27] characteristic of the finitude and ought to be overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal. However, the mode of being of the non-temporal has drastically different implications for the subject as the structure of world involvement. While for Sāmkhya-Yoga, Subject as pure consciousness retains its individuated identity and is a case of recovering of its original mode of being, for Ābhidharmikas the subject must give up its original mode of being and its individuality in order to attain nirvāṇa. *Nirvāṇa*, though eternally existent and constantly present, is not an original mode of being that the subject somehow lost and regains. World (*saṁsāra*) as the structure of temporal becoming does not share the ontological character of *Nirvāṇa* which for the Ābhidharmikas is eternally existent and beyond the operation of the forces of conditionedness (*saṁskṛtattva*).[28]

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It is important to be reminded that for Ābhidharmika Buddhism, *Nirvāṇa* is *not* a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in the form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state of being which is rendered non-existent on conceptual analysis.[29] Rather, *Nirvāṇa* is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which is acquired or reached and possessed (*prāpti*).[30] *Nirvāṇa* is eternally existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality of temporally determined *dharmas*. Within the Ābhidharmika context it is possible to discern distinction reminiscent of the Sāṁkhya-Yoga categories of permanence (*parināmi nityatā*) and eternity (*kutastha nityatā*). *Samtāna* or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-ending and is in that sense "permanent," is not, however, a case of overcoming of temporality.[31] Endlessness is not conquering of temporality at all, but rather it is a prolongation or perpetuation of temporality's defect. *Samtāna* (continuum) may be described as having a temporal mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end is not part of its meaning as becoming. But this "permanence" of the continuum can not be ascribed the value of eternity because it is only continuity of imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of non-perfection. *Nirvāṇa* on the other hand, is described by Ābhidharmika as eternal (*nitya*) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma or reality *Nirvāṇa* is eternity precisely in the sense that it transcends the mode of imperfection or conditionedness (*samskṛtattva*). *Nirvāṇa* is unconditioned and eternal because it is not subject to the operation of the forces of conditionedness, namely, *jati*, *jara*, *sthiti*, etc.[32]

As the realm of eternity *Nirvāṇa* is fullness of spiritual being, a completedness which constitutes the horizon into which the individual as subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as consciousness. As reflection subjectivity is essentially in fellowship with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates.[33] Contrasted with Sāṁkhya-Yoga, which admits the possibility of consciousness without content, Ābhidharma proposes an essential reciprocity of the consciousness and its content.

In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the essential imperfection of consciousness (*samskṛtattva*), for consciousness itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other *dharmas*.[34] Reciprocity and mutual conditioning also implies reciprocal otherness between the two. While the Sāṁkhya-Yoga makes the recognition of this otherness as the very condition for freedom, for the Ābhidharmika the otherness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the otherness does not consist in

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the discerning of an identity overreaching the difference i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the content of it as its own (such would be a case of inveterate tendency to conceptualize in terms of being the *satkayadṛṣṭi* which Ābhidharmika rejects). It consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as its content (*visamyoga*).[35]

Thus the overcoming of temporality i.e., the process of becomingness of the conditioned *dharmas* (*samskṛtattva*) is essentially the dissolution of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or consciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express itself, loses its subject-hood. Just as the object which become the possession of the consciousness are not mere objects and must be described as that which belongs to the consciousness (*caitesika*),[36] so the consciousness which is bereft of its content must completely lose its existing character as consciousness.

Thus, within Ābhidharmika scheme, at least two moments in consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming of this otherness. It is the realization that all *dharmas* as conditioned are essentially on the same ontological footing. It is the realization that consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent and conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably brings about, as it were, a perfect unity of the subject and object but this unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its complete annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the negation of the distinction of the subject. But it must not be forgotten that this in turn entails an overcoming of the subject-hood. The eternity of *Nirvāṇa* as the stillness of consciousness (*sthita*) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness.

There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness. Consciousness, according to the Ābhidharmikas, takes the form of the object that it cognizes. Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes *Nirvāṇa* must also become of the nature of *Nirvāṇa*. Consciousness itself is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned. It retains this character of temporality in its encounter with the objects which themselves are temporal and conditioned (*saṁskṛta dharma*). But in its encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond the pail of temporality and becomingness, consciousness must of necessity lose its own conditionedness and temporality. In other words it must lose its character of consciousness.

Eternity of *Nirvāṇa* in the sense of constant presence or "eternal now,"

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within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the true soteriological import of Ābhidharmika speculation about the structure of temporal becoming. Here a structural similarity and thematic congruity with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite prominent. For both the systems freedom is not in future, but it is in the present. It is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the temporal process shall come to an end. The process of temporal becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its termination is not conceivable. The freedom therefore, of necessity, lies in the present. It is in the temporal present that the *Nirvāṇa* can be attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping stone to the "eternal now." The realization of *Nirvāṇa* as eternity is possible precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously nonexistent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of consciousness is performed within the compass of this temporal present.

Concluding Observations

Ours was an attempt to offer a phenomenological perspective on the Ābhidharmika articulation of temporality and its implications for consciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the structure of metaphysical transcendentalism as represented in the conception of eternity that the systems implies. Of pivotal importance to the Ābhidharmika Buddhism is the analysis of the experience of temporality defined as finitude, and to determine whether or not experiencing of temporality necessarily implied positing a transcendental time as the receptum of entities. In other words, is temporality an experience of the flow of entities and events as they are present to consciousness in the original mode of their limitation, i.e. finitude, or is it an experience of the flow of entities and events as mediated through a transcendental principle of time? It was our attempt to show that in the Ābhidharmika system temporality is explained in terms of our experience which is radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the world of dynamic change and flow exemplifying finitude. From this point of view, the temporal differentiation is not an appearance to the pure subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of subjectivity as the structure of world involvement.

Thus, from Ābhidharmika point of view, any attempt to reduce temporality to appearance in and for an a-temporal consciousness would be an

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exercise in futility. For a proper understanding of the phenomenon of temporality the possibility of experience of temporality for an a-temporal consciousness must be ruled out. The Ābhidharmika position implies that the experience of temporality entails subjectivity immanent to the structure of world-involvement (the structure of *Skandhas* in the case of Ābhidharmika Buddhism). Subjectivity as immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the sense that the subjectivity as empiric consciousness is inconceivable without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of subjectivity, the mutual otherness of the subject and object or consciousness and its content is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to systematic disappearance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very structure of the "disappearance" of consciousness as consciousness *i.e.*, as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of" (*citta, Buddhi*). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of "disappearance" of consciousness discernible in the experience of temporal becoming or temporality also provides the clue for the transcendence of temporality. If empiric consciousness loses itself partially in the experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of eternity. This is accomplished through self-reflection or critical reflection as a mode of transcendence which is intrinsic to the very structure of consciousness as reflection.

NOTES

1. Murti, T.R.V., *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970, p. 56.
2. Conze, Edward, *Buddhist Thought in India*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962, pp. 120, 130, 131.
3. Keith, A.B., *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon*, Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 154-155 and 165-166.
4. Thevenaz, Pierre, *What Is Phenomenology*, (trans.) Courtney, Brockelman and J. Edie, Chicago: Quadrangle, 1962, p. 91.
5. For a detailed treatment of the three philosophical alternatives, see Sallis, John, "Time, Subjectivity, and the Phenomenology of Perception," *The Modern Schoolman*, 48, 1971, pp. 347-357. The treatment of the subject in this section draws up the conceptual apparatus proposed in this paper.

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6. Merleau Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, (trans.) Colin Smith, New York, 1962, p. 414.

7. *Ibid.*

8. Sallis, John, *op. cit.*, p. 351.

9. The reality of past, present and future has been accepted by some Pali traditions also. Such a view is clearly propounded by Nāgsena in *Milindapāñha* where he rejects the alternative offered by King Milinda who suggests that only present is real. This point may go in favour of views expressed by some scholars that *Milindapāñha* is a northern text (belonging to northern school of Buddhism). However, there is one important difference between Sarvāstivāda and the position of Nāgsena. For the Sarvāstivāda the past, present and future cannot be conceived in separation from the entities (*dharmas*). They are not empty slices of time. Nāgsena, however, is prepared to accord them independent status.

10. *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 394, cf. Schayer, *Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy*, Karkowie, 1938, p. 20.

11. *Mahāvibhāṣā*, 393a, cf. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

12. Schayer, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

13. Kalupahana, David J., "The Buddhist Conception of Time and Temporality," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, p. 187.

14. Inada, Kenneth K., *Nāgārjuna: A translation of His Mulamadhyamakārikā*, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, pp. 117-119.

15. Koller, John M., "On the Buddhist Views of Devouring Time," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 24, No. 2, April 1974, p. 205.

16. Nāgārjuna, *op. cit.*, pp. 117-119.

17. Kanakura, Y., "The Question of Time in Connection of Milindapāñha, Abhidharma and Mādhyamikakārikā," *Osaki Gakaho*, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of Milindapāñha to the Ābhidharmika tradition has been well brought out.

18. It is conceivable that Nāgārjuna would have opposed the Sarvāstivādin articulation of temporality in terms of the *svabhāva* of a *dharma*. (See infra, p. 208). But no explicit rejection of Sarvāstivāda can be discerned in the *Kālaparikṣā* nor is there any claim that Sarvāstivādins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: "Nāgārjuna agreed with the Sarvāstivādins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (*svabhāvavāda*). He drew the conclusion of the nonexistence of time from the Mādhyamika standpoint of non-substantiality (*niḥsvabhāvavāda*), which has a restatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self." Shoson Miyamoto, "Time and Eternity in Buddhism," *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*, Tokyo: Vol. 7, No. 2, 1959, p. 824.

19. Thus Ābhidharmika argued that past and future *dharma* are real because Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (*ārya-śrāvaka*) becomes indifferent to the past and future material objects (*rūpa*) only by concentrating on their *rūpas:*

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Uktam hi Bhgavatā' atītaṁ ced bhiksavo rūpaṁ nābhaviṣyanna śrutavānāryaśrāvakotīte rupénapeksobhaviṣyat. yasmāttahryastyatītaṁ rūpaṁ tasmāchrutavānāryaśrāvakōtite rupenapekso bhavati. anāgataṁ cearūpaṁ nābhaviṣyat na śrutavānārya śrāvakaónāgataṁ rūpaṁ nābhyanandiṣyat. yasmāttahryastyanāgataṁ rūpa itivistarah. *Abhidharmkośam*, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 804. Also, see *Sphuṭartha* on the above.

20. dvayaṁ pratītya vijñānasyotpādah ityuktaṁ. dvayaṁ katamat cakṣū rūpāni yāvat manodharmā iti. asati vātītānāgate tadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ dvayaṁ pratitya na syāt. evaṁ tāvadāgamatóstyatītānāgatam. *Abhidharmakośam*, 1972, *op. cit.*, p. 804.

21. The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of statement is comparable to the Blrāhmioica use of *śabda pramāṇa* (testimony as a valid means of knowledge). Historically; which is prior is very difficult to decide in this particular use, but there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the "priority" of the discussion of the "*pramāṇa*"—at the hands of the Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. It was the latter that gave rise to the preoccupation with pramāṇa in the different sutra commentatorial literature in brāhminical Hinduism.

22. See Vasubandhu's Bhāṣya on *Abhidharmkośa kārikā* 24. sati viṣaye vijñānaṁ pravrtate, nāsati. yadi cātītānāgataṁ na syādasadālambanaṁ vijñānaṁ syāt. tato vijñānaṁeva na syad; ālambanābhāvāt. *The Abhidharmkośam*, *op. cit.*, p. 805.

23. atītājātayorjñānamanyathāvisayaṁ bhavet; *Tattvasaṁgrāha*, 1788, *op. cit.*, p. 504. Also see *Pañjīka* on it: prativast urijñápty ātmakaṁ vijñānam, asati ca jñeye na kincidanena jneyamityavijñānameva syāt, *Ibid.*, p. 505.

24. Bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānamiti cocyate; *The Tattvasaṁgrāha*, 1849, *op. cit.*, p. 518.

25. *Vijñāna* is a *saṁskṛta dharma*. By definition *saṁskṛta dharmas* are temporal (*adhva*) and impermanent: ta eva saṁskṛtā gatagacchadgamisyadahāvādhvānah, adyante nityatayeti vā; *Abhidharmakośam*, (1970), *op. cit.*, p. 26, adyantè nityatayā bhaksyanta ityadhvāna iti saṁskṛtā evādhvaśabdena bhagvatā desitāh; *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā*, 1949, p. 23.

26. "*saṁskṛta dharmas* are called temporal (*dhva*) precisely because change or impermanence (*anityata*) eats them up." *Ibid.*

27. This is the connotation of the term *vikṛti* characteristic of the phenomena as modification of *Prakṛti* in Sāṁkhya-Yoga. A similar understanding of phenomena constituted of *saṁskṛta dharma* is present in the Ābhidharma literature.

28. The question of the existence of *Nirvāṇa* as a separate dharma which is not subject to the forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas. While the Sautrāntikas deny that *Nirvāṇa* exists or is real, Sarvāstivāda affirms its reality as a separate *dharma*. For the details of the argument and counterargument, see *Ābhidharmakośam*, *op. cit.*, pp. 318-328. Also see *Sphuṭārtha Abhidharamkośa Vyākhyā*, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-152.

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29. The negativism as a philosophical doctrine (śūnyavāda), if at all the ultimate philosophical position, is the one that is associated with Nāgārjuna. This is at least the historical truth even though it is increasingly questioned in modern times. Samkara criticized it as expressly a negative doctrine (see Samkara's Bhāṣya on *Brahma Sūtra* 2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is Prajnākaramati, the author of the *Paňjika* on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* of Śāntideva.

As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual analysis may be cited the Advaita Vedānta, according to which the state of being is rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground and the superimposed. See *Mandana's Brahmasiddhi*, Madras: Madras Law Journal Press, 1932, p. 136, ff.

30. *Abhidharmkośam*, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 211-212, 319.

31. nityaṁ kuśalaṁ cāsti dravyāntaram. tadvisaṁyogascocyate pratisaṁkhyā (=nirvāṇa) nirodhasceti sarvamevāsamskrtamadravyamiti, *Ibid.*, p. 321.

32. etāni hi saṁskṛtasya catvāri lakṣaṇāni. yatraitāni bhavanti sa dharmaḥ saṁskṛto lakṣyate vipaṛyādasamskṛtaḥ. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

33. According to Abhidharmkóśa *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* are interchangeable terms used for consciousness. Consciousness is always dependent upon what it cognizes: cittaṁ manó tha vijñānamekārtha pamcadha, Abhidharmakośam, *op. cit.*, p. 208-209, samprayuktakahetustu cittachaittāh, *Ibid.*, p. 306, also saman āśrayo yesāṁ te cittacaitta anyonyaṁ samprayuktakahetuḥ, *Ibid.*, p. 307.

34. Cittacaitah sahāvaśyaṁ sarva samskṛtalakṣanaih prāptyā, *Ibid.*, p. 185-186.

35. Visaṁyogaḥ kṣayo dhiyā
kṣayah=nirodhaḥ dhi=prajñā. tena pratisaṁkhyānirodho visaṁyogaphalamityuktaṁ bhavati, *Abhidharmkośam*, 1970, *op. cit.*, p. 332.

36. See *Abhidharmkośam*, 1970, kārikā 23-33 and bhāṣya on them, *Ibid.*, pp. 186-211.

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19

Problems of the Application of Western Terminology to Theravāda Buddhism, with special Reference to the Relationship between the Buddha and the Gods

NINIAN SMART

It was natural in the days when evolutionary theories of religion were more popular than they are today for scholars to attempt rather general comparisons of religious systems, so that they could be fitted into such categories as animism, polytheism, monotheism, etc. There is still some advantage in reflecting upon such general categories; and the purpose of the present paper is to consider how far traditional Western categories can be made to fit Theravāda Buddhism. I shall concentrate primarily on the Theravāda Buddhism of the Pali canon: some of my remarks may not apply so precisely to various contemporary forms of Buddhism in Theravādin countries.[1]

The puzzlement sometimes occasioned to Western scholars in the treatment of the Theravāda in part arises from the fact that though gods and spirits are not at all infrequent in the scriptures, they have an ambiguous and even peripheral place in the structure of Buddhist doctrine and practice. It is not plausible to look upon Theravāda Buddhism as basically polytheistic; nor on the other hand is it monotheistic; nor is it pantheistic or monistic. Its highest value and goal is not, in any plain sense, divine. The favourite Western categories fail to get a grip upon it. It is therefore worth examining the actual role of the gods and their relation to the Buddha.

First, it is to be noted that the *devas* are not, from the Theravādin point of view, properly the objects of a cultus. That is, worship of the gods, making sacrifices to them, etc., is of no use in the pursuance of the holy life. But clearly among the gods of the Pali canon are those who were recipients of a cultus—for instance Sakka[2] (indeed the use of this name rather than 'Indra' arises from its employment in the *upahavya* rite,[3] and may have been the name under which he was best known in popular

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religion in the Gangetic region). But while in some measure accepting the existence of such gods, the Pali canon does not endorse their cults. Thus the status of the *devas* is ambiguous in so far as the typical characteristic of gods is their being objects of cults (unless promoted to being *dei otiosi*). Why then did Buddhism retain these beings amid its cosmological furniture? The diagnosis of this matter may be similar to the conclusion reached by prof. T O. Ling in his study of Mara[4]—that they represent a bridge to popular religion. The Buddha, so to say, did not launch a direct assault upon current beliefs; but retained something of their outer form, while sucking away their inner substance. To this process I shall come in a moment.

It is perhaps significant that Brahmā Sahampati should visit the Buddha after his enlightenment to encourage him to preach the *dhamma*.[5] In a way, the trouble about the *dhamma* at first sight is that it moves against the stream of people's worldly goals, towards the attainment of which the *devas* and *devatās* can often assist them. This conflict between the requirements of the holy life and the sentiments of people may lie behind the concept of *paccekabuddhas*.[6] It is not unreasonable to see these as a reflection of a contemporary or pre-existent ascetic movement eschewing the creation of a genuine religious frontier with 'lay' belief. By contrast the Buddha, or early Buddhism at least, did this, partly by accepting some of the gods (and creating new ones, via the idea of rebirth in one of the heavens).[7] This acceptance, however, was essentially upon Buddhist conditions. These conditions can be described as follows.

First, the life of the gods is impermanent (though the gods may not realize this, owing to their longevity, just as Brahmā wrongly supposes himself to be creator).[8] It is thus just as much to be transcended in *nirodha* as earthly existence.

Second, worship of the gods does not conduce to liberation.[9]

Third, it is the normal condition of liberation that a god has to be reborn as a human being.[10]

Fourth, the Pali canon strongly suggests that *perception* of the gods is confined to *arahants*, and numerous passages indicate that the gods visit or appear to the Buddha and other liberated followers when they are in *samādhi* or other higher states of consciousness.[11] Hence, partly, the criticism of Brahmanical claims for the authority of the three Vedas (in the *Tevijjasutta*): the force of the question as to whether Brahmins have *seen* the gods and so possess their knowledge at first hand is that the liberated person, notably the Buddha, *has* so seen the gods, and in effect seen through them.

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Fifth, the Buddha himself transcends the gods. Put from the side of popular religion, he is *devātideva*,[12] or 'god above gods'. But strictly he is not a god (for gods are impermanent, and after his *nirvāṇa* he is indefinable, and not, so to say, 'there' to be prayed to, etc.). Moreover, there are many occasions on which the gods are represented as coming to the Buddha for clarification of points of doctrine, etc.[13]—a mythic mode of affirming the superiority of the salvific effectiveness of the *dhamma* over anything the gods can do.

Sixth, the Pali canon testifies to the 'existence' of gods who appear to be essentially Buddhist creations (such a being, for instance, as Anāthapiṇḍika),[14] wherein the doctrine of rebirth is used to elevate notable Buddhists to a divine position in subsequent lives.

Seventh, the state of liberation (*nibbāna*) is superior to even the most refined states of *jñāna* and by the same token even the most refined forms of supramundane existence (such as the *arūpadhātu*). It is interesting in this connection that the *jñānas* are so explicitly co-ordinated to supramundane realms of existence—this is, as it were, the psychologizing of the heavens.[15] It may not be entirely amiss to see in the Buddha's cryptic answer to the question of whether there are gods,[16] an indication that the texts understood the gods, and Mara for that matter, as data of experience in the higher ranges of spiritual attainment.

For all these reasons, it is clear that the divinities and spirits of popular and Brahmanical religion were partially accepted, but in the process emasculated. Here is one mode in which the *dhamma* could be co-ordinated with existing beliefs, but on conditions which safeguarded the central values of the *dhamma*. It is the Theravādin mode of *upāyakauśalya*. The gods and Maras are the interface along which the central message of Buddhism is adapted to features of existing religion. It is perhaps in the same light that we can see the establishment of a Buddhist cult of *cetiyas*,[17] issuing in the more florid and well-developed cult of *stūpas*.

It is thus misleading to dub the Theravāda Buddhism of the Pali canon polytheistic. If you like it transcends polytheism, and so can be called 'transpolytheistic'[18] (Zimmer used the word 'transtheistic'[19] but my locution seems more apt). But even to say this may be to concentrate overmuch on the periphery—like categorizing Roman Catholicism as a good example of non-Nestorianism.

The typical categories which have been used for characterizing religious viewpoints proceed largely by trying to pinpoint the main focus of foci of religious activities. If we were to ask ourselves what the primary focus of Theravādin activities are, as described in the Pali canon, it would undoubtedly be liberation—for the analysis of reality, the teachings of the

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Buddha, the various practices of meditation all have to do with the attainment of higher peace and insight, which brings cessation from rebirth and *nibbāna*. It scarcely needs saying the *nibbāna* is not an object of worship nor is it a kind of ground of existence, such as the Advaitin Brahman.

It can, however, be characterized as transcendent, differing in kind from 'empirical' existence. But even here it is necessary to be cautions in applying Western terminology. The early Buddhist cosmology is, as we have seen, somewhat psychologized, through the co-ordination of various levels of the cosmos with levels of spiritual attainment. The essential break occurs not between this world and the heavenly realm, which in some religions has come to be symbolic of God's transcendent place, but rather between the impermanent and the permanent.

A further reason for the difference of style as between theistic transcendence and that of the Theravādin canon is that God's otherness connects up with, and in a degree reflects, the worship, etc., directed at him. In the case of the Theravādin canon the whole emphasis, from a practical point of view, is on self-mastery and meditation. That is, it is essentially a path of *contemplation* which leads to *nibbāna* (ethical values being subordinate to the contemplative life). Precisely because of this, it differs also from Christian or Sufi mysticism, where the goal of contemplation, namely God, is already given us the supreme focus of worship. There is no Creator to be united with. In this respect it is more important to characterize Theravāda Buddhism in terms of the type of religious practice central to it than in terms of the major focus. (There remains too the question, which I do not now go into, of the possible categorization of other religions in terms of the main interest of Theravāda Buddhism—for surely it is no accident that Western terminology has proceeded from an interest in whether a given religion approximates, or does not do so, to monotheism: value judgements have lurked secretly or explicitly precisely because scholars are liable to begin with a norm of religion).

Yet there are aspects of the matter that remain unresolved by the above account. It is clear that many marvels occur in the Pali canon, like the occurrence of earthquakes at suitable times, as described in the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*.[20] More generally, the world and the gods respond to the crucial events of the Buddha's career. His birth was not without such marvels. This mythic milieu and acceptance of the fabulous world of *asuras*, *yakkhas*, *gandhabbas* and so forth, not to mention the *parittas* produced as ritual substitutes for the *yakṣamantras*[21] and the like, are all suggestive, in the Pali canon of a far from 'rationalistic' approach to popular religion. Is there not in all this a congruence with the typical world of the gods, and is the Buddha to be exempted from the

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category of a numinous Lord ?

It is too facile to suppose that the original teachings of the Buddha have just been overlaid by myth. It is so, for two well-canvassed reasons. First, it is hard to penetrate to the original teachings, and this must always have a strong subjective element influenced by modern presuppositions. Second, there is as much difficulty in detecting original doctrinal elements in Buddhism as in detecting mythological ones. There are, too, evidences of early quasi-cults in Buddhism (I use the barbarous term 'quasi-cults' advisedly, for reasons which emerge).

An explanation of the two-faced situation of Theravāda Buddhism as found in the Pali canon is that it *is* Janus-faced. On the one hand, there is the pursuit of the contemplative path, the institution of an Order to facilitate this, the elaboration of an analysis of reality (*anicca*, *anattā*, *dukkha* and so forth). On the other hand, there is the frequent reference to marvels, *devas*, *Brahmās*, *Māras*, spirits of various kinds, heavens purgatories, the myth of the Buddha himself, the cult of *cetiyas*. The Janus-faced character of the religion can be represented by a simile. It is like people looking at a stained-glass window from two sides. Those looking from within towards the sunlight can see marvellous things, yet through them the light of the Enlightened One and his liberated disciples can be seen, as more glorious than the marvels. Those on the outside can see the window, but dully : it has no charm or fascination. Or to put the matter less extravagantly, the social and religious situation allowed a movement of mendicants to establish a prestige greater than local and Brahmanical cults, and to present their doctrines and final goal as being the supreme truth in a manner not riding roughshod over the population off whom, in the last resort, the Sangha lived.

So a great man and his Enlightenment and the other great events of his life could find an echo in nature. What could be the privilege of the gods was a reverberation in nature, testifying to the transcendence of the Buddha over the numinosities of current religion. Yet secretly the religion was being changed. It is partly for this reason that any evaluation of the Pali canon must accept its *double-entendre*. If one *must* categorize it by relation to the traditional concerns of such classifications, it is a trans-polytheistic, non-theistic religion of contemplation.

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NOTES

1. In the subsequent discussion, I am indebted for certain points to the unpublished doctoral thesis, written under my supervision, on 'A Study of the Gods in Early Buddhism in their mythological and social milieu as depicted in the Nikāyas of the Pali canon', by Dr M.M.J. Marasinghe, of Vidyalankara University, Ceylon. (Thesis lodged in University of Birmingham Library, 1967.)
2. See Charles Godage, 'The Place of Indra in Early Buddhism', *University of Ceylon Review*, April 1945, pp. 41-72.
3. See A. B. Keith, *The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads*, (1925), i.p. 338.
4. *Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil*, (1962).
5. Cp. regarding the previous Buddha Vipassi, *Dīgha Nikāya* 11.37; re Gotama, *Majjhima Nik.* 1.167 f.
6. Hitherto these mysterious figures have not attracted a full-scale study.
7. Cp. *Majjhima Nik.* 11.130.
8. Cp. *Saṃyutta Nikāya*, v. 410 and elsewhere.
9. But by implication it helps a *god* to reverence the Buddha.
10. Except in so far as an *anāgāmin* may be treated as a *deva*.
11. Cp. *Dīgha Nikāya* 1.220 '*Atha kho so Kevaddha bhikkhu tathārūpaṃ samādhim samāpajji, yathā samāhite citte Brahmayāniyo maggo pātur ahosi*'.
12. *Niddesa* 1.355 ff.
13. Fully catalogued in Marasinghe, *op. cit.* (note 1, above).
14. See *Dict. of Pāli Proper Names*, ed. G.P. Malalasekera,
15. Cp. *Aṅguttara Nikāya* iv. 241 f. and numerous other passages.
16. *Majjhima Nikāya* 11.213 *Ucce sammatam kho etaṁ, Bhāradvāja, lokasmiṁ atthi devātti*, cp. *M.N.* 11.130.
17. Cp. the well-known passage in *Dīgha Nikāya*, 11.75.
18. As in my *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*, (1964), pp. 214 f.
19. In his *Philosophies of India*, (1957), pp. 181 f.
20. *Dīgha Nikāya* 11.
21. Cp. the *Aṭānāṭiya Sutta*, and *Sutta Nipāta* 39 f. *Dīgha Nikāya* 111.194 ff.

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20

Who Understands the Four Alternatives of the Buddhist texts?

ALEX WAYMAN

INTRODUCTION

THE Buddhist four alternatives are often referred to by their Sanskrit name *catuṣkoṭi*, and given in the form that something is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not, with observation that each of these terms may be denied. As we proceed we shall see that this is not the only manner of presenting a *catuṣkoṭi*. Since so many authorities and scholars of ancient and modern times have discussed this cardinal matter, sometimes heatedly, it is not possible to deal with all the previous studies. Certain discussions will be considered herein within the scope of my five sections: I. The four alternatives and logic; II. The four alternatives in a disjunctive system; III. The four alternatives applied to causation, each denied; IV. The four alternatives applied to existence, each denied; V. The three kinds of *catuṣkoṭi*, various considerations.

My findings differ from the Western treatments that have come to my notice, and the differences stem from my current preparations for publication of a translation of a Tibetan work that deals in several places with the formula.[1] In fact, Tsoṅ-kha-pa's separation of the causation and existence aspects of four alternatives, each denied, goes back to Atīśa (11th century), who in his *Bodhimārga-pradīpa-pañjikā-nāma* presents four ways of realizing insight (*prajñā*), as follows:[2]

1) the principle that denies existence by four alternatives discussed in section IV herein):

2) the principle called 'diamond grain' (*vajrakaṇa*). He illustrates this in his text by Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (MK), I. 1, with alternatives applied to causation (discussed in section III herein).

3) the principle free from singleness and multiplicity. He appeals to such

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an author as Sāntideva (especially his *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, Chap. IX).
4) the principle of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*). Here he means, for example, that the *dharmas* arise dependently and are void of self-existence.
Atīśa's classification is revealing of the meditative use put to the denial of four alternatives when applied to causation or to existence. The fact, then, that his listing does not allude to the disjunctive system of the four alternatives that I discuss in section II, may be simply because this system was not put to meditative use.

The two topics of causation and existence relate to Buddhist teachings that are essentially distinct. Thus, in Buddhism the problem of how a Tathāgata or Buddha arises by reason of merit and knowledge, that is, the problem of cause, is distinct from the problem of the existence, for example, of the Tathāgata after death. Naturally, the causal topic is first, since a Tathāgata has to have arisen before there is a point to inquiring whether he exists after death. Historically, the first topic represents what the Buddha preferred to talk about, and the second topic includes matters which the Buddha sometimes refused to talk about.

As suggested earlier, my main sources are from Asian languages. I am also indebted to certain Western writers, namely, Herman Weyl for the limitations of symbolic systems, Bernard Bosanquet for treatment of disjunctive statements, and Willard Van Orman Quine for his use of the word "logic" (bibliography herein).

I. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES AND LOGIC

Jayatilleke says, "there is little evidence that Nāgārjuna understood the logic of the four alternatives as formulated and utilized in early Buddhism."[3] This scholar was not content with putting down Nāgārjuna, founder of the Mādhyamika school, for he concludes that scarcely any Western scholars, classical Indian scholars, or modern Indian and Japanese writers have comprehended this logic either. Richard H. Robinson, one of the Western scholars whose theories on the matter were rejected for the most part by Jayatilleke, subsequently replied to him,[4] among other things questioning the use of the word "logic" to refer to the four alternatives, although himself having written an article entitled, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System",[5] which included a discussion of the four alternatives, and himself having a section entitled, "Nāgārjuna's Logic" in his book (*Early Mādhyamika...*).[6] Chatalian, in turn, asserts that Robinson did not justify his use of the word "logic" in his book.[7] While agreeing with

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Chatalian thus far, I still am puzzled by a seeming overattention by Robinson and Chatalian to other persons' use of the word "logic". Quine points out that while writers have used the term "logic" with varying scope, a common part of their usage is called "the science of necessary inference," although he admits that this is a vague description.[8] He then states that it is less vague to call *logical* certains locutions, 'including 'if', 'then', 'and', 'or' 'not', 'unless', 'some', 'all', 'every', 'any', 'it', etc. Furthermore, he mentions that a set pattern of employing these locutions allow us to speak of the *logical structure*. This is tantamount to saying that every grammatical English sentence in the indicative mood has a logical structure. Then, when Nāgārjuna writes (*Madhyamaka-kārikā*, XVIII, 8), in an English translation, "all is genuine or is not genuine..." this has a logical structure. Indeed, every statement with the pattern, "Every X is an *a* or a *b*," has the same logical structure. Quine further qualifies a statement as *logically true* if its logical structure alone yields truth; and thus his use of the term "logic" involves truth and falsehood in this sense. Other writers have used such terms as "formally valid", "analytic proposition", or "tautology" as closely related to this usage of "logic".[9] Accordingly, the application of symbolic logic to Nāgārjuna's statements, to prove them logically true or false, goes along with such a title as "the logic of the four alternatives"; and this application of symbolic logic has been engaged in by H. Nakamura, Robinson, Jayatilleke, R. S. Y. Chi, among others, including Shohei Ichimura in his recent dissertation, "A Study on Nāgārjuna's Method of Refutation". It does seem that both Jayatilleke and Robinson were justified in using the term "logic" in a study of these matters when they employed symbolic logic.

This still leaves the important problem of whether Nāgārjuna's statements are indeed *logically true*, and thus have truth or falseness according to their logical structure regardless of content, regardless of what is given. By "given", what is meant here is the usual 'granted, assumed'. This involves a problem of translation, because when Nāgārjuna's statements are assumed to be at hand, the mere fact that there are marks on a page in the English language purported to be his statements does not prove that they faithfully relay Nāgārjuna's intention by marks on a page in the original Sanskrit language. Here there are two points : If the statements do not have an easily isolated logical structure, it is hazardous and probably contraindicated to apply symbolic logic. Even if they do have an easily isolated logical structure, one asks if they are also so complicated that one requires a symbolic representation to sift or show truth and falsehood.

We may start to solve this problem with its two points, by recourse to Weyl's remarks regarding "constructive cognition"[10]: "By the introduction

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of symbols the assertions are split so that one part of the [mental] operations is shifted to the symbols and thereby made independent of the given and its continued existence. Thereby the free manipulation of concepts is contrasted with their application, ideas become detached from reality and acquire a relative independence." Thus Weyl, an eminent mathematician, is frank to admit that the pure operations of mathematics are independent of the existence of the given. In the case of the *catuṣkoṭi*. the given is a rather considerable corpus of material in the Pāli scriptures and then in Nāgārjuna's works, not to speak of contributions by later Asian authors. And there is the assumption that this corpus is at hand in a translated form of English sentences that are susceptible, in whole or part, of being converted from their natural form to the artificial language of a symbolic system.

Now to the first point. Let us assume that the *catuṣkoṭi* statements do not have an isolatable logical structure, and yet symbolic logic is utilized. If one would grant the applicability of Weyl's remarks, even if there were a valid utilization of symbolic logic, it could not account for the full corpus of the given, as the "given" has been explicated earlier. So it may be merely a section or subset of the given whose logical structure is not isolatable. But then the application of symbolic logic is a matter of mastering the art of the symbols. And so one may presume that it is an arrogated comprehension of the given—although in fact the symbols are independent, partially or wholly, of the given—whereby an undeniably brilliant writer as Jayatilleke takes the stance that he virtually alone understands "the logic of the four alternatives," while claiming that such a renowned author as Nāgārjuna cannot understand it ! Or claiming that a modern writer like Robinson cannot understand, because he does not apply the formal symbolic system right, that is, has not mastered the art. Thus the symbolic system becomes a vested interest, the users jealous of its misuse, while they champion its misapplication to the given, and even to what may not be at hand, for example, a correct translation of a passage from an ancient text.

Then to the second point. I do not propose to denigrate, in general, the employment of symbolic systems for representing propositions of Indian philosophy. But are the *catuṣkoṭi* statements so complicated that a symbolic restatement is necessary, with the implication of an understanding already at hand to certify the necessity ? Perhaps there is working a psychological factor which could be called "wonder". What mathematics student getting the "right answer" with calculus has not at times felt a wonder at the ability of the mathematics—beyond his native capacities—say, to determine the intercepted volume of the cone ? As Buytendijk has

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been cited : "Wonder is characterized by a halting of the thing observed. This halting, which men call attention, is at the same time permeated by a premonition that light may be shed on this thing."[11] But this premonition of light through the symbolic system is a will-o'-the-wisp, a subtle infatuation, because light can only be shed on the given, and the symbolic system is independent, in whole or part, of the given as it has been described earlier. It is like a person fascinated by a brilliant lamp and therefore is not seeing anything illumined by the lamp. The master of the art is himself mastered and uses the symbolism willy-nilly : even for the simplest computation, he needs the computer. For centuries the Buddhists believed that the given of the four alternatives, including the traditional exegesis, provides sufficient material for understanding—if a person can understand. Some of the modern writers have rendered the discussions into an artificial language, and then have dwelt on false issues of whether this or that scholar's formulation is a "logic".

II. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES IN A DISJUNCTIVE SYSTEM

Here by a "disjunctive system" is meant a system of statements subject to the judgment "A is either B or C." Either B or C is left and one of these two is excluded. Such a judgment appears to be involved in the Indian syllogism, whose 'reason' (*hetu*) is relevant to the 'thesis' (*sādhya*) when the case referred to in the thesis is agreed to be present in similar cases and absent in dissimilar cases.[12] Anyway, the disjunctive judgment is a form of inference (*anumāna*), and for a particular system it is necessary to state the rule of the disjunction. Jayatilleke has shown that various systems of four alternatives found in the early Buddhist texts are in a disjunctive system whose rule seems to be that when one of the alternatives is taken as "true" the rest are certainly false. He points to such systems as, "A person is wholly happy;...unhappy;...both happy and unhappy;...neither happy nor unhappy." "X is a person who torments himself;...torments others;...both torments himself as well as others;...who neither torments himself nor others."[13] Bosanquet has an apt illustration[14] : "I suppose that the essence of such a system lies in arrangements for necessarily closing every track to all but one at a time of any tracks which cross it or converge into it. The track X receives trains from A, B, C, D; if the entrance for those from A is open, B, C, and D are *ipso facto* closed; if A, B, and C are closed, D is open, and so on."

But the matter is not without complications. The Pāli work *Kathāvatthu* records a dispute between the two Buddhist sects Theravāda and Andhaka about the nature of the meditative state which is called in Pāli *nevasaññānā-*

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saññāyatana (the base of neither the *saññā* nor non-*saññā*), where *saññā* means something like "idea", and the disagreement was over the presence or absence of *saññā* in that state. The section concludes with an appeal to the case of the "neutral feeling" (the neither-pleasure-nor-pain), thus consistent with the traditional Indian syllogism which uses, as example, something well known to society (*lokaprasiddha*). Just as it would not be cogent to ask if that neutral feeling were either pleasure or pain, so is it not proper to assert there either is or is not *saññā* on the basis of neither the *saññā* nor non-*saññā*.[15] This conclusion agrees with the previous observation that only one of the four alternatives is the case at a particular time. Besides, we learn that the "neither...nor" alternative points to a neutrality with indeterminate content.

Jayatilleke quite properly explains the third alternative : "S is *partly* P and *partly* non-P."[16] Thus for the content of the third alternative, stated as "the universe is both finite and infinite," the *Brahma-jāla Sutta* explains this as when one has the idea (*saññī*) that the world is finite in the upward and downward directions, and has the idea that the world is infinite across. In agreement, Nāgārjuna states in his *Madhyamaka-kārikā*. XXVII, 17-18:

> If the same place (*ekadeśa*) that is divine were the same place that is human, it would be (both) permanent and impermanent. That is not feasible. If both the permanent and the impermanent were proven, one must also grant that the pair 'neither the permanent nor the impermanent' is proven.

One should note about this passage (Jayatilleke mistranslates and misunderstands it),[17] that Nāgārjuna does not here deny an alternative of "both the permanent and the impermanent" *per se*; he denies this for one and the same place. This can be illustrated by his own verse (MK XXV, 14; cited later), implying that *nirvāṇa* is present in the Buddha and absent in ordinary persons, but not present and absent in the same place. Nāgārjuna, in the present verses (XXVII, 17-18), also makes explicit his position that the fourth alternative (neither the permanent nor the impermanent) is derived from the third one, and that the third one (both the permanent and the impermanent) combines the presumed first one (the permanent) and the second one (the impermanent).

> This brings up Nāgārjuna's remarkable verse (MK XVIII, 8):
> All (*sarva*) is genuine (*tathyam*),[18] or is not genuine, or is both genuine and not genuine, or is neither genuine nor not-genuine. That is the ranked instruction (*anuśāsana*) of the Buddha.

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According to Candrakīrti's commentary "all" means the personality aggregates (*skandha*), the realms (*dhātu*), and the sense bases (*āyatana*).[19] See, along the same lines, Kalupahana's discussion[20] about the "Discourse on 'Everything' " (*Sabbasutta*), available both in the Pāli canon and in the Āgama version in Chinese translation. Therefore the word "all" in Nāgārjuna's verse amounts to "anything", where the "anything" is any entity chosen from the set of 'all' entities according to the Buddhist meaning, as just expounded. This agrees with Bosanquet's observation that the content of the disjunctive judgment "A is either B or C" "is naturally taken as an individual, being necessarily concrete."[21]

Next, the interpretation of the word *anuśāsana* as 'ranked instruction' comes from observing it among the three 'marvels' (*prātihārya*) of the Buddha's teaching, of which the first one is 'magical performance' (*ṛddhi*), the second is 'mind reading' (*ādeśanā*), and the third, 'ranked instruction' (*anuśāsana*), apparently made possible by the preceding 'mind reading'.[22] This interpretation is confirmed in Vasubandhu's *Buddhānusmṛti-ṭīkā*, saying in part, "...with the three kinds of marvels observing the streams of consciousness of the noble Śāriputra, and so on, and of other fortunate sentient beings, teaches the true nature of the Śrāvakayāna exactly according to their expectations and their potentialities."[23] This only clarifies why Candrakīrti's commentary on the verse interprets it as a ranking, and not why his commentary interprets the ranking as follows:

> (a) The Buddha taught to worldly beings the personality aggregates, the realms, and sense bases, with their various enumerations, in a manner that 'all is genuine' in order to lead them onto the path by having them admire his omniscience about all these elements. (b) After these beings had come to trust the Lord, it was safe to inform them about all those divisions of the world that 'all is not genuine', i.e., 'all is spurious' because they momentarily perish and change. (c) Certain select disciples could be told 'all is both genuine and not-genuine'. That is, that the same element which is genuine to the ordinary person is not-genuine or spurious to the noble person who is the Buddha's disciple. He tells them this, so they may become detached, i.e. not see it in just one way. (d) To certain advanced disciples, far progressed in viewing reality and scarcely obscured, he taught that 'all is neither genuine nor not-genuine', just as in the case of the son of a barren woman, one asserts that the son is neither white nor black (= non-white).[24]

However, he seems to be following, in his own way, the 'allegories' or 'veiled intentions' (*abhisaṃdhi*) which are listed and then defined in the

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Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra, XII, 16-17.[25] The first one is *avatāraṇa-abhi°* (the veiled intention so they will enter), explained as teaching that form, and so forth, is existent, so as not to scare the *śrāvakas* from entering the Teaching. The second one is *lakṣaṇa-abhi°* (the veiled intention about the character, namely, of *dharmas*), explained as teaching that all *dharmas* are without self-existence, without origination, etc. The third one is *pratipakṣa-abhi°* (the veiled intention about opponents, namely, to faults), explained as teaching by taking into account the taming of faults. So far these terms agree quite well with Candrakīrti's exposition. For example, in the case of the third one, the application to Nāgārjuna's line "all is both genuine and not-genuine" is the opposition (*pratipakṣa*) to the fault of one-sidedness. It is the fourth one whose relevance is obscure : this is the *pariṇāmana-abhi°* (the veiled intention about changeover, namely, to reality). In illustration, the *Sūtrālaṃkāra* cites a verse : "Those who take the pithless as having a pith abide in waywardness. Those who are mortified with the pains [of austere endeavour] [abide] in the best enlightenment." Candrakīrti is at least partially consistent by saying "to certain advanced disciples, far progressed in viewing reality," because these ones would take the pithless as pithless.

Jayatilleke[26] refers to the same passage of Candrakīrti's and to a different commentary on Nāgārjuna's verse in the *Prajñāpāramitāśāstra*, both as presented in Robinson's book,[27] to deny that in the verse cited above, the four alternatives are in a "relation of exclusive disjunction" and to claim that they amount to the non-Buddhist relativistic logic of the Jains. However, Candrakīrti's commentary is consistent with Nāgārjuna's MK XXVII, 17—18 (translated earlier, herein) concerning the dependence of the subsequent alternative on the previous one or ones.

Jayatilleke's hostility to Candrakīrti's commentary on the verse may stem from the modern Theravādin's reluctance to attribute a ranked instruction to the Buddha. Ordinarily the canonical passage cited in this connection is, as Thomas renders it : "Buddha replied, 'What does the Order expect of me ? I have taught the Doctrine without making any inner and outer, and herein the Tathāgata has not the closed fist of a teacher with regard to doctrines.' " [28] From the modern Theravādin standpoint, Candrakīrti's explanation attributes to the Buddha precisely such an inner and outer, because it portrays the Buddha teaching worldly beings (= the outer) in the realistic manner, and then teaching those beings once they had become disciples (=the inner) in the illusional manner. And going on with a still different teaching to certain advanced disciples. But that same scriptural passage from the traditional, last sermon of the Buddha could be taken differently than it usually is, and perhaps consistently

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with Nāgārjuna's verse as Candrakīrti understood it. That is because the original Pāli (*Dīgha-Nikāya*, ii, 100) reads : *mayā dhammo anantaraṃ abāhiraṃ karitvā* (By me was the Dhamma preached without inner, without outer). The phrase "without inner, without outer" can be restated as "with neither an inner nor an outer." And then just as the "neutral feeling" (neither pleasure nor pain) is not either pleasure or pain, so also one could not determine if the Buddha's doctrine was either inner or outer, and one homogeneous character, wearisome by repetition of the same doctrine over and over again. Nāgārjuna's verse, by use of the word *anuśāsana*, seems to mean that the Tathāgata, without the closed fist, would gladly communicate in a graduated manner so that disciples in different stages of progress could have a teaching suited to their particular level. While this position may not be agreeable to some modern exponents of the Theravāda tradition, it is not a 'Mahāyāna' quarrel with the earlier 'Hīnayāna' school, because also Buddhaghoṣa of the Theravāda tradition in his *Atthasālinī* insists that the Buddha's teaching was fittingly modified in accordance with the varying inclinations of both men and gods.[29]

III. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO CAUSATION, EACH DENIED

Starting with the Buddha's first sermon, the four Noble Truths have been a basic ingredient of Buddhist thinking and attitudes. Of these Truths, the first is the Noble Truth of Suffering; and of the fourth Truth, the Noble Truth of Path explained with eight members, the first member is called 'right views' (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*). Sometimes 'right views' were established by determining and eliminating the wrong views. So in the Pāli *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* (II, 19-21),[30] the Buddha, replying to questions by Kassapa (Kāśyapa), denied that suffering is caused by oneself, by both oneself and another, or neither by oneself nor by another. Then, in answer to further questions, Buddha stated he knows suffering and sees it. Then Kassapa asked the Buddha to explain suffering to him, and was told that claiming the suffering was done by oneself amounts to believing that one is the same person as before, which is the eternalistic view; while claiming that the experiencer of the suffering is different from the one who caused it, amounts to the nihilistic view. Thereupon the Buddha taught the Dharma by a mean, namely, the series of twelve members which begin with the statement 'having nescience as condition the motivations arise' and continue with similar statements through the rest of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*). The Buddha proceeded to teach that by the cessation of

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nescience, the motivations cease, and so on, with the cessation of this entire mass of suffering. In agreement, Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, I, 1 states :

> There is no entity anywhere that arises from itself, from another, from both (itself and another), or by chance.

In this case the given element is called the 'entity' (*bhāva*). The first two of the denied alternatives have the given element of 'cessation' (*nirodha*) in MK VII, 32. The element is 'suffering' (*duḥkha*) or 'external entity' (*bāhya-bhāva*) in MK XII. The meaning of the denial here is aptly stated by Bosanquet : "Negation of a disjunction would mean throwing aside the whole of some definite group of thoughts as fallacious, and going back to begin again with a judgment of the simplest kind. It amounts to saying, 'None of your distinctions touch the point; you must begin afresh.' "[31] In the discourse to Kassapa, to begin afresh amounts to accepting "dependent origination". This is also Nāgārjuna's position, following the ancient discourse to Katyāyana, as mentioned later in the *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, and as stated in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*, VI, 114 :

> Since entities do not arise by chance, (i.e.) from a lord, and so on (primal matter, time, atoms, *svabhāva*, Puruṣa, Nārāyaṇa, etc.), or from themselves, others, or both (themselves and others), then they arise in dependence (on causes and conditions).[32]

Besides, to begin afresh amounts to the establishment of voidness (*śūnyatā*), for so the *Anavatapta* (*nāgarāja*) *paripṛcchā* is cited: "Any (thing) that is born (in dependence) on conditions, is not born (to wit) : The birth of this (thing) does not occur by self-existence (*svabhāva*). Any (thing) that is dependent on conditions, is declared void. Any person who understands voidness, is heedful."[33] Since Nāgārjuna begins his *Madhyamaka-kārikā* with this theory of causation, it is reasonable to assume that it is essential for the rest of his work. Also, since voidness (*śūnyatā*) is established in the course of the causal denials, it is taken for granted in the denial in terms of existence, and so the attempt to establish voidness by way of existence becomes a faulty point of view (*dṛṣṭi*), as in MK XXII, 11:

> One should not say "It's void," nor "It's non-void" nor "It's both (void and non-void)," nor "It's neither." But it may be said in the meaning of designation.

One should not say, "It's void," because the four alternatives applied to existence cannot establish voidness. But in the meaning of designation

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prajñaptiartham), as in the celebrated verses (MK XXIV, 18—19), there is the act of calling dependent origination 'voidness' and the *dharmas* so arising 'void'; and here Nāgārjuna adds that the act of calling, when there is the dependency, is the middle path.[31]

Besides, the denial of the four alternatives in the scope of causation (confer, MK I, 1, earlier) was aimed at four philosophical positions, as follows :[35]

1. The denial of arising from itself is the rejection of the Sāṃkhya position, which is the *satkāryavāda* (causation of the effect already existent). Murti is certainly right on this point.[36]

2. The denial of arising from another rejects the creator being (*īśvara*), and Kalupahana increases the list from a Jaina source for 'caused by another' : destiny (*niyati*), time (*kāla*), God (*īśvara*), nature (*svabhāva*) and action (*karma*). The later Buddhist logicians held a theory of 'efficiency' that belongs here.[37] Murti incorrectly puts this kind of denial under the heading of *asatkāryavāda* (the nonexistence of an effect before its production).[38]

3. The denial of arising from both itself and another is the rejection of the Vaiśeṣika, who say the clay pot arises from itself (clay) and from the potter, wheel, sticks, etc. In fact, this theory is in both the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika philosophy, which Dasgupta,[39] in agreement with Shastri,[40] calls the *asatkāryavāda*, the opposite of the Sāṃkhya's *satkāryavāda*. Here, the clay is the material cause : the stick, wheel, etc., the instrumental cause.

4. The denial of arising without a cause (or by chance), is the rejection of the Lokāyata (the ancient materialistic school), which espouses the arising from self-nature.[41] That school held that consciousness is just a mode of the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) : consciousness is not the effect of another consciousness.[42]

Hence, there is no denial of arising *per se*, but the alternatives are meant to deny the arising falsely ascribed to certain agencies, to wit, itself, another, both itself and another, or by chance. This, then, is one of the 'right views'.

IV. THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES APPLIED TO EXISTENCE, EACH DENIED

The Buddha rejected each of the four alternatives regarding the existence after death of the Tathāgata, because none of the four are relevant

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(*na upeti*), or defined (*avyākata*).[43] Nāgārjuna devotes *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, chap. XXV to the same topic, saying generally (XXV, 22) : "Since all given things (**vastu*)[44] are void, what is endless, what with end, what both endless and with end, what neither endless or with end?" This refers to the celebrated fourteen 'undefined given things' (*avyākṛta-vastūni*).[45] So in the chapter, *nirvāṇa* is treated in verses 5, 8, 13, 16; and the Lord before and after cessation, in verses 17, 18. For example, this is verse 17 : "One should not infer[46] that the Lord exists after cessation (i.e. in Nirvāṇa). One should not infer that he does not exist, or both (exists and does not exist), or neither." Hence the rejections, again, are aimed against all philosophical positions that resort to inference or to ordinary human reason in such matters.[47] The failure of reasoning is clearly expressed in the Mahāyāna work *Ratnagotravibhāga* (chap. I, verse 9) when denying the four alternatives about the Dharma-sun as the ultimate nature :

> I bow to that Dharma-sun which is not existence and not non-existence, not both existence and non-existence, neither different from existence nor from non-existence; which cannot be reasoned (*aśakyas tarkayitum*), is free from definition (*nirukty-apagataḥ*), revealed by introspection, and quiescent; and which, pervasively shining with immaculate vision, removes the attachment, antipathy, and (eye-) cauls toward all objects.[48]

The question arises whether it is proper to interpret this to involve denial in Bosanquet's meaning, what he calls "contrary negation" :[49] "As we always speak and think within a general subject or universe of discourse, it follows that every denial substitutes some affirmation for the judgment which it denies." One could argue that simply to deny one judgment and thereby affirm another judgment would be a process of thinking that is negated by the goal alluded to in the preceding passage, since the Dharma-sun "cannot be reasoned." However, if Bosanquet's statement were altered to read "every denial substitutes some affirmation for the denial," it then appears to suit the state of affairs alluded to in the passage above. In short, the system of four alternatives would be denied in this contrary negation, thus to suggest the retirement of convention (*saṃvṛti*) in favour of absolute truth (*paramārtha-satya*).

In the preceding illustrations, it is the Tathāgata or the Dharma or Nirvāṇa which is affirmed as the affirmation of absolute truth in the process of the denials, because these denials are a meditative act—and acts succeed where theories fail—which downgrades the role of inference and human

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reason generally, and upholds the role of vision, so—as Atīśa indicated—to promote insight (*prajñā*).

Therefore, it is now possible to evaluate two interpretations which seem to be starkly contrasted : (1) Murti's "The Mādhyamika denies metaphysics not because there is no real for him; but because it is inaccessible to Reason. He is convinced of a higher faculty, Intuition (*prajñā*)...."[50] (2) Streng's, "In Nāgārjuna's negative dialectic the power of reason is an efficient force for realizing Ultimate Truth."[51] One could argue that the disagreement is deceptive, since if reason is to be taken as the mental process of making the denials which substitute an affirmation of the Real or Ultimate Truth, then indeed while the Real is inaccessible to reason, it cannot be denied that reason brought about that higher faculty, the supernal insight (*prajñā*), to which the Real is accessible. This very point is made in the *Kāśyapa-parivarta* :

> "Kāśyapa, it is this way: for example, when two trees are rubbed together by the wind, and fire arises (from the friction), (that fire) having arisen, burns the two trees. In the same way, Kāśyapa, (when given things are analysed) by the most pure discrimination (*pratyavekṣaṇā*), the faculty of noble insight is born; and (that Fire) having been born, (it) burns up that most pure discrimination itself."[52]

Hence, the very discrimination which is the kind of reasoning that denies the alternatives is described metaphorically as a friction which arouses the fire of insight that in turn destroys this kind of reasoning.

Turning to Tsoṅ-kha-pa's section,[53] defending the denial of the four alternatives, this concerns the presence and absence of entities. Tsoṅ-kha-pa states that there are only two possibilities for an entity, that is, accomplished by own-nature, and efficient. Then, if the first alternative is stated in the form, "An entity exists," that is denied; the denial meaning to the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika that, in the case of both truths (*saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*), one denies that an entity exists accomplished by own-nature, while the efficient entity is denied in the *paramārtha* or absolute sense but not conventionally.

Likewise, the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika rejects the nonexistence of an entity, should someone affirm the nonexistence of an entity accomplished by own-nature among the unconstructed (*asaṃkṛta*) natures (*dharma*).

Likewise, this Mādhyamika rejects the simultaneity of existence of that sort of entity with the nonexistence of the other sort of entity. And he rejects that there are neither, even one accomplished by own-nature.

While I have insisted that the ultimate nature is affirmed by the four

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denials, it should be granted that the acceptance of this absolute in Nāgārjuna's Mādhyamika is a matter much disputed by Western scholars; de Jong's thoughtful article[54] on the topic deserves consultation. In any case, Candrakīrti's position is clear, as he states in his own commentary on the *Madhyamakāvatāra* :

> Regarding this sort of *svabhāva* (self-existence) as written in particular (*Madhyamaka-kārikā*, XV, 1—2), received from the mouth of the ācārya (= Nāgārjuna), does it exist ? (In answer :) As to its authorization, the Bhagavat proclaimed that whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, this true nature of dharmas abides, and so on, extensively. The "true nature" (*dharmatā*) (of that text, = *svabhāva*) (necessarily) exists. Which (elements) have this "true nature"? These, the eye, etc. have this *svabhāva*. And what is their *svabhāva* ? Their uncreate nature and their non-dependence on another; the self-nature which is to be understood by knowledge (in *āryasamāpatti*) free from the caul of nescience (and its associated habit-energy). When it is asked, "Does that sort of thing exist ?" who would answer, "No."? If it does not exist, for which goal do the Bodhisattvas cultivate the path of the perfections ? For what reason do the Bodhisattvas, in order to comprehend the true-nature, assume myriads of difficulties that way ?[55]

In short, Candrakīrti explains the *svabhāva* of MK XV, 1—2, as the "true nature" of the scriptures, and in a manner equivalent to the *dharma*-sun of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* passage.[56]

Finally, the denials concerning existence are also referred to as the rejection of four 'views' (*dṛṣṭi*). So MK XXVII, 13 :

> Thus whatever the view concerning the past, whether 'I existed', 'I did not exist', 'I both (existed and did not exist)', 'I neither (existed, nor did not exist)', it is not valid.

Such passages undoubtedly support the frequent claim that the Mādhyamika rejects all 'views'. But note that the views here are of existence, not of causation; and that Nāgārjuna elsewhere adheres to the view of Dependent Origination, which in Buddhism would be counted as a right view' (*samyag-dṛṣṭi*).

V. THE THREE KINDS OF CATUṢKOṬI, VARIOUS CONSIDERATIONS

It might be argued that their are not really three 'kinds' of *catuṣkoṭi* but simply different applications of *the catuṣkoṭi*. Perhaps an exaggeration

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of contrast is involved in using the word 'kinds'. Still I feel the word is necessary to counter the frequent discussion of the *catuṣkoṭi* as though *the catuṣkoṭi* is at hand and the only difficulty is how to explain *it*. Hence we may observe that the first kind of *catuṣkoṭi*, in a disjunctive system, is explanatory of the individual propositions, and thus serves as an introduction to the next two kinds or uses of the *catuṣkoṭi*, to wit, to apply to the problem of causation or to the problem of existence. There were disputes concerning each of the three kinds, but it is especially the causation and existence applications of the four alternatives that occasioned spirited disagreements between the two main schools of the Mādhyamika—the Prāsangika and the Svātantrika—disagreements which would require too many technical explanations to be treated in this article.

Moreover, all three kinds of the *catuṣkoṭi* are found in early Buddhism and later in the Mādhyamika school. The first case where the four alternatives constitute a disjunctive system, with the individual terms not necessarily denied, was well represented in passages of early Buddhism, as preserved in the Pāli canon; and then was included in Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā* in the verse about the ranked instruction of the Buddha. The second case, denial of alternatives regarding causation, starting with the discourses to Kassapa and to Kaccāyana, is made much of by Nāgārjuna as the basis of the Mādhyamika, but does not seem to have been stressed as much in other schools of Buddhism. The third case, denial of four alternatives, has important examples in both early and later Buddhism, and, of course, is generously treated in the Mādhyamika. Therefore, when Jayatilleke says, "It is evident that Nāgārjuna and some of his commentators, ancient and modern, refer to this logic with little understanding of its real nature and significance,"[57] these remarks define the limitations of Jayatilleke's own views of these problems, outside of which is his own "little understanding". Robinson answered Jayatilleke in a different way : "And since the *catuṣkoṭi* is not a doctrine but just a form, later, writers were at liberty to use it in new ways, doing which does not itself prove that they misunderstood the early forms."[58] This is well stated and is meant not only to reject Jayatilleke's criticism of Nāgārjuna and others, but apparently also to justify the application of symbolic logic. However, I have brought up sufficient evidence to show that Nāgārjuna, in the matter of the *catuṣkoṭi*, is heir to and the continuator, of teachings in the early Buddhist canon (in Pāli, the four Nikāyas; in Sanskrit, the four Āgamas). Furthermore, I cannot concede that the *catuṣkoṭi* is just a form. Indeed, if Nāgārjuna had used it in new ways, Jayatilleke would have been more justified in his attribution of misunderstanding to Nāgārjuna.

Next, we observe by the foregoing materials that the first kind of

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catuṣkoṭi is a disjunctive system that was used to explain the Buddha's teaching. The second, applied to causation, each of the alternatives denied, is a meditative exercise, and besides serves to classify some of the philosophical positions rejected by the Mādhyamika. The third kind, applied to existence, each of the alternatives denied, is another meditative exercise, and besides serves to establish the absolute by negating the notional activity of the mind (*saṃjñāskandha*) and its net of imputed qualifications.[59]

The priority of the causality to existence treatments—as I have already insisted upon—is consistent with Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, which devotes chapter I to conditional causes (*pratyaya*), beginning with the denial of four alternatives concerning origination of entities, but in the same chapter begins to treat alternatives of existence, nonexistence, etc. So *MK* I, 6 : "Neither an existent nor a non-existent entity has a valid condition (*pratyaya*). What non-existent has a condition ? What is the use of a condition for an existent ?" The next verse (I, 7) shifts to the word *dharma* : "Whenever a feature (*dharma*) neither existent nor non-existent, or both existent and non-existent, operates, in that case how could an operator-cause be valid ?" (and it is not valid.) *MK* chapters III, IV, and V deal with the products of causes, namely, the sense bases, personality aggregates, and elements, that amount to "all entities" (*sarva-bhāva*, IV, 7). Here again, "all entities" presuppose their arising as products, so the causality. The establishment of causality in conventional terms and of existence in absolute terms is therefore implied in *MK* XXIV, 10 : "Without reliance on convention, the supreme *paramārtha*) is not pointed to."

I propose that it was by not distinguishing these uses of the *catuṣkoṭi* that there has been in the past various improper or misleading attributions to this formula. For example, there is the problem of which kind of two negations is involved : the *prasajya-pratiṣedha* (negation by denial) or *paryudāsa-pratiṣedha* (negation by implication). Matilal concludes that the *catuṣkoṭi* is of the *prasajya* type and that so understood the *catuṣkoṭi* is free from contradiction.[60] Staal after admirably explaining the two kinds of negation (the *prayudāsa* type negates a term; the *prasajya* type negates the predicate) agrees with Matilal that the *catuṣkoṭi* exhibits the *prasajya* type, but disagrees that this frees the formula of contradiction.[61] However, when one considers this along with my preceding materials, one can promptly agree with Matilal and then with Staal that it is the *prasajya* negation which is involved with the *catuṣkoṭi* nota bene, the four alternatives in their explicit form applied to existence, because the proposition "I bow to that Dharma-sun which is not existence" is of the *prasajya* type (confer, Staal : '*x* is not F').

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But when one examines the propositions of the four alternatives in their explicit form applied to causation, one can promptly disagree with Matilal and then with Staal, because the proposition "There is no entity anywhere that arises from itself," is of the *paryudāsa* type (confer, Staal: 'not-*x* is F'). And this *paryudāsa* type is of the variety implying action, for which there is the stock example, "Fat Devadatta does not eat food in the daytime." But 'fat Devadatta' must eat sometime, so when ? The world responds, "at night!"[62] Also, the entities that do not arise from self, another, both, or by chance, must arise somehow, so how ? Buddhism responds, "in the manner of Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)." In illustration, the first two members of Dependent Origination are : (1) 'nescience' (*avidyā*), and (2) 'motivations' (*saṃskāra*). 'Motivations' do not arise from self (motivations) or from another (nescience), or from both self and another (motivations and nescience), or without a cause (that is, by chance); 'motivations' do arise with 'nescience' as condition (*pratyaya*); and since 'motivations' are a *karma* member, have a cause (*hetu*) which is *karma*, hence the other *karma*-member, which is (10) 'gestation' (*bhava*) or 're-existence' (*punarbhava*).[63]

But then what of Staal's position that even so (that is, allowing the *prasajya* interpretation for the *catuṣkoṭi* of existence), this does not save the *prasajya* propositions from mutual contradiction ? Saying, "In rejecting the third clause, the denial of the principle of non-contradiction is rejected, not the principle of non-contradiction itself,"[64] he interprets the third proposition in its literal form, denial that something both exists and does not exist. However, at least in the Tsoṅ-kha-pa Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika explanation that I gave earlier, it is not possible to understand the four denials in terms of existence just by their literal form, because one must bring in the theory of two truths (*saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*) to understand Nāgārjuna's position. In such a case, the denial of the third proposition amounts in commentarial expansion to : This Mādhyamika rejects, in the absolute sense (*paramārthatas*), the simultaneity of existence by own-nature of that efficient entity with the nonexistence by own-nature of the unconstructed entity. In short, it is here claimed that 'existence' and 'non-existence' refer to contrasting entities. Along the same lines, Nāgārjuna says *MK* XXV, 14) :

> How could Nirvāṇa be both a presence and an absence ? Like light and darkness, there is no existence of the two in the same place.

Thus the third alternative of this type of *catuṣkoṭi* can be resolved in various ways, for example, one may deny both a presence and an absence of *nirvāṇa*, adding "that is, in the same place"; or, with a different subject, adding perhaps, "that is, at the same time"; or, with still other subjects,

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perhaps drawing upon the two truths, "that is, with the same truth." All these additions are consistent with Nāgārjuna's verses in the *M K*. Thus, in such interpretations it is not the intention of the denial, as Staal claims, to save a principle of human reason from default; but rather it is held that such is really the meaning of the third proposition, to wit, that a qualification of place, time, or truth must be added. However, it follows that the denials of alternatives applied to existence, while in their explicit form constituting the *prasajya* type of denial, turn out, by reason of the qualifications added in the Mādhyamika school, to be *paryudāsa* negations. Indeed, study of the two main traditions of the Mādhyamika, Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika and Bhāvaviveka's, Svātantrika will show that both of them insist on adding qualifications, especially in terms of the two truths (*saṃvṛti* and *paramārtha*), their disagreement stemming from how such qualifications are made. But that a qualification should be added is consistent with most of the attempts of Westerners to explain the *catuṣkoṭi* because they usually added something, to wit, their theory of the *catuṣkoṭi*. So the Mādhyamika commentators and the Western writers share this solicitude to rationalize, even in the case of the absolute, which was supposed to cut off the net of qualifications. Even so, as was indicated previously, the Mādhyamika is not against reason as the faculty which denies a self, denies the alternatives, and so on, because this reason leads to the insight which realizes the absolute.

CONCLUSION

Now we must revert to the initial question : Who understands the four alternatives of the Buddhist texts ? It is easier to define the persons who do not understand : as was shown, they are the ones who do not want to understand, or are not confident of their own ability to understand. Besides, no one understands *the* four alternatives, but perchance one does understand the four alternatives in a disjunctive system, or the four alternatives applied to causation, or the four alternatives applied to existence. The four alternatives, disjunctively considered, constitute a preliminary orientation. The alternatives of causation, each denied, are a meditation with upholding of human reason with its inferences, definitions, and the like. The alternatives of existence, each denied, are a meditation with ultimate downgrading of human reason. Then to answer more along the lines of the way Candrakīrti writes : Whether one who understands arises or does not arise, "this true nature of *dharmas* abides,"—the *svabhāva* of that sort. So Chandrakīrti says in his *Prasannapadā* commentary on *Madhyamaka-kārikā*, chapter XV :

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By *svabhāva* one understands this innate nature, uncreate, which has not deviated in the fire in the past, present, and future; which did not arise earlier and will not arise later; which is not dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat of water, (one or another) of this side and the other side, long and short. Well, then, does this own-nature of fire that is of such manner (i.e., uncreate, not dependent) exist ? (In reply :) This (*svabhāva* of such sort) neith r exists nor does not exist by reason of own-nature. While that is the case, still in order to avoid frightening the hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such as 'It is *svabhāva*' and 'It is *dharmatā*') and say it exists.[65]

Notes

1. Tsoṅ-kha-pa's *Lam rim chen mo*, the sections 'Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real'. The four-alternatives discussion occurs in the 'Discerning the Real' section.
2. The passage is in the Tibetan Tanjur, photo edition vol. 103, pp. 39-4-8 to 40-2-2.
3. K.N. Jayatilleke, "The Logic of Four Alternatives". *Philosophy East and West*, 17: 1967): 82; hereafter cited as Jayatilleke "Logic".
4. Richard H. Robinson, book review of Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory, Philosophy East and West* 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1969): 72-81., see especially 75-76; hereafter cited as Robinson, book-review.
5. Richard H. Robinson, "Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna's System", *Philosophy East and West* 6, no. 4 (Jan., 1957): 291-308.
6. Richard H. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), pp. 50-58; hereafter Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika.*
7. G. Chataliasn, "A Study of R.H. Robinson's *Early Mādhyamika in India and China*", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1 (1972), section II, Logic and Argument, pp. 315-325.
8. Willard Van Orman Quine, *Elementary Logic* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 1-3.
9. Co nfer, Hermann Weyl, *Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 13; hereafter cited as Weyl, *Philosophy.*
10. Weyl, *Philosophy*, pp. 37-38.
11. Cornelis Verhoeven, *The Philosophy of Wonder*, trans. Mary Foran (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 38.

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12. Confer, Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (New York: Dover Publication, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 242-245.

13. Jayatilleke, "Logic", pp. 70-71.

14. Bernard Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1948), p. 125; hereafter Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*.

15. Confer in translation of the *Kathāvatthu*, *Points of Controversy*, by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids (London: Pali Text Society, 1915), pp. 155-156, where the term *saññā* is rendered 'consciousness'.

16. Jayatilleke, "Logic", p. 79.

17. *ibid.*, p. 82.

18. My rendition 'genuine' is close to the dictionary. Confer, the negative forms *atathya* ('untrue, unreal') and *avitatha* ('not untrue, not futile').

19. In translation, see J.W. de Jong, *Cinq chapitres dela Prasannapadā* (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1949), p. 27: "il a enseigné que ces agrégats, éléments et bases. . .sont vrais." Hereafter cited as de Jong *Cinq chapitres*.

20. D.J. Kalupahana, "A Buddhist Tract on Empiricism", *Philosophy East and West* 19, no. 1 (Jan., 1969): 65-67.

21. *The Essentials of Logic*, pp. 123-124.

22. See Franklin Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary*, p. 392, under *prātihārya*. Here the form *anuśāsanī* is used.

23. Tibetan Tanjur, photo edition, vol. 104, pp. 33-5-8 to 34-1-1: . . . 'phags pa Śā-ri'i bu la sogs pa daṅ/de las gzhan pa skal pa daṅ ldan pa.rnams kyi sems can gyi rgyud la gzigs nas cho 'phrul gsum bstan pas bsam pa ji lta ba daṅ/skal pa ji lta ba bzin du ñan thos kyi theg pa'i chos ñid ston ciṅ . . ./

24. I have summarized. In full translation, see de Jong, *Cinq chapitres*, pp. 27-28.

25. *Asanga*: *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṃkāra*, édité par Sylvain Lévi (Paris, 1907), p. 82.

26. Jayatilleke, "Logic", p. 82.

27. Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika*, pp. 56-57.

28. Edward J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha* (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1952), p. 146.

29. *The Expositor* (*Atthasālinī*), trans. Pe Maung Tin, edited and revised by Mrs. Rhys Davids, vol. 1 and 2 (London: Luzac & Company, 1958 reprint), 1 : 246; 2 : 318-319.

30. As cited by I.B. Horner, *Buddhist Texts Through the Ages*, ed. by Edward Conze (Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1954), pp. 68-69, and my summary.

31. Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 125.

32. Here translated from the Tibetan in the context of Tsoṅ-kha-pa's *Lam rim chen mo*, 'Discerning the Real' section.

33. For the various occurrences of the important verse, see Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commen-*

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taire de Candrakīrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. 4 (St-Pétersbourg, 1903-1913), p. 239.

34. Here I accept Matilal's correction of my earlier stated position; confer, Bimal Krishna Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), p. 148-149; hereafter cited as Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic and Grammar*. But now my understanding only partially agrees with his, to wit, "Dependent origination =Emptiness= Dependent designation= The Middle Way." Because I would say that as far as Nāgārjuna is concerned, dependent origination is the way things happen and that it is voidness, while the *dharmas* so arising are void, whether one recognizes this to be the case. But while his school designates dependent origination voidness, this is not what every other Buddhist sect does; and Nāgārjuna goes on to add that the act of so designating, when there is the dependence, is indeed the middle path. So it is not voidness that is designation.

35. Here I have taken suggestions from the context of the *Lam rim chen mo* when *MK* I, 1 is cited, and from the annotational comments of the Tibetan work called *Mchan bzi*.

36. T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1955), pp. 168-169.

37. Confer, David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1975), pp. 5, 46. For the theory of the Buddhist logicians as later expressed by Ratnakīrti, see Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I (London: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 1 : 158-159. This is a theory that 'efficiency' (*arthakriyākāritva*) can produce anything, and so a momentary, efficient entity is the 'other' from which something may arise. The stream of consciousness is held to be of this nature, with one 'moment' of consciousness giving rise to the next one. Hereafter cited as Kalupahana, *Causality*.

38. Murti, *The Central Philosophy*, p. 170, misused the term *asatkāryavāda* (for the correct usage, see below).

39. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, 1 : 320.

40. Dharmendra Nath Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism* (Agra: Agra University, 1964), p. 236.

41. See now Kalupahana, *Causality*, pp. 25ff. for a valuable discussion of the *svabhāvavāda* in connection with the ancient Materialist, and on p. 31 he admits for them the appelation 'non-causationists' (*ahetuvāda*).

42. The *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśila*, trans. by Ganganatha Jha, vol. 2 (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1939), pp. 887-888.

43. Cf. Jayatilleke, "Logic", p. 81; and K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1963), pp. 473-474.

44. While the verse in Sanskrit has the locative plural *dharmeṣu* rather than *vastuṣu*, Candrakīrti's commentary makes it clear that the latter word is intended, because he promptly talks of the fourteen *avyākṛta-vastūni* and does not mention any *dharma-s*; while in the Tibetan translation of the verse, instead of the standard

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translation for *dharma* (T. *chos*), one finds the term *dṅos po*, which is frequently used to translate *vastu*; confer, Takashi Hirano, *An Index to the Bodhicaryāvatāra Panjikā. Chapter IX* (Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation, 1966), pp. 273-276.

45. Edward J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963 reprint), p. 124, states that they are actually four, but become fourteen by stating them in different ways.

46. My translation 'should not infer' is for the Sanskrit *nohyate*. The verb *ūh-* has a number of meanings, including 'to infer'; and the latter meaning is more associated with the verb root when there is the prefix *abhi*, with such a form as *abhyūhya* 'having inferred'.

47. This conclusion, however, goes against various speculative solutions that have been advanced to determine particular schools to go with the various denials applied to existence, namely, those of Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 243ff.; Murti, *The Central Philosophy*, pp. 130-131; K.V. Ramanan, *Nāgārjuna's Philosophy* (Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1971), pp. 155-158. It is noteworthy that there is little agreement between these authors' solutions, and their arbitrariness itself stems from human reason, while to counter such positions Nāgārjuna would also have to use ordinary human reason.

48. *The Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra*, ed. E.H. Johnston (Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950), pp. 11-10; Confer, also Jikido Takasaki, *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga* (*Uttaratantra*) (Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1966), pp. 163-166.

49. Bosanquet, *The Essentials of Logic*, p. 129.

50. Murti, *The Central Philosophy*, p. 126.

51. Frederick J. Streng, *Emptiness; A Study in Religion Meaning* (Nashville, Tenn: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 149.

52. The passage is translated in the context of its citation in Tsoṅ-kha-pa's *Lam rim chen mo*. It is number 69 in A. Staël-Holstein, ed., *Kāsyapaparivarta*, (Commercial Press, 1926), but original Sanskrit is not extant for this passage.

53. Referred to in note 1, herein. There were many Tibetan controversies on this issue.

54. J W. de Jong, "The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka school", *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1972): 1-6.

55. The passage occurs in the Tibetan Tanjur, photo edition. vol. 98 pp. 151-2-3 to 151-2-7, immediately preceded by Candrakīrti's citation of *MK* XV, 1-2. I have translated it in *Lam rim chen mo* context.

56. While it is not possible to deal here with the many misconceptions in Ives Waldo, "Nāgārjuna and Analytic Philosophy", *Philosophy East and West* 25, no. 3 (July, 1975), one may observe that Candrakīrti's passage directly contradicts his remarks (p. 283) that the acceptance of 'relational conditions' (*pratyaya*) entails a denial both of *svabhāva* and of nonrelational 'significant events'. Because Candrakīrti accepts as does Buddhism generally the *pratyaya* in the causal chain

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of Dependent Origination, and yet he also insists here upon the *svabhāva* as well as on a significance (the *bodhisattva's* goal) that is perhaps nonrelational.

57. Jayatilleke, "Logic", p. 82.

58. Robinson, book review, p. 76.

59. This is well stated in the Tibetan language by Red-mda'-ba's *Commentary to Aryadeva's 'Four Hundred Verses'*, ed. Jetsum Rendawa Shonnu Lodo (Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, 1974), p. 170: "The form and variety of natures (*dharma*) are posited as different by dint of *saṃjhā* (notions, ideas), but not by reason of the own-form (*svarūpa*) of given things (*vastu*)—because all of them being illusory, it is not possible to distinguish their own-forms."

60. Matilal, *Epistemology, Logic, and Grammar*, pp. 162-167.

61. Frits Staal, *Exploring Mysticism* (London: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 45-47; hereafter cited as Staal, *Exploring Mysticism*.

62. Confer, Dhirendra Sharma, *The Negative Dialectics of India* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970), p. 94; note where the example illustrates the Vedānta authority (*pramāṇa*) called 'presumption' (*arthāpatti*).

63. For Nāgārjuna's classification of the two members, nos. 2 and 10, as *karma*, see, for example, A. Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination", *History of Religions* 10, no. 3 (Feb., 1971): 188. I have gone much more into the cause and effect (*hetu-phala*) side of the formula in my forthcoming "Dependent Origination—the Indo-Tibetan Tradition", special issue of *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*).

64. Staal, *Exploring Mysticism*, p. 47.

65. La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās*, pp. 263.5 to 264.4.

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INDEX

Abhidharma 203, 425-43; Sarvāstivāda tradition 271; temporality and consciousness in 425-43
Abhidarmakośa 425
Abhiññā (higher knowledge) 288, 290, 292, 294, 300
Abhisaṃdhi (veiled intention) 456-57
'Absolute Person', in Buber 161
Action, Philosophy of 169
Ādesana (mind reading) 456
Adhyāsa 239,
Advaita Vedānta 239, 352
Advaitin Brahman 447
Agamas, Chinese 294; Sanskrit 464
Aggañña Sutta 138-39
Akalanka 57, 76
Alagaddūpama Sutta 129
Analytic philosophy, Existentialistic and 121-33
Anāthapiṇḍika 446
Anātmavāda 310
Anātman, Buddhist concept of 267, 269, 271, 272, 275, 279, 284, 285, 316, 317
Anattā (no-soul) concept 128, 129, 131, 257, 260, 273, 311, 353; *dukkha* and 131
Anavatapta (*nāgarāja*) *paripṛcchā* 459
Anguttara Nikāya 291
Anicca 257, 273
Aniccaṁ (Temporality) 353, 354-55, 365
Anitya, doctrine of 269
Anumāna, see logic
Anuśāsana 456, 458
Arahant 145, 259, 445
Aristotle 58, 59, 60, 122, 271, 334, 416; Frege and, on Meditation 234-36 on Thought 234-36
Āryadeva 33, 38, 44
Asatkāryavāda 460
Āsavānāṃ Khayañāṇa 288
Āsravas 283
Atthasālinī 458
Atiśa 450, 451, 462
Ātma, Atman (self), Hindu concept of, 203, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 343, 352-53; and Brahman 203
Ātma parikṣā 316
Ātmavāda 316, 317; philosophy 310, 311
Attachment, self 405-406, 408
Attanā va jāneyyātttha (personal knowledge) 287, 291, 294, 296, 299, 301, 303
Aṭṭhakavagga 45
Augustine, St. 31, 309
Austin 122, 123
Avatāraṇa-abhi 457
Avidyā (ignorance) 4, 275, 358, 362
Aviṣaya 298, 299
Avyākata 268
Awakened-man 255, 262
Awakened, in Zen 183, 184; Nirvāṇa and 424
Awakening of Faith 190
Awareness of Self 88, 89, 92, 93
Ayer, A.J. 122, 289, 290

Baal Shem, Tov (founder of Hasidism) 163, 167
Bahm, Archie 257
Bakunin 371, 372
Barlingay 62, 71, 77, 79
Barth 25
Barua, Dr B.M. 67
Beckett, Samuel 38
Bentham, Marx on 142
Being, concept of 333, 334, 339; meaning

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

of 178-85; in Western metaphysics 180-81 nature of 273-74; mode of 388, 404, 405, 406, 408, 409, 413 and nothingness 173, 175, 177, 178; in ten stages 193-96; Truth and, in Heidegger, 172-175, 176 and *Sattvam* 345
Being and Nothingness 124, 339
Being and Time 333, 339, 351, 357, 358, 359
"Beings" over law of nature 385, 389
Berdyaev, N 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 364
Bergson 271, 332, 359, 362, 382
Berkeley 232
Bhagavadgītā 169
Bhāra-hāra 282
Bhattacharya, S. 62
Bhāva 274, 276 (see also entity)
Bhāvanga 274, 276
Bhāvaviveka 467
Birth 329, 330, 336
Blue Cliff Record 187
Bochme, Jacob 152
Bodhi Tree 185
Bodhicaryāvatāra 451
Bodhimārga-pradīpa-pañjikā-nāma 450
Boole 59, 60
Bosanquet, Bernard 451, 454, 456, 459, 461
Brahmā Sahampati 445
Brahma-jāla-Suttaṁ 330, 335, 455
Brahman, Brahmanism 272, 445, 446
Brahmvihāra 252
Brāhmaṇimantanika Sutta 294
British analytic traditions 121-23
Buber, Oriental religions and 149-71
Buddha, Dionysus against the 244-66 enlightenment 186; essentialism and absolutism in 273 on existence and death of a Tathāgata 458-59 first sermon 458, last sermon 457 ideal man for 145; on language (terms) 310-11; Nature 164, 165; silence on metaphysics 160, 251, 322; suffering and its elimination 127, 336, 347, 361, 458-59
Buddaghoṣa 337, 338, 458
Buddhānusmṛti-ṭīkā 456
Buddhism, *Catuṣkoṭi*, in early 464; characteristics of 273; defects of popular 136-38, 148; on Divine and Supramundane in 421-24; existence philosophy of 328-78 God and terminology in Thervāda 444-49; Government and economy in early 139-41; Marxism and, in Sri Lanka 134-48; message of 275; modernists and 288-89, 301, 302; philosophy of early 127-29; verification in early 290-99;
Buddhist, *anātma* tradition (ES) 234, 236 (*see* also *anātma*); evils in Sangha 137, 148, 148-b; texts 454; four alternatives in texts 450-72 nature of self 267-86
Burden Sutta 282
Bultmann 25
Bunam, Rabbi 168
Buytendijk 453

Cakkavattisīhanāda Sutta 139
Calculus, Predicate 69-72
Camus 260
Canon 344
Capital 142, 143
Carnap, R 63, 122, 289
Cārvāka 310, 320
Catuḥṣkoṭa members of 322
Catuṣkoṭi, in early Buddhism 33, 35, 450; kinds of 463-67
Causation, four alternatives 458-60; existence and, 450, 451
Cessation; *see nirodha*
Cetiyas, Stupas and, cult of 446
Chalabhiñña, 292, *see* also *abhiññā*
Chang-chi-Chen 166
'Chariot', Nāgasena's analogy of 311
Chuang-tzu 154, 157; *Way of* 155
Chandrakīrti 41, 42, 45, 317, 319, 320, 433, 456, 457, 463, 467
Chao-Chou, Master 187, 193
Chatalian 451, 452
Chi, R.S.Y. 71, 79, 452
Chi-tsang 190; doctrine of 193
Chih-Yueh-lu 191
"China and Us" 158
Cho, Tibetan 423, 424

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

Christ, the mediating being 233; Nietzsche on 7, 12
Christianity, Nietzsche on 6-8, 9, 12
Citta 310; Nibbana and 256; *see* also Thought
Citta Smatā 257
Clinging, *see Upadana*
Cognition, as factor 434-36, 438
Coincidentia Oppositorm, concept of 38-39
Communist society, 184-C
Confessions 309
Confucius 151; Lao-tzu and 342
Confucianism 158
Consciousness 238-39; cognition and 434-36, 438; as a dharma 436, 440; being in 410, 411; self-identity 88, 90-93, 128; Temporality and, in Ābhidharmika 425-43; *see* also *Vijñāna*
Conze, Edward 256, 259, 425
Corporeality, *see rûpa*
Cūla-Māluńkya Sutta 268, 285
'Culture Crisis' 387, 389
Cun-lun 42, 43
Cusanus, Nicolaus, Tautology in 30-53

Darwin 271
Dasein 329; Being of 173, 174, 175, 176
Daseinsanalytik 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 194
Dasgupta 460
De aequalitate 39, 40
Death, Nietzsche on 12-14
De divisione naturae 33
De Jong 463
De Martino, Richard 166
De Morgan 60; law of 58
Dependent Origination 463, 466
Der Satz Vom Grund 183
Descartes 122, 210; dualistic ontology of 226, 232, 233, 239
Desire 25, 252, 254; *see* also *Kama*
Destiny, form of dualism 103-104, 118-19
Detachment 408
Devas, in Thervāda 444, 445
Devātidera, God as 446
Dhamma, Dharma 5, 6, 186, 190, 269, 423, 424, 443, 446, 458 ideal 185, 186, 190; in *Madhyamakārikā* 465; as past, present and future 431-32, 434, 441; Supramundane as protectors of 422; temporal quality of 431-34
Dhamma-padam 336, 350
Dhammo, characteristics of Buddha, 328
Dharmadhātu 196
Dharmakirti 57, 76
Dharma-Sun, as the ultimate 461, 463, 465
Dharma Śūnyatā 343
Dharmottara 57, 76
Dhātu concept 312
Dialectical Semantics (DS) of Nāgārjuna 231-32, 237
Dialogues de Genesi 43
Diamond Sutra 191, 421
Dīgha-Nikāya 458
Dignāga 56, 57, 68, 69, 76, 310, 312
Dilthey, Wilhelm 153
Dionysus, 3, 30, 31-33; on Buddha 244-66
Disjunctive system, four alternatives in a 454-58, 465
Diṭṭhi 40, 41, 43, 251, 252, 259
Diṭṭhi-taṇha 251
Divine, Supramundane and, in Buddhism 421-24
Docta ignorantia, concept of 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 45
Dōgen 409
Dostoevski 16, 355, 371
Dṛṣṭānta (example) 67, 71-72
Dṛṣti (views) 283, 463
Dualism, in Zen 85
Dualistic ontology 226, 233
Dukkha, Dukkhaṁ, 251, 273, 296, 316, 336-37, 339, 353; *annattā* and 131; *see* also suffering

Ecce Homo 8, 244
Eckhart, Meister 30, 32, 37, 43, 344, 345-46 392, 401, 408; approach to language 35-37
Eclipse of God 161

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts 143
Economy, in early Buddhist period 139-41
Ego 97, 249; consciousness 86, 88-108; as illusion 130;
as object and subject 87, 88, 90-95, 99, 108; self 408
Egolessness (*anattā*), doctrine of 129-31
Ehipassika. actions of 287, 301, 302, 303
Eightfold Path 252, 257, 264, 329
Einstein 271
Emptiness (Śūnyatā), beings in 411, 412; in Mahāyāna 196; meaning of 398-99, 408, 409 Zen doctrine of 188; *see* also *Śūnyatā*
Engels 134, 147, 148 C
Enlightenment XXII, 411; of Buddha XXIV, 186, 293, 294; *see* also *Prajñā*
Entity, existence of 459, 462, 466; *see* also *Bhāva*
Epicurus 161
Eriugena J.S. 30, 33, 35, 38
Essay on Zen Buddhism 341
Essentialism, definition 334; Hegel's 351, 368, 370; Wittgenstein on 237
Essential Existence into the way of Sudden Awakening 188
Ethics 233
Existence, Buddhism and modern philosophies of 328-78; doctrine of momentary, 279; four alternatives applied to 460-63; usage 123
Extensional Semantics (ES) 205-15; atomic concept in 216-17, 218; dialectics in IS and 240-41; Intensional and 232-34; language of 215-22; subjects in 211-12, 215-16, 221
Existentialism and Analytic philosophy 121-33
Existenz pilosophie 365, 367

Fables of Hyginus 339-40
Feurbach, Ludwig 152, 402
Fire-nature 414-419
Four alternatives, as applied to existence 460-63, 465, 467; as applied to causation 458-60, 464, 465; denial of 460, 462, 463, 464, 466, 467; in a disjunctive system 454-58, 464; logic and 451-54
Four Noble Truths 44, 288, 291, 322, 458
Frankl, Victor 194
Freedom, in Dualism 103-104, 118-19; problems 355-56, 362, 370; complete, *see nirvāṇa*
Frege 59, 60, 62; on Mediation 234-36; on Thought 202-43
Fromm, Eric 142, 144, 148c, 194
Freud 23, 147
Freudian 194

Gandhi 169
Gangesopādhyāya 58
Gautama, poisoned-arrow analogy 81-82
Genjo- kōan 409
Ghose, Aurobindo 373
God, Christian identity of 23-27, 28, 29; concept of 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 10-12, 18-20, 23, 31-32, in early Buddhism 445-46; Nietzsche on 1-3, 4, 6, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16
Godhead, nothingness as 417
Godel, K. 289
Gotra-bhū 338
Gotama, *see* Buddha
Gottheit 43
Govinda, Lama 258
"Great Vehicle" 161
Grote, G 67

Hamlyn 302
Hasidism, Buber on 149, 151, 152, 157, 167, 168-70; image of humans in, 167, 168, 169; streams in 163
Hegel 24, 122, 142, 143, 194, 195, 271; dialectical mediation of 236
Heidegger 6, 24, 96, 103, 106, 271 on Transmetaphysical dialectics 172-185; Sartre and 350-63
Heisenberg 271
Heraclitus 154, 157, 173, 255, 271
Herzen 371

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

Herzl, Theo 150, 158
Hesse, Hermann 160
Hetu 66, 67, 68
Hetu-vidyā see Logic
Hindu, Hinduism, 152; ātma tradition in 234, 236
Hinweise 154
Hisamastsu, Shin'ichi 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 94, 101, 102, 167
Hitler 158
Hua-yen doctrine 193, 196, 267
Hui-neng 190
Hume, David 210, 217, 232
Husserl 210, 232, 368
Huxley, Aldous 151

I and Thou, philosophy of Buber, 153, 154, 155, 158, 160, 161, 166
Ichimura, Shohei 452
"Idea of the Good", doctrine of, 271
"Identity" crisis 129, 131
Ignorantiae 37
Imbalance, problem of 389
Impermanence, *see anicca*
Ingalls 62, 77
India, Buddhism as non-theistic in 421, 423; logic in 55-58
Indian Logic : Medieval School 67
Indriya-Saṃvara 288, 291
Innocence 19, 20, 21
Insight, *see Prajñā*
Instinct 382, 383, 388
Investigations 205, 237
Intensional Semantics (IS) 205-15, 222-30; anatomic concepts in 222, 223; dialectics in ES and 240-41; Extensional (ES) and 232-24; 'Is' concept 24, 26, 27; language of 222-30; subjects in 211-12

Jacobson 129
James, William 103
Jaspers, Karl 256, 330, 331, 332, 333, 341, 344, 348, 363-67; on Buddha and Confucius—Socrates and Jesus 342
Jastrow 323
Jayatilleke, K.N. 128, 288, 291, 292, 293, 295, 299, 300, 302, 451, 452, 453, 455 457, 464
Jewish mysticism, trends in 163
Jhānas 288, 291, 292
Jīva 272
Jñānaprasthana 433
Jñeyavarana, Kleśāvaraṉa and 324
Johannson 256
Jōseki, Gasan 404
Judaism, mysticism in 151
Jung 147
Jünger, Ernst 33, 348, 357

Kālavādins, alternative to 431, 433
Kalupahana, D.J. 288, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 298, 299, 300, 302, 433, 456, 460
Katyāyana, 459
Kaccāyan 464
Kamma 248, 252; *see* also Karma
Kanjmann 256
Kant, on Being 194, 220; concept of Thing 410; on existence 334, 335, 351, 368, 373; Philosophy of 6, 8, 9, 10, 13
Kārikās 43
Karma XXVII 283, 422, 466; doctrine of 137, 138; 358-63; forms of 283, 286
Karuṇā 284, 423
Kassapa, Kāśyapa, Buddha's discourse to 458, 459, 462, 464
Kāśyapa-parivarta 462
Kathāvatthu, Pali work 454
Kavana, Hasidic concept of 167-68, 169, 170
Keith, A.B. 62, 63, 77, 425
Kierkegaard, Soren 123, 124, 157, 332, 333, 337, 346-47; 369-370
Kilesas (defilements) 248, 264
Kitagawa, H. 62, 77
Kitarô Nishida 345; on Nothingness 367-71
Kleśāvaraṇa, Jñeyavarana and 324
Knowledge development of 383, 384; *see* also Pañchābhiññā; sixfold higher 293, *see* also *abhiññā*; subject and object of 107, 119; personal higher knowledge

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

287, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301, 303
Kōan 187, 191
Kokushi, Daitō 404
Kokushi, Musō 409
Kollan, John M. 433
Kṣanika-bhaṅga 279
Kṣaṇika-vādah, theory of 355
Kumārajīva 42
Kunst, Dr Arnold 62, 77

Labour, Marx on 144-45
Lokāyata School, on arising 460
Lakṣaṇas 264
Landaver, Gustav 35
Language, experience and 19-20
Laṅkāvatāra-Sutra 107-190
Laṅkāvatāra-Sutra 107, 190
Lao-tzu 154, 156, 157, 158, 166, 169, 170; Confucius and 342
Leib, Rabbi 169
Leibnitz 24, 122, 232, 348
Lenin 148 b
Liberation 246, 247, 261; in Buddhism 256; Nietzsche on 252, 253; *see* also *nibbāna*
Licchavi, Bhaddiya 287, 299
Lin-chi 11, 15, 16, 184
Ling To 445
Locke 232
Logic, four alternatives and 451-54; in Indian and Western tradition 54-79; influence of Mathematics on 59, 61; as a term 450; usage of 55
Logical positivism, verification in 290
Lokattaravādins 322
Lonergan 25
Lornez, Konrad 147
Lukasiewicz, Jan 59, 62, 77

Madhyamaka-Kārikā 356, 450, 455, 459, 461, 464, 465, 467
Mādhyamika, teaching 242; *catuṣkoṭi* in 33, 464; on entity 462; school 310, 317; tradition 202, 205, 271
Madhyamikas 315; *nirvāṇa* in 41, 44, 45
Maggid of Mazritch 163, 167, 168
Mahāli Suttaṁ 342
Mahāparinibbāna 447
Mahavibhāsā 431, 432
Mahāyāna tradition 3, 4, 27, 343; early Buddhism and 421-24; on images 423
Mahāyāna-Sutrālaṃkāra 457
Majjhima-nikāya 40, 287, 291, 297, 298, 299, 367
Malunkyaputta 268
Man, concept of God and 391-92, 394, 401, 402, 405; definition 83-85; machine and 385-86, 387, 389, 390; Marx's and Buddha's ideal 145-148a
Mao Tse-tung 148b, 148c
Marx 134, 137; on man 142.43, 145-48b; Labour 144; on revolution 148c-48d
Marxism 141-45, 148, 148a, 148b, 148c; Buddhism and, in Sri Lanka 134-48
Mara, study of 445, 446
Marcel, G. 331
Masaryk, Thomas G. 371
Materialism, Marx on 141-42, 146
Matilal, B.K. 62, 77, 465, 466
Ma-tsu Tao-yi, Master 191
Mature period, Indian logic in 156-57
Māyā-vādah 352
Mc Dermott 62, 77
Meditation in ES and IS 231-34; Christ being as 239-40; Superimposition as 238-39
Meditation 252, 268, 337; Aristotle and Frege on 234-36; as way to *Nibbāna* 447; *see* also Saññāvedayitanirodha
Meditations 210, 211, 233
Meetings 158
Mehring 147
Merton, Thomas 155
Metalogical incompatibilities 70-72
Metaphysics 270; Buddhist 273; place and function of 260, 261, 268
Methodological problem, studies on 58-62
Middle Path (*Majjhima*) 184, 185, 246, 248, 257, 258, 272; in ātma and anātma 202, 204; Nāgārjuna's 364, 365-66; in Zen

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

and Madhyamikas 190
Milinda, King 311
Mind, nature of 3-6, 14-15
Mittelbochdentsch 35
Mohanty, J.N. 62
Moksah (release) X, XIV, XVI, 362
Moment, aspects of, 255, 258, 259, 276-80
Moore 122
Morgan 271
Mounier, Emmanuel 334
Muchū Mondō 409
Mūlamadhyamakārikā 312, 316, 322, 323, 433
Murdock, Iris 125
Murti, T.R. 256, 315, 425, 460, 462
Mystical theology 31, 32
Mysticism 151, 152, 153, 162, 163
Myths, spirits and, in Thervāda 447-48

Nāgārjuna 41, 43-45, 188, 265, 271, 343, 346, 351, 352, 355, 356, 359, 364, 367, 460; on *Catuṣkoṭi* 464; on Causation Theory 459; on de-ontologization 276; Dialectical semantics and 231-33, 237; on four alternatives 450, 451, 452, 455, 457, 458, 459; Tautology in 30-53; on Thought 202-43; on Time 433, 441; Wittegenstein and 306-27
Nagasena 311
Nakamura, H. 452
Nāma-rūpa 251, 264
"*Name so atta*" 353
Nature, Law of, Man 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386
Nausea 124, 125
Nyaya, Navya, logic in Indian 57-58
Negation, in Buddhism and Nietzsche 259, 260; Wittgenstein and Nāgārjuna on 317-20
Neibuhr, Reinhold 166
Nevasaññāna-Sāññāyatana, Pali 454-55
Nibbāna 245, 246, 248, 252, 254, 256, 261, 265, 445; attainment of 296, 300; as goal in Thervāda 446, 447; ideal of, 148b; *see* also *Nirvāṇa*
Nidānam 355, 360
Nidanas (links) 248, 264
Nietzsche, Friedrich, on Buddhism and Christianity 245; doctrines of 244, 247; on logic 253; on Man 247-50; on Nothingness 348-50, 372; Zen and 1-17
Nihilism 2, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11-12, 16, 245, 246, 394, 395, 400, 401, 402, 403, 405; doctrines of 343, 351; problems of 356-58; Russian 371-72; *Śūnyatā* and 379-420; things in 410-411; thought as 260
Nikāyas 287, 288, 291, 292, 294, 296, 297, 298, 310, 464; Aṅguttara 291; Saṃyutta 295, 312
Nirodha 445, 459
Nirodha-Samapatti 252
Nirvāṇa 43, 45, 269, 291, 330, 337, 356, 369, 424, 461; in Abhidharmika 430, 436, 437, 438; in the Buddha 455; in Buddhist schools 40-41; as goal 40, 41; meaning in ancient India 20-21; as negative image of God 18-29; *Saṁsāra* and 26, 28, 33, 39, 41, 44-45, 163, 164, 165, 186, 242; *see* also *Nibbāna*
Nirvānic self-awakening of Zen 174, 185, 186, 190, 191, 192
Nishida, Schopenhauer and 369
Nishitani 166, 167
Non-aliud, conception of 39, 40
Nothingness 364, 366-67; Being and 173, 175, 177, 178, 186, 187, 188; Meaning of 173-76; *see* also *Suñyatā*
"No-soul" (*anatta*) doctrine 128
Nyāya 60; Buddhist studies on 62-64, 66; philosophy 460; realists (bāhyārthavāda) 310; literature 318; *see* also logic
Nyāya Darśana 55
Nyāyapraveśa 64, 72
Nyāya-Sautrāntika debates 317-318, 326
Nyāya Sutras, anumāna in 56, 75

Ontology, individual 273; in IS and ES 210; process 274; *Svabhavic* (self nature) 271
Ontological Difference of Heidegger 176, 177, 181, 182, 183, 185

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

Paccekabuddhas, concept of 447
Pali Canon, on God 445, 446, text 345; Thervāda Buddhism 444, 445. 446
Pañchābhiññā 292
Paññā 251, 252, 253, 257, 260
Paramārtha-Satya 461, 466, 467; Samvṛiti Satya and 43, 44, 321, 322
Pariṇamana-abhi 457
Parmenides 58, 173, 182, 232
Paryudāsa in *Catuṣkoṭi* 465, 466, 467
Path, *see* Middle Path
Patipādah (course) 302
Patisambhida-maggo 338
Pattica-Samuppādo 248, 358, 359, 360
Paul and Nietzche 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 15
"Person" concept 125-27; in early Buddhism 127-29; identity *see* pudgala
Pfeffer 256
Philosophy of Buddha 257; science and 381
Philosophy of Revelation 348
Philosophical Faith 344
Philosophical Investigations 306, 307
Pinhas, Rabbi, of Koretz 169
Pisarev 371
Plato 122, 210, 232, 271, 395, 406; critics of 6, 9, 10
Potthapada Sutta 310
Poussin 425
Prajñā 284, 315, 423; realization of 450-51
Prajnā-pāramitā 188, 369
Prajñāpāramitāśāstra 457
Prajnapati 272
Pramāṇa vāda Tradition 55
Prasajya type of negations 465
Prāsangika school, on causation and existence 464, 467
Prāsangika-Mādhyamika 462
Prāsangika-Svatantrika debates 317, 326
Prasannanapā 41, 45. 467
Pratipakṣa abhi 457
Pratītyasamutpāda 42, 43, 69, 283, 284, 451; concept of 279; meaning of 204, 208; Śūnyatā and 44
Pratiyogin (counter-positive) 318
Predication, concepts in Aristotle and Frege 205-208; 215-16, 218, 220, 225, 242
Present, Specious 277, 278, 279, 280
Proclus 38
Property concept 140
Proudhon 144
Pubbenivāsānussatiññā 288
Pudgala 272

Quine, W. 62, 210, 212, 216, 217, 220, 221, 322, 451, 452

Rahner 25
Rahula 251
Ramana Maharshi 362, 366
Ramakrishna, Sr. 152
Ramanuja 153
Randle, Herbert N. 62, 63, 77
Ratnagotravibhaga 461, 463
Ratnakīrti 57, 76
Ratnāvalī 323
Rddhi 456
Reason 406, field of 415, 417
Rebirth, concept of XXI, 160, 252, 283, 329, 393, 394, 445, 446, 447
Relational originations *see Pratityasamutpāda*
Religion, Science and 379, 380, 391; Buber on Oriental 149-70
Revenge 249, 250, 251, 253, 254
Revolutions, 148b, Marxist idea of 148b-148d
Rhys-Davids 310
Richardson 181
Rituals, in Popular Buddhism 137, 138, 148, 148b
Rinzai sect of Zen 166
Robinson, Richard H. 451, 452, 453, 457, 464
Roquentin, Antoines 37
Rosenzweig, Franz 157
Rūpa 283
Russell 62, 63, 122, 123, 212, 216
Russian Nihilism 371-72

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

Ryle 122, 123, 292, 295

Sabbasutta 456
Sādhaka 422
Sādhya 66, 67, 68
Sakka 444
Salvation 160, 163
Samādhi (concentration) 337, 445
Sāmaṃ Yeva dhammam abhiññāya (personal higher knowledge) 287, 291, 292, 294, 295, 296, 299, 300, 301, 303
Saṁkhāra-dukkha 250
Sāmkhaya-Yoga, on consciousness 429; on Nirvāṇa 436, 437
Sammā 257
Samma,-diṭṭhi 252, 257, 259, 261, 329; —*Samādhi* 258
Samsāra 283, 284; Nirvāṇa and 26, 28, 33, 39, 44, 323
Saṁskṛtadharma 432
Samtāna (continuum) 437
Saṃvṛtti 44, 461, 462, 466, 467; Paramārtha and 43, 44
Samyag-dṛṣṭi (right view) 458, 461; *see* also *dṛṣṭi*
Saṁyuttam 347; —Nikāya 331; 343; 458
Sañjāya 311, 320
Śankara, Sankarācārya, 153, 239, 315, 320
Saññā 455
Saññāvedayitanirodha 296, 300
Saṇtāna 274, 276
Sāntideva 453
Sāriputta, 194, 322
Sartre 124, 125, 166, 194, 195, 210, 211, 329, 331, 338, 339, 344, 371; Heidegger and 350-63
Sartre : Romantic Rationalist 125
Sarvāstivāda School 433, 434, 441; Vaibhāsika 280
Sassatavāda 272, *see also* substantialism
Satipatthana-Suttas 337
Satkāryavāda 460
Satori, experience of 166, 167, 184, 185, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194
Sattva 272
Sattva-Śūnayatā 343
Satyāgraha, of Gandhi 169
Sautrāntika 271, 310; on cognition 435; *Nirvāṇa* in 41
Scazzoso 32
Schayer, St. 62, 77, 315, 425, 432
Schelling 348
Schema, inference (Parārthānumāna) 64-70, 72
Schler, Max 355, 356; on soul-substance 373-74
Schlick, M 289
Schneider, Gerhard 39
Scholem, Gershom 149, 157, 163
Schopenhauer, Arthur 335, 336, 337, 338, 340, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350; Nishida and 369
Science of Logic 24
Scottus, Johannes 30, 35
Sein und Zeit 173, 174, 175, 178, 182
Self,-absolute 39; actualization in Zen 80, 81, 109; being 400; belief in 323; Buddhist nature of 267-86; expression in Zen 80, 81 knowledge in 130, 131; *see anātta*
Selfness 414, 415, 417; substance and 417-20
Semantics, 205; Aristotle's International (IS) 205-15, 222-30, 231-41; Frege's Extensional (ES) 205-15, 216-22, 231-44; Nāgārjuna's Dialectical (DS) 205, 231.
Sen, P.K. 62
Seng-tśan, third Patriarch of Chinese Zen 86, 103
Shastri, D.N. 460
Shestov, Leo Isokovich 372
Silesius Angelus 30, 183
Skandhas 282-83
Socialism, Marx and 145
Society and Man in Marx 148-a
Socrates 346
Soto sect of Zen 166
Soul, Jiva, 272;—substance, Scheler on 373-74
Spinoza 122; ontological monism of 229, 230, 232, 233
Spirits, myths and, in Thervāda 447-48
Srāvakyāna 456

Digitization by Arya Samaj Charitable Foundation, Chennai

Sri Lanka, Buddhism and Marxism in 134-148-d
Srī-Mālā Sūtra 190
Stace, W.T. 151
Stall, J.F. 62, 71, 77, 79, 465, 466, 467
Stcherbatsky 62, 63, 77, 315, 425
Storr, Anthony 147
Stranson, P.F. 123, 312
Strawson 123
Strong, Frederick J. 460, 471
Stūpas, Cetiyas and, cult of 446, 448
Subject, concept of 412, 413, 414;—object consciousness 87, 88, 99, 100, 101, 102
Substance, concept of 412, 413, 414, 417, 418; selfness and 417-20
Substantialism 272; non-272
Seinsdenken, Heidegger's 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184, 190, 195, 196
Suffering 246, 247, 248, 250, 252; Buddha on 40, 460; first Noble Truth 458; see also *Duḫkha*
Suññata 344
Śūnya, Śūnyatā, Śūnya-vāda XXVII, 26, 27, 202, 238, 239, 240, 242, 269, 317, 344, 349, 350, 351, 367, 368, 460; definition of 40, 41-42, 45, 398; Nihilism and 379-420; *see also* Emptiness
Supramundane, Divine and, in Buddhism 421-24
Sūtrālaṃkāra 457
Suttanipāta 298
Suzuki, Daisetz T. 85, 86, 101, 106, 107, 108, 165, 166, 341
Svabhāva (self-nature) 189, 271, 463, 467, 468; concept of 312, 313, 319
Svatantrika School, of Madhyamika on Causation and Existence 464, 467

Ta-chu Hui-hai, Master 188, 190
Tagore, Rabindranath 149, 150
Takakusu 425
Taṇhās (thirsts) 248, 251, 264
Tautology, in Cusanus and Nāgārjuna 30-53
Tao, Taoism, Buber on 149, 151, 153-57, 159, 170 Heidegger on 341; True man of 16, 24, 173, 186, 192, 193, 197
Tathāgata 190, 268, 310, 451; on doctrines 457, 458
Tathāgata-garbha thought 190
Tattva-cintāmaṇi 58
Teaching of Tao 154, 155, 158
Temporality 362; consciousness and, Abhidharmika 425-43; meaning of 428; subject and 429-31; time and 424-25; *see* also *aniccaṁ*
Ten Commandments 9
Té-Shan, Master 191
Tevijasutta 445
Thervāda Buddhism 322, Andhaka and, on meditation 452-55; on Candrakīrti's commentary 457; myths and spirits in 447-49 as transpolytheistic 446; Western terms in 44-449
Third World, Marxist influence on 135
Thomas, Edward J. 282, 457
Thought, in IS 208-209; Nāgārjuna, Aristotle and Frege on 202-43
Tibet, Buddhism as non-theistic in, 421, 423
T'ien-tai doctrine 193, 196, 267
Tillich, Paul 25, 195
Time, Dharma and, in Abhidharma texts 431-34; temporality and 424-25, 428
Tolstoy, Leo 371
Toulmin, Stephen 71
Tractatus 237
Transcendent, one 293, 299; self, in Heidegger 176, 178, 192
Transmetaphysical dialectics, Heidegger and Zen on, 172-201
'Triple World' in Zen 3, 4, 5, 17
Troelsch, Ernst 152
Tṛṣṇā 281
Truth (s) Being and, in Heidegger 172-73; Reason and 176; Two (*Samvṛtti* and *Paramārtha*) 43, 44 ; Ultimate 464
Tson-kha-pa 452; on four alternatives 462, 466
T'ung-an, Master 191

Ucchedavāda *see* substantialism

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Udayana 57
Uddālaka Āruṇi 353
Uddyodaka 57
Unmattāka in Buddhism 248
Upādāna 281, 283, 286
Upahvya rite 444
Upaniṣads 331, 335
Upāya 423
Upāyakauśalya, Thervādin 446

Vaccha 40
Vādi Devasūri 57, 76
Vaibhāsikas, *nirvāṇa* in 41
Vaiśeṣika, philosophy 460; school 67
Vajrayanist Thought on images 423
Van Buren, Paul M. 314
Vanneste, Jean 32, 47
Vasubandhu 425, 456
Vātsyāyana 57
Vedānta, Hindu 164
Venh 59
Verification, logical positivism, 287-305; *see* also *ehipassika*
Viddyābhūsana, Dr S.C. 62, 67, 68, 69, 77
Vienna Circle, thinkers of, 289, 301, 302
Vagrahavyāvartanī 43, 312, 318
Vijñāna 283; *see* also consciousness
Vijñānavādah School 365
Vijñaptimātratā-siddhiḥ 365
Vipāka 276, 286
Vissuddhi-maggo (purification) 292, 337, 338
Void, *see* Śunyatā
Vom Wesen des Grundes 177

Wahl, Jean 367
Waismann, F 289
Warren 40
Weyl, Herman 451, 452, 453
Wheel of Life, see *Saṃsāra*
Whitehead, Alfred 270, 271, 278
Wijeysekera OH. de A 138
Will, basis of consciousness 368; in Buddhism 22-24
Will to Power, by Nietzsche, 1, 12, 14, 15, 16, 22, 249, 253, 254, 255, 259, 261, 348, 350
Wittgenstein 122, 123, 205, 216, 237, 269, 295, 303; on language and words 307-309, 311-13; Nāgārjuṇa and, on error 306-27
Wu, meaning of 187
Wu-wei, concept of 156, 158, 159, 169
Wu-men-kuan 187

Yab-Yum, form of images, 423
Yogācāra, doctrine of 193
Yung-chia 87
Yukti-saṣṭikā 45
Yun-men, Master 186-87
Yu and Wu, Zen dialects of 186-90, 191, 192

Zarathustra 8, 9, 12, 245, 253, 261
Zarathustra 253, 255, 258, 259
Zen Buddhism 367; on Emptiness and Being 187; Hasidism and 161-64; language of 186-87; Man's nature in 80-120; Nietzsche and 1-17; as Oriental religion, by Buber, 149-70; Taoism and 165-67; on transmetaphysical dialectics 185-201
Zeo Koans 362
Zenkovsky, V.V. 371, 372
Zone 59
Zionism 149-50



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